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Preface
My Lewis Henry Morgan lectures were first given at the Department 
of Anthropology at the University of Rochester in 1979 and then 
expanded in the early 1980s with the intention of publishing them. 
However, they overflowed the original lectures, and I left them un-
published. Now, at the kind suggestion of the Morgan Lecture Series 
editor, Professor Robert Foster, I have returned to the expanded type-
script that grew out of the original lectures and have shortened the 
text. I hope it is clearer as well. I have not tried to bring it right up 
to date, since the gap between medical anthropology then and now is 
too great. However, I trust the themes I looked at then will still be of 
interest.
First, some background: I came into medical anthropology from ini-
tial medical training and a few years’ experience of hospital practice in 
Britain’s National Health Service. Social anthropology had long attract-
ed me. What was it like to be ill in a society with no access to the sort 
of medicine I had been trained in? The contrast lured me and seemed 
to be a question that medical anthropology should try to answer be-
fore it was too late. I owe the quotation in my first chapter from Sir 
Thomas Browne to Mervyn Susser and William Watson (1962). Browne 
(1977) so eloquently expressed the question: Has there been progress in 
medicine? With Lewis Henry Morgan’s Ancient society ([1877] 1964) in 
mind, this seemed perhaps a fitting theme.
In global terms of human survival, life expectancy, and demographics, 
progress has been made; however, in Part I, “Being ill,” the first chapter 
raises some doubt about the specific role of medicine in that progress. 
In any case, medicine is concerned not just with life expectancy and 
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demographics but also with the illnesses of individuals and providing 
them with care in their illness.
The other chapters of Part I describe what it was like to be ill in a 
Sepik village in New Guinea: first in 1968–1969 and then about fifteen 
years later. Rauit was the village in the West Sepik District (now called 
Sandaun Province) where I lived with my wife Ariane and our toddler 
son for two years. The people in Rauit and two other villages were identi-
fied as speakers of a distinct language called Gnau, derived from its word 
for no. I had medical supplies suitable for a village health post supplied 
by the public health service. I provided medical advice when the villag-
ers asked for some, thus altering the situation, but I thought it would be 
wrong not to offer to help when I was able to. Care provided by nonkin 
or strangers raised various problems of trust and compliance; some of 
these problems are tackled in later chapters of this book. I aimed to ob-
serve and record as far as I could all the responses to illness that occurred 
in the village where we lived.
To observe and understand local experiences were the descriptive 
goals of my first period of fieldwork. What were the environmental and 
medical problems faced in that particular setting, and what did locals do 
about them? The collection of data came before any particular explana-
tory theories. At the time, few studies were devoted to medical anthro-
pology, either ethnographically or in anthropological theory. In chapter 
2, I try to describe examples from the range of illness and responses to 
them as seen by the outside observer, bearing in mind that it is easy to 
neglect common minor ailments in favor of paying attention only to ill-
nesses that demand more serious and dramatic responses. In chapter 3, I 
focus on the experience of suffering a long illness and on understanding 
the subjective experience of isolation, dependency, and rejection, of be-
ing unable to take part in ordinary activities and social life. But do others 
always recognize an obligation to help? Blame for illness and the justice 
or injustice of suffering are issues that raise questions.
The fifteen years that elapsed between my first fieldwork and the 
events described in chapter 4 included the advent of national independ-
ence and changes in the organization of national and local health ser-
vices. These changes involved some loss of village self-reliance. From the 
villagers’ point of view, there were doubts about whether to trust the care 
provided by unrelated outsiders: What could be the possible motives for 
their intervening?
Part II, “Recognizing and defining illness,” is about how to differ-
entiate the particular focus of medical anthropology. It begins with a 
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chapter on leprosy. The naming of an illness is not straightforward; the 
story of leprosy provides a lesson in the possible hazards of identifying 
the same illness in different societies. As an example of the power of 
labels to stigmatize, “leprosy” also has a long history. In the next three 
chapters, I argue for the definition of disease itself as critical in medi-
cal anthropology, both for distinguishing its distinctive scope and for 
conducting comparative studies. Doubts about the relevance of West-
ern medical categories for comparative social studies of illness emerged 
as medical anthropology developed. Alternative modes of thought had 
long been a lively subject for investigation in social anthropology, es-
pecially after Lucien Lévy-Bruhl ([1910] 1923) suggested the idea of 
prelogical thought, but E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1937) showed the co-
herent logic behind a radically different view of causality. Distinctions 
between fact and value, particularly between medical facts and social 
values, were being challenged in the sociology of medicine. Discus-
sions of truth versus belief and the verification or falsification of fact 
and theory in science became relevant. Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) studies 
of changing paradigms in the history of science reinforced theoretical 
doubts about the objective and authoritative status of medical and sci-
entific facts. History bore witness to the social relativity and changing 
nature of accepted ideas.
Illness could be seen as a form of social deviance. Strong and weak 
forms of relativism were proposed in medical anthropology and, more 
generally, in social anthropology at large. Within social anthropology, 
questions of translation and understanding another mode of thought 
were prominent. Fieldwork in the tradition of Bronisław Malinowski 
requires a proper grasp of the local language. How could translation and 
understanding be possible if there were no bridgehead of true assertions 
about a shared reality? Claude Lévi-Strauss held that our common hu-
manity and our shared endowment of senses guarantee we see and speak 
about the same objective world ([1950] 1966: xxv, xxix). The Melanesian 
of this or that island is a person I might have been: anyone could be 
anybody. I might have spoken his or her language and used the same 
modes of thought.
The objective reality of disease putatively sets up a basis or independ-
ent point of reference in medical anthropology for comparing differ-
ent responses, even though it is no simple matter to specify their exact 
scope and boundaries. Medicine is concerned with responses to many 




In other societies, traditional frameworks within which illness is ex-
plained clearly persist; the challenge for us is to understand their as-
sumptions. We must grasp the underlying notions of what is normal 
and possible. Many of these had and still have meaningful connections 
to moral and religious beliefs. But the encounter with modern change 
and introduced biomedicine can upset these connections. Part III, “The 
experience of change,” embarks on comparison by shifting to an African 
setting. An earlier chapter suggested that the leprosy of Biblical times 
changed from being a matter of priestly rules, taboos, and exclusion to 
a matter of atonement for sin or guilt; much more recently, the label of 
leprosy metamorphosed to refer to a problem for secular medicine to 
treat. This could be regarded as the medicalization of a religious and 
moral matter. The beginnings of an analogous shift in understanding 
and approach are the subject of the chapters on Bregbo, witchcraft, and 
depression. Chapter 9 describes the healing center of Bregbo in Côte 
d’Ivoire and its prophet healer Albert Atcho. Bregbo is a community 
of suffering. Atcho explained why some individuals prosper and oth-
ers fail by proposing a new morality more adapted to the demands of 
encroaching urban life. His clients came to him with problems of infer-
tility, childbirth, unhappy marriages, dreams of jobs and urban success, 
and ambitions they could not realize. Atcho called himself a healer and 
received official recognition as such. He preached a new understanding 
of the individual’s own responsibility for his or her suffering; for some, 
he provided treatment through confession and, for others, care in a com-
munity of like sufferers.
Considerable continuities exist between the old persecutive under-
standing of witchcraft and Atcho’s new emphasis on personal respon-
sibility and guilt. Opinions shifted among different observers about 
whether or not to see what Atcho did as treating witchcraft or as prac-
ticing a form of emerging psychotherapy and community care. After 
reading about Bregbo, I was introduced to Margaret Field’s (1960) study 
of an Ashanti shrine, published fifteen years before I learned about 
Bregbo. Many of the case histories and treatments were astonishingly 
similar. Field was first an anthropologist, later completing her train-
ing as a psychiatrist. She returned and studied a large sample of clients 
coming to the Ashanti shrine. She considered many of the women who 
complained of witchcraft to be clinically depressed or mentally ill. Her 
medical training gave her a different perspective on the problems about 
which the women spoke. Was this difference purely a question of psychi-
atric bias and different frames of understanding? Or was recognition of 
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the prevalence of mental illness at stake? Psychiatric illness poses special 
problems of criteria and evidence in cross-cultural diagnosis. 
Chapter 11, which focuses on the impact of events, considers wheth-
er the stress of change and adaptation to new circumstances affected the 
prevalence of illness and inclined priests or leaders of cults toward heal-
ing as their special activity. In practice, shifting views invite ambivalence 
and ambiguity. Past modes of thought are not simply repudiated.
Part IV, “Treatment,” begins by examining healing actions in chap-
ter 12. I discuss verbal techniques and moral persuasion, drawing on 
many insights in the literature to explain Atcho’s healing work. Pierre 
Janet’s (1919) monumental studies of suggestion and persuasion (as in 
both religious healing and psychotherapy) are especially relevant. He 
emphasized the personal qualities of the healer who provides moral 
direction and examined the power of the healer’s personal relationship 
to the patient to influence or even restructure someone else’s self-
understanding. Not only does the healer provide the patient with sup-
port but also with an explanation and meaning for the experience of 
illness. The effects of repeated one-on-one interviews in molding an 
eventual public confession were apparent in the Bregbo community. 
Janet did not neglect the crucial role of the community that encour-
aged the patient with their support and expectations. Care, rest, and 
support not only cure but also make up a significant part of the heal-
ing treatment.
Returning to Gnau, it was clear that villagers demonstrated support 
very differently than Westerners do. Their initial approach was to pro-
vide a protective isolation of the patient; this could even go to harm-
ful lengths in cases of protracted illness. Behind their approaches were 
particular ideas about the causes and dangers of illness. They also had a 
repertoire of substances, actions and gestures, spells, spittings, and invo-
cations to use in healing. Most of these actions were brief and did not 
seem to require any intense personal rapport. But when someone impor-
tant to the villagers seemed to be seriously afflicted, then a more com-
plex and elaborate performance could be organized, sometimes involving 
nearly the entire village. The ritual healing took the form of symbolic 
enactment, almost like a theatrical performance, in which the presumed 
cause of the illness, taking the form of a mask or contrived image, was 
brought into the village, honored, presented to its victim, entreated, and 
finally sent away or “killed.” The villagers symbolically made visible the 
cause, its placation, and its ending in a form of make-believe. Chapter 13 
describes one such treatment, the performance of Panu’et. The appendix 
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at the end of the book transcribes in detail exactly what participants said 
and how they behaved during one particular Panu’et performance.
My final chapter, “Faith and the skeptical eye,” focuses on belief and 
questions of efficacy. Healing activities can have various functions even 
when causality (in our terms) is not certain. In hopes of relief, a great 
variety of treatments may be tried. Some people are ready to believe in 
miracles; for others, experience brings skepticism. Different aims and 
different expectations guide judgment. Questions of therapeutic effica-
cy—of cause and effect—are almost always difficult to answer. Compli-
ance normally requires a willingness to believe a treatment might work. 
People may also question whether to trust someone else’s judgment, skill, 
or knowledge or whether to accept what has been done in the past. The 
shared beliefs and opinions of people in one’s own community, as well 
as the advice of specialist authorities, potentially carry great influence.
The sufferer’s view of success or failure is not always the same as the 
outside observer’s view. They do not necessarily judge by the same cri-
teria or have the same hopes and expectations. The anthropologist may 
wish to go beyond observation to analyze people’s activities and attempt 
to account for the outcome. Lévi-Strauss’s essay on the Kuna shaman’s 
chant for a woman in protracted labor is a famous example of this. But if 
an anthropologist explains success or failure in the terms of an external 
observer, he or she implicitly has to choose and justify the standards 
used. For an obstetrician (as for other medical specialists), the diagno-
sis and prognosis are vital for judging evidence of an effect. Follow-up, 
numbers, and records of failure and success would normally be expected 
in Western medical practice. Should anthropologists adopt different 
standards because the people observed do likewise? Anecdotal evidence 
is not enough.
Belief is not necessarily an all-or-nothing matter. Nor is allegiance to 
a single type of treatment a general rule. Pluralism rather than a mono-
lithic adherence to one method and one truth better characterizes many 
practices in treating illnesses. The distress that can arise from demands 
for unswerving belief is illustrated by the predicament of a New Guin-
ean pastor I knew who fell ill and had to choose between the local health 
service approach and a ritual treatment based on the non-Christian be-
liefs and traditions of his people. It posed a moral dilemma for him, re-
vealing the subjective problems engendered in outlooks and beliefs that 
are undergoing change.
Franz Boas (1966) recorded the experience of ambivalence vividly 
described by Quesalid in recalling his own initiation to shamanism as his 
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belief changed into skepticism. Likewise, in relation to Gnau treatments 
involving the extraction of malevolent arrows, we may ask about the sin-
cerity of individual actors’ belief in the actual or the symbolic efficacy of 
what they did. Issues of doubt and skepticism affected attempts to man-
age the treatment of leprosy in the village. People were less than ready 
to voice their opinions and doubts or to comply with the new treatment 
regimes demanded of them.
The treatment of leprosy brings out the impact of prognosis and tim-
ing on perceptions of cause and effect. According to Leviticus, the priest 
could decide on an uncertain diagnosis of this illness by whether the 
signs had changed after seven days or, in certain circumstances, after 
waiting another seven days. But the pace and nature of change in the 
signs of what is now meant by “leprosy” have none of those character-
istics. Signs take far longer to change. On questions of cause and effect, 
knowledge of the facts about diseases may become relevant to explana-
tions and judgments of efficacy, but for the sufferer, other criteria, such as 
considerations of care, familiarity, and safety, may matter more.
1
Part i: being ill
This part describes illness and the range of local responses to it in a small 
New Guinean village I observed during my first period of fieldwork in 
1968–69. At that time, the village was difficult to reach and had rela-
tively little exposure to introduced Western biomedicine. The villagers 
had to meet a diverse range of medical problems largely reliant on their 
own resources.
To shed light on local illnesses and treatments, I show how villagers 
responded both to the small ailments of daily life and to serious sick-
ness. Two contrasting cases are described in detail: one of acute panic 
and community response, the other of long suffering and gradual aban-
donment. They raise questions about care and their perceptions of the 
justice or injustice of suffering. During a later field trip fifteen years later, 
after national independence, access to health centers and aid posts had 
changed. It involved some loss of village self-reliance and raised prob-
lems for the residents in understanding the obligations and motives of 
the new health providers.
I begin with a brief review of the history and evolution of disease in 
order to ask what has been the role of human responses to illness in the 





Hesiod’s poem “Works and days” tells the story of Pandora’s box, the 
great grave jar from which misfortune was let loose upon the world. Ills 
came silently while hope remained shut up inside it. Prometheus stole 
fire from Zeus, who in anger planned for grief to come to humans:
Till now in peace all the days of the earth had run;
The tribes of men had been saved from the toil that drives,
And disease that flings the swarming Fates on our lives.
But Pandora lifted the jar’s great lid, and then
Its plagues were scattered abroad, with mischief for men.
Only hope remained, entrapped for evermore. (Hesiod, in Higham 
and Bowra 1938: 132)
It was the loss of a Golden Age when people had been free from toil, 
suffering, and disease. Similarly, in the story of Adam and Eve’s fall, 
a paradise was likewise lost. Since then, have people changed or is it 
diseases that have changed? This was the question to which Sir Thomas 
Browne gave an answer in his “Letter to a friend,” written around 1656:
Some think there were few Consumptions in the Old World, when 
Men lived much upon Milk; and that the ancient Inhabitants of this 
Island were less troubled with Coughs when they went naked, and 
slept in Caves and Woods, than Men now in Chambers and Feather-
beds. Plato will tell us that there was no such Disease as Catarrh in 
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Homer’s time, and that it was but new in Greece in his age. . . . Some 
will allow no Diseases to be new, others think that many old ones are 
ceased; and that such which are esteemed new, will have but their 
time. However the Mercy of God hath scattered the great heap of 
Diseases, and not loaded any one Country with all: some may be new 
in one Country which have been old in another. New Discoveries of 
the Earth discover new Diseases: for besides the common swarm, 
there are endemial and local Infirmities proper unto certain Regions, 
which in the whole Earth make no small number: and if Asia, Africa, 
and America should bring in their List, Pandora’s Box would swell, 
and there must be a strange Pathology. (Browne 1977: 399)
This could almost be the justification for a medical anthropology.
In Ancient society, Lewis Henry Morgan saw human history differ-
ently from Hesiod’s grim view of a decline from a Golden Age to an Age 
of Iron: Morgan saw progress not decline. He worked “to bring forward 
additional evidence of the rudeness of the early condition of mankind, 
of the gradual evolution of the mental and moral powers through experi-
ence, and of their protracted struggle with opposing obstacles while win-
ning their way to civilization” (Morgan [1877] 1964: 11). He followed 
two lines of investigation: first, into the “great sequence of inventions 
and discoveries which stretches along the entire pathway of human pro-
gress”; second, into the development of certain social institutions from a 
“few primary germs of thought.” To have survived or not is a matter of 
the facts: it is the criterion of success according to the theory of natu-
ral selection. By that criterion, the human species has been successful: 
the species has progressed from being rare to numbering in the millions 
today.
We inherit our genes and with them various potentialities and sus-
ceptibilities. People can find food in very different environments, obvi-
ously an advantage for survival. “We eat all sorts of things,” a New Guin-
ean man said to me with a cheerful laugh. “You White people choose 
only the good things to eat, you haven’t got strong teeth to eat the things 
we do, you can’t chew up the bones.” But though physiological versa-
tility and flexible development are vital to adaptation, the evolutionary 
mechanism is genetic. Genes are the basis of characteristics that will 
potentially be shown by the organism in any environment in which it is 
able to develop. The genome remains the same whatever the conditions 
in which the individual organism grows to maturity. Acquired charac-
teristics do not alter the genome. Indeed, it is fortunate that this is so, 
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since most acquired characteristics in nature are the consequence of in-
jury, starvation, disease, or senescence; only a minority are adaptive. The 
inheritance of naturally “acquired characters” would more likely lead to 
a deterioration of a species rather than to adaptive advantages (Maynard 
Smith 1966). The paradox of social evolution, Lamarckian though it is, 
is that we tend to assume the opposite and suppose that the changes 
we choose to make are improvements—progress rather than deterio-
ration—because people have exercised choice, as though what people 
choose and like must naturally be good for them. When people can 
change their environment through choices and by means of skills they 
learn, the effects may last, significantly changing the conditions to which 
their children and descendants must adapt. In this sense, perhaps the ef-
fects of acquired characteristics will be inherited and may lead to genetic 
change in the long term.
Adaptive fitness is decided in a particular habitat here and now; na-
ture pays no regard to a hypothetical future. However, the fate of any 
population will depend not only on the particular environment in which 
it lives now but also on whether it will be able to tolerate change. If we 
introduce time and speculation about the future, we alter the basis for 
deciding about fitness for survival. In retrospect, adaptations that were 
favorable in the short term may prove unfavorable in the long run. Peo-
ple can alter their behavior to benefit by learning from the experience 
of others; learned behavior leaves open a possibility for future change 
despite present choices. In this lies the human species’ great potential-
ity: the diversity of cultures. In comparison with other species, human 
behavior is less fixed, more guided by reason, and more flexible to change 
and new circumstances.
Diseases in history
Evolution and biological adaptation provide some answers about dis-
ease change and human progress. History certainly supports Browne’s 
observation that “new discoveries of the earth discover new diseases.” 
The distribution of infectious diseases has played a significant part in the 
peopling of continents and historical events. In his survey of the global 
role of infectious diseases through the ages, William McNeill (1976) 
identified the major disease pools and their spread through encounters 
and intermingling among people through war, conquest, trade, and pil-
grimage, following links between town and countryside, disseminating 
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to different city-states and countries, and crossing mountain ranges and 
oceans. The ability to survive or the tragedy of succumbing to new dis-
eases mark the history of contact, conquest, and colonization.
Diseases acted as barriers to the expansion of the Chinese beyond 
their southern frontiers. To the south lay fertile lands with a warm, wet 
climate, but to settle and thrive there, the invaders needed to accom-
modate to new endemic diseases and heavy parasite loads. Epidemics 
have provoked political instability and wreaked catastrophic effects on 
numerous populations. The conquest of Mexico is a notorious example 
of epidemic decimation. The exchange of diseases between the Old and 
the New World was not equal. The Old World had adapted to certain 
illnesses through gradual exposure over the millennia attendant upon 
contacts between Asia and Europe, the impact of the Mongol Empire, 
the Black Death, the effects of expanding communication, and trade by 
sea and by land. By contrast, the New World and Oceania were con-
fronted with the sudden transoceanic introduction of diseases from the 
Old World, with catastrophic consequences. Few if any truly isolated 
societies now remain.
After an epidemic wreaked its toll, a gradual equilibrium tended to 
emerge, with the populations becoming less vulnerable to disastrous epi-
demic diseases. They entered a new era of disease proliferation when the 
balance changed from epidemic to endemic patterns. By the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, populations in Europe began to grow. As 
McNeill (1976: 210) points out, “Europe’s expansion is such a central 
fact of modern history that we are likely to take it almost for granted and 
fail to recognize the quite exceptional ecological circumstances that pro-
vided sufficient numbers of exportable (and often expendable) human 
beings needed to undertake such multifarious, risky, and demographi-
cally costly ventures.” In the complex of factors sustaining Europe’s ex-
pansion, McNeill argues that the altered pattern of infectious disease 
was of key significance.
The identification of causes of change
The rise of human populations is a sign of adaptive success of the species. 
In modern times—the last three centuries—an unprecedented sustained 
rise in the world’s population has taken place. Assessing the contribu-
tion of medicine to this population change requires going beyond con-
jecture. Often facts are missing or impossible to recover. In The modern 
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rise of population, Thomas McKeown (1976) summed up his research on 
the role of medicine. His identification of various causes for the decline 
of mortality in England and Wales was influential, creating something 
of “a conceptual revolution in the disciplines of history and medicine, 
overturning a long-standing general orthodoxy regarding the impor-
tance of medical science and the medical profession in bringing about 
the decline in mortality which accompanied industrialization in Britain” 
(Szreter 1988: 2). Any orthodoxy is likely to elicit critical reappraisal. 
McKeown argued that conjecture is not of much value without reliable 
evidence. He proposed instead a method of deduction based on explicit 
evidence by applying reasoning and current medical knowledge to a de-
tailed series of national death records from the past. His analysis was 
original and persuasive.
McKeown found that, from 1838 onward, new rules of personal reg-
istration in England and Wales provided national records from which 
population size, birth rate, death rate, and causes of death could be calcu-
lated. These figures made it possible to discover reasons for the increase 
in population that occurred. From his examination of the records, McK-
eown concluded that the rise represented a decreasing death rate rather 
than an increasing birth rate. He found that the decline of mortality was 
due chiefly to the reduction in deaths from infectious diseases. Between 
the period of 1848–54 and 1971, 26 percent of the drop in mortality was 
due to a reduction in noninfectious mortality, but the largest propor-
tion—74 percent—was due to fewer deaths from infectious diseases. To 
interpret this finding, McKeown looked for when, to what extent, and 
which specific infections declined. Not all infectious diseases declined 
uniformly, since different kinds of such illnesses existed, each with its 
own characteristics and particular history. We know that airborne dis-
eases, for instance, display different potentials for exposure, risk, spread, 
communicability, and chances of control as compared to diseases that 
are waterborne or foodborne. McKeown drew graphs of the decline in 
death rates over the study period from each particular kind of disease, 
indicating exactly when an effective therapy for each was introduced. 
He found that, for the majority of infectious diseases, most of the de-
cline in mortality preceded the introduction of an effective therapy. A few 
diseases, such as scarlet fever, changed in virulence over time. Rules for 
public hygiene and the building of sanitation infrastructure reduced the 
study population’s exposure to infections by water- and foodborne dis-
eases, such as typhoid, cholera, and other intestinal diseases. Changes in 
the prevalence of tuberculosis reflected reduced exposure after reforms 
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in housing and working conditions were instituted, although class dif-
ferences in prevalence persisted due to uneven implementation of these 
reforms. However, these changes did not explain enough of the decline 
in mortality.
McKeown concluded that the growth in population during this period 
could not be attributed to fortuitous changes in relationships between dis-
ease organisms and hosts. The drop in mortality was not much influenced 
by immunizations or medical treatments before 1935, when sulfonamide 
antibiotics became available. Certain medical measures were effective be-
fore 1935 in the management of smallpox, syphilis, tetanus, diphtheria, 
diarrheal diseases, and some surgical conditions, but these had made only 
a small contribution to the total decline in the death rate since 1838. By 
the method of exclusion, he was left with one other explanation for the re-
duction of mortality—namely, improvements in the human environment. 
Water purification, efficient sewage disposal, and improved food hygiene 
were introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century and reduced 
death from intestinal infections, but the decline in infectious diseases had 
actually begun before then. His main finding was therefore the negative 
conclusion that, contrary to common assumptions, medical science and 
hygiene had not contributed much to this era’s decline in mortality. His 
positive finding was that improvements in nutrition explained the popu-
lation increase. The most likely explanation, in McKeown’s view, for the 
decline in mortality and the growth in population was the improvement 
in the population’s nutrition due to greater food supplies.
Assigning credit for change
I have stepped quite far outside the limits of my competence. Why? 
As someone trained in medicine, I was struck by McKeown’s argument 
that little evidence existed to support the notion that medical advances 
before 1935 had made much difference in the decline in mortality in 
England and Wales. He challenged the conventional wisdom that pro-
gress in medicine and treatments must be the chief reasons for a growing 
freedom from disease in modern times.
In my training as an anthropologist, however, I wondered whether 
medical treatments in other societies or earlier historical periods may 
have been more effective in reducing rates of death from infectious dis-
eases. Is our own readiness to value what we do for the ill matched by 
other people’s convictions in other places and in the past?
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If success is judged by population numbers, medicine has recently 
done a great deal for people in many countries by controlling and treat-
ing the most important infectious diseases, more than occurred in the 
period and place that McKeown analyzed. For instance, Stephen Kunitz 
(1983a) analyzed records of mortality and morbidity for the largest In-
digenous group of North America, the Navajo, who are a relatively poor 
population in an overall wealthy society. He found that medical interven-
tions were significant in reducing mortality even in the face of minimal 
economic change. He traced the history of several causes of death dur-
ing the past century and showed how specific medical measures brought 
about a decline in tuberculosis and maternal mortality among the Nav-
ajo. Such findings present a certain challenge to McKeown’s analysis. 
Another challenge was raised by Simon Szreter (1988), who reassessed 
the social and political developments that succeeded in improving work-
ing conditions, housing, education, health services, and the regulation of 
food quality in England and Wales from 1839 to 1935. He concluded 
that such social interventions played a greater part in the decline of mor-
tality than McKeown had allowed (Szreter 1988: 26). He argued that we 
need to examine the role of human agency in producing changes in health 
rather than just the processes of change. He was concerned with the po-
litical ideas and the individuals “causing” change. Political forces affected 
mortality by making demands for the introduction of changes—sewage 
disposal, better working conditions, the expansion of suffrage, and so on.
Different explanations give credit for the rise in population to differ-
ent agents and forces; each of these explanations may have ideological 
implications (Kunitz 1987). Some turn to the role of environment, some 
to individual behavior, some to medical care. We can see how McK-
eown’s conclusions might be congenial to authorities wishing to absolve 
the government of the need to fund costly health services. Similarly, if 
more weight is given to the role of individual behavior in explaining pat-
terns of mortality, then responsibility for health may be seen as a matter 
for the individual. If not the individual, then the responsibility may be 
put on society. Kunitz refers to this contrast as one between voluntarist 
and determinist views of health. The voluntarists may blind themselves 
to the powerlessness of the poor by assuming they could change if only 
they decided to do so. The determinists see the problems in terms of 
access to care, poor living conditions, and unsafe workplaces. Kunitz’s 
point is that explanatory theories may reflect political ideologies and 
deeply held assumptions about the nature of society, the existence of free 
will, and the requirements of justice.
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My interest in these conflicting theories led me to ask what we might 
learn from cross-cultural comparisons of medical treatments and beliefs. 
But why compare?
That most distinguished medical anthropologist, W. H. R.  Rivers, 
asked how medicine came to be differentiated from religion and magic. 
In his lectures published posthumously as Medicine, magic and religion 
(1924), he discussed the complex question of progress in medicine. Any 
study of medical practices brings constant reminders of cultural trans-
mission, borrowing, and pluralism as factors promoting changes in hu-
man societies. Rivers argued that comparisons of different human histo-
ries demonstrate that there is no such thing as uniform progress through 
stages of social evolution. “It errs by giving a far too simple account of 
a process which has in reality been exceedingly complex” (Rivers 1924: 
58). The fact of progress may be written plain and large on the page of 
history, but progress is not a law of nature, as H. A. L. Fisher remarked 
in his History of Europe (1935). Yet the notion of progress plays a large 
part in many people’s intuitive ideas of both natural evolution and social 
development.
Neither is progress a law of nature nor have social choices always 
been wise and successful. Many variations must have been discarded in 
the struggle to survive. Hereditary variation is blind in origin, not neces-
sarily adaptive. By contrast, purpose marks social evolution and makes 
it different from biological evolution. Likewise, natural selection is not 
a metaphor that can be applied to society. Rather, it is social choice 
that contributes to making change rapid in human groups, and this de-
pends on learning and imitation. Social evolution proceeds in a sort of 
Lamarckian fashion through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
As Morris Ginsberg (1932: 77) pointed out, “Social change is totally 
different from biological change, but also far more intelligible.” It does 
not face the mysteries of natural evolution—the chance, nondirected, 
tiny modifications that occurred and led over immense stretches of time 
from the invertebrate eye to the human eye. The process of change in 
nature is mindless: there is no drive toward a future goal, no teleology 
to give it direction. The situation is entirely different with human beings 
and their arts of subsistence. They try to improve these practices; they 
devise or borrow new solutions to practical or social problems. When 
they try out new practices, their bodies do not have to change or pass 
along new genes to the next generation. Social transmission across hu-
man groups and generations is vital both for preserving skills and knowl-
edge and for changing them. Acknowledging this fact of transmission, 
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however, undermines any rigid model of stages in social evolution. Con-
tacts among societies lead to the diffusion of ideas and techniques that 
enable groups to jump over intervening “stages” that others may have 
had to pass through to reach certain skills or forms of knowledge.
It is undeniable that people alter their environments.1 In effect, social 
progress has come to mean a certain kind of independence from nature, 
being “civilized” and not “wild.” The criterion of advancement now sug-
gests not adaptation to a particular environment but independence from 
one. Progress, in short, is seen as increasing human dominion over nature 
by artifice, going beyond a passive state of fitness, naked and defenseless, 
to survive. It is as though the human species turned the tables on nature 
regarding adaptation. Natural forces have lost the powers over people’s 
lives they once had. Living “now in chambers and with feather beds,” we 
are able to help some to survive who might not have if they had come 
into the world when our ancestors slept in caves and forests.
So far, I have been speaking of populations and diseases in history—
the rest of this book, however, is really about the care and treatments 
given to individuals.
1. Since I wrote these Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures in 1979, recognition 
of the human impact on the environment and climate change has become 
the most prominent topic of serious concern around the world and throws 





Village illness and a panic
In ordinary practice, medicine is concerned with individuals rather than 
with populations. Most people are likely to think of medical practices in 
connection with help for particular people: someone sick in their family, 
children in the community, and so on. They think of medicine parochially.
The biological criteria of progress in health in general—growth in 
population and increase in life expectancy—refer to mortality (death 
rates) but ignore morbidity (disease or ill health). They take account of 
the numbers of people who live and die rather than the quality of their 
lives. Most illnesses do not kill, although they cause distress. They in-
clude a great variety of morbidity factors that pose no or little threat to 
life. People presumably develop good opinions about treatments largely 
because of what was done successfully for those who did not die from 
their illnesses. Medical assertions of success in treatment point to such 
examples. If we want to understand how people evaluate medical care, 
we must consider the treatments that are given.
The consequences of illness for the sick person and for those around 
him or her are part of the distress caused by illness. The experience of 
kindness and nursing care affect judgments of the value of particular 
treatments. Illness brings awareness of the need for help. Unlike a blind 
sparrow, a blind man is not likely to starve because of his condition un-
less no one felt any responsibility, concern, or sympathy for him. Care for 
others lies at the root of responses to the sick. No doubt there are links 
between the words and the ideas of kin, kind, and kindness; sympathy 
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is akin to kindness. Perhaps sympathy—the feeling that allows one to 
recognize another’s pain and needs—has also played its part in the de-
velopment of medicine.
My purpose in this chapter is to give a sense of how residents of the 
village of Rauit, Papua New Guinea, experienced and faced illnesses in 
1968–1969. In chapter 3, I shall describe a long illness and the way it 
exposed problems of care and responsibility for the infirm. Even though 
these cases come from just a single village, they show a range of the prob-
lems and the variety of responses—enough, I hope, for some wider issues 
to be grasped. Although my periods of fieldwork were short (1968–1969, 
1975, and 1985), they spanned Papua New Guinea’s change from colo-
nial status to independence. In the interim, a village aid post was set up 
for the villagers of Rauit and Mandubil, supervised by the mission health 
service. Chapter 4 will describe how the village aid post affected village 
care and the work of the local health committee. The move from village 
morality and expectations to the aims of the National Health Plan was 
a huge change, requiring major shifts of assumption about care and re-
sponsibilities in treatment.
The villages where Gnau languages are spoken lie on the southern 
fringes of a band of settlements along the inland fall of the Torricelli 
Mountains. Villages to the north and west of them are slightly smaller, 
with land more densely filled with gardens and less room for forest to 
hunt in. By contrast, the village of Rauit (population c. 370 in 1969, c. 
420 in 1985) has access to extensive forest, which was empty of people. 
The village is a cluster of six hamlets, each associated with particular 
patrilineal clans. Marriage is mainly within the village between different 
clans. Rauit men like to see themselves as hunters, but their staple food 
is starch, specifically sago with green leaves, supplemented by yams and 
taro. Their annual gardening cycle set by wet and dry seasons. They plant 
bananas, pandanus, pitpit, sugarcane, various greens, tobacco, and several 
more recently introduced food crops, as do all the people who live in 
these foothills.
The Gnau-speaking villages are situated behind Anguganak Bluff, 
which rises. steep and sheer, among the hills of the southern fall of the 
Torricelli range. It has represented a barrier, isolating the villages at the 
top or behind it from easy access. A mission settlement was started in 
1958 at the foot of the bluff, but Gnau villagers had little contact with 
it at first since the steepness of Anguganak Cliff cut them off. In 1968, 
a dirt road in the river valley below was gradually extended toward the 
road leading to the subdistrict headquarters at Lumi.
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Figure  1. The path to Rauit village along the edge of Anguganak Cliff. The 
Christian mission and health center are located in the valley below.
Villagers have a myth about how Anguganak Bluff was raised as a 
barrier to an enemy. The Opan River has to curl around its base be-
fore it can go south to the distant plain. The ridges, hills, and valleys are 
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all forested, but near the villages, the bush is strewn with gardens. The 
lower-lying hills and the flatland far to the south of Rauit are almost 
uninhabited, containing great tracts of tall forest for hunting. The Sepik 
River is down there somewhere, far to the south, invisible, and elders in 
Rauit told me they did not know about it before White people came. 
They also knew nothing about the coast where the Sepik empties: they 
said they did not know how to swim or what a canoe was. Their envi-
ronment was bush, garden, and forest. The world they knew had narrow 
limits, forming a rough circle around them with a radius of about ten 
miles. Within this circle, ten different languages were spoken in forty-
two villages. Gnau speakers are likely to know one neighboring language 
in addition to their own and the contact language of Tok Pisin. They 
used to have little knowledge of most of the villages and places at or 
beyond the perimeter of the circle; few in the past would ever have gone 
to the edge of the former social horizon. The edges were known from the 
names of places that came into stories, genealogies, or myths.
Illness is a relatively public matter in a village. Houses are set close 
together, and people know each other and about each other in detail, 
since they spend most of every day outside and visible to others. They 
see illness and must cope with it at close quarters. However, to take an 
extreme example, the illness and death of a week-old baby passed unre-
marked by most villagers, unknown to some, while at another time, an-
other illness—that of a man in his forties—disturbed the usual pattern 
of the whole village’s life for about three months. Reactions may be very 
public or very private; they vary because of the sort of illness, its acute-
ness and severity, aspects of the person involved (who is affected, what 
age and status, belonging to what group), the timing of the illness and 
its mode of onset, and the circumstances. An accident or sudden illness 
can provoke concern that a gradual descent into illness usually does not.
Ordinary cases
One of the troubles with describing social responses to illness is that 
readers are often more curious to hear about dramatic or complicated 
cases than about common illnesses that people have to cope with or 
respond to without much fuss. As a result, anthropologists may neglect 
to write about care for common minor illnesses and give undue atten-
tion to complicated cases and ritual treatment. Partly this is inevitable 
because one hears more about them during fieldwork. In Gnau villages, 
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the hamlet rather than the entire village is the effective unit of daily life, 
of chatting, of trivial news. Unless one lives in the hamlet, many small 
illnesses and accidents pass unnoticed by outsiders. Home care is quiet 
and relatively private. The bite of a death adder understandably causes 
more of a commotion than an infected sore. Villagers would see the sore 
as something ordinary, an accident too trivial to make much fuss over, 
and assume it will get better soon. But a person knows if someone is ill 
in the same hamlet and should come without waiting to ask if there is 
something he or she can do to help. Whether much is done depends on 
how long the illness lasts.
Figure 2. A Rauit hamlet at noon, 1968. Coconut palms are planted within the 
village but not outside it. Their distinctive leaf crowns mark the presence of a 
village seen from afar.
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Matupin has just another fever. August 13, 1968, Watalu.
Matupin had gone to Namelim (the bush where he has gardens), 
and while working in the afternoon, he felt sick and hot and then 
vomited. He stayed there and slept in his garden house that night. He 
came back the next day feeling better. The following day, I saw him 
go off in the morning; however, as I was doing something in Watalu 
in the afternoon, his first wife called out to me to go and see him, 
since he was ill again. He had come back early and vomited. He was 
lying beside a small fire in his second wife’s fenced-off cooking porch, 
Figure 3. A hamlet with women’s individual family houses in the foreground. 
The thatching of the houses is made from sago-palm leaves, their walls from the 
large midribs of the leaves.
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apparently asleep. I didn’t wake him up and went to see someone 
else. Twenty minutes later, noisy retching came from where he was. 
Everyone could hear it, exaggerated looks were exchanged, someone 
said he’s very sick and told me to go and give him an injection. I went 
to look. He had retched up a little water; nothing else had come up, 
he said, just water. He felt hot and had a headache. I offered to come 
back with some medicine, but he said he wanted to sleep. However, 
that evening, I forgot to bring him the antimalarial tablets I said I 
would. No one came to remind me.
The next morning, I found him on the ground in front of his first 
wife’s house, lying in the dust. He had a headache and felt hot, but 
he did not feel nauseated. I gave him the tablets. He did not want to 
talk, just to sleep. In the afternoon, he felt better, chatted vaguely, and 
said he would like to smoke now. He had not smoked for two days 
because he had been ill. He thought the illness must be because he 
had cut the leaves of a big fern nimbe’ut that people associate with 
spirits and illness. He had not asked for treatment by anyone nor 
had he tried to treat himself, although he knows what to do for this 
kind of illness. He was going to wait for it to pass. He planned to sit 
around and wait. He was better the next day. No one did anything 
special about this illness.
Selpi has a swollen hand “from harvesting yams.”
Selpi, a woman in her forties from the hamlet of Animbil, came to 
see me because of painful swelling over the knuckle of her right index 
finger and middle finger. She said she hadn’t injured the hand and 
there was nothing else except the pain and swelling. She put it down 
to some yams. It was the time for first harvesting yams. The hand 
hurt so that she could not cook meals—that is, “turn” sago jelly—and 
her eldest daughter had to do it instead. I could not find anything to 
account for the swelling. I told her to rest the hand and gave her a 
sling. She kept it on for two days, then abandoned it when she was 
extremely busy with the celebration of her eldest son’s puberty cere-
mony and she was in high spirits. I did not see her again until six days 
later when the infection had come to a head and needed to be incised.
People’s previous experience with illness influences how much they 
worry. They know fairly well what to expect with sprains, headaches, 
cuts, and sores; fevers are common, although they are not predictable and 
sometimes turn out badly. A general discussion of the effect of diseases 
on social life would be vain, given the great diversity of disabling effects. 
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Severity, pain, inexplicability, duration, and disablement contribute in 
different ways to distress.
Sickness impinges on people’s work and social life in particular ways. 
The signs and symptoms and the restrictions or embarrassment they 
cause affect how they are tolerated. Illness may interfere with particular 
tasks or roles. Mobility and strength are obvious requirements for garden 
work and hunting. Many Gnau rules carry a general sanction of illness 
if one should break them, and the penalties most often indicated give 
a view of what illness in general means to them: they say you will get 
breathless, you won’t be able to manage the slippery steep paths, your 
joints will be stiff, your limbs will feel heavy, you will be confined to the 
village. Or your sight may fail; you will be confined just the same. Illness 
Figure 4. Women boil water in a bamboo tube for cooking taro or preparing 
sago jelly, their staple food. The large conical mound behind them is the eroded 
base of a coconut palm planted long ago.
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is a threat of premature decrepitude, a threat in keeping with their way 
of life and what they value.
The significance of illness can, however, depend more on who is af-
fected, on his or her role and place, rather than purely on the kind of 
disease. If the illness is severe enough to prevent someone from doing 
what he or she should, that consequence may be enough to make it seri-
ous. The contingency intrinsic to illness gives it power to disrupt plans 
and force itself on other people’s attention. Some of these points will ap-
pear later in the accounts of the illnesses of Maka and Wolai, when the 
flow of other events at the times they were ill affected the significance 
attached to their illnesses and the care they received.
Responsibility for care
The position of women
In the vast majority of societies, the stress of illness is felt immediately 
by the sick person’s family. In an urban situation, the strains may fall on 
the family and not be noticed outside it, unless the sick person is critical 
in some way for other people’s lives or for their jobs in the wider society. 
Illness is a mostly private matter that the family manages on its own, 
unless they need to hand over care of the patient to someone specially 
qualified because the illness is more serious. But this is not possible for 
people in many places. Instead, the family and the local community have 
to cope and rely on their own resources. It is hard to overemphasize (in 
fact, it is hard to imagine it properly at all) the distress of urgent need 
in such a community on certain occasions, as when a child screams and 
vomits with pain and a high fever or a man is unable to pass urine for 
three days and nights and lies moaning, his belly swollen. The Gnau do 
face such situations and have to cope on their own.
Who should help the sick person? The Gnau wife and mother is the 
central figure in providing basic care and nursing within her domestic 
group. The degree to which she is irreplaceable at the center changes 
with the family’s stage of development. When a man feels very ill, he 
can move to his wife’s house so she can look after him. In fact, illness 
is almost the only reason for a man to sleep in the same house as his 
wife in the village; men normally sleep apart or in the communal men’s 
house of their hamlet. However, a woman could not turn to her hus-
band for nursing care in the same way as he could turn to her. Upon 
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marriage, it is the woman who moves to live at a new place, her hus-
band’s home.
It takes some time for a young woman to feel at home among her 
husband’s kin. This shows itself in what she does when she is ill or 
when her child is ill. In the early phase of married life, she is likely to 
go back quickly to the family in which she was born, where her par-
ents and her brothers live. Fears of the illness caused by spirits of her 
husband’s lineage may be used to explain or justify such a move. A wife 
will only go back to her parents or brothers for an illness perceived as 
serious. Late in marriage, with daughters or a daughter-in-law to care 
for her and with established friendships among other women of the 
hamlet, her home and place are now really there; it is quite exceptional 
for illness to make her move from her established home. Whether a 
woman moves when she or her child falls ill depends on the growth of 
her attachment to her husband’s family and place, her sense of security 
and support.
Bagi, a young married woman, returns home to be mothered.
I went to see Bagi, a married woman in her twenties. I had been 
called by her brother. She had come back from Bi’ip to her mother’s 
house at Taki because she was feeling sick and feverish. She was lying 
on a sheet of palm-leaf spathe (limbum in Tok Pisin, biape in Gnau) 
with her head resting on the lap of her elderly mother. She was hold-
ing her mother’s leg with her arm; her mother’s arm was around her 
shoulders. She was lying about a foot and half away from the fire in 
the hearth of their day house. Her father, a younger half-sister and 
brother, and her classificatory brother and his wife were all sitting 
close by with her. She was lying listlessly. Beside her on the palm 
spathe (limbum) were stained nettle leaves, and she had marks of be-
tel juice spat onto her lower chest and epigastrium. Her father had 
treated her by spitting. Her brother said she had not eaten since yes-
terday, she was drowsy, and had been ill for many days. She made no 
attempt to answer the questions I addressed to her; others answered 
them for her. She gave no sign that she even heard them. I examined 
her; she seemed floppy from lassitude or apathy, moving slowly as 
she walked to her mother’s house so I could examine her eyes in the 
dark. When I finished, she walked back and sat on the limbum, sitting 
up now, looking more alert. She had a fever. I asked them about her 
husband, knowing he had been arrested two days before. She spoke 
up for the first time, saying a policeman had come to take him to jail. 
She spent the rest of the day sitting with her mother, who sometimes 
Village illness and a panic
23
rubbed her with nettles. I saw her throw the nettles away with the 
awkward gesture of someone ritually getting rid of something.
A man could not expect to get that sort of mothering. I visited 
Wani, a senior man. He had been treated for affliction by Panu’et, a 
spirit, two days before. He had a chest infection. The visitors from 
Animbil hamlet were gathered at the day house belonging to him 
and his sons, a place for guests to come and find him. But he was 
inside his wife’s house, lying on the flat-bench bed made from the 
midribs of sago palm leaves. Lawusa, his married clan sister in An-
imbil, was sitting on the earth floor beside him. He had taken off the 
fur head ring and the decorative arm bands he usually wore. He said 
in a quavery voice that his ribs were sore still but that someone had 
come to spit over him to counter possible harm from a clan ancestral 
spirit, since he had eaten betel nut from their land. It was so dark in 
the hut that all I could see of him at first was his white shell phal-
locrypt and the gleam from his teeth when he smiled. Outside, the 
people who had come sat chatting; they were given a meal later that 
day by his family.
Self-concern: Men
Men tended to pay more attention to their own trivial or mild illnesses 
than women did and more readily took time off to stay at home while 
ill. They could afford to indulge their indisposition because they were 
not bound in the same way as women were by daily demands to feed 
and cook for their families. But both men and women sometimes acted 
conspicuously or histrionically when they became ill. Such behavior in 
men was associated with a particular explanation or some fear about the 
implications of what they had noticed in themselves. In women, such 
behavior was unattached to any elaborate explanation, so it appeared to 
be an end in itself. It was as though married women, having greater pres-
sures on them not to stop work for mild illness and needing to justify 
abandoning their domestic duties, did so in part by making very clear to 
others just how ill they felt. At times of planting and harvesting, there 
were usually some senior men who would ostentatiously rub their aches 
with nettles, apparently quite ill. They claimed to be struck ill by the 
yam spirits during their hard work at the gardens. They would spend a 
day or two in the village and then go back to work. I was mystified on 
three or four occasions by men who appeared to be in extreme pain in 
one eyeball, groaning and in anguish, saying they had been struck by a 
yam spirit while gardening. I could find nothing wrong with their eye 
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except that it had become red from rubbing, which seemed to clear up 
by next morning. In Rauit, the men relied mostly on a nonverbal show 
of illness—social withdrawal, refusal of food and conversation, griming 
with dirt—to convey that they feel ill.
Silmai with a bad headache, Wimalu.
I came upon Silmai sitting crouched over a fire beside his house. He 
was in his fifties, a wily man, also sardonic, intelligent, and effective 
Figure 5. The warkao, a day house where families of a localized lineage group 
in the hamlet can gather. They often bring their food to eat at the warkao in the 
morning and evening. It is also used to receive friends who come by for casual 
conversation or to provide shelter for visitors who come to the hamlet for a 
particular event.
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in authority. His head was bent down on his knees, his eyes closed. 
Though he heard me coming, he made no movement to look at me 
or acknowledge my presence. Saibuten asked him if he was sick. In 
a gravelly voice, with no change in his bent position, he said he was, 
adding something about his matrilateral relatives cutting down a tree. 
He raised a furrowed, bleary, tired face and laid his cheek sideways on 
his knees. He had a headache and ached generally. Then he said he 
had dreamed of Balwun and Sukadel, who were matrilaterally related 
to him. He had sent for Sanawut to come and spit over him because 
he was also a matrilateral kinsperson. There were two splotches of red 
betel juice over his shoulder blades. We sat with him for a while. Sil-
mai, still crouched and occasionally snapping his fingers at his fore-
head, occasionally gave short hard blows with the heel of his hand 
against his forehead (that must have hurt!). He didn’t talk any more 
but simply growled at a dog sitting by him. He got up to urinate, 
came back, and lay down to sleep. Creased brow, haggard look—a 
bad headache.
Saibuten explained that Silmai thought his kinsmen might have 
been cutting down a big old tree on his mother’s brother’s land. The 
Gnau liken the relationship of a sister’s son to his mother’s brother’s 
clan to that of a tree growing up from a piece of ground. This image 
associates the sister’s son with the tree, the clan with the ground. So 
perhaps when a tree growing on the mother’s brother’s land is cut 
down, the sister’s son will feel sympathetic pain. A mother’s brother 
has the power, they think, to harm his sister’s son by calling on his 
ancestors and putting a spell on such a tree and then cut it down. 
When the tree falls, his sister’s son is also struck down. Saibuten 
was alluding to these ideas in his explanation. This idea had passed 
through Silmai’s mind because of his dream. Nonetheless, he was 
better the next day.
Analogy in explanation
What sets the general framework in which to see sickness? An intui-
tion of relationships between the facts (love and hate, attraction, opposi-
tion, association, unity, intention, purpose, aim, cause, the action of an 
agent on an object, resistance) may emerge from the perception of such 
forces in social life. Why should we think that causes for illness might 
be found inside the body rather than in visible or invisible forces in the 
outside world? The problem for explaining sickness maybe to find some 
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connection between the person who is ill and his or her circumstances. 
The Gnau approach depended on linking patients and circumstances 
(which were things to be observed) with certain causes (which were 
not ordinarily visible). They deduced the relationships by analogies with 
their experience of the motivating forces in social life. They considered 
the events of illness in a matter-of-fact way first, trying to deduce what 
might be the likely cause. I sometimes found it hard to tell whether they 
were giving me a plain description of recent facts or a statement that 
implied the mystical causes of an illness. The Gnau worked out possibili-
ties by considering the timing and circumstances surrounding the illness. 
Their conclusions would rest on certain components of the situation as 
significant for understanding how and why the illness had occurred. The 
cognitive process is similar to what we use in trying to decide why an 
accident occurred when we consider what risks attach to different com-
ponents of the situation (G. Lewis 1975: 265–66). Gnau diagnoses were 
applied to syndromes of circumstance rather than syndromes of clinical 
symptoms and signs.
Ordinary experience was the source of intuitions of possible causal 
relationships. Villagers would speak of a spirit causing someone to be ill 
as “crushing,” “holding,” “fastening round,” “tying up,” “holding tight,” or 
“pulling” on the afflicted person. The verbs express the sense of a patient 
crushed down, constrained, restricted by illness. The spirit could “strike” 
or “shoot” the patient (involving ideas of attack, hurt, disease as an en-
emy) or it could “stay” in her or “go down into” him (suggesting an un-
wanted presence, disease as an intruder). Sometimes they seemed to take 
this idea of entry literally—for instance, when they sucked out “arrow 
points” shot in by the spirit or when they tied a foul-smelling creeper 
around the affected part to “stink out” the spirit. They might sear the 
patient’s skin with flaming coconut fronds to expel the spirit with heat or 
try to startle it with blows and bangs. For example, the son of a man with 
heart failure got hold of some gun powder and came by in the evening 
as his father slept beside a fire. He dropped the gunpowder in the fire so 
the noise would startle the spirit away. Both speech and behavior showed 
what the Gnau thought about the illness. Certain verbs described how a 
spirit would take notice of someone: it would “spy him out,” “put its eyes” 
on him, “say his name,” “call out” to him, “smell” him. Their guesses and 
deductions about the causes and processes of illness constituted attempts 
to find some order, to explain events, to predict and control them.
The personification of spirits based on an understanding of human 
behavior allowed them to guess the motives that might actuate spirits to 
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cause illness. But despite their personification of spirits, the latter were 
not persons in the way people are (see also Horton 1967, 1982: 230–31). 
The Gnau did not know how to judge or understand spirits’ purposes and 
motives as they would those of other people. At times, the spirits seemed 
capricious, as motiveless as the wind. As a result, villagers did not assign 
blame and responsibility to spirits with the same moral indignation as 
they did to people who were thought to have caused someone’s illness.
Their general explanatory themes had to be observed in use to grasp 
their practical significance. The ideas of the localization of a spirit, its 
range of movement and attention, and the danger of it adding to some-
one’s illness came alive for me when I noticed fences set up to isolate 
and protect someone with an illness from the influence of people passing 
by who might have eaten things dangerous to the patient. How many 
paces off would be safe? Ten paces? Twenty? If a spirit took up a local 
habitation so that a patient had to move from her house, how far would 
she have to go to avoid the risk? Such moves rarely involved distancing 
of more than two or three hundred yards, sometimes much less. How 
long would she need to stay away? How long would she have to avoid a 
certain food? Answers to these questions helped me observe what such 
ideas meant in practical terms. The ideas were based on simple analogies, 
but their consequences (How far to move? Could that food have been 
the cause even though it was eaten two weeks before the illness came 
on?) required people to decide what they thought in order to know what 
to do. They had to articulate their theories with the myriad ordinary and 
chance events of life. They attended to both ideas and events selectively. 
In theory, a particular food might cause a man or a woman to get sick. 
In practice, however, it was more commonly used to explain women’s ill-
nesses—not because women ate such food more than men but because 
they played the major role in producing it, usually working on their hus-
band’s land with plants his jealous ancestors watched over.
Sympathy gatherings: The value of support
Obligations toward kin provided the local basis and idiom of care for the 
sick. To watch over others, to take responsibility for those with whom 
one lives, was a theme they expressed in many of their actions and atti-
tudes, such as the taboos that parents observed to protect their child and 
its health or in the act of the man who broke his knife or threw it away 
because he had lent it to someone who cut himself with it. If someone 
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harmed himself by misadventure or his own stupidity during a journey 
he took because you asked him to, then you would be held responsible 
for his harm. If a child fell ill when the father was away, he might blame 
the mother for letting harm come to the child left in her care. If a woman 
cut herself accidentally in the company of others, they would they say 
they felt “ashamed” at the sight of her blood. The most dramatic formal 
expression of this attitude was in the behavior expected of clan rela-
tives belonging to other villages who would come to mourn the death 
of a clan member. They would come smeared in clay or mud, chanting 
reproaches at the waiting villagers, weeping and sobbing, “Where was 
Figure 6. A family at meal-time, showing the separation by gender and age: the 
mother eats with her young children while the father and an older son sit in the 
background, each with a separate portion.
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I when you needed me? They have let you die, my brother. If only I 
had been with you!” The weeping showed their grief; the reproach was 
directed at the home relatives who should have looked after the person 
who died. They sometimes expressed this fiercely, since they had license 
to shoot at the patient’s house, the men’s house, or surrounding trees. 
At times, they would even shoot toward the mourners, aiming to miss. 
The home mourners were expected to stay seated, grief-distracted, disre-
garding any arrows that flicked by them as the deceased’s clan members 
wreaked havoc.
In any serious ailment, public gatherings would take place dur-
ing the course of the illness; people hearing of it would come for the 
day to the hamlet where the sick person was lying. This response was 
meant to demonstrate concern. The Gnau referred to this as “coming to 
sit in company with the sick person so that he or she may get well” or 
Figure 7. A family shares taro mash from a wooden bowl.
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sometimes as “sitting in company with the family to surround the sick 
person.” The second phrase suggests sitting around the patient to shield 
him or her. The normal pattern for these sympathy visits was for the fam-
ily to provide a meal for the visitors and spend the day with them. These 
“sit-downs” for sickness (like the ones for certain other misfortunes, as 
well as those during gatherings to celebrate achievements, returns from 
plantation labor or from jail, and the celebration of certain rites) brought 
people close together in a literal sense and in the figurative social sense. 
The ordinary run of daily life was punctuated by these sociable occasions.
Figure 8. People who remain in the village to hold a sympathy gathering for a 
sick man. Instead of going to their gardens, they sit next to the patient’s house 
to support and protect him.
In sudden serious illness or catastrophe, the whole village might 
gather for the night, staying to surround and shield the afflicted per-
son; they fasted in sympathy, a demonstration of communal solidarity 
in visible and touching terms. They “watched over the patient.” When 
people were abruptly frightened that someone they cared for might 
die, they showed their anguish and grief by destroying their own pos-
sessions, breaking pots, cutting at trees. The following account I wrote 
about Maka’s attack when people thought she might have been struck 
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down by sorcery or a spirit illustrates the intensity and strength of these 
responses. Panic spread among the villagers. They went through much of 
their repertory of acute responses. They tried different ways of diagnosis 
and treatment, but Maka’s problems did not end with this episode. The 
pace of events and the suddenness of people’s reactions struck me. It is 
difficult to briefly portray the dense flow of activities, dramas, and dis-
tress going on in the village at this time. Some were directly or indirectly 
related to another man’s illness, others were unconnected; however, they 
all contributed to a sense of the complexity—the involvement and rami-
fications—of village life.
Response to crisis
Panic at Watalu hamlet. Maka becomes possessed and fears she might be 
dying.
The background events leading up to this crisis were complicated. 
A large ritual “singsing” for the spirit Malyi was being performed at 
Watalu for the long, severe illness of Dauwaras, younger brother of 
Maka’s husband. His illness and the beginning of the Malyi singsing 
had occupied everyone’s attention recently, but minmin sorcery fears 
also lurked in the background.1 Over the previous three months, fears 
about minmin had been spreading and intensifying. This form of sor-
cery was beginning to overtake the long-reviled langasutap sorcery 
as the danger most to be feared when away from the village and in 
strange places (G. Lewis 1977).
The panic on September 19, 1968.
It was 2:15 in the afternoon. The Malyi singing for Dauwaras contin-
ued but without verve. It was the ninth day. About fifteen men were 
there, mostly from Watalu. A shouted message came from outside. 
Purkiten, Maluna, and Mawikil got up halfway, then sat down again. 
The stanza of song ended. Purkiten got up, Tawo said to get water, 
Purkiten looked for a bamboo water tube: empty. Nearly everyone 
left the men’s house, not hastily, but obviously something was up. It 
had something to do with Maka. Under her house porch, sitting on 
the ground near where she normally cooked her meals, Maka was 




possessed. Quite close, sitting half turned toward her was Padik, her 
aged mother, then slightly further away were Katina and Wolusi, 
both young wives from Watalu; on Maka’s other side, her daughters 
Wankyi and Kenken were sitting facing away from her and looking 
at the ground. Pe’alen, her stepfather, and Maluna stood in front. 
Purkiten was just turning away from her, having spat water sprays to 
either side of her. They thought the spirit possessing her was that of 
his dead clan brother. Purkiten called out that it should not harm her. 
Children had come to see what was happening and were staring with 
excited interest. So was I. The others just sat listening but without 
seeming worried or excited, not staring at her. Most looked either at 
the ground or in front of them, vaguely or blankly.
Maka sat on the earth, her legs extended straight in front of her, 
arms loose at her sides, her torso shaking rapidly (about one and a 
half times per second), seeming to pivot about the pit of her stom-
ach (at the wuna’at, thinking center). But her general tonus looked 
relaxed or flaccid rather than taut and tense, the jerks of her torso 
were passively transmitted along her limbs, her face expressionless, 
lids half drooped, eyes downcast. With each shake, she made a little 
noise as though her breath pushed out the cry. The cries rose and fell 
in waves roughly in time with a deep breathing rhythm, about ten 
cycles per minute. The cries went hus! hus! hus!, changing to he! he! 
he!, then sometimes ha! ha! ha!, and back to hus! hus! hus! (Hus! was 
the most frequent cry. It sounded like someone encouraging a dog to 
find something, some child said, giggling a bit naughtily.) Sporadi-
cally the cries stopped and Maka spoke, her sentences starting but 
not all finished. Her utterances were in a higher pitch and a flatter 
tone than her normal speaking voice, the flow of words was partly 
broken or stuttered by the jerky outflow of her breathing; some of the 
sentences came out in one flat unbroken flow, others were interrupted 
by staccato hus! hus! hus! cries. So far as I could catch what she said, 
she first spoke the names of people, the father of So-and-So, as if she 
were questioning them; then she said something about minmin and 
Nembugil, that Maluna or his eldest son Melui would be struck at 
Wolwakat or Walyip: “Melui yi-yigai wadagep Walyip” (“Melui will 
d-d-dig up yams at Walyip”). She repeated this phrase a number of 
times. Then “Melui wiyab . . . Melui wiyab . . . wiyab Wolwokat? . . . 
wiyab Walyip?” (“Melui, it will strike you . . . strike you at Wolwakat? 
. .  . strike you at Walyip?”; her tone implied Wolwakat rather than 
Walyip). Then “Melui yai munda’an? . . . gnau . . . Walei munda’an?” 
(“Where’s Melui’s father? .  .  . No .  .  . where is Walei?”), to which 
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people listening answered calmly, “He’s here.” They did not then try 
to talk to her or the spirit directly. A number of times she said “Dji 
bedjirabeke’in” (“You be quiet now”), speaking gently, almost wonder-
ingly, as if to herself or the spirit.
She became quieter, but her hus! hus! sounds continued. Purkiten, 
Mawikil, and Maluna, having sat down, occasionally commented to 
each other on what she was saying and soon seemed to lose interest. 
They went back to the men’s house. Meanwhile, her husband Kan-
tyi came over. He had been at Animbil because they were shooting 
a large boar there. On his arrival, Kantyi looked briefly at her and 
quietly sat down about ten feet away, crouching with his back to her. 
As the other men got up to go, they told the children to clear off. 
I moved slightly off to the side. I did not see Maka look anywhere 
except at the ground in front of her, but then she said that I was 
there and she felt ashamed. She paused, then I heard her get up quite 
rapidly and, without faltering, go inside her house. There was silence. 
The scene (up to this point) had lasted about twelve minutes. I went 
back to the men’s house, where they were talking about what she had 
said, but I heard only the tail end of this. Tawo, who had not gone to 
see Maka, began beating his kundu drum and the others, following 
his lead, began to sing.
The singing continued. In pauses, I could hear the hus! hus! he! 
he! cries again. Pe’alen slipped out. After a bit I followed. The wom-
en were sitting quietly under the porch while Kantyi and Pe’alen 
crouched outside. Fine rain was falling. From inside the house, Maka 
could be heard still sometimes calling, sometimes talking. The pauses 
between her cries grew longer. She became quite silent. Now it was 
forty minutes from the start.
In the men’s house, they told me the spirit possessing her had 
been reproaching her for using bush that had belonged to the spirit. 
Singing was resumed. The singing stopped suddenly at a burst of 
noise, a confusion of crying and shouting, voices calling out that 
Maka had died. It was sixty minutes from the start. Women were 
crying out. People were running to Maka’s house, women wailing 
and in tears, crying out, “She’s dead!” Wosabat (the wife of Dauwaras, 
the sick man, Maka’s husband’s younger brother) was throwing her 
own bamboos out of her house, smashing her own cooking utensils, 
destroying things, desolate, grief-stricken. I called to Walei, Maluna’s 
second son, who was rushing there, asking him what it was. His face 
was very tense when he said langasutap sorcery has struck her. Pe’alen, 
her stepfather, was crouching, weeping, “Maka! Maka!” Her husband 
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was in the house with her. He led her out to me. She was dazed, pale, 
haggard-looking, blank-faced. I briefly examined her. People pre-
pared to treat her and she was quiet for a short time, and then again 
entered possession. Wara came up with nettle leaves to do a kind 
of blowing, patting divination, a “smelling out” of the spirit. Maka 
interrupted this by walking down the slope close to her house where 
rubbish is thrown. She began crying for her children and announced 
she was going to die. She fell back, as if struck down dead. Wolei 
and Wara raised her and, with Kantyi supporting her too, she walked 
up the slope to her house. She sank down semirecumbent, Kantyi 
crouching behind her to support her back, weeping. Wara, who was 
about to treat her, kept hold of her right wrist. Padik and another el-
derly woman, Sawi, flung themselves wailing on Maka’s chest; others 
grabbed at her loose arm or sobbed down over her legs.
Amid this confusion of bodies and weeping, Wara stood facing 
her, holding her right wrist, talking to her calmly. He called her by 
name, “Maka,” and began to treat her by striking her with the net-
tle leaves. Wolei from Bi’ip was also striking her with nettles. Wara 
delivered sharp blows on her ears, forehead, temples, then her chest, 
and brushed the nettles along her arms and legs with sweeping ges-
tures. The blows were intended to startle the spirit or sickness out 
of her. He did a lot of puffing and striking on the nettle leaves and 
puffing into or close to her ears, striking again with the nettles. Then 
he stood back and called, “Maka, Maka, you get up now, get up. . . . 
Do you mean to abandon us?” Maka—whose head was sometimes 
lolling back, sometimes forward—occasionally fluttered her eyelids, 
but they were mostly drooped nearly shut. Her right leg showed a 
rapid irregular tremor. Her breathing was not distressed. She did not 
answer. Wolei was administering the same treatment as Wara from 
the other side, but Wara’s was a more sustained, ordered, and impres-
sive performance. The grieving women were still sprawled on Maka’s 
body. At one point, Wara half-knelt on Maka’s jerking leg (I think in 
order to still or feel the jerks). Someone cried out that they must get 
coconut leaves. Some dry ones were brought, bunched together into 
a torch, and set on fire. Flame flared. Wolei moved the flames close 
along her arms, sides, legs, then held them briefly to her fingers and 
then the soles of her feet. He worked down one side of her body, then 
the other. Maka allowed her limbs to be held passively to the flames, 
giving no sign of pain, although she bent her feet down to the flames 
and shrank from them a little when they were held close to her side. 
The flames were meant to sear the spirit and frighten it off.
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She mumbled something in a low voice, something about the 
back of her neck and three yammami (a type of yam, Dioscorea esculen-
ta) given to her by Kalimao, Purkiten’s daughter. I was told that she 
said it wasn’t minmin or langasutap sorcery but the spirit of Tambin 
that had struck her because of yammami she had eaten. Later, Wara 
said he smelled out the spirit of Weikris, a deceased clan brother of 
Purkiten whom Maka’s husband had been brought up with. Maka’s 
own revelation about the Tambin spirit afflicting her caused people 
to direct their subsequent treatments to ousting Tambin from her. (I 
should mention that Maka was exceptional: she was one of very few 
women who, as a girl just before puberty, had gone through the entire 
Tambin performance in the men’s house just as if she had been a boy; 
her father had only daughters, and she was the eldest one; since he 
had no son, he put her through the rites.)
Pe’alen had been crouching to the side of the melee around Maka. 
He now came up to Maka holding nettles, spat a pale juice on them, 
and struck her with them. He was chewing something, saying words 
to a spell in a low voice. Then he bent, opening Maka’s mouth for her, 
and spat juice into her mouth. He took her hand and pulled and bent 
her fingers to try and make her knuckles crack. This gesture, called 
lagela galbietap (“breaking her fingers”), was done to see if they would 
crack, which other people also tried later. It was a kind of test: if the 
spirit or sickness had left her, then her knuckles would crack; if it was 
still inside her, they would not. Pe’alen stood up, shaking his head.
Amid the confusion of women crying, wailing, and Maka herself 
occasionally saying, “Degadeyig” (“I am dying now”), Wara and Wolei 
and Maluna continued striking her with nettles or brushing them 
along her legs, as if catching something up in them and throwing it 
away. All the time, more people were gathering round. Maka asked 
for her uncles from Bi’ip and her brother, but they were in the bush. 
Someone went off to call them back. Maka then said that she was 
dying and asked to be taken back to Bi’ip (where she was born). Sup-
ported by Wara and Wolei and followed by a long line of people, she 
began to walk feebly toward Bi’ip. She got about three hundred yards 
to the point where the path goes down muddily beside water holes, 
sago palms, and a fish pond. She paused, and others decided that she 
could not go to Bi’ip because no one was there. So they turned Maka 
around, who was now passive and accepting, and walked her back to 
Maluna’s day house (warkao).
There they sat her on a piece of limbum, her legs stretched out 
limp, with Walei, Maluna’s second son, sitting on a kerosene drum, 
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supporting her as she rested back in his arms. Maka was quiet now, her 
face drained and haggard, eyes and head drooping. Padik, her white-
haired mother, was at her side holding her hand. By now, no one was 
wailing, but some women had tears on their cheeks as they continued 
to gently sob. On the way back to the day house, Kantyi had stooped 
to the side of the path to pick some heart-shaped leaves called langit, 
which are associated with Tambin. He gave some to Wara, Wolei, 
Maluna, and Pe’alen. In succession, all of them first blew spells into 
the langit and then patted Maka’s chest gently, chanting quietly. Then 
each held his leaf in the ring formed by the index finger and thumb 
of the semi-clenched fist of his left hand and slapped it sharply with 
his right palm, lifted his palm to look at the leaf, then casually threw 
it away. (The slap may cause a tiny tear in the leaf; they said if the tear 
curls upward, that indicates that the spirit of Tambin is the cause of 
illness. No conclusive answer came out of this.)
Others collected dry coconut leaf fronds into two piles, one on 
each side of Maka, about two feet away. They lit them and flames 
flared up. This was to make the spirit leave her because of the heat. 
Maka, though looking dazed and absent, obviously shrank from the 
flames. She sometimes showed pain when people rubbed nettles on 
her; she gave little cries. It was by now an hour and three quarters 
from the onset of her possession. She showed signs of sleepiness, her 
head drooped. Others told her sharply to open her eyes, to not fall 
asleep. She complained of the back of her neck; they repeated it, she 
must have been struck there, it must be treated.
After these things, Wara went and sat alone on a low seat at the 
back of the opened day hut. He did not talk. His self-contained air 
has a certain authority and impressiveness. Possibly it helps explain 
why he is often asked to treat others. However, there are two other 
reasons for him to treat Maka: first, he belongs to a collateral branch 
of her natal lineage, although his branch is at Animbil, not Bi’ip; sec-
ond, he is Walei’s father-in-law, and Walei is a “son” to Maka.
Gradually, the concentration that everyone focused on Maka 
began to fragment. People began talking it over, explaining things 
to latecomers. Maluna repeatedly described for others how he had 
heard noises in the bush the day before and shouted, “Who’s there?” 
and Maka had replied. The possible tricks of minmin crossed their 
minds, I think. Pe’alen came forward again and then Wara did so. 
They chewed and spat nettle leaves to rub on Maka, then spat into 
her mouth. It was betel juice chewed with herbs, bark shavings, and 
ginger, hot or bitter things with strong smells, which they keep on 
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them in their string bags. Maka was supposed to swallow the juice so 
it would go into her belly and oust the spirit.
Kantyi had again disappeared. After fifteen minutes he came back 
with a collection of leaves and herbs in a banana leaf. There were color-
ed cordylines, the strongly perfumed leaves of dyuelbi, nilape, et cet-
era. He began shredding and crumpling the leaves; the scent released 
was strong. This done, he went outside. Wara and Maluna followed, 
Wolei supporting Maka. There they placed the crumpled leaves on a 
large lyimungai banana leaf, where two hibiscus flowers were stuck 
in the midriff. They chanted some Tambin verses in a low voice and 
tore the leaf down its midrib so that the scented leaves cascaded over 
Maka. This was also done to rid her of Tambin. The crumpled leaves 
contained small bits of house thatch from houses in the hamlet, and 
I noticed some bright feathers from the red-breasted pitta wa’aubi. 
Maka was led back and sat down in the day house, as before.
Pauwarak, a senior man from Animbil who had been a luluai (of-
ficial village headman), now appeared. He was chewing a large wad 
of betel and, without saying anything, went over slowly to Maka and 
stood over her, looking at her. He bent and palpated the back of her 
neck, pinching her skin up, bent further, and seemed to nip at the fold 
of skin with his teeth, then straightened back up. With his forefinger 
and index, he delicately removed something from between his front 
teeth, against which his tongue was pressing; it was something tiny, 
which he then threw aside on the ground. He repeated this about 
seven times, each time palpating carefully before pinching up the fold 
of Maka’s skin. When he had done that, he picked some leaves and 
blew and patted on her skin, murmuring “pur pur pur pur” and words. 
He was extracting sigap (arrowheads) by the Panu’et method. These 
were supposed to be in her neck at the back where she had com-
plained of pain. It was not made explicit whether the spirit of Tambin 
or the spirit of the yammami or something else had shot them in her. 
The arrow-remover must not think or talk about the arrowheads but 
should keep his mind blank as he extracts them.
Next Kantyi called to Wolei to cut some bamboo. They got a fresh 
coconut and cut the shell away so as to leave the meat intact in a ball. 
They cut a small hole in it and poured the coconut water out into a 
basin and gave it to Maka to drink. The coconut was then cut and the 
inside grated into shreds. Kantyi and Wolei came back with bamboo 
and some green shoots that were finely cut and mixed with a little 
water, some salt, and the shredded coconut, then put the mixture into 
the bamboo to cook. The green shoots were Tambin herbs.
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Another senior man, Maisu from Dagetasa, had arrived. He was 
Kantyi’s mother’s (collateral) brother. He sat down and talked qui-
etly to Kantyi while the bamboo tube was cooking. I had forgotten 
about him, but then Maisu came forward holding nettles, and he re-
peated the patting and blowing to “smell out” the cause. He declared 
that he smelled the spirit of Weikris (just as Wara had). He brushed 
the nettles over Maka’s chest as if to catch up or sweep something 
up from it with care and difficulty, then gathered the leaves against 
her skin, and threw the extracted “contents” on the ground beside 
him. He bent over and searched minutely in the dust and dirt for 
the “arrowheads” that he hoped he had pulled out, picking at tiny 
fragments of wood—or dirt or chipping or betel shred—discarding 
them as not what he had extracted. Evidently, he could not find any-
thing right. So he repeated the whole maneuver and again searched 
the ground beside him. He didn’t seem to find anything this time 
either, but he did not look dissatisfied or troubled by this. Covertly, 
during his search for the extracted arrowheads, Maka was looking 
sideways to try to see what he found, what had come out. Maka al-
ternated sporadic interest in what was going on with drooping sleep; 
she rested her arm on her knee now, bent her head, and rested it on 
her arm.
Maisu sat down beside Kantyi. Later the cooked bamboo ap-
peared, and Kantyi shook out its contents into a bowl, removed some 
coarse shreds of bark, and stirred it. When it was cool, he gave her 
some in a spoon, but she took the bowl to feed herself. Slowly she 
took about eight spoonfuls, then gave the bowl to Pe’alen (her stepfa-
ther), and he handed out a spoonful to one of her younger daughters, 
then to other children, her older daughters, Maluna’s youngest son; 
they ate it without ceremony. Maluna called out that they should give 
some to Tuawei’s puppy, but they had already finished it.
Dukini, the middle one of her uncles from Bi’ip—her father’s 
younger “brothers,” collateral line—came into the day house. He had 
come from a garden quite far off at Abitag. He had noticed the si-
lenced “singsing” and wondered what had happened. Dukini went 
over to the kerosene drum and Walei ceded his place to him. It was 
now about 5 o’clock, two and three-quarter hours on from the be-
ginning of her attack. Dukini sat down on the drum and supported 
Maka’s sitting position. He stayed sitting there until about 8 p.m., 
when Maka went to Sildao’s house to sleep with Sildao and Padik. 
Sildao is Walei’s wife, Wara’s daughter; Maka calls her “daughter-in-
law,” as she is married to Walei, Maka’s husband’s elder brother’s son. 
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Half an hour after Dukini got there, her two other Bi’ip uncles also 
arrived along with her closest “brother,” Peitu.
Many people stayed, though some people began leaving after 
5:30 p.m. Chatting grew general and relaxed, Maka was allowed to 
doze and scratch at her nettle stings. But no one ate at Watalu that 
night out of concern for Maka. Dukini and Peitu stayed the night, 
as did Pe’alen and Padik. Kantyi did not seem anxious that evening. 
During the evening, Maka’s two-year-old daughter came to suckle. 
(In fact, she had been suckling the child when Maisu went to use 
nettles on her chest. The child screamed.)
The next morning, Maka sat in the porch of another house with 
Padik beside her. She still looked exhausted but she ate some sago 
and leaves. She spent much of the day lying or dozing on a piece of 
limbum, her younger children sprawled with her. Later in the day, 
people came to sit in sympathy from the other hamlets. They had a 
large meal early in the day because of fasting the night before. Du-
kini and Peitu left that evening, judging that Maka was better. Padik 
stayed to help cook for Maka and her family. The next day, most peo-
ple went off to garden. Maka stayed at home with her mother and 
the children. She looked more cheerful. On the fourth day after the 
attack, she went back to ordinary work, fetching food from a garden.
Moral obligation and natural duty
Such ways for people to show concern may not seem to be very comfort-
ing expressions of sympathy and support. People do not usually sit with a 
sick man or woman to talk to him or her or to bolster his morale. Indeed, 
when sick, the Gnau withdraw from social contact and conversation; 
they tend to refuse food. At first, what struck me about the gatherings 
for a sick person was the absence of the sick person him- or herself. The 
patient rarely showed up at them, and people did not go to see him or 
her unless specifically to provide a treatment.
The social withdrawal follows from their idea of the risks of normal 
behavior when one is ill. Men say they fear harm by contamination from 
the menstrual blood of women. They say spirits may strike the sick be-
cause they wish to warn them. A spirit may follow food or people it is 
concerned with. Therefore, it would be tactless to go to chat with some-
one seriously ill, for a spirit might follow, or the afflicting spirit might 
think the patient took the illness lightly and therefore might strike the 
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patient harder. There are also elements of conscious deception in some 
people’s exaggerated show of their abject state; through dirty wretched-
ness and feeble whimpering, they hope to make the spirit think they are 
not worth more bother; they are finished, wrecked.
So at the gathering, the sick person would usually be nearby but out 
of sight, lying half hidden in the porch of a house, on the ground to one 
side, or else inside a house in the dark. A visitor would not normally 
feel free to go inside a private house. When women are ill, companion-
ship and physical contact are greater. A married woman needs help with 
young children, which other wives, sisters, or a mother-in-law will give. 
And women will comfort another woman openly, as shown earlier in the 
description of Bagi being mothered.
More often, however, it looks as if the visitors who gather to spend 
the day with a sick person’s family scarcely pay any direct attention to 
the patient. As the behavior showing illness makes known the person’s 
need largely by nonverbal signs, so the sympathy called forth in response 
is rarely expressed with words directed toward the sufferer. Actions can 
speak louder than words. The spread of concern, the variety of constraints 
imposed by someone’s illness on many others in the community, and the 
way they overcast and disrupt normal village life can give a public quality 
to private suffering.
There are paradoxes in Gnau responses to illness. Anyone would no-
tice pain and certain other signs of illness. Pain or weakness calls for 
attention. Sometimes the abnormality is obvious to others. If illness or 
change draws attention to a person, it can act to individuate him or her. 
The sufferer is singled out, as seen in the conspicuous self-neglect, the 
contrast with ordinary sociability, the patient’s eclipse from participation 
in normal social life. The social gap calls the person to mind. Someone 
who should be there is not; a familiar voice and face are missing. The 
patient is there negatively, in the shadow somewhere nearby. Restric-
tions imposed on others by someone’s illness also act as reminders. In 
the context of village life and community, the conventional withdrawal 
during illness not only makes the patient solitary but also singles out and 
draws attention to them.
This isolation offers a point of resemblance to their way of honoring 
someone for hunting achievement and in some rites of passage. Charac-
teristically, they have a gathering and a meal at which the person being 
honored does not eat with the others; when he does eat, it will be separate 
from everyone else at the gathering. The similarity lies in the focus by 
exclusion (more precisely, it is noninclusion). The exclusion singles him 
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out and reinforces a sense that people have gathered to do something for 
him as distinct from doing it in company with him. Normally, they take 
it for granted that friends and relatives share food and eat in company. 
Food is widely used to express affection, pity, and concern, and to gain 
Figure 9. An ill man lies on a palm-leaf mat in the porch of his wife’s house, 
1969. She sits outside with their adult daughter and some children to watch 
over him and shield him from harm.
Pandora’s box
42
approval and prestige. In diverse situations, both when being honored 
and being ill, one person is marked out from the group, individuated by 
being different, not included when they eat together.
Those who come to sit together with the sick person show they are 
aware of their obligations. Selfish interests are forgotten. They speak of 
another’s illness as “binding” them to stay at home. Hunting parties and 
gardening plans are disrupted. A long illness can interfere seriously with 
a hamlet’s social and economic life. They must not dance and sing; they 
cannot go off for distant hunting; they may put barriers across parts of 
the village to protect the sick person from harmful influences, which oth-
er people might bring these if they come too near. Residents away in the 
bush must be called back. They must avoid using the sick person’s name 
lest bandying it about as though he were well would attract the baleful 
attention of other spirits. Behind all these constraints is the feeling that 
if people know someone is ill, they should come take care of him or her, 
thinking of the patient constantly: “Your eyes should not lose him.” To go 
off hunting as if things were normal would be to forget the sick person 
and show indifference. With someone lying very seriously ill, I saw peo-
ple come to weep to lament his or her ruined state and impending death.
Loyalty obliged kin to come; the obligation was seldom questioned. 
They felt they could not leave their kin or friends to face distress alone. 
There was strength and security in numbers. In a number of myths, the 
theme of the butabasi (people on their own) recurs: someone is left alone 
to face a danger, be it from a demon witch or from human attack. It may 
be the woman alone in her house, the door shut, the village empty, the 
fateful cough outside as the demon spirit announces itself: “Eh-hei! I 
thought you had gone, but here you are!” Or it may be the warrior all 
alone in his village awaiting his enemies. The only child, the orphan, 
the last survivor, each is vulnerable. People should not leave them like 
that. “What? Is he one man all alone? Has he no friends to help him? 
No one to take his place?” That is the Gnau’s basic view. In such small, 
independent communities, there was little security except through the 
support of kin and neighbors. In some cases of illness, the duration and 
severity of the constraints on others reflect the strength of social bonds 
as well as affection and concern for the individual who is ill. There is both 
a practical and an emotional side to the gathering of kin and friends. The 
disabled patient needs food, water, simple nursing care, and protection. 
The displays can perhaps be regarded as a kind of pledge that practical 
sympathy will be forthcoming if needed. People can also discuss what to 
do at the gathering and organize larger-scale treatments, which involve 
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more elaborate rituals. In effect, the Gnau illustrate a principle of natural 
duty in these sit-downs. As John Rawls puts it, “A sufficient ground for 
adopting [the duty of mutual aid] is its pervasive effect on the quality 
of everyday life. The public knowledge that we are living in a society 
in which we can depend upon others to come to our assistance in dif-
ficult circumstances is itself of great value. . . . The primary value of the 
principle is not measured by the help we actually receive but rather by 
the sense of confidence and trust in other men’s good intentions and the 
knowledge that they are there if we need them. Indeed, it is only neces-
sary to imagine what a society would be like if it were publicly known 
that this duty was rejected” (Rawls 1973: 339). Rawls places mutual aid 
among the moral ideas—the natural duties—that are fundamental to so-
ciety. If these duties to each other were not recognized, we might be un-
willing to accept that they belong to a society, or we might say it would 
not be a society worth living in. The discussion of natural duties concerns 
duties that obtain between those regarded as equal moral persons (1973: 
115). The ethnographic problem is to establish how people in another 
society qualify and define the range of those whom they regard as equal 
moral persons. Are the duties owed to all or only to particular individu-
als standing in specific social relationships? A marked distributive aspect 
comes into much of what Gnau people say about their duties to others, 
so they refer to family and closeness of kinship, village, and common 
language as the qualifying grounds they recognize. K. E. Read (1955) 
analyzed the distributive aspect of morality among members of one New 
Guinean society in his fine account of their concept of the person. Peace, 
government, and contact with strangers through travel made Papua New 
Guineans have to change and extend the distribution and range of their 
moral identifications. Gnau people speak about many of their obliga-
tions in terms of basic reciprocity rather than altruism or natural duty. 
They bind justice to reciprocity: “If I do not help my brother, who will 
help him? If I do not help my brother, why should he help me?” My 
questions about support and help provoked that sort of reply rather than 
reference to generosity, which was one of the first things they described 
to characterize a good man or good woman.
However, support in illness is not inexhaustible. In the next chapter, 
I will describe the bitter situation of a man who gradually felt more and 
more abandoned as his long and serious illness dragged on. An illness 
may have moral implications. Is someone to blame for it? Illness has 
been given moral meanings as people seek to make sense of pain and 




Long suffering and injustice
Chronic illness can be hard to bear, especially if the sufferer is getting 
worse. The demands on everyone are dragged out; they exhaust resources, 
wear down the strength to resist, and use up the knowledge of what to 
do. Perhaps the patient can adapt to a disability; more often he or she 
has to do so aware of being overcome. Material and emotional reserves 
dwindle as they are drawn out over time. Kafka’s Metamorphosis (1915) 
is a bitter allegory on this. In a long illness, Gnau visitors might arrive 
saying, “Don’t bother to feed us,” although of course they would be fed. 
There could be heavy demands on the family of the patient to provide 
food, tobacco, and betel nut. I remember seeing someone’s face fall as an-
other batch of visitors turned up in the unremitting succession of visits. 
There is also the bitter possibility of indifference. And this is what struck 
me in the case that follows, which contrasts starkly with the crisis over 
Maka described in chapter 2.
The bitterness of long illness
Wolai’s end. January to August, 1969, Pakuag.
On January 1, 1969, Wolai returned from the distant hunting bush 
complaining of a swollen face. He said his face had been swollen for 
two days, but otherwise he felt the same as before—his chest had not 
been worse lately. He wanted liniment to rub on his face. His face 
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was puffy, he had his usual signs of long-standing bronchitis, and a 
trace of swelling at the ankles. His blood pressure was normal. I gave 
him the liniment he wanted and asked for a urine sample to check 
whether it showed signs of abnormal kidney function to account for 
the swelling. (Liniment is popular; the kind the public health depart-
ment issues, intended for aches and sprains, is thick and dark with a 
fine, strong smell; people like rubbing it on and like the smell; they 
use it for swellings as well as aches.)
I think Wolai is in his late forties but his age is difficult to guess. 
He belongs to Pakuag hamlet. His daughter Kurei is about seven-
teen years old. In the next few days, she does not speak about her 
father; I asked about him. She says he still has a little swelling. The 
urine sample comes after six days. The trace of albumin in it does 
not suggest serious kidney damage. I wait to be asked to see him. 
Then Kurei has her puberty ceremony with two other girls on Janu-
ary 14. Her father keeps clear of all the celebrations, sitting out of 
sight by his aged mother’s house. Two days later in Pakuag, a large 
Panu’et treatment is done in the hope of prompting the delivery of a 
woman who is enormously pregnant but seemingly very long over-
due (in fact, because of twins). The young men are talking of run-
ning off to try and get taken on for plantation labor—it’s the right 
time of year—and a batch do so despite the opposition from their 
mothers and some older men. The next day, their mothers, sisters, and 
brothers chase after the men who have run off to present themselves 
at Nuku (the next subdistrict center) for recruitment there. At one 
point, the very sick man at Watalu, Dauwaras, is thought to have 
died. There is briefly tremendous panic over him. The next day, after 
another puberty ceremony at Bi’ip for a girl’s first menstruation, there 
is a second panic, this time for a woman at Bi’ip who gets possessed, 
thought to be struck by minmin sorcery. Wolai has been forgotten 
in the turmoil of these other events. On January 19, there is a small 
sympathy gathering for him that his wife’s brothers from Animbil 
attend. The following two weeks are busy: the condition of Dauwaras 
(the ill man at Watalu) is desperate; Maka and another woman have 
further possessions and change hamlets; batches of young men run 
off to seek plantation labor; people chase after them; the pregnant 
woman has twins; fears of minmin burgeon, and meetings about this 
take place between villages; the government dentist comes to do a 
full village dental survey; there are sympathy gatherings to mourn the 
departure of the young men to the coast. Wolai is still ill but does not 
ask for me to treat him. On February 4, at the ceremonial breaking up 
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of the worn Wimalu-Basilasel men’s house, Wolai’s elder “brother” 
(FeBS)1 and his sister’s husband asked me to go and see Wolai and 
give him medicine (fifteen days before he had a perirectal abscess 
that I treated—perhaps he feels that since he had to go through it at 
my hands, others should, too).
Wolai was sitting near the tiny house of his mother, Dabetu. His 
mother’s and his wife’s houses are set on a mudstone level hollowed 
out just below the main Pakuag hamlet space. He was sitting alone 
eating dry sago and leaves. He had taken off his shell phallocrypt 
and so was naked and dirty, with ashes on his skin. He complained 
of swelling in his face, his legs, his scrotum. He was evidently breath-
less. The signs were of heart failure, mild to moderate. I could not tell 
the cause of his heart failure. It was likely precipitated by his chronic 
bronchitis, damage from repeated chest infections, smoking, smoky 
houses, wheezy breathlessness. He was also anemic, which was add-
ing to the problem. I gave him diuretics and digoxin to treat his heart 
failure and later iron for the anemia.
As soon as I had given him the immediate treatment, I went back 
to Wimalu where everyone was gathered. They had finished and were 
eating a meal to commemorate the end of the men’s house. A number 
of Wimalu and Watalu hamlet men sat after this, chatting and laugh-
ing together. They brought up the subject of Wolai and his illness. 
Seilun said he was ill because he had eaten a tambelyiti lizard (a spiny-
backed agamid lizard a bit like a small iguana; it is forbidden for most 
people to eat this species as food, except old men). In the following 
conversation (which I was recording), they first say, rhetorically and 
laughing, “Why should someone so young eat that? A young man 
like that! They must be teasing you. Or is he blind to eat something 
bad like that?” Then they go through the order in rules for a variety 
of foods, mainly for my benefit, sorting through and agreeing what 
the order should be. I asked who gave him the lizard to eat. A chorus 
of answers: “He shot it himself ! His own for himself ! He shot it!” I 
asked whether he had said that or did they see him do it. The answer 
came that someone saw his footprints, the remains of the head of a 
tambelyiti lizard, signs of a fire; this man had seen these signs as he 
was on his way coming back through some of Wolai’s bush. The point 
of it was that no man should eat anything he has himself shot: it is 
like eating yourself, your own blood (G. Lewis 1980: 173–74). One 
man said, “He ate it, his own blood struck him.” Another leaned over 
1. FeBS stands for “father’s elder brother’s son.”
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to me, speaking in a hoarse confidential voice, “He knows the ‘dog 
aroid’ spell. . . . He knows the ‘evil spell’ (nunt wola; a kind of destruc-
tive magic), he ate it for revenge and the aroid has struck him (re-
bounded on him).” They went quiet at this. Selaukei explained to me, 
“He has swelled up.” Another, remonstrating: “Hey! What are you 
saying?” Tawo, quietly: “K. was the one who said that.” Others agree, 
“He said so.” Grunts of assent. All right. A pause, silence. Selaukei 
speaks again, “That’s why he’s ill and lying there, and that’s why we 
have spoken out about him.”
At first, the mood is bantering. They are laughing at his alleged 
gross disregard for the rules of proper behavior. It brings Wolai into 
relief as a figure of fun to many (though not to his brothers), a bit 
of a failure; they show him disrespect combined with some unkind-
ness and callousness. I wondered if Wolai’s dignity and stiff reactions 
sometimes provoked the teasing and unkindness.
Wolai is unprepossessing in appearance. He is noticeably short, 
with thin arms and legs. By comparison his head looks large and 
heavy about the jaws and parotids, the more ill-shaped because he is 
bald on top. His chest is shallow and his belly domed so that when 
he walks with his very straight back and erect head, his belly advances 
first. But he is far from fat. He is covered by tinea, an unfortunately 
chronic fungal infection of the skin, making it flaky and grayish. His 
movement is generally stiff, lacking the casual grace and mobility 
many people show. He always seems to me to walk and sit unusually 
straight—I wonder whether it is because of his shortness. He does 
not move his head much to look around him as he walks; his erect 
posture and deliberate gait make him appear dignified and slightly 
ridiculous. He nearly always wears a very faded red laplap (loin wrap) 
cloth at his waist, going down to his knees.
He is less sociable and talkative than most men. He is often sit-
ting by his wife’s house or his elderly mother’s house. As these are 
on a different level from the other houses in the hamlet, the physical 
spacing emphasizes his social distance. My mental picture of him is 
of him walking alone along a path or sitting erect, knees drawn up to 
his chest, somewhat apart from the group of others. He does not take 
much part in conversation, never roars to make himself heard, as the 
others do. He is not assertive. In the early days after my arrival, he 
was one of the few who did not come to look at me to find out what 
I was like. It was months before he would turn up, usually alone, to 
sit on the ground, not saying anything or asking me for anything. He 
does not sit around much looking after or playing with his youngest 
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son. If he walks past Maluna’s day house, he rarely calls out to pass 
the time of day or drop in to chat.
One afternoon, he was in the group as we were sitting in the 
men’s house at Watalu during the Malyi ritual. Some of the others 
related how two evenings before, they were walking back to the vil-
lage, and the man immediately behind Wolai began to tremble as if 
he were going into trance and about to shoot someone. Who? Wolai. 
Everyone went into fits of laughter and slightly belatedly, stiffly (but 
pleased by it, I thought), Wolai laughed with them. What strikes me 
in remembering that is that it is the only time I can think of seeing 
Wolai in the center of a laughing group, enjoying it.
His first marriage ended when his wife died in the dysentery epi-
demic in about 1943–44 (Allen 1983; G. Lewis 1977). It was sug-
gested Berau might marry him after her first husband died, but she 
rejected him. Then a younger brother of his father and others of his 
powerful lineage abducted Beikalyi from Animbil for him. Beikalyi 
is a capable, hard-working woman with a daughter and three sons. 
I don’t know much about her character: she seems observant, intel-
ligent, and reserved. I notice that she frequently goes to Animbil to 
see her brothers and other kin there, as do her children. Her ties to 
her brothers are strong, and her children often go to see or stay with 
their mother’s elder brother, for instance, if they are ill. On one such 
occasion, Wolai said to me that he had sent his son there because he 
had scabies and Wolai didn’t want him at home spreading it.
As for Wolai’s illnesses, apart from the chronic fungal skin infec-
tion (in the Tokpisin language, grile) and his general physique, he has 
recurrent chest infections. In my first year there, he had three that 
needed, I thought, some antibiotic treatment. He and Bilki, who is 
old and white-haired, are the two people most commonly said to be 
short-winded. Some say—maliciously—that Bilki must have eaten 
his son’s or a younger brother’s food. Some say that about Wolai, 
too—in other words, that he broke the taboo and paid the penalty, 
which is breathlessness, wuna’at wola or dapa wola (bad vital center, 
bad wind). Both have chronic loose coughs and get breathless more 
than they should.
Others do not treat Wolai with respect. They will joke at his ex-
pense; they can be quite good-naturedly callous. I think this may be 
in part because he is not good at taking teasing (he lacks “a sense of 
humor”); he gets cross, he is easy to bait. But I have seen him give and 
take teasing when he and Tuawei were peeling taro. They horseplay, 
cheerfully threatening each other with their knives, Tuawei holding 
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him at arm’s length, Wolai threatening to stab him. The sight was 
absurd, that was the joke: Tuawei, tall and strong, fending off Wolai, 
such a shrimp. But some of the jokes about him are cruel. On Febru-
ary 4, when I went by with the medicines for him, someone called out 
to me, “Why bother, he’s an old man old wreck?” Hearers laughed. 
Another, mocking, rhymed, “Wolai, Wulyi, Wulyi’ai” (I’m not sure if 
this was just alliteration, or a play on words coming close to a Gnau 
obscenity wulyi’it).
I believe that Wolai is rather proud, sensitive about his dignity. 
When I first gave him an antibiotic tablet to swallow, I remember 
he put it in his mouth and had great difficulty swallowing it, down-
ing large volumes of water with his head up, neck extended, but 
each time finding the pill still there. There were catcalls and encour-
agement from spectators and children watching. Wolai, absolutely 
miserable, grim-faced and unsmiling, eventually crunched up the 
tablet (which was bitter) and stalked off. Children laughed at him 
openly and showed disrespect in a way that I do not think they 
would have dared with most other senior men. When I went to see 
him, his first remark to me was that he did not want any medicine. 
Then when someone brought a dirty half-coconut shell for a cup, he 
immediately and angrily said, “Take that away and fetch me a good 
one!” The next day when I brought him his medicine, he called for 
water; a child came with a coconut shell, and Wolai said, “Coconut 
shell? Go and get me a cup!” He sounded cross. He did not like 
people watching when I gave him treatment. I had to inject one 
of the diuretics at first. He took the injection silently and with an 
expression of grim endurance. He hated being watched by others 
for this.
Three days later, as I was going to see him, the people in Maluna’s 
day house called to me as I went past: “Don’t go up to Pakuag. Se-
laukei has gone to do the aroid treatment for Wolai—the danger-
ous one. Don’t go close to watch, you might be struck by the aroid.” 
In Pakuag I found the men gathered; Wolai was inside his mother’s 
house. His wife, Beikalyi, was inside her house with her children, 
except for his eldest son, who was sitting with the men. In the space 
in front of Wolai’s two houses, as at the center of a stage, Selaukei 
(the same Selaukei who had shot him in the leg years before at An-
imbil) stood with the decorated “dog aroid” shoot he had fetched and 
prepared the day before at his own bush. It had a red cordyline leaf 
“headdress,” shell and pig-tusk ornaments, yellow lily leaves, and net-
tles bound around its base. Parku, who is married to Wolai’s only full 
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sister, assisted Selaukei. He held the lyimungai banana leaf, with three 
hibiscus flowers stuck in it, and the ashes. The Pakuag men remained 
at a distance, looking down from the open space in front of their 
men’s house. Selaukei prepared the banana leaf by spells and spitting 
betel juice. They held the banana leaf over the aroid, blew smoke, and 
tore the leaf, then Selaukei spat betel and blew spells into the “head-
dress” of the aroid. The others called for Wolai to come. There was a 
pause as Wolai was putting on his laplap. Wolai came out and stood 
over toward the bushes by the path with his back to the spectators. 
Selaukei chanted very quietly beside him, then waved the aroid over 
him and rubbed the nettle base on his thighs and scrotum. He spat 
Wolai on the shoulder blades with two blotches of red betel. He put 
the aroid down, took a langit leaf (as I described in Maka’s case; see 
chapter 2), and tried the divinatory smack on it held over his fist, then 
threw it away with a special throwing gesture. He repeated this two 
or three times. He tried to get Wolai’s knuckles to crack, then made 
his own crack. He got water from a bamboo, and spat it out in a fine 
spray to either side of Wolai.
The others called out to remind Wolai about the money, and 
Wolai produced two shillings, which he waved in a circle around his 
own head and then gave to Selaukei. The people at Pakuag said they 
wanted Selaukei to take the aroid back to Bi’ip with him, not to 
throw it away at Pakuag (as it might come back and strike some-
one). The ceremony appeared very much to be just between Selaukei 
and Wolai, with Parku as assistant. The others commented afterward 
that this aroid spell had been specifically to rid him of the swollen 
scrotum. They associated the procedure with Ligawum and Libuat 
villages (a different isolated language group to the southeast). Hadn’t 
I noticed how many men there had swollen scrotums?
Before the ceremony, Wolai said something to me about the pos-
sibility that he was ill because he had eaten some betel pepper catkins 
from the coast, which were given to him by someone just returned 
from plantation work. After the ceremony, he talked to me about 
another idea he had: the cause of his illness was destructive magic. 
He had stayed in December in the hunting bush. While there, two 
of his “daughters” (married and from a collateral line) had come from 
Saikel, their husbands’ bush, over which there had been a furious dis-
pute with Mandubil, a neighboring village. They brought him greens, 
tobacco, and bananas. Perhaps these had had spells put on them by 
Mandubil who were still cross about the outcome of the dispute. He 
thought perhaps the spells were for belyipeg wolendem (evil spirits).
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The swelling went down quite quickly. The signs of heart failure 
diminished until all he had was a very little swelling of his feet. He 
continued to take the diuretics and digoxin. By February 14, he said 
he was fed up with the tablets, they stuck in his throat. I did not 
think it was nausea. He agreed to go on with them. All this time, he 
has been sleeping in his mother’s house. She is tiny, and the door of 
her house is so small that I find it quite tricky to bend and squeeze 
myself through it. So far, I have hardly exchanged a word with his 
wife about his illness. She has not broached the subject with me. All 
his food and care seem to come from his mother. His daughter rarely 
mentions him to me; his eldest son sometimes helps with fetching 
water and encouraging him to take the tablets.
At Watalu, Dauwaras died at last. There was great pandemonium: 
grief, mourning, reproach, trance, and possession. After three days, I 
had to go to the coast for a meeting. I left Wolai with diuretics and 
discontinued the digoxin, since I was going to be away for two weeks. 
I left on February 20.
I saw him the day after I got back. He was now wearing his phal-
locrypt but he still had some leg edema. He said his illness was from 
his brothers-in-law, he had got it at their bush. He was sitting be-
hind his mother’s house, she was the only other person there. She, 
too, insisted strongly that it was his in-laws who caused the illness. I 
noticed that he spoke their names aloud to me (strictly forbidden for 
brothers-in-law). One of his brothers-in-law is his wusai (coinitiate). 
Why did he think they were the cause? He said he had no particular 
reason, they had had no quarrel, he just guessed, wuna’at wosapeg 
(literally, my thinking center spoke to me).
I put him back on digoxin, continued with diuretics, and gave him 
some iron by intramuscular injection. Over the next period, I heard 
people inquire after him at odd times. Some said that he still had 
swelling and he would die. His brother-in-law, the coinitiate, said he 
thought it was a ghost of a Mandubil man that had struck him. Oth-
ers agreed with this view. Perhaps Mandubil people had used a vine 
and put bad magic on it and Wolai must have stepped over it. I did not 
see him every day, sometimes giving his daughter the tablets for him. 
On March 13, he had a bit more swelling, and he was bitter and re-
sentful. He had had enough pills; he said he was stuffed up to the arse 
with pills. What he wanted was fish, bread, flour, and biscuits. Why 
wouldn’t I sell them to his daughter? I said I wasn’t running a store.
The next day, I had to give him a diuretic by injection. He jumped 
a bit at the prick; the needle came out, so I jabbed it back. It upset 
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him: “Udei!” he said with pain, turned his head away, and began to 
snuffle. I tried to soothe him, saying, “It’s all done, all over.” Then I 
got out the tablets, which he said he did not want. His eldest son, 
standing just outside the hut, spoke up, “He says he doesn’t want 
them? He’s always saying that. Don’t bother with him.” I thought this 
sounded very unfeeling. For Wolai’s benefit, I went on about how I 
knew the tablets and the injections were nasty but they were the only 
way for him to get better, and so on. If he didn’t want them, I would 
not make him take them. Then without saying anything, Wolai put 
his hand out for them, took them, and put them in a tin to swal-
low later. Dabetu had been beside him throughout in the tiny dark 
space, telling him to put his leg in the right position, telling me to 
inject downward so it would course down the leg to where the swell-
ing was. After the injection, he turned over and lay on his face on a 
leathery sheet (made of the base of limbum palm leaves), head down, 
snuffling. By cajoling, Dabetu got him to turn over—the mother. elf-
sized, wrinkled, naked, bending over her middle-aged son who was 
snuffling, cantankerous, miserable in the half-dark, the door almost 
shut. Everything cramped, and brown: the floor, the limbum sheet, 
the walls, the firewood. Wolai turned over onto his back. He looked 
up at me straight faced and did a gesture as though to hit me in the 
face, meant as a joke; his mother smiled hopefully at me to check that 
I understood the gesture.
I went on to Dagetasa hamlet. There they said that Wolai’s illness 
was going on so long because he had eaten something wrong—horn-
bill or the tambelyiti lizard—they were not sure what, but something 
he should not have eaten according to their rules. They said further 
that he knows the aroid spell, implying that they think his knowledge 
has turned back on him.
In the days following that, his brother-in-law (who is the most 
senior of them and closest to his wife) came to spit over his legs, 
arms, and belly against harmful spells placed on paths to protect bush 
or crops; he might have stepped over them. His edema improved 
and Wolai seemed more cheerful and cooperative. His mother was 
pleased and said, at least to me, she thought the pills had helped. 
One evening, there were bangs like gunshot from Pakuag. The peo-
ple I was sitting with at Watalu immediately guessed: it was Wolai’s 
son dropping gunpowder into the fire beside his sleeping father to 
startle the sickness out of him. He confirmed it next day. His fa-
ther continued to feel better and had only a trace of swelling left. 
On March 21, I noticed unswallowed tablets from yesterday on the 
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ground in the hut. The day after that I found him holding a hot stone 
in bamboo tweezers to rub against his wuna’at, the thinking center 
and vital center (at the middle of his chest, bottom of the sternum). 
The hot stone had been put in water in a coconut shell with herbs. He 
was doing this for himself because he thought that his breathlessness 
might come from having eaten food cooked by his wife’s brother’s 
daughter (permissible). But she was married to someone he called 
“son,” therefore her food is cooked by a son’s wife and is consequently 
forbidden. However, this “son” belongs to a quite separate and rather 
distantly connected collateral lineage, so there is not much force in 
the rule and the other relationship might override it. He said only 
one foot feels swollen, though his legs and knees are stiff. He wants 
to rub liniment on his hamstrings. A few days later, he put a poultice 
of hot sticky breadfruit bark on his legs. I found an irregularity in his 
pulse rate and decided to stop the digoxin. Some days later, I noticed 
unswallowed diuretic pills again. On April 3, since he had hardly a 
sign of swelling left, I stopped the diuretics.
He continued to sit around in Pakuag, seemed more cheerful. He 
was pleased the swelling had gone, although he said he felt his legs 
were too stiff for walking, the tendons pulled. Wolai and his moth-
er continued to maintain that his leg trouble was due to his having 
stepped over the magic against trespass placed on their bush paths 
by his brothers-in-law. His eldest son denies that. Throughout May, 
Wolai stayed much the same, making little effort to get himself walk-
ing again, although he kept a broken old bow beside him as a stave 
for support.
On May 13, nearly everyone in his hamlet went off to stay at their 
hunting grounds. His wife and the children remained with him for 
the first week, then she went off with the younger ones while the 
two older children went to stay at Animbil. That left Wolai alone 
in the hamlet with his aged mother. I heard some people in another 
hamlet joke about his two children abandoning him. The place was 
empty. He was bored. Later in the month, when I walked up, I found 
a dog lying dead on the path in Pakuag, close to its owner’s shut and 
barred-up house. There were flies. The dog’s corpse and the flies and 
the silence was an image of abandonment, only a few doors from 
Wolai. I mentioned the dog to Wolai; he said to leave it for its owner 
to come back to. There was little sign of anyone taking interest in him 
now, no sit-downs, no people coming to chat.
Except for his inactivity, Wolai does not appear to be very ill. 
He is bad-tempered to Dabetu, telling her to shut up and raising 
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his hand as though to strike her when she talks too much to me. He 
wants to answer me himself. His restricted life is not much relieved 
by interesting things. Daikun’s return after being bitten by a snake 
on June 1 was a high point of commotion to break the dreary days.
The others returned and June drew on. There were no marked 
changes in Wolai, but gradually some edema returned, mainly in his 
scrotum because he kept sitting and made scarcely any attempt to 
walk. He did not ask for treatment. I asked his eldest son and daugh-
ter to find out whether he would like me to bring pills again. They 
doubted it but did not come back with a definite answer. Wolai said 
to me, after I had reminded him that the edema had gone before, 
that he wanted liniment to rub on his tight hamstrings, that was all, 
no more pills, a tin to cook in. He and his mother talk quite cheer-
fully to me; they say the reason he is not walking yet is because of 
his brothers-in-law’s antitrespass magic. They complain that no one 
brings them game or fish. There was a sit-down gathering for him 
on July 5, but he and Dabetu are alone together most of the time. 
Beikalyi brings food and Dabetu cooks his.
Late in July, Wolai hit Dabetu. I heard the gossip about it two 
days before I went to take them a bit of brush turkey to eat. Dabetu 
came out through the door, greeting me: “Oh you’ve come about my 
eye, it’s closed up. It was an argument about firewood, he hit me, my 
eye is closed.” She had a swollen black eye with rheum gathered at the 
corner and a crusted scab at the lateral border. Wolai called out from 
inside, “He must come and do my sores.” His wife, Beikalyi, from her 
doorway said, “Do his sores, they are on his knee and belly, his belly is 
bloated.” Wolai had some patches of sodden raw skin leaking edema-
tous fluid on his knees and lower abdomen, not infected. His face, 
legs, abdomen, and scrotum were swollen. He said, “Do something 
for the sores on my knees and belly; the water is in me and these have 
broken out; they just came up out of nothing.” He looks piteous. He 
is crotchety with Dabetu. He agreed to take the medicine again and 
knew he would have to go on taking it for a long time. Over the next 
few days, he lost a lot of the fluid and the sore areas dried up, begin-
ning to heal cleanly. Wolai went outside again to lie in the sun and 
was more talkative. He thinks it is the spirit Malyi—the same as killed 
Dauwaras—that has tied him down with illness for so long now; Da-
betu backs him up. He says it must have been when he went to sing 
for Dauwaras with everyone that Malyi saw him and struck him.
Early in August, people began to leave again to hunt in the dis-
tant bush. Pakuag again emptied, except for Wolai, his mother, his 
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wife, and their children. I left on August 7 to join the men at one 
camp. My wife had a supply of diuretics and digoxin for him, but two 
days later she set out with some people from Watalu to find me. She 
said Wolai looked noticeably worse; she had left diuretics with him.
Wolai died during the night on August 11. Dabetu and Beikalyi 
wept over him.
On my way back on August 12, we came past the Pakuag hunt-
ing camp at Lawugda along the river and the people there told us 
he had died. Early that morning, they had heard the distant garamut 
slit-gong beats from Rauit, announcing the death. What surprised 
me was that although they were his own clan, they were still there at 
Lawugda. Why had they not rushed back to mourn? We were walk-
ing back with a small band that included Wolai’s ten-year-old son. 
When they told us Wolai was dead, no one showed any concern or 
sympathy for the son. He did not show distress; he went on as before 
as if nothing was different. At one point, he picked a decorative fern 
frond from beside the path and was about to stick it in his hair when 
another boy said, more or less joking, “Don’t do that, your father has 
just died, you can’t decorate yourself.” Wolai’s son scampered on.
We reached the village late in the afternoon. The schoolteacher 
(one mission placed a local “catechist schoolteacher” in the village; 
he was only sometimes present, but that is a different story), assisted 
by a strong young woman, had dug the grave to bury him. Some 
people from De’aiwusel, the next Gnau village, had come to mourn, 
and they were able to help bury him. Dabetu and Beikalyi, along 
with her children, went to sleep at Animbil with Beikalyi’s elderly 
mother. They would have been in danger from Wolai’s ghost if they 
had been alone at Pakuag. None of the Pakuag residents had come 
back; no one seemed to expect they would return for Wolai’s death. 
The next day, some people wearing mud came from Bi’ip to mourn 
in the empty village. On the day after that, some kin from Mandubil 
came; they were received at Animbil because no one was at Pakuag. 
On August 15, his two elder children returned from a hunting camp 
with their mother’s two brothers and mourned and wept at his grave. 
I asked a man from Watalu why the Pakuag people had not returned. 
He said, “Oh, because they are in the bush.” I contrasted this with 
Dauwaras’s death, marked by the residents’ return and their wild 
grief. He said, “Well, Wolai was always cross and telling them off.” 
The Pakuag and Wimalu hunting parties did not return until August 
22–23. I did not hear them mourn.
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On August 25, they began building a new men’s house at Wimalu-
Basilasel, which was the main reason why they had been hunting so 
long: to make ready for the ceremonies for building it. One of Wolai’s 
lineage brothers said something to me privately on that day about 
not having mourned for Wolai. They had been in the bush, he said, 
and anyway, Wolai had not been a wuyin (good man or healthy one, 
or perhaps a well man; I failed to find out whether he actually meant 
his character or his state of health). On August 26, after erecting the 
center posts of the new men’s house, Pakuag ate the ceremonial meal 
to send off Wolai’s spirit. The same Pakuag man who had spoken to 
me privately before said rather cynically they had to do that quickly 
so that they could sing for the new men’s house. Beikalyi and Dabetu 
and the children stayed on at Animbil until then. An elderly, forceful 
Pakuag woman went off to tell them they must return.
Figure 10. The clan men’s house at the Rauit hamlet of Bi’ip, 1968. It shows the 
conspicuous size of the structure and its traditional shape, which is less notice-
able in recently constructed men’s houses.
The opening night ceremony for the new men’s house was on Au-
gust 29. Wolai’s most senior brother refused to come out of sorrow or 
respect for the memory of Wolai, and Beikalyi wore mourning clay 
to it. But overall, the lack of display of grief for the death of Wolai by 
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his family and kin was in stark contrast to what had happened when 
Dauwaras died.
Beikalyi went back to her house with her children. Old Dabetu de-
cided to move to her married daughter’s house in Wimalu. I saw her at 
odd times—little, thin, old, just as before. On October 13, she seemed 
well. After the evening meal, she went off to sleep, but a few hours later 
she was dead. Her kin from Mandubil, the village of her birth, came to 
mourn. She was buried at Dagetasa. Pakuag gave these Mandubil kin 
the payments for her own and her son’s death at the same time.
*     *     *
I wrote most of that account of Wolai’s illness at the time that it took 
place, a running record of his illness. As it went on so long, I grew con-
cerned by his growing loneliness and bitterness. I have recorded my 
impressions of his character and other people’s responses to him. Cer-
tainly, I was struck by his isolation, the tiny old woman looking after 
her crotchety son, the apparent indifference of his wife and children, the 
neglect, the dog dead on the path, the lack of loud grief when he died. 
My impulse is to comment on the way it shows how people assessed him 
as an individual (prickly, awkward, not much to admire) and how this 
evaluation of him detracted from their readiness and enthusiasm to help 
him. It reflects the feelings people have for someone as an individual 
whom they know and interact with, their obligations to him as a person 
with a particular social position. In this case, the long illness put heavier 
demands on them and in the end exposed more about how they evalu-
ated him as an individual. The illness individuated him.
It illustrates in a more marked form the way illness can single 
someone out in Gnau village life. Many New Guinean societies stress 
competitive achievement as well as equality. This is a recipe for indi-
vidualism, for giving greater recognition to the individual, which dif-
fers from societies where power and authority are fixed by ascription or 
depend more strictly and exclusively on group status and social position 
(La Fontaine 1985).
Behavior in extremity
The empty village, the dead dog, flies buzzing around it, fix in my 
memory an image of his abandonment: a most unfortunate, embittered 
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man and his decrepit mother. Perhaps I read the judgment and in-
difference into the picture and make too much of it. For the picture 
recurred to me when I read Colin Turnbull’s account of the Mountain 
Ik (Turnbull 1974). His book raised appalling questions about indif-
ference, callousness, and inhumanity. With Wolai, the question seemed 
to be about the judgment of an individual; with the Ik, it seemed to 
be about the moral degradation of a people as a whole during extreme 
deprivation; by extension, the book raised questions about the essential 
nature of human beings and society. Is this what society is like when 
the duty of mutual aid is rejected? Turnbull argued (1974: 239) that 
during starvation, the Ik were brought together by self-interest alone; 
they lacked any sense of moral responsibility toward each other, lacked 
any sense of belonging to, needing, or wanting each other (1974: 180); 
they were so close to death from starvation that such luxuries as fam-
ily and sentiment and love could mean death (1974: 108). The Ik fit 
Thomas Hobbes’s harsh view of the essential nature of man, not views 
like those of Mencius or David Hume, who put forward compassion 
and sympathy as essential principles of human nature and moral action 
and held that feeling for others is present and basic to man. So, too, is 
self-love.
Is egoism or altruism at the root of human social behavior? I pause 
on this point because of the suggestion that compassion or sympathy 
would prompt care for the sick in any society. People have tried to use 
cases of human behavior in extreme and horrifying situations as guides 
or clues to human nature and the roots of human action as though ex-
tremity stripped humanity down to its naked essence. Turnbull’s descrip-
tion of the Ik has been used in this way, just as his account and inter-
pretation have been questioned (Barth and Turnbull 1974; Heine 1985; 
Pitt-Rivers 1975). But these inquiries are both misconceived. It is surely 
mistaken to look for the foundations of human morality in people who 
are starving. Would a physiologist expect to find the essential princi-
ples of growth exemplified by them? Many traps wait for someone who 
tries to explain the normal by examining the abnormal. Writing of his 
experiences at Auschwitz, Primo Levi did not conclude that man is fun-
damentally brutal, egoistic, and stupid, but he did argue that in the face 
of driving necessity and physical disabilities, many social habits and in-
stincts are reduced to silence (Levi [1960] 1987: 93). In the concentra-
tion camp, the struggle to survive was without respite because everyone 
was desperately and ferociously alone. If someone stumbled, there was 
no one to extend a helping hand.
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To sink is the easiest of matters: it is enough to carry out all the 
orders one receives, to eat only the ration, to observe the discipline 
of the work and the camp. Experience showed that only exception-
ally could one survive more than three months in this way. All the 
musselmans (a word the old ones of the camp used to describe the 
weak, the inept, those doomed to selection) who finished in the gas 
chambers have the same story, or more exactly, have no story; they 
followed the slope down to the bottom, like streams that run down 
to the sea. On their entry into the camp, through basic incapacity, or 
by misfortune, or through some banal incident, they are overcome 
before they can adapt themselves. (Levi [1960] 1987: 96)
In the camp, where each person was alone and where the struggle 
for life was reduced to its primordial mechanism, an unjust ferocious 
law was openly in force: “To he that has, will be given; from he that has 
not, will be taken away” (Levi [1960] 1987: 80). In his chapter on “The 
drowned and the saved,” Levi describes how the pitiless process of selec-
tion and survival worked.
Levi saw how some—a tiny few—managed to survive. Adaptation 
took place by cunning or by skill. Some were ruthless, some were a bit 
prepared for it by harsh experience. C. D. Laughlin (1978) interpreted 
the Ik’s response to starvation as the response of people who have learned 
the hard way by experience, by repeated exposure to extreme deprivation. 
If they wish to survive in bad times, they cannot afford the same rules 
of morality and reciprocity as in good times. The flexibility and atom-
ism of a hunting-and-gathering mode of life applies more stringently; 
nothing is spared for the old or the young; care for them may cost the 
survival of young adults. Lorna Marshall (1961) argued that gift-giv-
ing and reciprocity served, among other things, to control and alleviate 
emotional tension and aggression among the Bushmen; reciprocity and 
sharing were the rule and strongly sanctioned. Without any food or gifts 
to give, emotions normally channeled and controlled by obligatory shar-
ing were given full expression. Perhaps this may help to explain some 
of the heartless and cruel behavior of starving Ik. It is hardly surpris-
ing that people’s willingness to share varies with their resources, that 
moral behavior and rules for hard times may differ from those suited to 
good times. People can show generalized reciprocity, cooperation, and 
concern for longer-term interests when times are good, but in very bad 
times, negative reciprocity and short-term interests predominate and 
groups fragment. Marcel Mauss and Henri Beuchat’s (1906) study of 
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seasonal variation in Eskimo (Inuit) society showed that moral systems 
can vary under different environmental pressures. The implication is 
that societies will also differ in their aptitudes for coping with crises, 
in the kinds of acute and chronic problems they are well or ill prepared 
for. In this respect, people might look at social responses to epidemics 
or famines as a test of social strengths and weaknesses, as if in famine, 
plague, or crisis, the social drama would provide an epiphany or showing 
forth of the character and resilience of the society and its social structure 
(D’Souza 1988; Firth 1959: chapters 3, 4; Iliffe 1987; I. M. Lewis 1981; 
Lindenbaum 1979; Sen 1981; Sorokin 1946).
The frame of adaptation includes variation due to environment and 
to stress. It allows for altruism being part of human nature though sti-
fled under pressure. Views on altruism have come from others besides 
philosophers. Anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and socio-
biologists have analyzed varieties of reciprocity, the gift in social life. The 
argument of kin selection theory and of reciprocal altruism (E. O. Wil-
son 1975: 117, 120) is that the benefits of such behavior outweigh the 
losses. “While on particular occasions we are required to do things not 
in our own interests, we are likely to gain on balance at least over the 
longer run under normal circumstances. In each single instance the gain 
to the person who needs help far outweighs the loss of those required 
to assist him, and assuming that the chances of being the beneficiary 
are not much smaller than those of being the one who must give aid, 
the principle is clearly in our interest” (Rawls 1973: 333). The idea that 
parents have a natural impulse to care for their young, even at some 
sacrifice of themselves, is easy to accept as well as understandable in 
evolutionary terms. It is not surprising that behavior roughly possible to 
call “altruistic” should have evolved in animals—the thwarting of preda-
tors by communicating alarms or feigning injury to distract them, the 
practices of parental sacrifice, cooperation in breeding, “aunt” and “uncle” 
behavior in monkeys, food sharing, ritualized contests, all must have of-
fered advantages for survival. Etymology is oddly in harmony with kin 
selection theory if it suggests links between kin, kind, and kindness. The 
evolutionary argument would reinforce the position of those who assert 
that mutual aid is a natural duty. Peter Kropotkin ([1902] 1939), Edvard 
Westermarck (1906–8), and Leonard Hobhouse (1906) were quick to 
compare animal and human social behavior to establish mutual aid as 
a factor in evolution and in the origin and development of moral ideas. 
Care for the ill might then have roots in the emergence and develop-
ment of sympathy and mutual aid. Social life requires some recognition 
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of others and their rights and some feeling of responsibility for their 
welfare. The final question we might ask about a moral attitude toward 
another person is whether someone cares if another lives or dies. The less 
we know about people, the more we can be indifferent to them; complete 
ignorance may amount to complete indifference.
There were elements of indifference to Wolai as his illness went on, 
but it may be mistaken to suppose it was simply indifference. People’s 
abilities to respond depend on their particular circumstances at the time. 
There were competing calls on them, demands to participate in care for 
other people, the staging of ceremonies, departures for plantation work, 
and the flow of many events within the village. It is hard to tell exactly 
how different people weigh up costs and benefits in deciding on action. 
For in the case of Wolai, it was clear they did attempt to treat him with 
a number of remedies, but his illness went on and on, and as it did so, 
they became increasingly pessimistic about his chances of recovery. The 
treatment I provided probably prolonged his illness and the burdens on 
others of providing long-term care. In terms of their past experience 
with Dauwaras’s suffering, they had tried to heal Wolai using many, if 
not nearly all, the means they knew, but without success. All they felt 
they could do was wait. Their traditional treatments (particular actions 
and rituals they performed to rid someone of illness) had failed; only 
caretaking was left, care that they saw not as a remedy so much as a wait-
ing, without much hope, for the outcome.
His illness was a long one, and many people tried to help him with 
specific treatments. It was most difficult and demanding to sustain basic 
nursing care over such a long period. People’s indifference seemed to be 
most evident in regard to such care. It is easy to judge acts and omissions 
by the wrong criteria—criteria appropriate to our own society but not 
to theirs. Their patterns of withdrawing care for an ill person are differ-
ent from ours. Judgments about the primary responsibilities of a mother 
compared to those of a wife, as well as beliefs about the dangers or support 
each may bring, are not the same everywhere. In Wolai’s case, the issues 
of acts and omissions should include my own. The varieties of omission in 
helping others have different moral weightings depending on how people 
view the probabilities of alternative outcomes and their abilities to act or 
do something that might make a difference. Some omissions are more 
blameworthy than others; it is impossible to do all good things at once, and 
since actions take time and omissions do not, people must make choices 
and weigh alternatives and priorities (Glover 1977: 92–112). Wolai’s case 
reveals the uncertainty in the diagnoses proposed by different people; they 
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proposed various causes that came from various sources, some based on 
evidence and others on speculation. Not all diagnoses were acted on nor 
were all proposed with the same conviction. Staging a large-scale treat-
ment, making an invocation and spitting spell-infused substances over 
the patient, coming from another hamlet to spend a day at the patient’s 
home—all of these choices demand different amounts of time and ef-
fort. However, they are relatively public gestures and receive acknowledg-
ment from others. By contrast, the continuous daily actions of caring for 
a sick family member in private may be far more demanding of effort and 
patience than a public treatment but does not receive acclaim—indeed, 
people hardly refer to private caretaking at all. Men control and perform 
public treatments and take credit for the results; women do most of the 
basic daily care for sick family members, but they do it without fanfare 
and without reward, rarely getting much credit for it.
The visits and gatherings to sit in sympathy for the ill and the treat-
ments organized by men were the main public responses to illness. In 
1968, most people were prompt in recognizing their duty to show sym-
pathy in the expected way, although their feelings about the individual 
concerned might affect what they chose to do. The response showed 
concern and willingness to help. However, in 1980 or thereabouts, I 
think Gnau people began to change their attitudes toward the ill. They 
now seem to feel less bound to come; the imperative to do so is gone, 
partly because some people now ask whether gathering to sit together 
has any practical value for treating the illness. They compare gathering 
to sit down around a sick person with getting an injection, visiting the 
health post, or going to a hospital (though they do little enough of that). 
The customary visiting has come to seem passé: occasionally they al-
lude to this with the cliché Tokpisin phrase westim taim tasol (wasting 
time, that’s all). They are more calculating about sit-downs, more likely 
to plan when and whether it is worth the effort, whether to come if the 
sick person is someone important or someone old, to come on weekends 
rather than as soon as they can. Twenty years earlier, the gatherings were 
a common feature of village life; they used to happen regardless of the 
week or day. However, people have become well aware of the Western 
calendar, the days of the week, and time patterning, even though they 
are largely irrelevant to village life. They rather like the notion of tak-
ing time off during weekends to rest and socialize instead of assuming 
responsibilities like visiting the sick. In the past, coming to sit down 
in sympathy for an ill person represented a recognition of duty, even 
if it was either spurred or curbed by feelings about the patient or the 
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current state of their social relationships. By 1985, sit-downs seemed to 
no longer be considered an adequate or worthwhile response to illness; 
they were viewed less as natural expressions of mutual aid than as social 
obligations that had to compete with other more pressing calls on peo-
ple’s time. Perceptions of alternative methods of treatment, the presence 
of a health post in the village, and various modern influences and experi-
ences contributed to changes in attitudes about the protective and social 
value of the sit-downs.
Figure 11. A young woman keeps watch over her sick father while a visitor 
chats.
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Blame for illness
Care for others may be at the root of responses to the sick, but the re-
sponses are also affected by explanations given for the illness. Someone 
may be thought to deserve the illness or to be ill because of personal 
faults or because of the actions of other people. Consider, for exam-
ple, the mother-in-law of two young wives who quarreled about a sago 
palm. When she fell ill with a chest infection, she blamed her illness on 
them for quarreling and suggested that a spirit of her husband’s lineage 
made her ill because it was cross at the lack of harmony between the 
wives. Ideas like this likely increased sympathy for the sick woman. But 
the question of why she should have suffered—instead of one or both 
of the daughters-in-law—was ignored. There was disharmony among 
the families of that part of the lineage, one member of the group had 
fallen ill, and the timing fit: that was enough. It was true that one of the 
daughters-in-law had earlier run off to return to her parents, perhaps 
due partly to shame, partly to anger, partly to fear of being struck by a 
lineage spirit if she stayed, and partly to seek comfort and sympathy. At 
her parents’ home, it was almost as though she were there because she 
was ill (at least she was there to avoid the danger of illness). The Gnau 
would leave room for ambiguity and different interpretations when they 
explained illness; they often described the facts and circumstances but 
drew no definite conclusion. For instance, when Daikun was bitten by 
a snake, people insisted on remarking that his mother had died after a 
snake bite years earlier; this was meant to draw attention to a possible 
connection, perhaps a motive and an agent, whether human or spirit. But 
no one spelled out who or which or what; they just raised the point, it 
echoed, and they left it at that.
My aim now is to consider the effect of some explanations on at-
titudes toward the patient and treatment. Explanations of cause and 
general theories about illness often imply advice about how to avoid 
exposure to risk. You would think that people must get some blame for 
their illness if they know what the risks are but do not bother to avoid it. 
The suggestion that Wolai had shot the lizard himself and eaten it was 
insulting and, so far as I know, no one voiced it openly to him. Expla-
nations of illness and theories about the causes of illness often suggest 
lines along which people may attribute blame. Even if they do not do so 
explicitly, they may, by pointing out regularities in the process at work 
in illness, provide grounds for judgments about the sufferer’s foolish-
ness or thoughtlessness (or that of someone else). But it is not always 
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simple to do this. If we take the common Gnau case of someone com-
plaining of aches or sudden pains after digging up yams—or especially 
senior men at the time of first planting, mounding, or harvesting their 
yams—no one implied they had been foolish; they had done their duty, 
the work was hard, the risk it entailed was bound to be there. The risk re-
flected the seriousness and worth of the work, the spirits, the magic, and 
the powers in it. The aches were thus a kind of testimony to them. The 
rather histrionic element in their behavior made me think that it was 
due not so much to pain but the expectation of it and the feeling they 
had completed a weighty task, which made them satisfied to suffer and 
draw attention to themselves. People can make the rights and wrongs 
of illness complicated by the theories they put forward to explain it. I 
shall argue that the complication and the possibility of complications 
sometimes help to meet the difficulties of reconciling illness with justice. 
They increase the alternatives of explanation, they meet contingencies of 
circumstances, and they allow people to attribute significance to events 
that may be deeply distressing and might otherwise be meaningless.
In many societies, people suppose that wrong action, immorality, or 
sin may cause illness. To an outsider who does not share their beliefs, 
they seem to have seized on the nastiness of illness to use it as a sanc-
tion to reinforce rules they think are right. Nature is thus portrayed as 
upholding morality. Taboos may identify the dangers in foods that react 
to breaches of certain social rules; teachings against incest warn that 
it causes a sort of skin disease. Such views may seem more intelligible 
when actual illness occurs in a context of social disruption or when the 
disruption is caused by illness. Diagnosis reveals some person’s wrong or 
something wrong in the community; people make sense of the illness 
by discussing how it indicates past or present conflict, tension, evil, or 
offense. The illness may seem to be a judgment on someone or on the 
group that also suffers, though less directly, through his or her illness. 
Victor Turner’s much admired analysis of the illness of Kamahasanyi 
(1964) is a striking account of this—the illness is taken as a social in-
dicator by the Ndembu and as a catalyst of a social dénouement by the 
observer. Turner (1957: 91–92) found that such social dramas provided a 
limited area of transparency on the otherwise opaque surface of regular 
uneventful social life. Latent conflicts of interest become manifest, and 
kinship ties whose significance is not obvious in genealogies emerge into 
prominence. They show how social tendencies operate in practice and 
how conflict between individuals or groups, which may revolve around 
a common norm or contradictory norms, can be resolved in a particular 
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set of circumstances. Partly because of Kamahasanyi’s weakness when 
faced by his duty, relations within the village had soured into bitter but 
half-concealed distrust and rivalry. The village was close to the point 
of breaking up. Kamahasanyi’s illness served to catalyze a decisive re-
action in the ferment of troubles. It resolved the doubt about whether 
or not the members of the village were prepared to come together, for 
they thought Kamahasanyi had little hope of recovery unless they were 
prepared to reconcile their differences, to vent their hidden animosities 
at the ritual to heal him. The decision to use that way to treat him was 
an earnest token of their desire to stay together; at the least they were 
prepared to shelve their differences and try to get him well. The members 
of his village were divided in their opinions on the rights and wrongs of 
the situation. As in a legal case, some bargaining and dispute took place 
over how the rules applied to the case and over the justice and rightness 
of the eventual decision.
Suffering and justice
In most societies, illness has been associated in some respects with law, 
religion, or morals. Issues of justice and fairness come to be bound up 
with it. But if illness could be a punishment or the result of vengeance, 
it may be hard to explain why such a punishment was merited or why 
anyone should wish to take such revenge. The problem is to diagnose 
or interpret the event when people want to make sense of it in those 
moral terms. They do not want to leave the situation unaccounted for. 
Ideas about regularities in how things happen, about processes, enable 
people to plan their actions and interpret events. Less is left empty and 
unexplained. Beliefs in the ability of people and spirit agents to cause 
illness thrust forward issues of fairness and malevolence. Illness is then 
likely sometimes to catalyze or provoke conflict. Maka’s case (see chap-
ter 2) contains a collection of different diagnoses and implications: the 
preceding accusation of revenge on Dauwaras for an earlier death voiced 
indirectly through someone else’s possession; Maka’s own possession and 
the warnings to Dauwaras’s brothers; the possibility she had been struck 
by sorcery; earlier threats from Nembugil; the switch from seeing her as 
merely possessed to seeing her as ill; the ambiguity about the motive of 
the spirit possessing her and its relationship to her husband; and the un-
certainty over which among the alternative spirits addressed in the fran-
tic succession of treatments was the one that had attacked her and why. 
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Diagnosis is not always sharply separate from treatment. At first, Maka 
was seen not as ill but as possessed, a state in which she revealed mes-
sages about danger and diagnosis. When people thought she might be 
dying, each possible suggestion prompted action; they tried each treat-
ment but no one waited for an answer about which one might be right, 
thinking the situation was too desperate for that. There is no reason why 
the people involved should come to a single opinion on the merits or 
justice of a particular case or on the diagnosis. Over Wolai, there was 
more than a hint of malice in the diagnosis others gave of the lizard he 
supposedly had shot and eaten. I never felt I had really fathomed what 
he felt about his brother-in-law, whose magic against trespass was one of 
the explanations he gave for his illness. At times, I thought he resented 
him and was jealous of his influence over his wife and children—for 
instance, from the way he spoke his name when he should not have done 
so and from his remark about sending his son to him when he had sca-
bies. There was no consensus on Wolai’s diagnosis.
If we ask why illness is considered in some cases to come as a pun-
ishment or sanction of those who break social or ritual rules, the answer 
may be that it is because of the suffering that can accompany illness. 
Illness strikes the individual directly; it would be the most personal and 
individual form for retribution to take. Life is valued, and illness may 
even take it away. Legal forms of punishment have often included the 
infliction of pain, mutilation, or death to satisfy the spirit of revenge or 
to express a feeling of public outrage. They take vengeance on the person 
of the guilty. Sickness and punishment may have been linked because 
both might mean suffering pain and even death. However, even when 
the threat of illness occurs as a sanction for social or religious codes 
because of its deterrent effect, individual illnesses in practice may rarely 
be interpreted as retribution. In a number of cases, the Gnau suggested 
that the cause of an illness was antitrespass magic or the ancestors of the 
owners of the land attacking wives or visitors or passersby. But some-
times the sufferer had done no wrong to the owners or the ancestors; 
people suggested the explanation as if once the ancestor were set, like the 
magic planted on paths or the hidden arrowhead traps, it might easily 
and inadvertently strike an innocent person. A sense of justice demands 
that the punishment should fit the crime, but often illness will not fit. It 
may strike the wrong person. This cannot be reconciled with a sense of 
justice. If a sanction were so rigidly fixed to a particular offense that the 
illness automatically accused the sufferer, it would be hard to imagine 
how such beliefs could survive and still seem fair, given the contingencies 
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and inconstancy of disease in everyday life. It would be difficult to rec-
oncile the suffering in each case as rightly bound to rules that people 
regard as being good. These questions of responsibility and justice extend 
to fundamental problems of meaning, of fate, destiny, and theodicy that 
religions seek to answer (Fortes 1959; Obeyesekere 1968).
John M. Janzen (1978) compared decisions taken in the manage-
ment of illness to legal decision-making. Both processes might involve 
evidence, argument, and negotiation, the transfer of rights to act or take 
responsibility. Societies differ in terms of the distribution of rights to 
make decisions, rights to control, and rights take action. In the man-
agement of the illnesses of Maka and Wolai, the lack of consensus was 
striking. There was no agreed-upon decision, no single specialized or au-
thoritative source. Different diagnoses and treatments flowed on without 
opposition or confrontation. The moral implications raised by some of 
them were not publicly or squarely faced. More often it was left open or 
ambiguous whether the agent had struck on purpose or capriciously or 
by chance.
If the problem for some people is to reconcile sickness with fairness 
and give it a credible moral meaning, then ideas about sorcery, witch-
craft, and capricious spirits offer other ways for people to do so, to ex-
plain the pain and the justice or injustice of suffering. They fix it within 
a framework of intention and a framework of good and evil. If they 
sincerely think that others can hurt, harm, or kill by sorcery, they may 
suppose others have used evil unjustly to get what they want or to pun-
ish those they hate by inflicting illness. For the sufferer and the circle 
of his friends, the sickness is certainly not deserved; it is by no means a 
just retribution. It is evil pain, unfairly suffered, wickedly or capriciously 
caused, so the right response is pity and sympathy.
Is the individual or the group at issue?
Exculpation of the sick for their deviance has been proposed as the main 
(or at least as one) distinguishing characteristic of the medical system 
(Parsons  1951; Young  1976, 1982). Ideally, the sick would be neither 
blamed nor stigmatized nor punished. Clearly, this is not the view in all 
societies, but it is surprising that the patient is not more often blamed 
for his or her own illness when there are so many inculpating etiologies 
to choose from. People may sometimes think of illness as retribution 
or use ideas about it to deter. But the common response in the face of 
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actual illness is the response of sympathy, an effort to help or remedy 
it. If treatment resembles any part of punishment, it would be the cor-
rective or reformative elements found in some penal systems. However, 
I would stress a difference between our legal and our medical systems 
regarding the treatment of deviance. The aims of legal and moral rules 
are (ideally) to preserve and protect the well-being of society; the aims 
of medical treatment are usually not the same, for its object is the in-
dividual, not society. Punishment may contain a number of elements: 
retributive, restitutive, corrective, reformative, expressive, and deterrent. 
The grounds given for reforming a criminal are primarily that it will ben-
efit others. John S. Mill (1910) argues that the only purpose for which 
power should be exercised over a member of the community against his 
will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, 
is not a sufficient rationale. The point of interest for my argument here is 
not the issue of coercion but the question of aim: For whose good is the 
treatment (or punishment) applied? The primary ground for treatment 
in illness is precisely not the good of others—the social good—but the 
individual’s good. The aim is to restore to normal someone’s impaired 
capacity to choose and act. The fundamental principle used in our legal 
system—that a generally accepted standard of conduct should be appli-
cable to all alike—runs dead against the principle of our medical system 
that each person’s needs must be assessed and their disabilities treated 
according to their individual state and need. If the doctor were asked to 
let the social cost outweigh some individual’s good and decide not to 
provide treatment, then the way would be open for a policy that denies 
health services to, for example, the aged, the depraved, the chronically 
disabled, and so on. To make the good of others, rather than the affected 
individual’s good, the primary consideration would be to use the social 
and legal principle, not the medical one, for remedial action. Part of the 
healer’s task would then be to judge or to find out from the community 
whether the patient was considered to be worth treating, to merit it or 
not.
Medicine, in the European tradition, has focused on the individual. 
In many nonliterate societies, the diagnosis of illness may resemble, in 
the style of procedure and reasoning, the discussion of a dispute. This 
also prompts a question about the difference between the resolution of a 
dispute and the treatment of illness. How far does an approach like the 
one taken toward Kamahasanyi’s illness, described so vividly by Turner, 
handle the illness as an indicator and set out to treat the social dis-
harmony rather than the individual? If the illness is really taken to be 
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the indicator of a social ill—disharmony—in the same sense as a cer-
tain blood sugar level or pulse rhythm is taken to indicate a particular 
disease, then treatment of the social disharmony should be gauged by 
whether or not the patient gets well. In Turner’s view, the Ndembu doc-
tor saw his task less as curing the individual patient than as remedying 
the ills of a corporate group; however, the interrelations between the two 
(the problem and its indicator) were complex. Just as medical treatment 
may bring a blood sugar level back to normal without the patient feel-
ing well, so Kamahasanyi might have improved without the underlying 
social conflicts being settled. If the real problem was strictly perceived 
as the problem of social disharmony rather than the man’s individual 
illness, then the restoration of harmony might be enough. That would 
alter our conventional view of the central remedial aim: to heal the in-
dividual. However, the question forces a cut-and-dried choice between 
ends and means that it is unrealistic; the balance between them oscillates 
and their interrelations are complicated. I doubt that the Ndembu would 
simply abandon Kamahasanyi to his sickness if the healer judged that 
social harmony had been restored. The method of healing may differ 
from those of biomedicine by portraying it as depending on the patient’s 
ties to others. Social ties are things that people make and break; they 
may think they understand social ties and can manipulate or master such 
ties but not the internal and hidden workings of the body. In the case 
of the Gnau, they made few claims to understand how the body worked 
inside or to know herbs or drugs that would have direct effects on it. My 
argument here boils down to a simple point: people do what they think 
they can with what they have and what they think they know. People 
like the Gnau, who lack a belief in their ability to interfere directly with 
bodily processes of disease, concentrate instead on the explanation and 
treatment of social and spiritual aspects of illness that they feel they can 
understand and possibly affect. In a long illness like that of Wolai, they 
are more likely to reach the disheartening point of having tried most or 
all they know. A system of diagnosis in which the circumstances of the 
person who is ill play a large part in deciding what the cause of illness is 
and what to do about it clearly contrasts with our practice, which most 
often looks for the immediate signs of disease, rather than at the person 
who is ill and his social circumstances, as the basis on which to decide 
about the cause and treatment.
The differentiation of a specifically medical domain in our belief sys-
tem tends to detach it from legal, moral, and religious concerns. To the 
extent that our scientific medicine approaches its goals of understanding 
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the patterns and processes involved in illness in terms of impersonal, 
law-like regularities that pursue their course indifferent to the moral 
qualities of the affected person, we consider its theories of diseases and 
how to treat them to be universally applicable. The sounds made by the 
heart do not differ with the religion or the customs of the person ob-
served, nor does the effect on him of insulin or phenobarbitone. But the 
doctor’s dealings with a patient can never be just a matter of impersonal 
science; they inevitably involve social and moral interpersonal relation-
ships. In the next chapter, I will take up some of the changes brought 
about in Gnau society by the introduction of a health aid post and their 
exposure to certain features of our medical practice.
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chapter four
The introduction of a medical aid post
In the past, the residents of Rauit had to depend on their own resources. 
They did not trust unrelated outsiders to care for them when they were 
sick. Trust followed the outlines given by their own distributive morality. 
They might treat themselves by simple rest, food avoidances, or nettles 
as a counterirritant. For more serious illnesses, they depended on close 
kin. Most adults, upon deciding they were ill, left it to others in the local 
community to come forward and perform treatment. But on the ques-
tion of confidence in foreign healers, their attitude was simple: Why 
should I trust strangers to help me? I see no reason for them to care 
about me.
In the postcontact setting, however, sick villagers have some options 
of treatment, whether from an orderly at the medical aid post in the 
village or, at a greater distance, from a nurse or a doctor. However, they 
may be reluctant to seek treatment. In the village, they can choose not to 
go to the aid post or to ignore the orderly’s advice or to throw away the 
prescribed pills. At the hospital, among strangers, they are not so sure 
of being able to escape or refuse treatment. They know about common 
forms of treatment, such as dressings and injections, from observation 
and reports, but they also know of other things that might be done and 
seem alarming, such as intravenous drips, stomach tubes, and surgical 
operations, all of which violate the body. At the hospital, the doctor or 
nurse in charge decides what to do, and villagers feel that, once interned, 
they have little or no control to stop such things being done to them. For 
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some peoples, this is reason enough to avoid the hospital. Nevertheless, 
they do not suppose that these ill-understood procedures are intended to 
harm them, something that is perhaps surprising given their suspicious 
regard for the mysterious things that New Guinean strangers may do. I 
heard nothing to suggest they supposed White people might be contriv-
ing harmful magic; it was the latter’s imposition of rules and objections 
to local practices that appeared arbitrary or unfair to the villagers.
Figure  12. The Anguganak Mission Health Center, 1985. A line of people 
waits for treatment. (Color image posted in www.haubooks.org/pandoras-box.)
White people’s motives sometimes made no sense. They had to be 
accepted as things they chose to do for their own undisclosed and un-
known reasons. Among the puzzles were why strangers should bother 
about them, and what gave them the right to interfere. Village women 
asked about the nurses who came to weigh their babies. The question was 
essentially a moral one: Why did nurses come to weigh their babies and 
to give them injections and tell them how to feed them? These babies 
were not the nurses’ babies—indeed, they were nothing to them, no kin. 
So what concern of theirs was it if the baby was fat or thin, healthy or 
sick? The questions had a sharper point. Why should the nurse be able to 
order the child to go for supplementary feeding? In pre-Independence 
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days, they wondered why a nurse could report the mother to a patrol 
officer, who might send a policeman to fetch her and her baby if she re-
fused to come for supplementary milk. In terms of Gnau morality, one’s 
obligations to others, one’s interest in them and care for them, should 
depend on the kind of relationships and social closeness one has with 
them. The idea of having duties toward other people for the mere fact 
they were other human beings was not particularly intelligible. What 
motive would plausibly account for White strangers caring about vil-
lage babies so strongly? They could see that the nurses went to a lot of 
trouble to come, but that still left unanswered why they should bother. 
Sometimes mothers did not want to follow the advice because it seemed 
like interference. They silently rejected it or did not come for assistance 
the next time.
A new medical domain
At first, village people lacked the information and experience necessary 
to distinguish what were the different jobs, skills, and spheres of respon-
sibility of the White people they encountered. Both missionaries and 
government patrol officers (kiaps) in the early days of contact gave medi-
cal advice or treatment. It was no cause for surprise to local people if a 
priest on patrol pulled a syringe and a half-filled vial of penicillin out of 
his rucksack and offered to inject a sick baby. Prayer was mixed up with 
treatment. It was difficult to work out what was different about the patrol 
officer’s orders for someone to allow a wound to be treated or for him to 
order someone else to pay a fine. It was equally hard for them distinguish 
the missionary’s attempt to stop the practice of spitting betel juice on 
sores from his attempt to put an end to their masked rituals. In the pe-
riod of Australian administration, patrol officers might carry out health 
inspections, order treatment for yaws or sores, take absconding lepers into 
custody, or require a mother to take her child for supplementary feeding. 
Missions established clinics and health centers. Patrol officers ordered 
people to dig latrines, bury their dead, use new sources of water, and 
change the position and style of houses—villages viewed these orders as 
part of what kiaps did. Missionaries sometimes preached against their 
customs, masks, dances, ritual bleeding, polygamy, sorcery, and sometimes 
about cleanliness, diet, clothes, water, and latrines. How was someone 
who had no contact with European society to recognize the different 
aims and motives behind all these various exhortations and reproofs?
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At first, the villagers mixed them up or conflated them; they sup-
posed they might be rewarded for compliance and punished for disobe-
dience—and sometimes they were. They could not understand why all 
these changes were ordered. Some were intelligible in terms of their own 
ideas: flies carry “poison,” germs are invisible spirits, washing cleanses 
female pollution. The particular setting for a practice played a part in 
allowing people to make sense of them. Some of the practices, particu-
larly the equipment—bandages, lint, syringes and needles, penicillin, 
liniment, and pills—were clearly new and associated with the White 
people who brought them. The separate medical sphere to which they 
belonged became progressively more distinct as health care was increas-
ingly confined to specific times, places, and people—that is, clinic sched-
ules, the aid post, and the people whose main job seemed to be giving 
medical care. The activities of patrol officers and missionaries came to 
be differentiated. The experience of those who went to towns or centers 
with hospitals and surgeons, the establishment of a local health center 
with a missionary doctor, and the encounter with Papua New Guineans 
who were trained to provide medical care and use the equipment led to 
changes in Gnau views about how medical ideas and practices were dif-
ferent from other new practices and ideas that White people brought.
Figure  13. A nurse treats a child at the mission health center, 1985. (Color 
image posted in www.haubooks.org/pandoras-box.)
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Although the novelties of health care were tied up at first with the 
people who introduced them, the equipment and treatments were grad-
ually put in New Guinean hands—indeed, into those of trained local 
people—making it clear that medical practices and knowledge were de-
tachable from White people. The local health center gave them some 
exposure to the complex equipment used in Western medicine. The 
“real” medicine of the White people came to be seen as what went on in 
hospitals.
The kinds of treatment and the people who administered and con-
trolled it were still mostly alien; even as local people took over the man-
agement of illness, they were more or less passive recipients and observ-
ers of it rather than controllers and active participants. But it would be 
misleading to portray them purely in a passive light as the objects or vic-
tims of administrative demands and missionary goals. People might hide 
or run away to avoid treatment they disliked, they might keep silent, or 
they might accept the pills but throw them away in private. With time, 
they began to recognize limits to external authority. They became more 
active in choosing what to accept and what to reject.
Problems of the new medical aid post
The medical aid post was built in Rauit in 1969. It was organized by the 
mission health center and was primarily intended to serve the needs of 
the village and the neighboring one of Mandubil. When health posts 
were set up, the mission hospital would train Indigenous men to be aid 
post orderlies (APO), who were expected to provide treatment for vil-
lagers’ common ailments: cuts, sores, simple wounds, injuries, and com-
mon complaints such as chest infections, malaria, diarrhea, ear infections, 
headaches, and the like. Ideally, an APO was supposed to meet nearly all 
the villagers’ first-aid needs for medical attention, guidance, and health 
education. An APO was expected to live in the village with the people 
he served and to be familiar with them, their language, and their way 
of life. He received a salary from the Public Health Department using 
funds allocated to the province. The village people were expected to sup-
ply him with food and to give him convenient land on which to make a 
garden.
None of the local men of Rauit or Mandubil had been trained as an 
APO and none had reached the necessary school standard. Men from 
other villages in the district who spoke a different language had been 
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among the first to complete their training. The first APO sent to attend 
to the Rauit aid post in 1970 was one of these. He came from a nearby 
village. On the score of familiarity with the village and the closeness to 
his home, the arrangement should have been satisfactory. His wife stayed 
at home in their own village most of the time. But it was easy for him to 
return there—too easy.
The villagers were caught in a dilemma: they lacked knowledge of 
the skills required for the newly-introduced medicines, so they had to 
depend on someone who was trained. They preferred to trust those who 
were closest to them—those who were kin, not outsiders, especially 
those from neighboring places with whom they fought in the past. There 
may have been controls over training, examinations, and supervision, but 
the villagers did not know about these nor were they in any position to 
assess them.
Problems also arose with recognizing and meeting the reciprocity and 
obligations expected between the community and the health worker. Af-
ter a few months, a new APO came to Rauit for a short while, but he was 
soon transferred to a post closer his home. A third APO replaced him 
who spoke the same language as the first one, although his home village 
was farther away, far enough to make him come with his wife. Initially, 
things went quite well. He settled in. He made a garden. Then a village 
pig raided it. He was naturally angry about this. The villagers did noth-
ing to stop the pig continuing its depredations (a difficult thing to do 
anyway), so one night he shot it. This was exactly what a Gnau man in a 
similar situation might have done, but he would have had the support of 
kin in the dispute that inevitably followed. The APO instead was faced 
with the furious group of those who owned the pig and who seemed 
ready to attack him. He fled to the patrol office. The officer investigated 
the dispute and decided that the medical aid post should be closed for a 
time to teach the people a lesson: they must properly look after an APO 
who came to help them. The people at Rauit saw some justice in such a 
view and reproached the pig’s owners for threatening the APO.
The medical aid post stood empty. Besides having been established 
to benefit the people of Rauit, it was also intended to serve Mandubil 
residents as well. They were the closest rivals of Rauit, their enemies in 
the past as well as their relatives and affines. People in Mandubil pointed 
out that Rauit’s bad behavior had lost both villages their health post, so 
the right thing for Mandubil to do would be to move the post to Man-
dubil. In 1971, men from Mandubil went to Rauit to try to dismantle 
the post and take it to their village. This started a fight between the two 
The introduction of a medical aid post
79
villages. The building was not moved, but the dispute was brought before 
the patrol officer, who decided that the aid post, having been the cause 
of so much trouble, should remain closed until the two villages earned 
the chance to have it opened again and staffed by demonstrating good 
behavior for three or four years.
In 1976, the health post was reopened with a very experienced APO 
who came from the area. He had close ties to Rauit, although he came 
from a village that spoke a different language. He had married a woman 
from Rauit as a second wife. His first wife and family with grown chil-
dren remained in his own village. At some point in 1983, he moved to 
work at Lumi. The missionary nurse in charge of the health center closed 
the post after seeing its neglected state and noting complaints about the 
lack of local community cooperation. She wrote, “It is a hard place for 
people to be stationed due to its distance, lack of available water, and 
the fact that the majority of people tend to be in the bush most of the 
time.” A replacement APO was found in 1984 who came from Lumi. 
He soon became dissatisfied with his posting and sent complaints about 
how there were no people in the village, since they had all gone out to 
the bush and planned on being there for two or three months, so he had 
nothing to do. It was too long a wait for him, so he wrote a letter asking 
to come down to work at the health center or to be sent back to work 
in Lumi. He soon sent a second letter repeating his request. A hospital 
orderly went to investigate and confirmed that the village was empty, 
the APO was alone, and no one was there to bring him food. So, as he 
recorded in his report in April  1984, they put away all the dressings, 
medicine, and equipment, locked up the aid post, and left. In July, the 
post was found broken into, the things left in a mess. The upshot was 
that the health committee decided to send back the experienced APO 
who had married a woman of Rauit and perhaps try to find someone 
from the village to train as APO for the future.
This experienced man came back. But the problem was that he came 
from a village too close by, and he was always leaving to go home. Ideally, 
some of the villagers said, if they got an APO from far away, he wouldn’t 
leave. On the other hand, if he were to go, the aid post would probably 
stay empty. They wouldn’t get anyone else to come. When I asked oth-
ers about the hours, some said they thought the APO should be there, 
most said they didn’t know. A few thought he should be there every day, 
even on weekends and at night, in case they needed him. Most were 
vague but thought he should be there because he got “big pay from the 
government,” and it seemed wrong that he should be paid for no work. 
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The village councilor and committee man did not show any particular 
interest in the matter. They thought that the place to lodge complaints 
was the patrol office and the court; no one mentioned the local health 
committee meetings that were intended for community participation 
and dealing with such matters. No one, it seemed, except the APO who 
attended them, knew anything about them.
I described the committee meetings in my field notebooks.
The local health committee
The local health committee meets every three months at the health 
center that the mission started. The local APOs all come, as well as 
the White nurses (women) who now run the health center. Any vil-
lage councilors may come who wish to attend or bring matters up for 
discussion, but there are rarely more than one or two of them at any 
given meeting. The bunch of APOs are old friends; they meet every 
few months. They are all men, the oldest is probably in his late 50s, 
the others of various ages. There are cheerful greetings when they 
meet, some banter. There will be about fifteen people present at a 
meeting, although attendance has varied between nine and twenty-
four. Minutes are kept, the meetings are chaired—of late, by the New 
Guinean Health Extension Officer in charge of the district hospital 
at Lumi (a man) but, before him, by the White Australian or New 
Zealand nursing sister in charge at the health center. After opening 
the meeting with a prayer, the nursing sister asks for items to go 
on the agenda: routine matters, any new instructions, suggestions, or 
questions raised by those present. They sit at desk benches in a class-
room. At the front of the room is an anatomical chart and a plaster 
cast of a head and body dissected to show the arrangement of some 
of the internal organs. The agenda is written on the blackboard. The 
business is conducted in Tokpisin. Many items are about conditions 
of service, plans, and pay.
A meeting is held, 1985
A meeting has been called to order. After the minutes of the last 
meeting are read, the chairman reports that he has not had a reply to 
his letter about some money they should have received. He announc-
es how much was available from the public health department grant 
and the Rural Improvement Programme for building aid posts. As 
there was enough for two, they discuss priorities. The APOs suggest 
where they think the new ones should go. They recall they had agreed 
to rebuild the dilapidated post at Rauit. The chairman then reminds 
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them that they need to get their priorities right, that they must have 
the necessary staff first before they build new medical aid posts. There 
are places like Yilui with an aid post standing empty; they are short 
of men, not money. He explains the training policy, saying there is 
room for eight new trainees from the province per year. They can 
only get one applicant in from their area every so often. One of the 
nurses points out that some of the aid posts are staffed by two APOs 
at once, that there are trained people, such as P. and M. who stay at 
the center without jobs in the villages, and then there is N., who likes 
to stay at the same post as C. and is not ready to go on his own to 
Yilui. The chairman speaks up with strong reproach for lazy people 
who just think about money and not about providing a service and 
helping the people. He calls them bikhet (obstinate, arrogant, selfish), 
saying they have jobs when there are plenty of other men looking for 
work who would be very happy to take over their jobs; we can’t have 
two men working at the same aid post unless both men are work-
ing full time. He warms to his theme: You don’t get real supervision, 
you work when you feel like it, you can’t have someone to come and 
assist you (yu wok long laik bilong yu iet, nogat man iken ikam lukau-
tim yu). Others speak up with the example of N., who resigned and 
did nothing for a while, then asked to come back. At that point N., 
who is late, walks into the room. The other APOs greet him cheerily. 
The chairman goes on to say he was told at the provincial govern-
ment headquarters that people who are not doing their jobs properly 
should have their jobs terminated.
The items followed with varying amounts of discussion and ani-
mation: the old aid post at one village was going to be demolished, so 
who should get the corrugated iron roof and other materials? People 
in the village want to use it to cover a water tank, but the nurse points 
out that the roof was originally paid for out of rural improvement 
program money (but water tanks must come out of council funds) 
so they cannot use it for that. They decide that the materials will go 
to Rauit, since they had put in their request to rebuild their aid post 
long before, when there was no money available. Someone asks about 
another village, for which they have already voted money for a medi-
cal post. Water tanks come up in the next item too because another 
aid post has an unsatisfactory water supply. One of them asks, “Why 
do they build an aid post without a clean water supply? That’s not 
doing a job properly.” The chairman reminds them that water tanks 
cannot be purchased out of funds for aid posts or rural improvement. 
One APO, who has been four years at his post, says that it is in such 
Pandora’s box
82
a mess that if a health inspector were to see it, he would close it down 
because there is no good water source near it. If they cannot improve 
it, he wants to leave and they won’t be able to find anyone to replace 
him. He says he is not joking. He and his family have tolerated it for 
four years. The aid post must be rebuilt closer to the village and to 
water, not far away so no one comes. The chairman suggests he dis-
cuss this with the councilor of the village and the people, especially 
since the village is divided into two sections. Would both be ready to 
help?
Then there are items about the conditions of long-service leave 
and ordinary leave. One of them says he was asked by the pilot to pay 
for his airfare coming back from leave. Why should he have to pay 
for his fares? Why won’t the government reimburse air tickets? One 
of the nurses replies that she has written about this matter but has 
not yet received a reply. There are differences that depend on wheth-
er the APO works within the mission health service framework or 
within the government framework. This leads to a prolonged discus-
sion about how different individuals have had to pay for fares, how 
long they waited for reimbursement, whether it is fair for APOs who 
work for the government (ananit long gavman) to be treated better 
than those who work for the mission health service. The APO from 
Rauit says he thinks the provincial government at Vanimo undercuts 
support for the APOs in this area because they see them as part of 
the mission and therefore not in need of support. The chairman then 
has to explain about the way government and provincial allocations 
are fixed.
A bit later, the question of one APO’s retirement comes up. He 
wants to retire as soon as his retirement pay and final pay come 
through. Then he will retire properly and another man should come 
to take his place. Nurse J. brings up a problem: he already works to-
gether with N. because he was forbidden to give injections until he 
had taken a refresher course. N. left the village where he had been 
posted (village X) to go help the old APO. But as N. does not have 
permission to do this, he is reprimanded for leaving the place where 
he was meant to be. The chairman slightly modifies the direct and 
personal reprimand by saying that it is intended as a general piece 
of guidance for all of them, not just N., since any of them might get 
involved in a serious court action if something goes wrong and he is 
found to have been working at a place or in a job to which he has not 
been appointed. In fact, village X’s schoolteacher has come to lodge a 
complaint about the absence of the APO, since there are people with 
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chest infections in the village and no one to give them an injection. 
Nurse J. reminds the old APO that she has been trying to get him to 
come for a one-week refresher course for seven months. He answers 
that it is not because he is bikhet, but how could he have come and 
left the people at his post without an APO, without treatment? What 
if someone died? Nurse J. reminds him that N. is there. A third APO, 
who happens to come from village X, volunteers to go there and help 
out.
A long discussion develops about some villagers’ demands for a 
health subcenter to be started near them. This is linked to questions 
about the organization of maternal and infant welfare work. Under 
any other business, a number of APOs voice their difficulties with 
supplies. The amounts they are given do not last long enough; if they 
run out during the month, the APO has to go fetch an extra supply, 
and that may mean a long walk. The chairman explains about the 
general shortage of dressings and stresses the need for economy. The 
chairman also stresses that the APO must persuade people to fetch 
medicines and dressings that are needed for the good of the com-
munity. APOs who pay for people to fetch and carry the aid post 
supplies are doing wrong; they should talk this out with the village 
councilors and make sure people from the community do the fetch-
ing. Certainly, the APOs shouldn’t have to do it themselves. But one 
APO declares vehemently that it is not so easy. If he fails to persuade 
people to go and fetch supplies, he will get the blame when the sup-
plies run out. If they complain he does not treat them, he will have 
his pay cut.
Community values and the bureaucratic system
This account has not covered the whole meeting, but it conveys in im-
mediate terms some of the clashes between individuals, community val-
ues, and those of an introduced system: the modern health care system. 
Problems of payment, the community, and the orderly’s obligations and 
priorities are prominent.
The system is organized in a hierarchy of relationships and respon-
sibilities. Local people cannot see all of it. There are more or less im-
plicit obligations, some of which are not accepted or recognized in the 
same way by everyone involved. Some of the difficulty may stem from 
attitudes prompted by their first encounters with introduced services. 
The demand for them initially seemed to come more from the givers 
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of the services than from the receivers. These matters were literally in-
troduced by aliens. This alienated local people because the services and 
conditions seemed imposed on them or were unwanted, and because 
they were not able to understand and control it. They had been bet-
ter able to do this before with their own forms of care and treatment. 
Foreigners brought their kind of medicine and thought local people 
needed it. However, there seemed to be gap between how people per-
ceived needing versus wanting something. Since they had not asked for 
it, why should they now contribute to making it work? This attitude 
sometimes appeared in their unwillingness to work for the medical aid 
post or fetch supplies for it, or even to follow suggested treatments, 
revealing patches of blindness in what they saw as their obligations. 
Despite good intentions, Westerners’ paternalism in the past may have 
contributed to the relative indifference of many of the people who, in 
fact, benefited from the service. Good intentions may look different to 
other people.
We are easily disposed to read other people’s motives for them or to 
imagine that we can read through them. Christian missions have been 
greatly involved in health care in many parts of Papua New Guinea. The 
measures were primarily introduced for humanitarian reasons rather than 
as a strategy to win converts. In this area, as in other parts of the country, 
the local missions established the first medical services, so villagers were 
bound to associate the introduced health care with Christian mission 
action. The mission background of many APOs and the prayers that 
began and ended meetings of the local health committee were among 
the many signs of this connection. The delivery of medical services in the 
region was not riven by factionalism or by interdenominational rivalries. 
Different missions were active in the area, but local people did not say 
one denomination was favored or the other disadvantaged in receiving 
care, nor did they say nonbelievers failed to get as good treatment as 
Christians did. The medical services were not used overtly to evange-
lize, although they contributed in general to the authority and success of 
the missions. Rauit residents certainly appreciated the part the mission 
played in building and staffing a thriving local health center, which was 
seen as one of the main ways the mission helped them. The villagers 
frequently and, I think, sincerely referred to this using the Tokpisin verb 
halpim mipela (helping us). They used the same phrase in general and 
almost by convention to describe White people’s actions and requests, 
sometimes in odd ways—for instance, when describing my efforts to get 
exhaustive genealogies from them. It began to sound ironic. The mission 
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began providing health services and then ran the aid posts for years with 
some financial assistance and supplies from the public health depart-
ment. Upon the independence of Papua New Guinea in 1975, health 
care began to shift into local hands and become integrated with services 
from the government.
The right to health care: National Health Plans
The epigraph to the introduction of the Papua New Guinea National 
Health Plan 1974–78 reads as follows: “A National Health Plan is not 
just a set of recommendations about what should be; rather it is the re-
cord of choices and decisions made by those who are committed to the 
implementation of those decisions.” Among the decisions made by the 
government are those concerning the health of the country’s popula-
tion. The introduction continued: “Health planning is not just an aid to 
economic progress. It is concerned with providing people with a service 
which is theirs as a basic human right” (Papua New Guinea National 
Health Plan 1974–78: 1). It recognized the maintenance of health as one 
of the government’s tasks and duties to society.
People have a right to health, but it is difficult to make sure that 
everyone in Papua New Guinea has equal access to treatment when they 
need it. It is challenging to provide them with the same chance to enjoy 
good health, as social equity would demand, given that villages are so 
dispersed and located in such different terrains and that the nation holds 
such a wide variety of societies. Who should be responsible for providing 
the resources needed to secure the right to health? The individual? The 
community? The government (Abel-Smith 1976: chap. 1)? Do the poor, 
rural villagers, or the ignorant have less of a right to it or need it less than 
others? Rhetorical as those questions may sound, people and govern-
ments indeed have to face them. The realities of limited resources push 
people into having to make unpleasant choices. A colonial government 
that provided services for its expatriate officers but did nothing for the 
people it governed, would be—as some have been—condemned for self-
ishness or inhumanity and exploitation. Government officials may argue 
that local village people cannot make choices for themselves because 
they have so little knowledge of modern medicine, so the government 
has an obligation to provide treatment for them whether they think they 
need it or not. How can local people make the right choices without 
sufficient information and education? Some may see this as the stuff 
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of paternalism and dependency or interference; however, probably most 
would say it is the duty of a responsible government to try to provide 
medical services and provisions.
Cultural diversity is one of Papua New Guinea’s most striking at-
tributes. Colonial rule created a political unit from a multitude of cul-
tures and languages. Western institutions were based on a centralized 
hierarchical system, and the public health service followed suit. It was 
meant to provide a basic standard of care for everybody regardless of 
their local setting. By 1974, government staff had to think afresh about 
the goals of their health care services and how to adapt them to meet 
the needs of a country on its way to becoming independent the follow-
ing year. Many of the expatriate officers who had filled posts and run the 
services under the Australian administration were expected to leave. The 
National Health Plan set out the goals and principles for the future in 
these terms:
Unplanned health services are those in which the allocation of re-
sources is based on arbitrary and ill-considered criteria such as the 
demands of privileged groups, an influential elite or the self-interest 
of professionals. The government of this country is concerned with 
the improved health and welfare of all the people and the use of all 
resources in a way that best meets this aim. Planning may there-
fore require a deliberate choice of priorities which cuts across the 
demands upon which previous allocation was based . .  .  . Planning 
therefore requires involvement of the people who will benefit from 
it through the expression of their real needs and priorities . . . . Plan-
ning must also involve, in its decision-making process, those who are 
required to carry out the provisions of the plan. (Papua New Guinea 
National Health Plan 1974–78: 1–3)
The principles were that services should be integrated and participa-
tive so that people and communities are involved in making decisions 
about their own health. Services should be equitably distributed and 
available to all. The standards should be appropriate and reflect the level 
of community and national development. They should be efficient and 
allocate expensive scarce resources for maximum benefit. They should 
collaborate with other government departments and the communities. 
The officials in charge of health care planning drew up a list that ranked 
the health problems in the country and, on this basis, established na-
tional health objectives in order of priority. The plan listed thirteen of 
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such objectives: among them, the first was the provision of basic health 
services for all through health centers and medical aid posts; second, 
the control of malaria; third, provision of health education; fourth, the 
reduction of tuberculosis and leprosy; and fifth, the decentralization of 
decision-making and the promotion of community participation. The 
second National Health Plan, published in 1986, reaffirmed the prin-
ciples of the first one and put emphasis on consolidating rather than 
expanding services, but the principles themselves were unchanged. The 
strategy now was to give priority to improving the quality and efficiency 
of existing services; increasing the emphasis on self-reliance and com-
munity participation in health and development; and providing more 
effective health education and information (Papua New Guinea National 
Health Plan 1986–90: 68).
In a discussion of reasons for providing national health service that 
was free of charge at the time of use, Brian Abel-Smith (1976: chap-
ter  3) proposed a number of justifications, including the efficiency of 
providing certain services as collective goods and the benefit to the 
whole community that comes from ensuring that individuals get treat-
ment for communicable diseases, such as cholera or tuberculosis, that 
they might otherwise spread to others. As he further argued, it would 
be unfair to oblige people by law to get treated for certain conditions 
and also expect them to pay for it; government control and financing of 
certain medical services are warranted when people are unable to make 
informed choices about them and seldom know in advance if or when 
they will need a particular service; the cost of the service may be wholly 
disproportionate to their ability to pay and, indeed, their need for treat-
ment may prevent them from working to earn money to pay for it. Un-
predictable needs make it hard for an individual to plan how much to 
put aside for health care, but it is more feasible to predict the general 
health care needs of a community or the country as a whole. Competitive 
private insurance inevitably results in risk-taking and those who most 
need insurance coverage are the least likely to be able to purchase it. A 
key point that distinguishes health service provision from the provision 
of other things such as food and shelter—which are necessities, although 
no government provides them free for everyone—is that few people can 
make informed choices about what health problems to anticipate or for 
which they should insure themselves (Abel-Smith 1976: 41). Few can 
tell what difference treatment might make compared with doing noth-
ing, whereas they do know their food and housing needs and can make 
informed choices about them.
Pandora’s box
88
From ideals to practice
The ideals and objectives of the Papua New Guinea health plans were 
channeled into specific proposals. But intentions are one thing, fulfill-
ment is another. There are bound to be gaps between ideals and practice. 
Discussion at the local health committee illustrated how things may 
seem so different according to someone’s perspective and position in a 
system. The local communities perhaps did not show the active involve-
ment that the government hoped to see. Villagers were weakly aware 
of their obligations and what the orderlies could or should be expected 
to do, and health education had far to go. The orderlies gathered at the 
meeting sounded much like workers or professionals anywhere, with 
much to say about their pay and conditions. They justified themselves, 
they answered criticism, they did their job. But despite that, we must re-
call how vigorously villagers reacted when they thought Maka was dying, 
coming together to sit down around her house in sympathy, discussing 
different causes and treatments. We must then consider what the local 
health committee meeting represented a decade later and what changes 
had taken place. The village attitudes had not disappeared; place and 
setting still made a difference, people still moved between settings, as 
witnessed in the APO mobility, and their reactions still took on different 
colors according to place.
In the village, care and treatment were provided within a close circle 
of people, mostly as a matter of kinship and community obligations. 
Ethics of generosity and loyalty appropriate to their distributive morality 
lay behind them. This contrasts with health care in the national system 
organized in a hierarchy, with its complex division of labor, specialized 
jobs, and contractual obligations in which people do their work for pay. 
The ethics behind this system thus seem very different than the ethics 
of community care. If health care workers have to be paid for services, 
then does that mean the payment creates the obligation to act? Or do 
they also have a social duty? Is medical care to be put on the same level 
as commerce? People are loath to do that. The methods of financing 
medical services and rewarding those who work within them vary great-
ly among countries, their political systems, and their ideologies (Abel-
Smith 1976: chapter 5). They imply widely divergent views about the 
impacts of payment on the quality of medical practices. Some argue that 
compensation acts as an incentive to good practices and efficiency, as a 
way to ration in order to prevent waste, while others argue that it distorts 
and undermines good practices.
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Richard Titmuss’s comparative study (1970) of human blood trans-
fusion services in different countries was an attempt to address these is-
sues by examining one particular component of the medical care system 
in Britain and comparing it with equivalent services in systems based on 
different ideologies. His study arose from wider questions about giving 
and taking in modern welfare systems. If medical care is a consumer 
good indistinguishable from other goods and services in the private eco-
nomic market, all policy might become in the end economic policy. In 
that case, the only values that would count would be those that could be 
measured in terms of money. “Each individual would act egoistically for 
the good of all by selling his blood for what the market would pay” (Tit-
muss 1970: 12). What concerned him was the place allowed for altruism 
in modern society. The effect of the argument in favor of treating blood 
commercially would be to establish policies to reduce the already limited 
opportunities left for altruism in modern society in Britain. The Na-
tional Blood Transfusion Service in Britain is based on voluntary blood 
donation and it represents, he argued, an extreme type of “non-economic 
exchange”—that is, altruistic giving to unknown people. It is a social 
transaction, not an economic one; the donors are giving something they 
value highly and without reward. Such a social gift or action is a form 
of what Titmuss called “creative altruism” (1970: 212). Economists ar-
guing on the basis of theories of the “economic individual” suggest that 
payment would increase the efficiency of use, the safety, and the guaran-
teed supply of blood. However, Titmuss found that this was not so.1 He 
maintained that gift relationships of the social and moral kind still have 
certain functions in industrialized societies. Indeed, the spread of scien-
tific and technological developments had increased the social need for 
gift relationships. Modern societies require more rather than less free-
dom of choice for the expression of altruism in daily life.
At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that people look for sympa-
thy and consideration in the care they receive when ill. Even if those who 
care for them do not know what to do or have little that they can do, the 
demonstration of immediate concern may still provide moral support to 
someone who is sick. The sympathy gatherings of the Gnau made that 
side of response to illness even more obvious because of the relative lack 
of other things they could do in most cases. The sympathy gatherings 
1. This holds true when judged by the measurable criteria of economic effi-
ciency (or waste); administrative efficiency (or shortages, both chronic and 
acute); cost per unit; purity, potency, and safety; or quality per unit.
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were more than simple visiting: they provided support and opportunities 
for organizing more elaborate treatment. Relations with other people 
and with spirits played a great part in their explanations of illness. Their 
own treatments relied on affecting these relations rather than on mate-
rials, herbs, or instruments. Responsibility for action depended on the 
social and moral ties between people. Trust played a part together with 
the expectations and close reciprocities of kinship and community. The 
Gnau were expected to gather when someone was ill, partly as a duty but 
also as an expression of sympathy.
Care for a sick person in vital matters and decisions about treatment 
are rarely handed over simply and directly through mercenary exchanges. 
In many societies, this is demonstrated through the ambiguities about 
payments for treatment; they are often not considered to be payments 
but gifts made in gratitude according to the giver’s inclination or offer-
ings made to the spirit; in other places, the compensation is made in kind, 
not in cash, or the healer is rewarded with prestige or reverence. These 
special forms make it difficult to assess exactly how much or sometimes 
even how healers are paid for their work. People in many cultures seem 
reluctant to put a cash value on a life or on restoring health and find it 
hard to accept that someone deserves much confidence if money is the 
prime motive for healing. As Lewis Henry Morgan found, Handsome 
Lake told the Iroquois,
The Great Spirit designed that some men should possess the gift of 
skill in medicine. But he is pained to see a medicine man making 
exorbitant charges for attending the sick. .  .  . When a sick person 
recovers his health, he must return thanks to the Great Spirit . . . and 
the medicine man must receive as his reward whatever the gratitude 
of the restored may tender. This is right and proper. There are many 
who are unfortunate and cannot pay for attendance. It is sufficient 
for such to return thanks to the medicine man upon recovery. The 
remembrance that he has saved the life of a relative will be sufficient 
reward. (Morgan 1851: 251)
An increase in the specialized technical knowledge required to prac-
tice medicine has brought an increasing division of labor in many socie-
ties. The choice of healer no longer rests on trusted personal ties. But 
the sufferer is nevertheless anxious to be fully convinced of the efficacy 
of care. With a choice based on professional criteria of competence and 
contract, trust in sympathy risks being diminished. Payment does not 
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necessarily buy sympathy. The state or society seeks to guarantee the 
competence of healers by instituting special controls: examinations, sha-
manic tests, or ordeals. Those who pass must take a professional oath, be 
required to follow a special code of conduct, or adopt a certain dress to 
set them apart. Such standards and professional controls are intended to 
provide confidence in care and to replace kinship and community as the 
prime basis for trust.
The illness of one individual in a small village may even upset most of 
the community. A comparably general disturbance can only very rarely 
be the case in industrialized societies. If the illness of one person has 
effects on many, the experience of general upset may help explain why 
people in small societies lay stress on the social and moral causes of ill-
ness or take the illness of an individual to be a sign of something wrong 
in the community. The biomedical approach has tended to focus on the 
patient in isolation as someone with a particular kind of disease. The 
risk is that as we try so hard to identify the disease, we disregard the 
individual and his or her social context. It might seem something of a 
paradox that as we find out more about illnesses, we come to provide less 
moral support to patients. We focus on the individual, but perhaps we 
see the whole person less clearly.
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Part ii: recognizing and defining 
illness
The aim of Part  II is to consider the basis for specifying the subject 
matter and place of medical anthropology within social anthropology in 
general. I begin the first chapter with the problem of identifying illnesses 
and of comparing like with like, for there are traps in the identification 
of an illness. Leprosy is a disease with a long history that provides a les-
son in mistaken assumptions. The term “leprosy” had other referents in 
the past, and the Bible long influenced Western ideas associated with 
the condition. This example shows how facts and meanings linked to 





The meaning of “leprosy”
There is nothing in the entire range of human phenomena which 
illustrates so impressively the divine power of the redeemer, and 
the nature and extent of his work of mercy on man’s behalf, as this 
leprosy. There are many most striking analogies between it and that 
more deadly leprosy of sin which has involved our whole race in one 
common ruin. It is feared as contagious; it is certainly and inevitably 
hereditary; it is loathsome and polluting; its victim is shunned by all 
as unclean; it is most deceitful in its action. . . . Who can fail to find 
in all this a most affecting type of man’s moral leprosy? Like it, this 
too is hereditary, with an awfully infallible certainty. As surely as we 
have inherited it from our fathers do we transmit it to our children. 
(Thomson 1882: 653–54)
The moral connotations of leprosy have changed since the days of 
Reverand William McClure Thomson, and far more since biblical times. 
The significance attached to the word “leprosy” blinded people to facts. 
What started my interest in the terminology was an echo of those ideas 
and their practical consequences. When I returned to Rauit in 1983, the 
village where I had conducted my first fieldwork in 1968–69, I was dis-
mayed to find that almost thirty people in the village had been told they 
had leprosy. Five years before, only one person, a young married man, 
had lepromatous leprosy, the infectious form. The government health 
policy in 1958 had been to segregate people with lepromatous leprosy 
for treatment to prevent their condition from infecting others. If they 
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absconded from the segregated unit, a policeman might be sent to fetch 
them back. When I first stayed in the village, the man with leprosy had 
run away from the unit more than once, so he had been sent away to a 
hospital on the coast. His brother and father looked after things for him, 
while his wife, so far childless, tended their gardens.
Five years later, when I came back, he was still at the coast undergo-
ing treatment, although the policy of segregation had changed. During 
his absence, however, he was betrayed by his wife and his elder brother. 
They were caught in flagrante delicto in a garden by his elder brother’s 
wife. Not long after, with the timing of classic tragedy, the man with 
leprosy returned from the coast, climbing the hill with gifts, to announce 
that he was well again and had come home for good. In the village lo-
cated before his own, someone told him what had happened. He left his 
gifts there on the path and went home, destroying his gardens, cutting 
his fruit-bearing trees and palms to “lay waste and wreck them” (nauwom 
nari’in) as he came. Then he entered the village to seek out his brother 
and his wife.
But the fight between the brothers that people expected was stopped, 
partly because the kiap (government patrol officer) was already aware 
of the incident. A solution was reached. It involved fines on both sides 
and a short spell of jail for the elder brother, and the betrayed husband 
stabbed his wife in her thigh with a bit of wood. She seemed to accept 
it without rancor—in fact, while I was dressing the infected wound, she 
talked about it, I thought, almost happily. The two of them, she and her 
returned husband, settled down again together.
Attitudes toward illness: Leprosy in the village
Leprosy was not just another kind of sickness for these villagers. The 
events I recounted above spanned more than five years. The man had 
slightly thickened earlobes and his eyebrows had lost some hairs at the 
edges, but otherwise he looked quite normal and felt strong and well. 
But he was fled his home on more than one occasion, was fetched by 
the police, and was then forced to stay in a hospital far from his village. 
Much trouble followed. Sik lepro, the Tokpisin phrase for leprosy, meant 
something special to the Gnau villagers.
The segregation represented by a haus lepro was certainly part of the 
meaning embodied by the disease. The haus lepro was a house for the 
treatment of lepers built down by the river at some distance from the 
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main part of the mission and its hospital. The local people had experi-
ence with the special rules for leprosy and its segregation. The policy had 
changed by 1975, when I returned; people were now treated at home. 
Health education patrols came to find cases and educate villagers about 
the disease. They tried to impress on them the need for treatment, em-
phasizing the risk of destructive changes, the disease’s horrible effects, 
and the dangers of contagion. But what was diagnosed as leprosy by the 
medical staff seemed to the villagers to be mere superficial skin blem-
ishes. There was little that seemed to justify so much concern.
Occasionally, however, someone fell seriously ill with swellings but no 
injury to account for them. People thought of sik lepro and suggested it 
might be the diagnosis. With this diagnosis went the fear of spreading 
it to others. The way that sik lepro was singled out was what first struck 
me. Later I was to hear of other cases, including the death of a man I 
had known on my first visit. His belly and legs had swollen, he felt weak, 
he tried to walk down to the mission hospital by a path along the ridge, 
which passed through the nearest neighboring village. When he came 
to the village, the people there would not let him pass because they said 
his illness would infect them. They said he had sik lepro, so he was turned 
back. He died at home shortly thereafter, his belly grossly swollen. The 
body was buried with special haste for fear the illness might jump to 
someone else.
In retrospect, people in the village said he had died of sik lepro. To 
them, it was the strange swelling that was the significant marker. They 
had learned that there were special horrors to leprosy and, although they 
were not convinced by the slight skin blemishes of early leprosy, they 
linked them with swelling and to what they took to be a serious case of 
sik lepro.
Leviticus as a source on leprosy
The Gnau people give leprosy (in its Tokpisin form) a new meaning and 
range of reference. When I later looked up leprosy in the Book of Leviti-
cus, I was struck by the amount of space given to it—a good deal more, 
for example, than to dietary rules. Why was so much space devoted to 
leprosy?
The biblical chapter on leprosy that led to so much misery is Leviti-
cus 13. It gives detailed directions on how to identify the disease and 
how to deal with the leper. It says, “And the leper in whom the plague 
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is, his clothes shall be rent, and the hair of his head shall go loose, and 
he shall cover his upper lip, and shall cry: ‘Unclean, unclean.’ All the 
days wherein the plague is in him he shall be unclean; he is unclean; 
he shall dwell alone; without the camp shall his dwelling be” (Leviticus 
13:45–46).
Most of us probably think of leprosy as a disease that can be mutilat-
ing and disfiguring. We know it is contagious and slowly progressive. But 
behind what many of us might say in plain recall of what we know, some 
other images may spring to mind: a rotted, lumpy face, glazed eyeballs, a 
gnarled hand without fingers, the fear of contagion through touch. These 
are the images that lurk in Rudyard Kipling’s story “The mark of the 
beast,” with its figure of the Silver Man, and again in Sherlock Holmes’s 
“The blanched soldier,” illustrated in the fate of Ben Hur’s mother and 
sister. With such horrors in mind, we are not surprised that leprosy has 
been singled out for special dread. We might accept that for the Israel-
ites, casting out lepers was a way to protect the rest of the community.
But, if Leviticus gives such attention to leprosy, we might also ask 
whether leprosy plagued the ancient Hebrews more than other peoples. 
And what were their ideas about contagion and infection? Were they 
medically sound regarding other infectious kinds of sickness? Leprosy 
was not the only contagious disease they suffered, nor could it have been 
the worst or the most obvious. Was it the most disfiguring? The most 
deadly?
I go too fast. Leprosy is not a simple example of a contagious or 
infectious disease. Years may intervene between exposure to the disease 
and the appearance of any symptoms. People can live for years among 
lepers without catching it. Not all forms of leprosy are infectious; not 
everyone who is exposed to someone with infectious leprosy will catch 
it. Were the dangers of infection so much more striking or apparent to 
the ancient Hebrews?
And then there is something else we should notice. One of the chap-
ters of Leviticus is about how to restore the sufferer to the community 
after the signs of his affliction have disappeared. So this leprosy might 
disappear or heal by itself. But textbooks of medicine do not write of 
lepromatous leprosy disappearing spontaneously or of the body becom-
ing whole again. So what was this leprosy of the Bible?
The answer is plain. The biblical leprosy was not what we now call 
leprosy. The description given to the priest in Leviticus 13 make that 
clear. It lays out the diagnostic criteria and they are explicit. No reference 
is made to deformity, a loss of feeling, destructive changes, blindness, or 
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paresis. In doubtful cases, the unclean lesions should show changes after 
seven days. Leprosy as we know it does not change in seven days; its 
advance is very slow, sometimes taking years. Various other skin condi-
tions might fit some of the biblical criteria: vitiligo, psoriasis, or fungal 
infections. The instructions could cover a number of different conditions 
according to current medical classifications.
Doctors are familiar with the discrepancy between the biblical lep-
rosy and the leprosy of today’s medical textbook. The Bible uses the He-
brew word zara’at to refer to “unclean” skin lesions. This word was trans-
lated in the Septuagint as lepra (deriving from the Greek lepros, “rough 
and scaly,” and lepis, “a scale”). Zara’at translated into lepra gave rise to 
derivative forms with different referents. Medical writers of the first few 
centuries (such as Paulus Aegineta, Aetius, Oribasus, and Polybius) used 
lepra to refer to a circular, superficial scaly eruption of the skin, a condi-
tion that was curable and not serious or contagious. Some commentators 
have thought that the disease they called elephantiasis was the leprosy of 
modern medical writers (Adams 1846: 1–15). It was quite distinct from 
lepra (Brody 1974; S. Browne 1975; Macalister 1902; Waldstein 1905).
But during the Dark Ages up to the Middle Ages, the word for one 
kind or set of skin conditions, lepra, came to refer to different conditions. 
It eventually settled as a word that applied to leprosy as we now know 
it.1 What I saw happening on a tiny scale in a few villages in Papua 
New Guinea bore some resemblance to what had happened centuries 
before in Europe. The foreign name was adopted and adapted, still car-
rying some of the associations it had in its former reference. But the 
close description of observable signs given in Leviticus 13 enables us to 
recognize that zara’at did not refer to the disease we now call leprosy. It 
was also questionable if the symptoms called sik lepro in the villages were 
actually signs of leprosy.
The history of leprosy in the West shows the persistence of attitudes 
that stem from a written source and their link to a label or name. The 
name endures; the denotation changes. The label remains fixed in people’s 
mind. Its moral associations have changed but not out of recognition; 
what it refers to almost shifts out of recognition. It shifted regardless of 
1. The rise and fall of leprosy in Europe is a curious story. It is not clear how 
differences of diagnostic criteria, the spread of tuberculosis, hygienic meas-
ures, resistance, and relative immunity may have changed the prevalence 




the instructions about making a diagnosis set out in the Bible. Instead, 
an inferred moral message or meaning took hold of people’s imagina-
tions. If readers are surprised to learn that the passages in Leviticus are 
not, after all, about the leprosy they had supposed, their surprise will cast 
perhaps a little light on that long story of blindness.
The Jews were not led down quite the same path as the Christians 
who translated the Bible. The Old Testament, the Jewish Bible, remained 
in Hebrew, and its adherents were expected to follow the letter of its in-
structions. Zara’at remained zara’at. In Talmudic tradition, leprosy was 
not considered contagious in a medical sense. As Danby (1933) points 
out, the Mishnah does not consider pagans, gentiles, or resident aliens 
with signs of leprosy to be unclean (Mishnah, Nega’im 3.1).2 If a man 
removed the signs of uncleanness, plucked out his white hairs, or cauter-
ized quick flesh before he came to the priest, he was considered clean. 
However, if he did so after he had been certified unclean, he was still 
unclean (Nega’im 7.4). Indeed, would we be right to suppose that the 
Israelites thought of zara’at as a kind of sickness? It is difficult to avoid 
assuming so when we think about it in English: we can hardly detach the 
words “leprosy” or “malignant skin disease” from the idea of sickness. The 
chapters in Leviticus are concerned with signs of “uncleanness” in the 
body—that is, with ritual purity and impurity. There is no discussion of 
measures to care for or provide remedies for people with the bodily signs 
that show them to be unclean. The word for “plague” (nega) and the one 
for “leprosy” (zara’at) both derive from roots with meanings of “smit-
ing” (naga, “to smite, blast, touch, reach”; zara’, “to smite, strike, pierce, 
sting”). Leviticus 13 and 14 nowhere use the main verb halah (being or 
becoming sick) with reference to the “plague of leprosy.”3
Something else also prompts us to question the sense in which the 
Israelites considered leprosy a kind of illness. The biblical chapters on 
leprosy describe the leprosy in a house, in garments, and in anything 
made of skins, which are all “unclean” because a person with leprosy is 
unclean. We use the idea of sickness with reference to living creatures; 
we do not speak of things like houses or garments falling sick.
2. The Mishnah was a rabbinic codification and compilation of the great body 
of Jewish law handed down by oral tradition. Its redaction was the work of 
many scholars in about the second century CE.
3. In only one phrase in the Leviticus chapters (“Behold if the plague of lep-
rosy be healed in the leper” [Leviticus 14:3]) does another verb, nirppa’ (to 
“be healed,” from the root rapa’, “to heal, mend”), appear.
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Impurity or sin
Leviticus defines the leper as one in the category of persons and things 
that are ritually impure. Although there is no explicit moral condemna-
tion of the man found to be leprous, the terms for moral valuation are 
all there (Brody 1974: 111–12). Leviticus does not deny that leprosy 
is a punishment for sin; it simply ignores the idea. Rabbinical com-
mentaries in the Mishnah connected leprosy with sin, as did the early 
Christian writers Justin Martyr, Origen, Chrysostom, and Tertullian. 
Leprosy was the external revelation of internal evil, an emblem of sin 
visible on the skin. For simony, avarice, and lust, a man or woman might 
be smitten with leprosy. By the Middle Ages, leprosy had become a 
disease of the soul as well as of the body (Brody 1974). A bishop, priest, 
or ecclesiastical jury that decided whether people had leprosy had the 
power to cut them off from ordinary life. The rules differed with time 
and place, but segregation of leprous patients was the common and 
persistent theme. The leper was dead to the world (in Rothar’s edict, il 
est mort quant au siècle). Over the centuries following the Middle Ages, 
the numbers of lepers in Europe slowly declined; the moral stigma so 
closely bound to leprosy also slowly attenuated and changed. How-
ever, the stigma has never wholly died out (Gussow and Tracy 1970). 
It remains in the attitudes people still bring to the disease as well as 
the horror of leprosy that, for centuries, has seemed to justify segrega-
tion and the special treatment of lepers (Iliffe 1987: chap. 12; Richards 
[1977] 2000; Waxler 1981). Something of that stigma lingers with us 
still. But the question I have in mind concerns a much earlier period: 
biblical times.
Do the biblical rules for cleansing the leper reveal why leprosy was 
singled out? The cleansing of the leper required the performance of a se-
ries of rites with sacrifices. Old Testament sacrifice was a complex ritual 
system, and the order and forms set out for cleansing the leper were pe-
culiar. William Robertson Smith’s Religion of the Semites (1889) famous-
ly discussed Old Testament sacrifice, throwing light on the social context 
of sacrifice, ritual change, and the imagery of relationships between God 
and man. He took the rite of sacrifice to be the model of all complete 
acts of worship in Semitic religion (1889: 214), stressing its persistence 
despite elaborations of procedure. But its meaning has not been constant 
throughout its history. Robertson Smith considered sacrifice in the spirit 
of Julius Wellhausen’s critical approach ([1883] 2013), taking account of 
people’s changing history and political circumstances.
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From sacrifice to sin
The ancient Semites were first a nomadic people, like others around 
them. They were born to their religion; their god was the god of their 
tribe, fighting with them on their side against other tribes with their 
allegedly false gods. The rules of the community were binding on all its 
members; they distinguished them from surrounding peoples and served 
in a period of intertribal wars to weld the people together. The rules were 
public, not private matters. The individual who broke them endangered 
the community. Equality and the solidarity of kinship, along with the 
authority of a father over his son, provided imagery for the relationship 
between the people and their god. The many holy places, a tent of the 
Lord, a traveling Ark of the Covenant belonged to a tribal people whose 
god moved with them—their shield and their strength. They conquered 
another people, they established a kingdom, they settled a land.
Then the imagery became that of a king, of tribute, and of hom-
age; with this, the celebration of power and prosperity appeared. The 
conceptual distance widened between God and his worshippers with a 
monotheism suited to the idea of absolute or final justice coming from 
one source, a king over all, a judge whose decrees were laws. All sacrificial 
offerings had to be brought to a central place of worship. The priesthood 
grew stronger as it assumed the role of mediator between the people and 
God. The kingdom was a holy land.
Then the kingdom became divided and began to fall; the first to fall 
was Israel to the Assyrians. The power of Babylon rose, Judah was be-
sieged, and Jerusalem taken, the Temple destroyed. The sense of celebrat-
ing prosperity was removed from worship and was increasingly replaced 
by a sense of guilt over offenses against God and the need to pacify his 
anger through expiation and propitiation. After the destruction of the 
kingdoms and the experience of exile, the themes of sin, punishment, 
and the need to atone came to dominate the entire sacrificial system, 
altering its character; its focus came to rest on sacrifice offered out of sin-
fulness. Most of Leviticus was codified and written down in the period 
after the exile. It bore the priestly stamp and their views of guilt and sin.
Uncleanness had to be excluded from contact with holy things. The 
taint of lepers required cutting them off from any contact with holy 
things. The rule had a religious basis, not a medical one. An underly-
ing religious theme recurred in many details, especially in the contrast 
between death and life, whereby death was seen as polluting, life as the 
great good. Priest and Nazirite contrasted with lepers, the former two 
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associated with holy things, the latter tainted as if by death. To forbid 
the mixture of holy things with uncleanness had the character of taboo.4 
The purpose was to prevent life from being contaminated and mixed 
with death. The means lay in obedience to God and observance of the 
code of holiness.
The ritual cleansing of the leper
The ritual procedure for the cleansing of the leper was a rite of passage, a 
readmission to the community of those who could worship together. The 
cleansing was not a treatment in a medical sense. The sacrificial system of 
Leviticus was a priestly elaboration made coherent by their conception 
of sin and expiation. My argument is that the leper was singled out as a 
human emblem of uncleanness, tainted by death, which contrasted with 
the image of the cleanness required for contact with holy things and 
epitomized in the priest and the Nazirite. But later, the priests’ preoccu-
pation over sin—an interest bound up with their mediating role and the 
control they exercised through sacrifice—led them to recast the cleans-
ing of the leper as something done for the expiation of sin. Notions of 
sin changed from concern with actions to concern with the individual 
actor and his or her intentions. The earlier regard for action was closer to 
the attitude toward breaches of taboos.
The leper was said to be “unclean” (tame’). Unclean things defile. They 
are intrinsically unclean. So the leper had to be cast outside the camp 
and have no contact with holy things or defile other people. “Defile not 
ye yourselves in any of these things; for in all these the nations are de-
filed, which I cast out before you. And the land was defiled, therefore did 
I visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land vomited out her inhabit-
ants” (Leviticus 18:24, 25).
In keeping with the character of taboo, leprosy was defined unclean, 
but no reason was given for why. However, one possible reason is sug-
gested by the story of God’s anger with Miriam when she, along with 
Aaron, spoke against their brother Moses because he had married a 
Cushite woman (Numbers 12:9–15). God made Miriam leprous and “as 
white as snow”; Aaron said, “Let her not, I pray, be as one dead, of whom 
the flesh is half consumed when he cometh out of his mother’s womb.” 
4. A taboo is a ritual prohibition that may express either the sacredness (holi-
ness) or the uncleanness of something that is set apart.
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Miriam’s leprosy is likened to the flesh of the dead, who bring unclean-
ness. According to the Mishnah’s list of the different degrees of unclean-
ness, that of the leper is exceeded only by the uncleanness of bones from 
a corpse and by that of the corpse itself (Mishnah, tractate Kelim 1.4). 
The priest was forbidden to defile himself for the sake of the dead (i.e., 
to bury or come near the dead or to observe mourning rites) except for 
the death of a close kinsperson (Leviticus 21:1–4). In the case of a high 
priest, he could not mourn even the death of his own mother or father 
(Leviticus 21:10–12). The holiest place had to be kept strictly separated 
from any defilement by contact with the dead. The general rules about 
the dead, their polluting effects, and the means of being purified from 
such effects are given in Numbers 19. The rules for the priests were spe-
cial rules of avoidance. The priests might not leave their hair disheveled 
or tear their clothes in mourning for the dead (Leviticus 10:6; 21:10; cf. 
Numbers 5:18; Ezekiel 24:17, 22). “But the leper in whom the plague is, 
his clothes shall be rent, and the hair of his head shall go loose, and he 
shall cover his upper lip” (Leviticus 13:45). In effect, he was expected to 
behave as one in mourning, made unclean by contact with the dead. But 
the uncleanness was in himself, in his own flesh, and he had to be cast 
out of the camp. The rules appear to liken leprosy to a living death—a 
notion preserved in medieval Christian thinking: il est mort quant au 
siècle.
Death and flesh “half consumed,” white as though dead flesh, carried 
the worst taint. The taint had to be kept away from anything that was 
holy. Life and prosperity were good: this was the great theme that Mo-
ses, nearing the end of his life, declared for God on the day of the Blood 
Covenant. Correlatively, death was evil. “See I have set before thee this 
day life and good, and death and evil, in that I command thee this day 
to love the Lord thy God, to walk in His ways, and to keep His com-
mandments and His statutes and His ordinances; then shalt thou live 
and multiply, and the Lord thy God shall bless thee in the land whither 
thou goest in to possess it” (Deuteronomy 30:15, 16).
The cleansing rites for the leper did not constitute a medical treat-
ment. The three-phase procedure had the pattern of a staged transition: 
the first phase took place outside the camp and was concerned with sep-
arating the leper from the foulness that was in him so he could enter the 
camp; the second phase was a marginal one within the camp, where he 
was allowed back into civil life but was still not clean enough to enter his 
own house, to come in contact with family life, or to have marital inter-
course; the third phase enabled him to expiate himself through sacrifice. 
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The third phase showed the priestly concern for sin and atonement—it 
was the leper’s final purification that restored him clean to the commu-
nity of worshippers. The priestly view of the purpose of sacrifice was that 
it was an expiation for a sin.
In the third phase, the offerings for sin and guilt were made. Old Tes-
tament ideas of guilt and sin differed from modern ones. “Sin” (hatta’at) 
was incurred by doing anything that was forbidden by a command of 
God. The root from which hatta’at comes is hatta’, which means “to fall 
or miss one’s aim, to make a false step, to fail in one’s duty.” In Le-
viticus 4, the sins for which offerings made atonement were inadvertent 
ones. They involved unintended transgressions, among which were ones 
leading to the condition of ritual impurity. “Sin” in this sense included 
defilement and uncleanness. It was the action or the state that mattered, 
not the intention. The expiation of sin was made the central object of 
sacrifice and permeated the system, but its ethical sense was not spelled 
out. After the early, explicit statements about the rules and false steps, a 
growing concern emerged of awareness of sin by a people estranged from 
God because they strayed after false gods, foreign lovers, or luxury. The 
idea of sin took on a shape that is more familiar to us now.
Conclusions
The problem is this: Why were the skin conditions described in Le-
viticus given so much attention? “Lepers” were taken to be unclean and 
tainted with death. If skin conditions were seen as a mixture of the dead 
and the living in someone’s flesh, that might explain why the person with 
“leprosy” was singled out—indeed, who came close to being the epitome 
of an unclean person, the image of someone to be outcast. The leper 
posed a danger to holy things and other people. The form the rules took 
was that of taboo. Other things were identified in Leviticus as unclean 
(e.g., a woman “in the days of her impurity,” the hare, the stork, the bat, 
etc.) because of their state or inherent characteristics, not because of 
disease or anything they did or sin in our modern sense.
The idea that life and death must not be mixed may lie behind the 
command to not mix blood (which is life) with flesh (which can be 
eaten; Leviticus 17:14). Mary Douglas (1966) put forward a theory of 
taboo that made ambiguity and the mixture of kinds or the confusion of 
proper boundaries the heart of the matter. The leper would be taboo in 
this sense, being someone with a combination of dead and living flesh. 
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Such a view may help explain the special ruling for the man who was 
wholly leprous, an otherwise astounding notion: “Behold, if the leprosy 
have covered all his flesh, he shall pronounce him clean that hath the 
plague: it is all turned white: he is clean” (Leviticus 13:13).
The great theme of the code of holiness in Leviticus was, “Ye shall 
be holy for I the Lord your God am holy.” The commands were rules for 
holiness, to set the people apart and make them a holy people. Those 
people who were most strictly separate—in the sense of dedicated to 
God—were the priests and the Nazirites. They could have no contact 
with the dead. The leper was almost the polar opposite of them, perhaps 
because he carried in his person a defiling taint of death that excluded 
him absolutely from any contact with holy things, even contact with 
clean people, even contact with the community. The theme in Deuter-
onomy 30:19 was life: “I call heaven and earth to witness against you this 
day, that I have set before thee life and death, the blessing and the curse; 
therefore choose life that thou mayest live, thou and thy seed.”
I think the biblical attitude toward leprosy first arose from these re-
ligious themes. One strength in setting ritual rules—but not setting out 
the reasons for them or what they mean—is that they may persist even if 
interpretations change. The power to evoke feelings and meanings stays 
open for reinterpretation as times, ideas, and interests change. The rules 
about leprosy provide an example of this. My argument is that biblical 
attitudes toward leprosy had little or nothing to do with attitudes of the 
sort we now take toward illness. The medical sense overtook the moral 
meaning long after the biblical period had passed.
Henry Ernest Sigerist ([1951] 1967: 446–47), like Karl Sudhoff and 
some other historians of medicine, was prepared to see the Israelites as 
pioneers of public health because of the influence of their ideas about 
purity and pollution. The notion of contagion grew, they thought, from 
ideas of the danger of defilement through touch or closeness. The pre-
cepts of Leviticus taught people to fear contamination. These were first 
religious ideas, not medical ones, but they had hygienic consequences.
Another lesson in the story of leprosy concerns cultural relativity and 
our selective blindness. Leprosy shows how words, concepts of sin, and 
responses to illness may be confused and can change with time. Our 
impulse is to see or set a medical frame around the biblical instructions 
on leprosy; one might say we medicalize their leprosy. We find it difficult 
to think about the subject without thinking of sickness. Medical asso-
ciations are so well entrenched around the word that it traps our think-
ing. Its meanings were different in the past; in changing, this relativity 
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exposes our errors of interpretation. Our bias lets us listen uncritically to 
explanations of the biblical rules and attribute hygienic motives to them. 
We rationalize them in line with our own assumptions. But it perhaps 
comes as a shock to see that the leprosy of the Bible was not our leprosy, 
and to realize that, long into modern times, those passages in Leviticus 
were taken to refer to the same thing, even though the instructions given 
for diagnosing the condition clearly indicate they did not. Many people 
must have read them with selective blindness.
An antipositivist and strong skeptical view of Western biomedicine 
might say that truth and falsity depend on certain assumptions about the 
nature of reality. These are not constant and universal. Medicine of the 
kind we are familiar with is a cultural product peculiar to us, resting like 
any other on specific assumptions about the world we live in. Its facts 
are accepted to be facts only when those assumptions are accepted. To 
say that the reality of illness is subjective (and determined by particular 
cultural views) sounds like an extreme idealist position if the possibil-
ity of finding objective criteria of disease is denied. Sometimes writing 
about other societies in medical anthropology seems to imply that ill-
ness realities are fundamentally semantic, taking the meaning-centered 
approach of Byron Good and Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good (1981) but 
without noting their proviso that “it is not our argument that disease is 
not biological or that meanings of illness and symptoms are independent 
of physiological conditions” (Good and Good 1981: 176).
Strong versions of cultural relativity can come close to implying that 
all that matters is what people think. Mary Baker Eddy’s ([1875] 1971) 
position on sickness and healing was even more idealist and subjectivist: 
the spirit is everything and matter nothing. From this she developed the 
approach of Christian Science to healing. It is clear that beliefs about 
the significance of illness have power to alter outcomes and experiences 
of illness. The history of leprosy is a vivid illustration of this point. Social 
attitudes to the disease have added much misery to the direct afflictions 
of bodily damage, as John Iliffe (1987) describes in his account of leprosy 
in Africa. The power of moral attitudes to blind or overcome attention to 
the facts of disease is an old story.
The next three chapters continue with the theme of the cultural rela-
tivity of modes of thought about illness, asking what the scope of medi-
cal anthropology should be. How critical or necessary are the facts of 






To settle disputes it is no good appealing to a logical definition: what 
we need are not definitions but criteria. An elephant is a pretty clear 
case, but take another example—those swans which the logicians are 
so fond of. If the word “swan” is to describe a bird that has the char-
acteristic, among others, of appearing white then those black birds in 
Australia must be called by another name, but if the criteria for being 
a swan are anatomical and do not mention colour, then the black and 
the white swans are in the same category. All the argument is about 
how to set up the categories, not about the creatures. They are what 
they are however we choose to label them. (Robinson 1964: 8)
When we make definitions or argue about them, we are primarily 
asking about the use of words, not about the nature of things. The ques-
tion here is about the criteria of medicine to use in cross-cultural com-
parison. Comparison is inevitable. We name a subject “medical anthro-
pology,” so what comes into it? Medicine in other cultures. What is that? 
Their art of healing, says one. Their knowledge of illness, says another. 
Healing what or whom? Illness, the sick. But what is illness? Who are 
the sick? We reach the edge of a tangled argument. If we knew diagnos-
tic facts about diseases, we could look into the variety of social responses 
to them, confident of comparing like with like and of distinguishing the 
medical facts from the social responses that a particular kind of disease 
happened to evoke in a particular place or situation. In infinitely varied 
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ways, the ideas and practices of a society can affect the occurrence and 
outcomes of diseases.
The sting is that the categories can make a difference to what be-
comes of the creatures. As I discussed in the previous chapter, “lepers” 
were outcast. People did not notice how the reference of the word had 
changed; the use of a constant name deceived them. The same label was 
applied to different facts. Facts about things, their properties, are neutral; 
statements about them can be true or false. It is we who attach certain 
meanings and values to them. Leviticus described particular signs to 
look for to identify the “leper”; those ancient criteria could have pro-
vided a factual basis for comparisons, for matching like with like. People 
meet disease in all societies no matter how they name it or think about 
it. Medical categories would be helpful if they represented descriptions 
of identifiable facts with nonrelative truth values, not ones dependent on 
a particular cultural or subjective appreciation of the case.
Some decry the positivism of medical doctors, complain they are 
dogmatic, and doubt what they assert are facts. Biomedical criteria of 
diagnosis are mostly explicit and defined. They are useful for some pur-
poses of comparison. Those who find bias in scientific medicine must 
usually fall back on their own derivative versions of biomedical criteria 
to identify the illnesses they describe so their readers know what they 
are writing about. They do not confront the problems of comparison and 
translation. But it is not possible to explain what the illness categories of 
other languages mean without translation or examples. It would be bet-
ter to decide how to make the criteria clear.
Subjective views and the semantic approach: The aim of understanding
To understand why a feverish man calls for blankets, it helps to know 
he feels cold. The aim of understanding someone else’s viewpoint is cru-
cial in medical anthropology and medical sociology. “If there is anything 
unique about sociology, it is its preoccupation with the social reality of 
human life which, while never wholly independent of other levels of re-
ality, can be treated usefully as a reality in itself. . . . While the physician 
can use biophysical science to explain the signs he labels as illness, he 
himself cannot explain the behavior of the sufferer by reference to that 
science. For the task of explaining the ‘illness behavior’ of the sufferer, 
and for the task of explaining the ‘diagnosis behavior’ of the man who 
treats him, ‘scientific medicine’ is simply irrelevant” (Freidson 1970: 211).
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Eliot Freidson provides a reason to see this as the proper preoccu-
pation of medical sociology and medical anthropology. But the social 
reality he speaks of would have to be relative to particular people. One 
person’s views are not more or less real than another’s, for the reality in 
question depends on what they think and feel. Each is an authority for 
his own case. Subjective reality is the sort of reality that prompts, “Well, 
that may be how it seems to you, but it’s different for me.” It makes 
reality not independent of but always relative to culture and, ultimately, 
relative to individuals.
Shall we hypnotize the starving man to think that he has feasted? If 
truth were all subjective, we could, and the starving man would grow fat, 
as in the story recounted in Pierre Henri Cami’s short play, “Un radeau 
de la ‘Méduse’, ou naufrage et gastronomie” (“A raft from the ‘Medusa’; 
or, Shipwreck and gastronomy”) (Cami  1972: 92–99). The captain of 
the good ship L’Entre-côtes sees a raft at sea, on it twelve people ship-
wrecked and seemingly dead. But, no! They are stretched out snoring. 
It is the first time he has heard of shipwrecked snorers on a raft float-
ing lost at sea. And what is more, they are all grossly fat. Woken up, 
the shipwrecked people beg the captain to let them digest in peace, but 
one of them hands him the logbook as they resume their snoring. From 
the logbook, he learns of the hypnotist (fortunately, their companion in 
shipwreck), who for the past three months on the raft has kept them 
from starving by stuffing them each day through hypnosis with dream 
feasts of rich food.
Is thought so magically omnipotent? We do not grow fat on dreams 
of food. A burned child fears fire, and we will not be able to persuade 
him or her otherwise. Ernest Gellner (1970) scoffs at the excesses of 
charity in those anthropologists who consider the truth of concepts 
wholly relative to the culture which maintains them. We cannot say to 
each his own truth, because some propositions, if believed and acted on, 
will eliminate those who hold them to be true. With time and ingenuity, 
many errors are eliminated, so we may make progress in the accumula-
tion of objective knowledge. The more extravagant, the more dangerous, 
and the wilder hypotheses will strike against reality.
The fundamental question at issue here is an ancient one about real-
ism or idealism. The commonsense view is that the world will not come 
to an end when my existence ends: this is a central tenet of realism. Most 
would accept it as the only sensible hypothesis, even though the opposed 
theory of idealism is not refutable. In its simplest form, idealism as-
serts, “The world (which includes my present audience) is just my dream” 
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(Popper 1972: 38). Karl Popper puts forth the case for realism as the only 
sensible hypothesis (1972: 32–47).
Yet it seems clear that some anthropologists know, as Bertrand Rus-
sell teased (1945: 684), that idealists are virtuous and materialists are 
wicked. The idealist position may appeal to the anthropologist because 
much fine work in the field has required an imaginative effort to gain 
entry to the worlds in other people’s minds. The anthropologist needs to 
learn how they classify experience and the assumptions by which they 
interpret their experience and give value to it.
But I doubt that any anthropologist seriously adopts the extreme ide-
alist position. The view that the diseases of biomedicine are just cultural 
constructs may come to look like an idealist position if we deny the 
possibility of finding objective criteria. Some people have, indeed, been 
convinced that disease has no objective status. It was, of course, the view 
affirmed by Mary Baker Eddy in Science and health: her third principle 
was that “God, Spirit being all, matter is nothing”; her fourth was that 
“life, God, omnipotent good deny death, evil, sin, disease.” On the basis 
of her belief that the spirit is everything and matter nothing, she devel-
oped the Christian Science approach to healing (Eddy [1875] 1971). An 
extreme position on the cultural relativity of disease (that scientific views 
about diseases are just one other case of a culturally specific view of ill-
ness, having no special status) would be, like Eddy’s, an idealist position, 
opposed to the realist view that we can acquire knowledge of things as 
they are, existing in the way they do independently of anyone’s thoughts 
or feelings about them.
The construction of social reality
It is one thing to say that a person who does not have a thermometer or 
never heard of one has no way of knowing his or her body temperature 
in degrees centigrade or Fahrenheit. It is quite another to say that some-
one has a fever if he or she feels hot. And we have no reason to accept 
what the thermometer measures as what somebody’s temperature really 
is, since our belief in the thermometer is a matter of where and how we 
were brought up. Something rather like that can be considered a criti-
cism of medicine. 
For health scientists and clinicians the most fundamental reality is 
biological. Everything else is somehow less “real.” This ideological 
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bias is an artifact of socialization into biomedical science and the 
modern medical profession. It is a very powerful ideology, howev-
er; one in which behavioural and social science teaching in medical 
schools has had little impact. If there is a single concept in social 
science which challenges this ideology, it is the idea of the social 
construction of reality. (Kleinman et al. 1978: 329)
But what does this phrase “social construction of reality” imply? That 
the truth of any assertion about reality, including physical reality, must 
depend on particular cultural conventions? It is a wording that would 
seem to put all knowledge in the same boat. Émile Durkheim’s theory 
made culturally determined knowledge the model of all knowledge, and 
it has sometimes been taken to authorize a view that reality, includ-
ing physical reality, is a social construct dependent on particular cul-
tural conventions (Durkheim and Mauss [1903] 2017). The remark that 
biological reality is most fundamental to health scientists and clinicians 
because of their ideological bias tallies with that relativist view. The psy-
chiatrist and anthropologist Arthur Kleinman, however, does not con-
sider biological facts to be purely conventional (1980: 41).
To explain why someone holds a particular belief does not necessar-
ily mean explaining it away or showing that it is somehow dubious or 
ill founded. Indeed, the idea of a social construction of reality implies 
that we should try to investigate how people came to hold their views, 
the social influences that have shaped them, as well as the content of 
those ideas. The circumstances that have led one person to know about 
thermometers and another not to are contingent, historical, or acciden-
tal; they are not relevant to the epistemological question of whether it is 
possible to know what somebody’s temperature is. Whether a person has 
measured his or her temperature is also a matter of historical fact, but it 
is not a contingent matter that what the thermometer measures is the 
body temperature of that person in degrees.
I am conscious of belaboring a point. Nearly everyone assumes that a 
commonsense, objective reality exists. There would be no reason to harp 
on this point if there were no skeptics. But the influence of skeptical 
philosophies of knowledge lies behind some of the critiques of medi-
cine in medical anthropology. Our knowledge of the world depends, of 
course, on our faculties for perceiving it. Bats flying in the dark hear 
things we cannot, bees finding flowers in the sun see things we can-
not; their abilities must seem mysterious or magical until we learn that 
bats perceive echoes above a pitch audible to humans or that sunlight 
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gets polarized and determines how bees dance. All our experience and 
knowledge reflect a particular endowment of senses, capacities adapted 
for solving some kinds of problem but not all, weaving a certain mental 
fabric (Popper  1972: 71–72, 257–61). Our unaided perception of the 
world has evident limits and particularities. Things will stay hidden from 
us and thus cannot become data or facts for us until we invent some 
means to identify them. This means that our knowledge of the world 
depends also on the historical events and discoveries that have provided 
us with the means to know it.
There is also variation in what people pay attention to. We perceive 
the world selectively. We give it meaning by relating what we perceive 
to our understanding and past experience. The intensity of the sensa-
tion of pain does not follow automatically from the extent or nature of 
an injury. Fear of implications for the future may intensify pain felt by 
the surgical patient or, by contrast, the hope and chance to escape the 
risk of death may diminish an injured soldier’s awareness of pain. Henry 
Beecher’s studies on pain and its relief (1959) have shown the power of 
ideas about the meaning of a situation to modify the experience of it. 
Mark Zborowski (1952) described differences in the response to pain of 
people of Jewish, Italian, Irish, or “Old American” extraction. He attrib-
uted these differences to cultural attitudes—concern with immediately 
relieving pain versus a desire to know its cause and the implications it 
might hold for future illness; a desire for sympathy and company; values 
set on silent fortitude, self-reliance, and so on. Pain, like fear and anxi-
ety, is open to many influences. Its subjective reality cannot be denied by 
reference to facts. The experience of illness is what the assumptions and 
constructions held by a particular person in a particular cultural milieu 
help to make it, that is, its subjective reality. However, the disease, as 
distinct from the experience of it, is not a subjective matter.
Observation is theory-impregnated in the sense that it is selective 
and influenced by ideas about what is relevant. In a larger sense, we are 
bound to observe selectively. Theories, whether they are explicit or not, 
will guide what we take to be relevant in deciding for or against some-
thing. We use a thermometer to measure the fever of sickness but not to 
measure how cold hatred is or how hot passion is.
Other views of illness illustrate the variety of cultural views. Whether 
or not some condition should be called illness is more a matter of in-
terpretation rather than stark disagreement. There are some things we 
would not regard as illness that other societies do, and vice versa. For 
instance, Gananath Obeyesekere (1976: 207–15) describes “the way that 
The right diagnosis
115
Ayurvedic conceptions create diseases that could hardly exist in a dif-
ferent belief system,” an example being a class of illnesses that affect 
men and women through dhatu loss, as in the loss of semen through 
nocturnal emission. Then again, Marjorie Topley (1970: 421–37) re-
ports that some women from Kowloon, Hong Kong, regard measles as 
an inevitable, natural, and necessary part of growing up. The child must 
cleanse its system of a hot poison passed from the mother’s womb into 
the child. The poison erupts in “pustules” and thus corrects the imbal-
ance of hot and cold. Measles may be a dangerous transitory process, a 
crisis, just as childbirth may be, but Kowloon women do not consider it 
to be an illness. Rather, they treat it more as a rite of passage, although it 
may involve medical treatment and complications just as childbirth may 
(Kleinman 1980: 87, 93). People’s judgment about whether they are ill or 
not may also differ because they have never experienced what it is like to 
have better health, so they may accept a condition—say, lassitude from 
anemia—as something normal, knowing no alternative.
However, the striking cultural variation lies in how people explain 
the causes of illness and how they treat it rather than in basic disagree-
ments about whether some condition is an illness. They direct attention 
to different aspects of the illness and the circumstances surrounding it. 
In almost any account of illness, some of the underlying assumptions are 
apparent. For instance, Rauit villagers gave scant notice to bodily signs 
and symptoms—the clinical features by which we usually diagnose an 
illness. They put cases of all the following diseases or conditions in a sin-
gle category: acute renal failure, arthritis, congestive heart failure, pneu-
monia, perirectal abscess, diarrhea, common cold, aches in hip and thigh. 
This was a category that distinguished the type of illness by making an 
inference about its spiritual cause rather than deducing it from the signs 
or symptoms manifested or reported by the sufferer. Such a classification 
limits the possibilities of discovering regularities of nature in producing 
diseases. If the Gnai were to try to predict the outcome on the basis of 
past experience, they would have to find features common to congestive 
heart failure, acute renal failure, and the common cold.
With any classification of illness, we can inquire into the principles 
on which it is based, the assumptions it makes, and the information 
it conveys. The Gnau do not assume that examining bodily signs and 
symptoms will reveal the cause of illness; they are simply not concerned 
with classifying illnesses by clinical features. What matters to them in 
serious illness is finding out the cause so they will know what to do to 
treat it. Therefore, they distinguish between kinds of illness in terms of 
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their causes—this, to them, is diagnosis, as it often is for us, too, although 
in different terms and on the basis of different kinds of evidence. A diag-
nosis in Gnau terms will convey almost no information about the bod-
ily condition of the person who is ill. While I lived among them, I had 
to find out what features they paid attention to in order to discern the 
cause. Understanding these features helped answer the question of what 
information was conveyed in their diagnoses.
Yet the Gnau, like all other people, start to speak of illness only 
after recognizing some change in a person. There is nothing to explain, 
no reason to classify by cause or sign, or to treat illness except when 
something has been recognized as requiring a response, whether ex-
planation or treatment. The values we all set on life, self, our capacities 
to move, see, taste, think, and so on provide an intelligible reason why 
people everywhere tend to create various classifications and explana-
tions around a common core of experience in illness. “Of all the ob-
jects in the world, the human body has a peculiar status: it is not only 
possessed by the person who has it, it also possesses and constitutes 
him” (Miller [1978] 2011: 14). A person is conscious of the body as 
him- or herself: it is the self. For this reason, I have argued that “illness 
is a distinctive form of misfortune sensed by the sick person in ways 
which other misfortunes, like his house burning down, are not. And 
since some diseases destroy or maim the individual, having the power 
to alter or abolish a living identified member of that society, it seems 
to me unlikely that any society would fail to distinguish at least part 
of the whole field of disease from other misfortunes” (G. Lewis 1975: 
356). There may be uncertainties about the boundaries between illness 
and nonillness, difficulties of recognition and calculation, but a com-
mon core remains. The significance attached to it is another matter. As 
Karl Jaspers put it,
Whether illness is understood in religious or moral terms as guilt 
or atonement, or assessed as some derailment of nature (“had God 
so foreseen he would not have created the world”) or whether it is 
interpreted as a testing challenge to the self or a constant sign of hu-
man powerlessness, a memento of human insignificance—these are 
all mere expressions of the general concern and are not in any sense 
insight. By interpretations such as these man reassures himself about 
this really unbearable fact; they may help some individual patients 
to a self-evaluation, console them or emphasise their misfortune. 
( Jaspers [1913] 1963: 778)
The right diagnosis
117
The attitude someone adopts will reflect cultural assumptions about 
what sort of state illness is. They are not necessarily single or exclusive. 
Jaspers ([1913] 1963: 414–27, 773–90) traced how people give existen-
tial significance to illness, how they confront their condition and have 
to interpret it. He wanted to know its content, portent, to bring out the 
meaning of the facts. Is it meaningful or meaningless? Is the illness seen 
as part of the self (“This is just how I am”), something one is tied to as 
inextricably as one’s age, sex, race, body? What has nature added, what 
comes from within? What has been sent or added by something else or 
someone else? Does sickness come by one’s own fault, on purpose, by 
design, or by accident?
This aim of understanding the personal significance of an illness is 
clearly different from the aim of classifying it. The metaphysical ques-
tions asked above are certainly not obtrusive in every illness. But in gen-
eral, they create attitudes toward illness and make a frame for interpret-
ing it. The sufficiency of an explanation depends on what questions are 
asked. It is only by confining the questions about poor health to those 
concerning the body that we may think we know enough when, for in-
stance, we find that someone has tuberculosis and we know what kinds 
of processes may follow from it. If we alter our approach to ask why that 
person fell ill then and there, much more must be answered: poverty, 
poor food, inadequate housing, and pollution may all have played a part 
in bringing about the illness, making any search for a full explanation 
endless. In illness, a desire for simplicity, to find a single or ultimate 
cause for it, has often misled people to rest content with explanations 
that are far from complete; many factors extrinsic and intrinsic to the 
body, not single causes, contribute to the occurrence of illness. Individu-
als faced with ill health must circumscribe what specifically they want 
to find out about it. The value to them of answers will often turn on the 
relevance of the factors to treating or controlling the situation. Ordinar-
ily, it is the particular, not the general, that matters in an illness.
The traditional biomedical view depends on three kinds of criteria: 
(1) the patient’s subjective feelings; (2) the manifest signs and symp-
toms that the doctor observes and examines; (3) occult signs that have 
to be detected by special means, such as radiography or clinical labora-
tory tests. But there are many other ways to classify a sick person. We 
may view the person as an organism coping with its environment; as 
a member of society filling certain roles; or as an individual personal-
ity responding to his or her culture. We may classify patients according 
to the diseases that makes them ill; the extent to which their personal 
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functioning is limited by their illness; the symptoms they are experienc-
ing; the length of time they have had the disease and are likely to have in 
the future; or the course of their illness, that is, whether it is chronic and 
of disabling intensity, progressive, remitting, or recovering (Shepherd et 
al. 1966: 18, quoting Gruenberg 1963). The variety of criteria is useful 
for different purposes. The attention given to the meaning of illness by 
many recent medical anthropological writers takes the enterprise in one 
direction, the semantic one. Horacio Fabrega (1974) reviewed the im-
plications of biomedical notions of disease, pointing out that diseases, as 
defined by orthodox medical indicators, are imperfectly correlated with 
social behaviors. He proposes viewing disease as the independent vari-
able and looking at whether and in what respects behavior varies directly 
in response to it. We have a relatively precise framework for describing 
biomedical structures and functions and how they break down. However, 
as he notes, our judgments on biomedical standards, norms, and cut-off 
points between health and disease have been derived mainly from studies 
of people living in urban industrialized settings. We should be cautious 
about attributing timeless, universal validity to them. To extend them to 
people in different settings or other periods may entail the questionable 
supposition that what are normal standards in urban populations must 
also be so for them.
The subjectivity of illness
Michel de Montaigne, who clearly stressed the power of ideas about ill-
ness to affect one’s experience of it, stated:
How many people have not been made ill by the mere force of imagi-
nation. . . . But even though knowledge could really do what they say, 
blunt the point and lessen the bitterness of the misfortunes that at-
tend us, what more does it do than what ignorance does, much more 
simply and manifestly? The philosopher Pyrrho, in peril of a great 
storm at sea, could offer his companions no better example to follow 
than the serenity of a pig, their fellow-traveller, which was looking at 
the tempest with perfect equanimity. . . . In my opinion, that faculty 
[imagination] is all-important, at least more so than any other. The 
most grievous and the most common ills are those that fancy puts 
upon me. I like this Spanish saying from several points of view, God 
defend me from myself. (Montaigne [1588] 1927: 585, 566)
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People do not make up all ideas of illness by themselves; most knowl-
edge of illness is learned from others. We tend to take whatever is taught 
or prevails in our society for our own beliefs. The Gnau have their own 
ideas about human development, growth, and susceptibility to illness or 
harm at different stages of life (G. Lewis 1980: 134–85). Food taboos 
are one facet of this. To them, few types of food are neutral: food is 
not just food or always food to all persons. Nearly all types have va-
lences that make their use right or wrong for certain kinds of people, for 
people in particular relationships, or for people in particular situations. 
Their notions about the presence of spirits, their attachments to places, 
their movements, their temper, and their interests animate the landscape 
through which people move, facing varied hazards to health. Spirits are 
part of the Gnau world, although they are neither directly visible nor 
quite predictable. When people work in their gardens, for instance, they 
are cautious and observe proper behavior because the spirits are present, 
watchful—and indeed, after certain events like planting—activated and 
aware.
In cutting things down they see themselves as cutting down things 
which belong to certain spirits, or in which these spirits have a pro-
tective jealous interest. The same sense of a possessive jealous inter-
est, of things that belong to certain spirits, goes with crops ready for 
picking or harvesting, and prepared sago. When cutting is involved 
the imputation is that spirits are annoyed or angered at the injury or 
destruction of their things; when things are taken, the imputation is 
of their anger or spite at the loss of what they hold dear, protect or 
benefit and hoard. . . . But these ideas are part of the complex am-
bivalent views they have about the power of spirits which also has 
its other face—that of benefit, securing crop growth and abundance, 
aiding people’s efforts to produce their food. . . . The benefits must 
be sought and so the risks must be run. They are not wholly predict-
able and avoidable risks, even though people carefully observe proper 
prescribed forms of behaviour in gardening. (G. Lewis 1975: 314)
The Gnau move in an environment that is, as it were, variously mag-
netized by the concentration of spirit powers. Place is one of the coor-
dinates of presence and danger and so is time. For how long does an 
action or event carry risk? The interval between an event and choosing it 
to explain someone’s illness reveals something of how they think about 
the risks involved in certain actions and how they remember people and 
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events. Trivial actions may become significant only by coincidence; how-
ever, certain deaths, certain quarrels, or certain rituals in the past may 
be recalled to explain an illness long afterward, thus showing how they 
stayed in the mind. In this perspective, illness comes to resemble ac-
cidents, natural misfortunes, bad luck, mischance. The risks in external 
things are simply there, intrinsic, and hard to predict. The danger may be 
recognizable only later because it has been revealed by the illness. People 
can hardly be blamed for it. The external field (places, powers, activities) 
interacts with an internal field (the person, his or her particular strengths 
and vulnerabilities).
These ideas are bound to make a discussion of illness between Gnau 
villagers sound highly circumstantial to alien ears. The conversation 
seems wayward, attention to detail appears desultory. They can pick out 
the possible relevance of certain actions and do not need to make explicit 
the assumptions behind their deductions. On the surface, the discussion 
sounds like a description of recent events with a jumble of items of ob-
servation, but it can also be taken as more than a statement of plain facts. 
A convalescent woman visited her married daughter the week before she 
had a relapse: they may recall the visit but leave unsaid that the point 
of recalling it is that the lineage spirits of her daughter’s husband in his 
hamlet would have noticed her weak condition and may have struck 
her. A newborn baby dies: people may mention that the baby’s grand-
mother had come to see the mother and baby straight from cutting some 
bamboo at a clump located in a particular place. On the surface, this is 
simple narrative about recent events; it is also the evidence from which 
the Gnau deduce the cause. Talk about recent events is shot through 
with potential implications to listeners who are alerted by illness. Such 
conversations form the content of Gnau case histories, answering their 
typical questions: What has someone done to become ill? What did she 
eat to make her ill? What struck him that he doesn’t know about? Do 
you think it might be a spirit, or what, or is he just sick? The form of a 
case history stems from their assumptions.
If there are general grounds for doubt about how to justify beliefs, 
medical knowledge is not spared them. The relativist position applied to 
biomedicine has had some support in medical anthropology.
A recent article of mine (Young 1981) . . . argues that all knowledge 
of society and sickness is socially determined, and that anthropolo-
gists cannot legitimately claim access to demystified facts. What they 
can claim, and what would set their accounts of sickness off from 
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those of others, is a critical understanding of how medical facts are 
predetermined by the process through which they are conventionally 
produced in clinics, research settings, etc. Thus, the task at hand is not 
simply to demystify knowledge, but to critically examine the social 
conditions of knowledge production. (Young 1982: 277)
The relativist argument is not particularly directed at medicine. But 
if the discussion should conclude with a clear decision, then that judg-
ment would presumably also apply to medicine. Observation shows that 
people may be sincerely convinced of a truth not believed in a different 
society. Durkheim ([1912] 1968) argued that rules and categories belong 
to a society and reflect its social structure. People accept the essential 
beliefs of their society because nearly everyone in their community do 
so. We are prone to believe what we are told when it comes to us from 
a respected authority. Society and culture, due to our upbringing and 
dependence on them, have the power to establish our beliefs and what 
we take to be true. At one extreme, it might be argued that belief results 
from social pressures.
To argue that belief is wholly relative to culture, however, would deny 
a place for objective knowledge; it would grant no privilege to certain 
systems of knowledge (e.g., physics or medicine) as forms of knowledge 
that approach objective facts. Anyone wedded to this view in its extreme 
form (i.e., that truth is relative to the society) must face a question: Why 
does he or she believe that? It is like the problem of the Cretan who says 
all men are liars. If I believe it, I cannot argue a special case for my asser-
tion being true in the nonrelative sense unless I exempt my own belief 
from my theory about all other beliefs. As Ernest Geller stated:
Relativism is interesting at least in that it takes what others consider 
to be a problem, and uses it as a solution. The problem: truth is dif-
ferent on the other side of Pyrenees—so how can it be truth? The 
relativist turns this upside down: for him it is not so much a problem, 
but rather a solution. Truth is that which is locally believed: it is tied 
to locality, time, space or culture, as are dress, manners, or cookery. 
(Gellner 1979: 47)
Nothing can be universally true by the normative view of relativism: 
there are no universal independent criteria. Gellner scorns that view: it 
is no guide for anyone. It is like an unhinged road sign that we could 
push in any and every direction. “No sane man would follow such an 
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unhinged signpost and no sane man should suppose that he can derive 
guidance from relativism” (Gellner 1979: 49).
Why then should anyone hold on to the relativist view? Ideas ac-
cepted in another society might seem to an outside observer transpar-
ently false, but the ideas were not foolish or easy to falsify in the contexts 
in which they were used. The observer wrongly presumed to know what 
question or problem was relevant, what the criteria or the rules of evi-
dence were. Language was critical. For Edward Sapir,
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone 
in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very 
much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the 
medium of expression for their society. . . . The fact of the matter is 
that the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the 
language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently 
similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The 
worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely 
the same world with different labels attached. (Sapir 1929: 209)
If Sapir were right, each culture must have its own vision of reality, 
created and expressed in its particular language. This would mean, in 
effect, that people are bewitched by language, living on a Prospero’s isle 
of shared meanings, where the spell of language cannot be broken (Hol-
lis 1977: 163; Gellner 1979: 53). But anthropologists in the field face the 
problem in reverse: they cannot enter the isle or discover the fabric of 
the inhabitants’ vision until they take on the local language as their own.
For Peter Winch, too, ideas of reality depend on language; each lan-
guage belongs to a mode or form of social life with its own view of reality, 
its own rules on criteria for judgments about truth and reality.1 He ob-
jects that E. E. Evans-Pritchard was “wrong, and crucially wrong, in his 
attempt to characterise the scientific in terms of that which is in accord 
with objective reality” (Winch 1970: 80). If Evans-Pritchard wished to 
go beyond merely registering that a Zande believer in magic has a dif-
ferent conception of reality from a member of a scientific culture and to 
argue that the scientific conception agrees with what reality actually is 
while the magical conception does not, Winch (1970: 80–82) opposes 
1. Winch seems to take an extreme relativist position (see Gellner 1979: 144–




him on the grounds that the data needed to experimentally test a scien-
tific hypothesis must use criteria that only makes sense to someone who 
is already conversant with scientific activity and accepts its methods.
This is one path to a skeptical position toward biomedicine. It is 
based on the view that conceptions of reality are rooted in and depend 
on language and society. But many reject it (e.g., Hacker 1972: 176; Hol-
lis 1970, 1977: 143–64, 1982; Lukes 1970, 1982). They point out that we 
cannot begin to try to understand the meaning of utterances in an un-
known language without assuming, first, that the other speakers perceive 
the world more or less as we do (then we can try to relate their utter-
ances to some equivalent of ours and to the world) and second, that the 
speakers are rational beings (whose beliefs are, on the whole, rationally 
connected and whose utterances express those beliefs). “Some overlap in 
concepts and percepts is a necessary condition of successful translation. 
The sine qua non is a bridgehead of true assertions about a shared reality” 
(Hollis 1970: 216).
These assumptions about an independent objective reality and their 
basic rational conceptual commitments provide the only basis from 
which we can begin to understand the language and beliefs of people 
from another culture. How can translation occur without there being 
the same facts of the world described in the two languages? We must as-
sume that people in the other culture are trying to make themselves un-
derstood, just as we must impute rationality to them. Indeed, we should 
impute rationality wherever possible, allowing irrationality when it is 
necessary to do so but with the proviso that irrational beliefs need fur-
ther special explanation.
The relativity of scientific knowledge: Kuhn’s argument
Another influential critical analysis of science deserves attention: Thom-
as Kuhn’s (1970) analysis of change in scientific methods and theories. 
Kuhn argues that the effect of a scientific education is to initiate young 
scientists into a particular community. The community has a tradition, 
a shared culture. Learners are shown typical examples of the problems 
and solutions that characterize that particular branch of science. These 
establish a model of proper methods for them to emulate. The process 
of learning which methods are normal in that branch resembles entry 
into any new community, where newcomers must assimilate its tradi-
tions and rules. But from time to time in the course of normal work in 
Pandora’s box
124
some established branch of science, abnormalities occur that are hard 
to explain. The gathering force of obtrusive doubts and questions may 
impel members to face a crisis of confidence in what they thought they 
knew. They rethink their assumptions and accepted arguments, and out 
of this they conceive a major shift in theory.
Kuhn called this a shift of paradigm. It alters the problems addressed 
as well as the methods needed for solving them. “And as the problems 
change, so, often, does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific so-
lution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word game, or mathemati-
cal play. The normal scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific 
revolution is not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable 
with that which has gone before” (Kuhn 1970: 103). When he writes 
that competing viewpoints are incommensurable, Kuhn means they have 
failed to make complete contact because they disagree about the list of 
problems to be resolved. When competing paradigms become incom-
mensurable, “Proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades 
in different worlds” (Kuhn 1970: 150; see also 111–35). Shifts of opinion 
are clear in the history of medicine. Are they comparable? Leprosy is a 
problem for medicine now. In the Bible and in the Middle Ages, it was 
treated as a theological problem or a ritual matter for the priests. The 
shift from one view to the other involved medicalizing the issue, which 
took a long time. It serves as an example of differences of opinion or 
outright disagreements about the nature of a problem to be solved. In 
many parts of the world, there have been periods of competition between 
medical and religious views of the problems of witchcraft and sorcery.
Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions is bound to appeal to the rela-
tivist: consensus identifies what the scientific problems are. Teachers and 
prevailing authorities establish the consensus among incommensurable 
paradigms; when the paradigm changes, so, too, do views of the world, 
what is real, what the problem is. But in a postscript (1970: 198–207), 
Kuhn states that those who accuse him of arguing that science and the 
choice of paradigm are subjective—that there is no recourse to reasons 
for supporting one over another—or who claim he holds a relativistic 
standpoint are seriously misconstruing his position. He does not doubt 
that scientific development like biological development, is a unidirec-
tional and irreversible process. “Later scientific theories are better than 
earlier ones for solving puzzles in the often quite different environments 
to which they are applied. That is not a relativist’s position and it dis-




Why bother here with such grand issues?
By now I owe the reader an explanation for this excursion into fields that 
are not mine. Work in medical anthropology confronts anyone who un-
dertakes it with striking evidence of the relativity of views on illness. An 
anthropologist cannot fail to be aware of the possibility of ethnocentric 
bias. But acknowledging this is not the same as adopting the relativ-
ist stance that “truth can be no other thing than that which satisfies 
some local criteria and that there are no universal independent criteria 
by which a confrontation between local ones could be judged” (Gell-
ner 1979: 48). To take the position of the normative relativist and assert 
that truth is always relative means endorsing any and cultural views. But 
the issue of the relativist position and the status of medical knowledge 
is not solely theoretical: people’s health and lives are on the line. If we 
regard truth as whatever happens to be believed locally, then we have no 
good reason for judging between alternative cultural theories of illness—
and thus no good reason for choosing to intervene or provide treatment.
Relativity applied to illness has three strands: the first is descriptive 
and empirical—we describe the differences of view we find; the sec-
ond is analytic and philosophical—we may question the nature of this 
knowledge, the epistemological status of what we or others believe; the 
third is normative—we judge the justification for different views, say 
what we think is true or what we think ought to be done. A concern for 
forms of social life and different worlds of socially constructed mean-
ings is understandable. But in the study of sickness and treatment, we 
cannot evade questions of how theory relates to fact. We must admit 
the possibility that some theories about illness are false or lead to re-
sponses that produce worse outcomes than others; we must reckon with 
the awful knowledge that the deaths of some people were escapable yet 
were not escaped. In a brief picture of the conditions and quality of life 
in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, Keith Thomas (1972) 
describes the experience of ordinary people, particularly the poor, with 
chronic poor health, frequent diseases, the early deaths of many of their 
children, and so on. He points out that they had no other standards by 
which to expect less misery or to see their lot as piteous; they simply 
had to accept what they experienced. Something like that situation still 
prevails in many parts of the world. It is the situation of, for instance, a 
woman who has been anemic nearly all her life. She accepts her lassitude 
as something that is normal for her. Only after her anemia is remedied 
can she realize that it was not a given.
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Relativists are spared possible moral pressures that might provoke 
them to judge or act in relation to what people think or do in another 
culture. They can try to understand and analyze what others think and 
abstain from judgment. This would justify inaction or indifference. But 
if sometimes they see other people doing things that make a sickness 
worse, it is not so easy to say nothing and do nothing. Someone who 
would adopt the subjectivist or the normative relativist arguments to jus-
tify passivity or noninterference is challenged by Bernard Williams, who 
states, “I am only saying that it cannot be a consequence of the nature 
of morality itself that no society ought ever to interfere with another, 
or that individuals from one society confronted with the practices of 
another ought, if rational, react with acceptance. To draw these conse-
quences is the characteristic (and inconsistent) step of vulgar relativism” 
(Williams 1975: 39).
The Fore people of New Guinea (Lindenbaum 1979) suffered from a 
highly distinctive and inevitably fatal disease that they called kuru. They 
maintained it was caused by sorcery and tried all sorts of ways to treat 
it and to control the sorcery. They kept failing. After much investiga-
tion, an atypical virus that spread in a certain way was discovered to 
cause the disease. No action against sorcerers or against magical bun-
dles could have stopped it. The facts do have implications for the fate of 
theories. A concern with concepts and the problem of translating them 
from one language into those of another may disguise what is really been 
at issue here: the relationship between theories and facts. Individuals, 
people, cultures, languages, cities, and villages do not live such wholly 
self-contained lives that they never face the challenge of alternative ideas 
or theories or the problems of choice between them. For Gellner (1979: 
48–50), this is the most devastating objection to relativism. People all 
meet challenges of translation, of new concepts, of judgment and choice. 
They manage to surmount problems of translation because communica-
tion itself involves sharing some perceptions and some basic logic. Oth-




To designate something to be a disease is at bottom a moral un-
dertaking, with moral consequences. It involves declaring that some 
things are undesirable and influencing the life of the person said to 
possess them by singling him out as bearing an undesirable attribute. 
Because it is a fundamentally moral task, I suggest, the designation 
of disease does not rest on a scientific foundation. .  .  . Technically, 
medicine is equipped to demonstrate that some signs, symptoms and 
complaints run a given course or lead to certain consequences. That 
the consequence is bad or undesirable is for all men to judge, not 
merely for the physician. (Freidson 1970: 342)
Scientific medicine emerges from a background of folk ideas about 
illness. During most of our historical past, as for most people in the 
world now, scientific views of disease played little or no part. Biomedi-
cine achieves its peculiar autonomy by maintaining the objective charac-
ter of its scientific knowledge: the facts of sickness are as they are wheth-
er someone knows about them or not, whether anybody likes them or 
not. But a critic might argue that talk of scientific medicine camouflages 
a practice that is subjective and evaluative. The critical questions concern 
standards of normality and actual practice. The medical scientist can-
not suppose his or her current theories constitute some privileged final 
state of knowledge to be the lasting arbiter and authority for our stand-
ards. Current knowledge is continually being changed, corrected, and 
improved. The aim of scientific medicine may be objective knowledge 
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free from cultural bias. But this task is incomplete, full of difficulty and 
complexity. In his innovative chapter on medicine as a social institution, 
Talcott Parsons (1951: chap. 10) proposed a sociological approach to ill-
ness. This approach holds that members of a society may look at sickness 
as forms of deviance that were potentially disruptive to the functioning 
of society; they may also consider medicine to be the means to control 
such deviance. Indeed, medical authorities may assume their own stand-
ards and experience represent what is normal.
Stephen Kunitz (1983b) suggested a subtle version of this line of 
argument in his analysis of the historical roots and ideological function 
of disease concepts in three primary-care specialties. His main point was 
that patterns of disease prevalence and techniques of investigation can 
influence the ways doctors think about disease. As infectious diseases 
waned or came under control, degenerative diseases were left more ex-
posed and became more obtrusive as problems. Infectious diseases were 
easier than degenerative diseases to view as specific disease entities. The 
degenerative ones were more suited to physiological explanation, since 
they revealed the effects of wear and tear, modes of life, maladaptation, 
and stress. It was more difficult to restrict their investigation to the labo-
ratory. To understand and treat them, researchers had to take account of 
the habits, work, and family situations of the patients. This required a 
broader view of disease. Social and psychological aspects of illness crept 
back into concepts of disease, at least in some fields. Those attracted to 
some medical specialties would be more likely to share an “expansionist” 
view of what is relevant to understand the illnesses they deal with. That 
is, they would be more likely to include social and psychological factors 
of deteriorating health as part of the medical field because they must 
take them into account, for example, in pediatrics, general practice, and 
community medicine. Practitioners in these fields also claim that they 
have expertise in family, social, or developmental problems and that this 
may properly be called a medical expertise. In short, they are likely to 
hold expansionist views of the province of their medical specialty.
Illness as deviance
Eliot Freidson (1970: 205–358) considered the actual circumstances of 
practice and explained why so often in medicine the desire to be sci-
entific outstrips performance. Someone in a consulting profession is 
subject to pressures and temptations from which a researcher, pursuing 
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“pure science,” may be spared. From the sociologist’s perspective, illness 
is a form of social deviance which people in our society think has a bio-
physical cause and requires biophysical treatment. The sociologist is con-
cerned with social reality. If someone is thought to be sick, various social 
reactions may follow from that belief, whether or not the differences per-
ceived in the patient’s state or behavior in fact have the biophysical basis 
attributed to them. As Freidson put it, “In the sense that medicine has 
the authority to label one person’s complaint as an illness and another’s 
complaint not, medicine may be said to be engaged in the creation of ill-
ness as a social state which a human being may assume” (1970: 205).
One strand of his study involved identifying the social facts that fol-
low from the recognition of an illness; another entailed investigating the 
role of medicine in making or defining an illness. If a certain disease has 
been identified, then certain social consequences follow. What matters 
about this recognition is not the factual truth of the assertion that cer-
tain changes result from this disease but the fact that people believe they 
do and respond accordingly.
It is no surprise that people everywhere pay attention to sickness 
and relate it to values. Behavior or attributes that people disapprove of 
according to their prevailing cultural standards have indeed sometimes 
been considered signs of disease or medical abnormality. Attitudes past 
and present reveal shifts between confident moral and medical views—
for example, with regard to alcoholism, suicide, and homosexuality. The 
possibility of conflating medical with moral issues has allowed for a vari-
ety of abuses. In the USSR, for example, political dissidents were judged 
(with certification by psychiatrists there) to be mentally ill (Wynn 1983). 
Jaroslav Hašek satirized such political misuse of medicine in The good sol-
dier Svejk. The job of the army doctors in the hospital where soldier Svejk 
was sent was to find out and declare men fit for military service because 
their country needed them.
In those great times the army doctors took unusual pains to drive the 
devil of sabotage out of the malingerers and restore them to the bos-
om of the army. Various degrees of torture had been introduced for 
malingerers and suspected malingerers, such as consumptives, rheu-
matics, people with hernia, kidney disease, typhus, diabetes, pneumo-
nia and other illnesses . . . There were stalwart men who endured all 
five degrees of torture and let themselves by carried off to the military 
cemetery in a simple coffin. But there were also pusillanimous souls 
who, when they reached the stage of the enema, declared that they 
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were now well and desired nothing better than to march off to the 
trenches with the next march battalion. (Hašek 1974: 62)
Evaluation is inherent in the notion of illness
Freidson’s (1970: 205–52) point was that medicine uses normative cri-
teria to pick out what it will pay attention to, and this involves an evalu-
ation of what is normal, proper, and desirable. Evaluation is as inherent 
in the notion of illness as it is in notions of morality. He argued that 
“medicine is a moral enterprise like law and religion seeking to uncover 
and control things that it considers undesirable” (1970: 208). The charac-
teristic social meaning ascribed to illness is that the changes—the devi-
ance—noted in the sick person—the deviant—are not thought to arise 
through any deliberate choice by the actor. Rather, they are thought of 
as essentially beyond his immediate control. In principle, the sick person 
is not held to be responsible for his deviance. The illness is condemned 
rather than the person who suffers it.
The thrust of Freidson’s argument goes from the first observation 
“that illness can be analyzed as both biological and social deviance” 
(1970: 211) toward the position that
disapproved behavior is more and more coming to be given the 
meaning of illness requiring treatment, rather than of crime re-
quiring punishment, victimization requiring compensation, or sin 
requiring patience and grace .  .  . With the growth of medical sci-
ence, more and more human behavior began to seem to stem from 
specific “causes” over which prayer, human choice, and will had little 
control. And medical discoveries allowed the successful treatment of 
such problems. From this core of scientific discovery grew a vague 
halo of authority that encouraged the wholesale extension of medical 
definitions of deviance into areas of behavior previously managed by 
religion and law. (Freidson 1970: 248)
He directed the force of his critique at the spurious “medicalization” 
of certain behaviors, situating the tendency in a historical context in the 
interpretation of mental illness, alcoholism, and, more vaguely, of attrib-
utes associated with poverty and crime.
The profession of medicine has extended the sweep of the label of ill-
ness. Physicians act as moral entrepreneurs. There is good reason for the 
sociologist to examine what they do rather than take on trust the label 
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“illness” wherever it is applied through consensus by medical profession-
als. This would be unwise in the light of history, which testifies to the 
past errors of misguided “science,” suggesting that “today’s unwitting, 
unstated assumptions will not all survive” (Freidson 1970: 210). The dis-
eases of modern medicine are an extremely heterogeneous collection in 
which not all have “the unambiguously scientific status of a compound 
fracture” (1970: 211).
A consulting profession and the practice of pure science
As a consulting profession, medicine is committed to treating rather 
than merely defining and studying people’s ills. In the everyday practice 
of professional medicine, questions of reward or the urgency of making 
a diagnosis or demands for treatment expose practitioners to pressures 
and temptations that may compromise a critical objective stance. Doc-
tors sometimes have to make decisions without enough evidence; fur-
thermore, when some matter is urgent, they may be justified in acting on 
incomplete evidence.
Do medical criteria of normality involve value judgments? Some ar-
gue that such judgments are ultimately subjective or emotive. According 
to this view, in disputes about morals, we move from sorting out ques-
tions of fact or logic to resolving them and then to a last phase when “all 
that is at stake is a clash of feelings or commands or intuitions or arbi-
trary postulates” (Bambrough 1979: 135). In matters of right and wrong, 
we may still disagree even though we speak the same language and agree 
about the facts of the case.
Such a sharp separation between fact and value, however, cannot 
always be made; the borders are not always clear-cut. For instance, if 
I describe a clock and say it often breaks down, my true description 
of it comes close to supplying you with my evaluation of it (see Wil-
liams 1976: 52–61). When standards are clear or when they are subject 
to strict social conventions, factual description may amount to evalua-
tion. Words that seem to be value terms turn effectively into descrip-
tive terms: a “good” clock keeps time and does not break down. Simi-
larly, when the physiological functions of an organ or system are clearly 
known, a factual description of how it is working veers close to passing a 
verdict on whether it is in “good” condition or not.
The next difficulty is the role of emotions in moral judgments and 
in medicine. Moral judgments express something about the person who 
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makes the judgment as well as about the thing judged or evaluated. Two 
aspects of this obviously affect the recognition of illness: emotions are 
almost inevitably bound up in responses to sickness; they may even pose 
obstacles to the objective assessment of the sickness. There are strong 
evolutionary and adaptive reasons for linking malfunction and the sen-
sations that accompany it (like pain, nausea, weakness) with responses 
that lie within the range of emotions like dislike, hatred, fear, and desire 
to escape. It is no surprise that diseases should provoke strong feelings 
of suffering, such as pain, misery, disgust, anxiety, or abhorrence. Nor is 
it surprising that these strong negative feelings and the impulses of sym-
pathy and concern for others should have contributed to the elaboration 
of complex moral attitudes to sickness.
However, social deviance cannot be identified with disease. Samuel 
Butler satirized the folly of mixing them up for the readers of his imag-
ined Erewhon ([1872] 1945), where disorders and bodily failures were 
punished but misbehavior and criminal acts were considered as more 
or less severe fits of immorality to be treated with solicitude. No doubt 
some criminal acts may result from mental disorders, but it would be 
rash to equate criminality with these disorders and the cure with incul-
cating a willingness to keep the law (Wootton 1959). Conformity to so-
cial rules is not always a sign of health or mental health. Not all ways of 
life nor all social institutions are equally desirable and salutary. Consider 
the following example of unemployment masquerading as sickness. The 
rate of growth in the population of Mauritius was becoming a serious 
problem by 1952. This was partly the result of bringing malaria under 
control, which allowed Mauritius to halve its infant mortality rate in less 
than five years. As children grew up, mass unemployment among them 
became one of many unintended consequences of the demographic 
changes brought about by medical science. There was no public scheme 
of financial assistance or relief for the unemployed or their families, but 
those who were sick or certified to be sick were eligible for public as-
sistance. In practice, the system worked to encourage both large families 
and official illnesses: the larger the family, the larger the cash relief if the 
worker was certified to be sick or only “fit for light work.” This incentive 
inevitably encouraged people to resort to medical services of all kinds. 
Richard Titmuss found that
the heavy consumption of drugs is in part attributable to the public 
assistance system. A structure of values has been created which (1) 
increasingly makes it important to be regarded as sick, (2) gives relief 
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in cash or in kind, but generally refuses to provide modern drugs and 
injections, and (3) this leads the individual to the moneylender, the 
private doctor, and the chemists’ shop to buy drugs privately. These 
practices reinforce each other and, during the last ten years of falling 
mortality, have been accompanied by a tenfold rise in the cost of pub-
lic assistance. This increasingly heavy burden on the island’s budget 
is, however, due to unemployment rather than to a genuine rise in 
morbidity. A rapidly growing problem of unemployment is masquer-
ading as sickness which is being partially relieved under public and 
charitable poor-law systems. (Titmuss 1962: 210)
Thus, if the ability to hold a job is to be taken as a sign of social 
competence and therefore of health, then judgments about the health or 
disability of individuals may depend on the state and saturation of the 
employment market. Someone could be called “healthy” one moment 
and “sick” the next because the employment market changes. Thus, the 
definition of illness as a failure of social competence becomes circular.
Fine phrases cannot, however, obscure the fact that adjustment means 
adjustment to a particular culture or to a particular set of institutions; 
and that to conceive adjustment and maladjustment in medical terms 
is in effect to identify health with the ability to come to terms with 
that culture or with those institutions—be they totalitarian methods 
of government, the dingy culture of an urban slum, the contempo-
rary English law of marriage, or what I have elsewhere called the 
standards of an “acquisitive, competitive, hierarchical, envious” soci-
ety. (Wootton 1959: 218; see also 265)
Adjustment in this sense is, as Roger Bastide noted (1972: 58) a ver-
sion of the ancient adage: vox populi, vox Dei. People tend to consider 
their own ways to be the standard for normality. They want to call those 
who differ “abnormal”; they find strange customs unhealthy or repug-
nant. This is, of course, the vulgar tendency of prejudice, but it also ap-
pears in mental health professions. The social side of psychiatry is obtru-
sive at every point and has always been so.
Subjective reasons and the meaning-centered approach
Irving Hallowell ([1955] 1967: 253) was doing fieldwork among the 
Ojibwe when, one night, an elderly man became panic-stricken after 
Pandora’s box
134
he found a toad hopping inside his tent. He was unable to kill it at first 
because of his panic, but after much effort, he managed to do so. Then 
he spent part of the night with a flashlight searching for toads outside 
the tent, weighting down its edges with stones so none could get in, 
and stayed awake the rest of the night waiting for morning. The Ojibwa 
people that Hallowell knew in the 1920s and 1930s were still living as 
forest trappers. They were frightened of snakes, toads, and frogs, yet they 
did not fear wolves or bears. The snakes were not poisonous; the toads 
and frogs were harmless. But the Ojibwe feared them as creatures that 
might be associated with evil, used in magic, or have spirit owners who 
would use the creatures to creep up and do them harm. Even though the 
elderly man was a Christian, he told Hallowell about the malevolent at-
tributes of toads, stories of monster toads, the taboos that, if broken, led 
to affliction by toads.
The contents of the elder’s fears were molded by his culture, but it 
turned out there was more to them than that. Hallowell noticed that 
other Ojibwe teased the man about his fears, considering them to be 
excessive; he even saw another man pick up a toad and deliberately put 
it near the elder. The latter said that, as a boy, he had crushed a toad 
that shocked him by crawling up his leg inside his pants. A toad crawl-
ing over someone was considered to be retribution for breaking rules 
about telling myths. Outside observers, like Hallowell, face the problem 
of evaluating unfamiliar behaviors and attitudes. They may not be able 
at first to tell whether these represent abnormal reactions or a pattern 
considered normal in the culture. This example also reminds us that peo-
ple within a society can discriminate the normal from exaggerated or 
abnormal responses.
We can grasp an actor’s point of view, but that does not suffice. A 
cultural belief may provide a reason for why people act a certain way, but 
the cause of their beliefs is still unknown. If they give good reasons for 
expecting rain (black clouds are gathering), they explain both why they 
expect it and why they act as they do (such as carrying an umbrella). 
But the weaker and weaker their reasons for expecting rain (perhaps 
someone has thrown something in a sacred pool, portending death), the 
more we are reduced to explaining only why they act as they do but not 
why they expect rain or death. A rational person can reason rightly from 
false premises. We might say that he or she acts rationally, given their 
beliefs. A certain man may think he is a poached egg, so he goes to find 
a piece of buttered toast to sit on. Although we have found a reason for 
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his action, as Martin Hollis points out (1977: chap. 6), we have not found 
one for his belief.
Purely subjective criteria may make all actions seem equally rational; 
purely subjective criteria may make us think we are sick. But we can have 
delusions about ourselves; physicians may make mistakes in diagnosis. 
And the assertions of people in other cultures about diseases can also 
be wrong. Hollis tells us not to be distracted by our habit of accepting 
objectively bad reasons as good-from-the-agent’s-point-of-view to the 
point where we confuse the distance between the ideally rational and the 
ideally irrational.
At each level—the individual, the local community, the human spe-
cies as a whole—we confront problems of normal standards. Western 
knowledge of biology and physiology is incomplete. Much is known 
about some physiological functions, which has depended partly on dis-
covering suitable techniques of investigation. Suffering has been a spur 
to discovery. Changed patterns of disease, as Kunitz pointed out, have 
also changed how people think about disease and normal standards. This 
history of changes also shows that Western medicine has made some 
advances. Part of the confusion between social or moral judgments and 
biomedical criteria has been disentangled and made clear—but not all. 
The doubts of medicine are by no means all dispelled, especially in regard 
to psychiatric illnesses.
Diseases are not natural entities in the way that individual people 
or organisms are. The classification of disease represents an ordering of 
selected data about the ways in which people may be sick. Behind the 
classifications lie more specific theories about how the facts are intercon-
nected. Biomedical criteria for classifying disease can provide a means 
to compare things seen as similar in relevant medical respects. Some 
facts about human diseases depend on circumstances; however, this does 
not necessarily mean they are arbitrary. “Normal” human standards are 
not easy to specify in global terms. Nevertheless, humans cannot change 
their biological constitutions as they change their clothes, their politics, 





It is easy to think of disease with the model of infectious disease in mind, 
as an illness is caused by a specific entity: the germ. We name the disease 
and its cause by the same name. The false step comes next: the disease is 
its cause. But diphtheria is one sort of illness; diphtheria bacteria grow-
ing on a plate of agar in the laboratory are not a disease even though they 
can cause it. To distinguish between illnesses according to their causes, 
as many people do, reflects an appreciation of the significant problems 
to be faced. But the state of illness must be distinguished from its cause. 
People may say, for example, poverty is a cause of illness, but they do not 
therefore consider poverty itself to be an illness.
The English language is rich in words for illness: “sick,” “ill,” and “dis-
eased” are all acceptable as opposites of “healthy.” In ordinary speech, 
“sickness” and “health” are the broad inclusive terms. They lie at the ends 
of a continuum, but sickness is the member of the pair to which we give 
more marked attention. It demands attention in a way that health does 
not. Someone falls ill and then thinks of the previous state of health, now 
lost, that perhaps he or she had taken for granted.
It would be convenient if there were a simple criterion of sickness or 
health to match the clarity of the contrast in speech. Although we may 
speak of disease or illness in the singular, as though it were a unitary 
phenomenon, medical writing abounds with different kinds of diseases 




Medical science does not consist in elaborating these normal stand-
ards to arrive at a general concept of illness any more than it feels it 
should discover a single remedy for all its cases. The doctor’s function 
rather consists in ascertaining what precise kind of state or event is 
presenting itself, on what it depends, how it proceeds and what will 
affect it. In the great variety of states and events called “disease” almost 
the only common factor is that disease implies something “harmful, 
unwanted and of an inferior character.” ( Jaspers [1913] 1963: 780)
In this respect, it is useful to recall what John Locke wrote in his Essay 
concerning human understanding:
I do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular 
beings makes them not always new and various, but very much alike 
and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that the 
boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men; 
since the essence of the species, distinguished by different names are 
.  .  . of men’s making, and seldom adequate to the internal nature 
of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a 
manner of sorting things is the workmanship of men. (Locke [1690] 
1824: Book iii, Ch. 6, para. 430)
Science directs attention to regularities in nature. It underlies a gen-
eral view that biological events show regularities and these may, by tests 
and observations, be possible to discover. The symptoms and the clusters 
of traits used to identify syndromes or diseases in medicine are abstracted 
from the many complex phenomena observed in actual cases of sickness. 
Thomas Sydenham (1742), a friend of John Locke, was very much con-
cerned to discover the regularities of nature when disease was produced, 
to find the essences of the different species of disease, to distinguish 
them by names, and to make a classification of diseases adequate to the 
internal nature of the things they were taken from. Sydenham compared 
a disease entity to a botanical species and spoke of “specific” diseases. 
Like seeds of a plant, the disease entity might grow in the body of a 
patient and develop the characteristic attributes of the species noticeable 
in the patient’s signs and symptoms.
But diseases do not have separate and independent existences. It is 
a mistake to think of disease “entities” as though they were natural spe-
cies like plants or animals, when they are actually hypotheses or theo-
ries based on certain regularities that are observed in actual entities (i.e., 
the individual people who are sick) and used to classify them (Kraupl 
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Taylor 1979: 5–31). Are there really diseases as distinct from individuals 
or creatures that are diseased? No, the so-called disease entity is a reifi-
cation. Biomedicine aims at the definition of an impairment, given the 
nature of the human species, of anyone irrespective of his or her culture. 
The one-eyed man may be king in the country of the blind but, while 
perhaps better off than others there, he is nonetheless a maimed man, 
abnormal by the standards of his species (see Wells [1904] 2004).
The assumption of regularities in nature is the basis for seeking to de-
fine the normal range of various human functions. The criteria of normal-
ity in medicine are both statistical and ideal; they are ideal in the sense 
that the proper functioning of different organs is conceived with the help 
of teleology—scientists try to determine the relationships between dif-
ferent organs, what purposes they serve, what should count as adequate 
function. Some important physiological functions regulate and integrate 
the whole. Ideals of integration and balance and of the contribution of 
different parts to maintain this whole come to be involved in judgments 
of adequacy. Certain functions vary with age and sex and so the stand-
ards to apply vary. However, the appeal of the biological criteria still 
lies in their objectivity. To say there is something wrong with someone’s 
kidneys is not like saying there is something wrong in telling lies.1 Ac-
cording to a biomedical view (Campbell, Scadding, and Roberts 1979), 
signs and symptoms are identified as relevant to disease because they 
alter the capacity of the individual to survive and reproduce—the essen-
tial biological concerns. The spirochete of syphilis depends on precisely 
set conditions to live. These are given in a human body. It is in terms of 
its effects on human individuals that we call syphilis a disease. It harms 
physiological and psychological functioning in an affected individual so 
as to reduce his or her likelihood of survival and successful reproduction. 
We cannot say “a society is sick” in any nonmetaphorical sense. Disease, 
whatever its social repercussions, is not an attribute of collectivities: in-
dividuals, not societies, are born, live, and die. Ideally, the characteristics 
chosen to identify kinds of disease are discriminating and recognizable 
by objective and explicit means. The aim is to make comparison possible 
and identification objective.
Should we take the average as a guide to normality? It has the ad-
vantage of being measurable. It avoids our choosing between what is 
1. We do not usually establish or support moral values by appeal to experi-
ment. If telling lies is thought to be wrong, there is no point in waiting to 
see if the next instance is wrong—we know in advance that it must be.
Pandora’s box
140
“desirable” and what is not. However, a purely statistical view of abnor-
mality will end up identifying the abnormal with the unusual. Good 
teeth are unusual, so is great strength, great skill at snooker, and so on. 
So we must import ideas of what is relevant and desirable for health: the 
ideal aspect. But ideals involve what ought to be and resist exact defini-
tion. They cannot be identified as straightforwardly as an average can. 
What is health? Is it “a state of complete physical mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity,” as stated in the 
constitution of the World Health Organization? Health then becomes 
an unattainable ideal, enjoyed perhaps by Adam before the Fall. The ab-
sence of disease and the adequacy of health are less ambitious criteria for 
determining health than is ideal health conceived in terms of perfection.
Insofar as evolution links abnormality and malfunction, it does not 
make much difference which of these two criteria we choose in the ob-
jective definition of disease. But serious difficulties arise with regard to 
human diseases because social conditions may so strongly affect both 
adaptation and what is normal or average. Then the biological and evo-
lutionary criteria lose something of their apparent simplicity and clarity. 
Adaptive success is bound to time and place, as in a much-cited example, 
that of the peppered moth (Biston betularia). Pale forms of the moth 
were the only ones known until 1845. By then the effects of the Indus-
trial Revolution had begun to blacken the trees around Manchester with 
soot. The pale moths’ bird predators found it easier to pick them off, and 
the black mutant forms of the moths—hitherto unknown—became the 
common form in that altered environment (Curtis 1979: 785). The pale 
form was ill-fated for survival and reproduction; yet how could we think 
of calling it a morbid or diseased variant? If certain kinds of change in 
any living creature may be called those of disease, in a global and long-
term view such changes may be seen to result from varied causes, such as 
genetic change, maladaptation to environment, environmental change, 
and the predatory, parasitic, and competitive habits of different organ-
isms. The issue of disease may be focused on the individual of a spe-
cies. However, answers about whether some condition of the individual 
should be considered a disease are not always absolute, unequivocal, or 
all-or-none. With regard to the human species, in marked contrast to 
other animal species, there is great difficulty in specifying “ordinary cir-
cumstances.” For most animal or plant species, ordinary circumstances 
are, to an overwhelming extent, outside their control. Adaptation is a 
result of natural processes by which individuals of the species either sur-
vive to reproduce or they fail to do so and the species eventually dies out.
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The argument that normality in the sense of average will imply some-
thing like the optimal or ideal condition depends also on the environ-
mental stringency of nature in eliminating maladaptive difference. This 
is how natural selection should work. But with the human species, ad-
aptation to environment becomes problematic because of the ways peo-
ple alter their natural surroundings. They have often reshaped their own 
environments so much that it becomes hard to speak of them as “natural 
environments” (see also Fabrega 1974: 134–37, 267–73). The point of 
H.  G.  Wells’s story “In the country of the blind” ([1904] 2004) was 
that there, the one-eyed man could not be king, for the inhabitants had 
made their towns and their ways so strangely and so peculiarly suited for 
themselves that the sighted man could not see how to follow them, so he 
was left bewildered, clumsy, and helpless.
People modify environments to suit their wishes as well as their 
needs. They use cars, build cities, plant crops, work in factories, and in 
countless other ways complicate what they have to adapt to. It is not 
necessarily clear whether a specific attribute then brings advantage or 
disadvantage; at times, all we can say is something changes. Findings 
may become average that are not ideal; tooth decay is an example. Peo-
ple learn how to protect themselves so that traits that would otherwise 
put them at a biological disadvantage survive. Many characteristics are 
not overwhelmingly or strikingly malfunctional but only relatively so, 
requiring other stresses to produce evident sickness. Or they may be 
graded characteristics (like blood pressure or serum cholesterol levels) 
that fall within an average range on a continuum that begins to be statis-
tically associated with manifest sickness at the upper or lower ends of the 
common range and beyond. However, the association with sickness is 
not inevitable; it may depend on other contributory or predisposing fac-
tors. In such cases, the identification of standards is very difficult. Stud-
ies of the physiology of hunter-gatherers, for example, made biomedical 
scientists change their view that the rise of blood pressure with age was 
inevitable. When continuous or graded indicators go outside the normal 
range, the person affected does not necessarily switch suddenly at some 
discrete step to become sick: indicators of disease may well have borders 
or ranges where the decision about whether someone is sick or has some 
disease must be qualified or uncertain. Sickness is often not an all-or-
none, either/or state.
Whether an inherited predisposition becomes evident or not can de-
pend on the environment. A trait may be inherited yet not show itself in 
a recognizable form until environmental stimuli, such as deficiencies or 
Pandora’s box
142
excesses, expose it. Responsiveness and plasticity are essential to human 
development of every kind. The distinction between the intrinsic and the 
environmental, like that between the physical and the mental, is conven-
ient but artificial. The ultimate biological criteria of survival—threat or 
risk to life and reproductive capacity—may in fact be almost impossible 
to apply. Instead, medicine concentrates on specific disease theories, not 
on a general theory applying to disease as a whole.
The assumption of regularities in nature is crucial for specifying nor-
mal attributes and for identifying kinds of disease. No simple view of 
cause and effect is possible if natural forces are thought of as beings with 
free will (and possibly capricious). If a people believe that other beings or 
natural phenomena can make them ill but may choose whether to do so, 
they alter the conditions for finding out regularities or “laws” of nature. 
They alter the possibilities for predicting the outcome. What may seem 
critical is to determine the unpredictable reasons why the agent causing 
illness has acted. The regularity of a link between cause and effect is no 
longer present: there can only be an appeal against the agent’s choice and 
some hope of averting a bad outcome. To understand the reasons for the 
illness becomes more critical.
The more the symptoms of a syndrome are definable only in social 
terms, the less likely we are to find an underlying biological cause for 
the disorder. Consider some reasons why people may be unable to eat 
specific food: (a) certain people cannot eat a particular kind of parrot 
because of a cultural taboo, socially defined in terms of age and kin re-
lationships, that determines its inedibility for them—recognition of the 
rule and social disapproval stop them from eating it; (b) some people 
cannot eat pork because their religion forbids it, yet the force of the rule 
is perhaps felt so deeply they feel nauseous or might vomit on finding 
they have inadvertently consumed it; (c) other people cannot eat crab or 
prawns because they are allergic to them and eating them produces nau-
sea and vomiting, even severe shock. The wholly social terms that make 
the parrot inedible may be changed by place or age. The idiosyncrasy that 
makes someone allergic to crab or prawns cannot be changed by put-
ting that person in another social context or by convention. Nevertheless, 
the fact that circumstances may alter cases does not itself make medical 
theories subjective or arbitrary. The harmful effects of some malfunction 
may be more or less severe, depending on the environmental or social 
circumstances of the person affected. The effects are, in other words, rela-
tive to circumstances—relative in the sense of being neither universal 
nor absolute. The absolute is not the same as the objective: objectivity is 
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not bound up with being able to state a rule that has no exceptions (i.e., 
is absolute). Diet and water requirements vary with age, sex, size, activity, 
and environment; so do many other physiological variables. Bambrough 
gives an analogy: “The fact that a tailor needs to make a different suit for 
each of us and that no non-trivial specification of what a suit has to be 
like to fit its wearer will be without exceptions does not mean that there 
are no rights or wrongs about the question whether your suit or mine is 
a good fit. . . . Circumstances objectively alter cases” (Bambrough 1979: 
33).
With almost all diseases, there is some interplay between factors that 
are internal and external to the patient. What is at issue is the signifi-
cance of the effects of the different factors. Indeed, a disease theory is 
unlikely to be useful when its characteristics are largely or wholly de-
pendent on the external or social environment. Although it would make 
things easier if the biological and the social were sharply separate and 
unmixed in real life, they are not. Poverty and lack of education may 
contribute to infection; genetic endowment may have played a part in 
the crime someone committed. The difficult part is to know how large a 
part and how directly each played. The answers are almost never all-or-
none. The social and the biological components involved in a syndrome 
interact. Medical theories about diseases are based on a concern to find 
underlying biological disturbances. The more the symptoms of a syn-
drome are definable only in social terms, the less likely it is that a medical 
hypothesis about the syndrome (viz., that the cluster of traits is sympto-
matic of some underlying biological disturbance) will in fact contribute 
much to an understanding or explanation of the syndrome or traits. And 
a strictly biological view of disease leaves out the dimensions of illness 
of chief interest to the anthropologist or the sociologist—those dimen-
sions related to the social context and significance of illness. Someone’s 
illness is an event, a patch of personal biography, to be understood rather 
than classified. For biomedicine, it is only by ignoring much of what is 
individual about a particular illness that the types or categories can be 
recognized.
The aim of understanding the particular events of someone’s illness 
(how that person has construed them, how the illness constitutes part 
of an individual’s biography) is much more appealing to social scientists 
because it accords with their interest in the social significance and mean-
ing of an illness. Many problems in medical practice belong primarily to 
the social dimensions of illness. Clinical practice, not detached scientific 
study, is the daily preoccupation of most physicians and the raison d’être 
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for medicine. Concern for the patient, skill in interpreting people’s be-
havior and what they say about themselves, skill in showing sympathy, 
gaining trust, and learning to giving advice are essential parts of any 
healing practice. Let me repeat Jaspers’s lines: “The doctor’s function 
rather consists in ascertaining what precise state or event is presenting 
itself, on what it depends, how it proceeds and what will affect it.”
It is easy to imagine that an experience of life in which one is directly 
dependent on one’s community and dependent on nature must color at-
titudes to illness. Human self-interest has often supposed that nature is 
animate and has feelings of sympathy and antipathy toward people. Yet 
we may wonder how some beliefs survive the test of practical experience. 
There are countless examples of beliefs held to be true at one time or 
place but not another. Values may constrain the opportunities for knowl-
edge. The authority of past great writers has sometimes blinded people 
to their own experience. Medicine is full of examples of wrong or mis-
taken reasons that people thought were good and would serve to justify a 
course of action. Even so, they are not wholly trapped in the customs and 
beliefs of their own society. The story of borrowings, the diffusion of the 
great traditions of medicine, the wandering healers and peddlers of pat-
ent medicines, the adoption of cults and rites of healing, the rise and fall 
of fashionable treatments, the diversity of modes of explanation and of 
healing now to be found in nearly all communities imply a willingness, 
even an eagerness, to try alternatives and find solutions that will work. 
In illness, perhaps more so than in other things, people sometimes feel 
such an urgent need to escape suffering that they may become impatient 
with conventional wisdom.
145
Part iii: responses to change
Ways of accounting for illness certainly vary. Many of these ways are 
linked to social, moral, or religious beliefs. This next section, Part III, is 
concerned with changes in response to illness. Chapter 5 suggested that 
leprosy in biblical times shifted from being a matter of priestly rules, 
taboo, and exclusion to being one of atonement for sin or guilt. Eventu-
ally, the label of “leprosy” came to refer to something requiring treatment 
wholly within the secular domain of medicine and public health. It was, 
in effect, an example of medicalization. The beginnings of such shifts in 
approach and frames of understanding are the subject of the next chap-




Bregbo, a healing center in Côte d’Ivoire
Bregbo is a village on the shores of a lagoon, about twenty kilometers 
from Abidjan, the capital of the Côte d’Ivoire. The village is a communi-
ty that became famous as a center to which sick and unfortunate people 
came for healing and guidance. Some stayed for weeks, others for years. 
The community grew up around its first leader, Albert Atcho.1 Most of 
those who came were from the Côte d’Ivoire, although a few came from 
farther away, notably from Ghana. The community began to form in 
1948; by 1967 it had grown to hold about 900 people. Between Abidjan 
and Bregbo is a large town, Bingerville, with a psychiatric hospital. In 
the beginning, it was the hospital that sent patients to Atcho because 
there was nothing clear it could do for them, and some of the patients 
were quite agitated. The calm of Bregbo and a kind of security surround-
ing Atcho enabled many of them to eventually return to their villages. 
The description of Bregbo that follows is based mainly on Prophétisme 
et thérapeutique, edited by Colette Piault (1975). This is a portrait of the 
place and the man who founded it from the varied perspectives of six 
writers, covering a period roughly between 1965 and 1970. As a case 
study, it may serve to show how in one distinctive setting, perceptions of 
illness and treatment began to change under new economic and political 
pressures.
1. Albert Atcho died in 1990.
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The founder Albert Atcho was a prophet in the Harrist tradition, 
although he claimed no place in the Harrist hierarchy or priesthood 
(Augé 1975a: 252). The front of his church at Bregbo proclaimed the 
Ten Commandments of Harrism in cement letters:
Love your neighbour; Do not work on Sunday; Do not bear false 
witness against your neighbour; Do not despise your neighbour be-
cause you also shall be judged; Do not kill; Do not go naked; Honour 
your father and mother; Do not steal your neighbour’s wife; Do not 
seek to know the mystery of God; It is strictly forbidden to satisfy 
sexual pleasure in the open air; Do not eat meat on Friday; Do not 
eat human flesh; Do not drink human blood; Do not insult the poor 
because it is a sin—W. W. Harris. (Bureau 1975: 101)2
Blessed by Atcho, the lustral and healing water with plants and bark 
conveyed the presence of God and was similar to the water used in bap-
tism. Atcho instituted a special system of water distribution through his 
network, a great web centered on Bregbo and Atcho himself.
Atcho had a secretary and clerks who helped in his healing work. 
They questioned patients to find the roots of their misfortunes. After 
long interviews spaced over many days or even weeks, a patient would 
give a confession. This admission of guilt, typed up by clerks, was then 
read aloud in a public ceremony of confession, with cleansing and treat-
ment or penance to follow. Over 3,000 “diabolical” (diabolique) and 
“ordinary” confessions were collected for study. Here is the beginning 
of a typical “diabolical” one: “I declare publicly that I am a witch. By 
my diabolical action I have killed my grandfather Agah Daniel, Kout-
ou Kjarabou, I have killed the unnamed newborn child of Agah Elié, 
two unnamed newborn children of Assamo Anan. . . . I have killed my 
grandmother . . . I have killed . . . I have killed. . . . Here are the names 
of my associates. .  .  . This is the list of my spoilings and destructions, 
my evil actions” (Piault 1975: 123). This was the type of confession that 
emerged from some who came to Atcho due to sickness. They expressed 
a new self-understanding in the stereotyped terms of Bregbo. He called 
this healing.
2. Admittedly, these are fourteen “Ten Commandments,” and they are those 
of Atcho rather than the Ten Commandments proclaimed by W. W. Har-
ris.
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The Annual Chief Festival of Bregbo took place each year on No-
vember  1. Atcho’s influence was celebrated with great ceremony.3 He 
received official recognition for his healing ministry by being named 
Chevalier de l’Ordre National Ivoirien (Knight of the Ivorian National 
Order). People came from a widely dispersed network of villages where 
Atcho’s lustral water (for blessing and healing) was distributed. When 
ministers of state came, it was a further confirmation of Atcho’s fame; 
the same was true when foreign researchers came. He was proud of his 
political and external links. Monsieur Clavère, Assistant of Atcho, spoke 
of this in his speech of welcome at the Festival of Bregbo in 1968:
Agent of healing, great herbalist, Monsieur Atcho, instead of engag-
ing in commercial trade with his healing herb, has given it freely to 
international sociologists who have come to visit him. Thus for more 
than four years, we have received the visits of doctors and sociologists, 
in a word international research workers, without mentioning also 
the many film-makers who have taken his portrait back with them 
and a record of his healing activities. (Piault 1975: 69)
What can we make of this man and his qualities? This was the story 
told of his revelation: the prophet Albert Atcho was born in 1903 and 
his birth was miraculous. At birth, he held a white powder in his hand. 
This powder, obtained from a certain tree, made water froth with suds 
when put in a basin. It was put into a lustral water for washing the sick. 
Atcho was one of the Three sent by God to look after Black people: his 
task was to take charge of ills of the body and soul. His father named 
him Atcho, which means “to bathe,” and he told his son that he was 
destined to serve God as one who washed away sins. The story described 
Atcho’s first act of healing when he was twenty-one years old. Military 
service then took him away to France. His real work of healing began 
after he came back. He met the great Harrist preacher Pita Logba, who 
put him to a test: “If it is truly God who has given you this power, you 
will remain a healer forever, but if this power comes from yourself, God 
3. This annual festival lasted for three days. Day 1: Day for politics, with the 
visit of someone representing the President of the Republic and the award-
ing of a decoration, Atcho in modern suit and tie; Day 2: Harrist religious 
celebration, with the Harrist congregation all dressed in white—Atcho as 
well—and processions, addresses, and hymns; Day 3: The village network 
celebration, with a return to ordinary dress, music, and dancing.
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will take it from you.” Albert Atcho triumphed in the test, and Pita 
Logba said, “Go, it is God himself who sends you to save your people. 
Go and do your work.” Pita Logba prayed. Atcho returned and began 
his career. Such was the story of the revelation and confirmation of his 
healing powers (Piault 1975: 27–45).
People sought his lustral water to help in healing at home. Atcho 
could heal even at a distance. The Chefs d’eau (Water Chiefs) from the 
villages came regularly to fetch his water. The network of ties to Bregbo 
could be traced far afield. When Atcho visited the villages, he performed 
healing and was asked to confirm or reject witchcraft accusations made 
between covillagers. His role was to recognize or unmask and condemn 
the sorcerer or witch. However, his work with witchcraft was ambiguous; 
sometimes he confirmed or rejected witchcraft accusations made by a 
sick person against someone else, usually one of the sick person’s covil-
lagers; at other times, his work consisted of showing the sick person that 
it was evil in himself that made him ill (Piault 1975: 73–85).
The teaching of Atcho was powerfully, often magnificently, expressed 
in his sermons. The problem of inequality between White and Black 
people was explained as God’s choice. But it was actually understood 
and lived in terms of sorcery and witchcraft. In the special terminology 
of Bregbo, these were things of the devil, of action diabolique, actions en 
diable. Power was seen as a privilege that was evil only when misused:
The Devil is a spirit whom God loves. He gave him power to visit 
his people, to see good and evil. It is through the Devil that God 
has sent his wisdom. The Devil helps to make all that is necessary to 
man. The whites with their diabolical spirit, they do everything, make 
everything. You, Africans, you make nothing. The Africans refuse the 
good use of the diabolical spirit, whence comes death and disease. 
(Bureau 1975: 105)
Someone with power might transform evil not so much by giving it 
up as by making it pass into the public domain. To become like White 
people meant transforming sorcery and witchcraft powers from the 
world of darkness and night by bringing them to the world of daylight. 
Devilry of the night was witchcraft and sorcery: devilry of the day was 
knowledge and cleverness. The transformation required people to take a 
radically new view of their world.
By custom, suspicions of witchcraft turned on people within the 
matrilineage who owned more things and kept them for themselves, the 
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powerful and wealthy of the village or lineage; in practice, however, the 
weak and wretched were more often accused (Augé 1975a: 269). Tradi-
tional views aimed to preserve equality between members of the social 
group. But Atcho denounced this expectation of equality as an illusion 
and as harmful. The power of sorcery and witchcraft could be used by the 
envious to bring down those who exerted themselves and who succeeded. 
Africans would not tolerate inequalities; only White people did. That was 
where the difference was thought to lie. This Harrist speaker explained:
With you in France long ago, all the village houses were single sto-
ried. Then one day a richer and more ambitious man wanted to build 
a second floor to his house. His neighbours were jealous. They said, 
“What? He wants to put himself above us!” So what did the neigh-
bours do? They all built houses with two floors and then the neigh-
bours of neighbours built them with three floors. So that is why your 
towns have not stopped growing up toward the sky. With us it’s the 
same. In a village one man wants to put himself above the others—he 
builds his house with cement, a second floor, a staircase. The villagers 
are jealous. They say, “What? Who is he to put himself above us?” But 
the difference from you whites with us is this: that man will never live 
in his house [he will die by witchcraft]. (Bureau 1975: 117)
The traditional view of witchcraft was one of persecution by others, 
and it reinforced a morality of lineage and village obligation and solidar-
ity. In their theory of witchcraft, the cause of illness was external to the 
patient. It might come from neighbors or relatives—that is, from other 
people on whom someone should be able to rely for support but who de-
nied their obligations. Illness was attributable to evil in others who chose 
to use witchcraft or sorcery to satisfy ambition or greed. The theory in-
volved a view of fraught relations between the individual and his or her 
social group. Whether things went well or ill with someone depended 
in part on others conforming to their obligations to support him or her 
as a member of the group. The village African could see the outward 
evidence of prosperity in the town (cars, shops, hotels, shining glass, and 
steel). They saw what was possible for some and aspired to it. But to enter 
that glittering world required wealth, education, and skills not provided 
in the traditional setting. People could go to the towns, but that was 
just a beginning. They risked joining the jobless, mobile, urban popula-
tion. With signs of prosperity around them, they made up a reserve of 
frustrated and aspiring people who had little money, no organized voice, 
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who wanted work and would work for little pay. The success of business 
depended in part on that reserve.
Marc Augé (1975b: 219–36) suggests this as the reason for the of-
ficial praise of Atcho’s work. The mass of people came from villages in 
which they learned a persecutive theory of misfortune. They believed 
that ills in life would come to people because of evil in others, especially 
those they should have been able to depend on. They came to town full 
of hopes, but many failed to realize them for want of skill and educa-
tion. If those who failed transferred their traditional understanding of 
misfortune to their new situation, they might conclude that their failure 
and misfortune were due to evil in those others they had to depend on in 
their new surroundings. These others were potential employers, the new 
conditions of work and life created by those in authority, the govern-
ment, the laws. In this might lie the seeds of unrest or uprising.
New arrivals at Bregbo went to see the prophet and tell him their 
reason for coming. Atcho then had to decide whether he could help 
them. He selected his cases, rejecting people who seemed violent and 
mad or some with serious organic ills. At the first consultation, he would 
implant a sense of the need for confession. From a recording of one 
such interview, J. Lehmann (1972: 355–93) showed the skill of Atcho. In 
the extract, Atcho suggested only obliquely to the patient that he might 
have hidden faults to confess. It is noticeable that Atcho accepted the 
patient’s explanations for his illness without comment, for instance, that 
the origin of his illness was the poison en diable (devil’s poison, sorcery) 
used by the patient’s uncle. It was possible that the uncle would continue 
to harm his nephew, but that did not matter any more. It was more 
important for the patient to think over his faults and to confess and so 
begin the healing process. That was how the shift in interpretation oc-
curred. Confession might allow the patient to disengage himself from 
some responsibility for his acts, offering a way to get out of the conse-
quences his actions would have if they were real. The insistence in the 
subsequent sessions was on total avowal: nothing should be repressed, 
nothing hidden. The relation of undisclosed sin to illness appeared in the 
aggravating effect of hiding anything.
But in the end, the written confessions revealed a strongly stereo-
typed set of wrongdoings: ones involving violations of rules about sexual 
behavior, others dealing with fetish practices, yet others having some-
thing to do with actions en diable: sorcery, drinking blood and eating 
human flesh, murder. The stereotyping was so evident that what was 
important seemed to lie less in what was said than in the fact of saying 
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it. The completed confessions that were typed out were not guides to 
the individual problems from which they grew so much as guides to the 
changed attitudes and ideas established at Bregbo.
Between the beginning (the troubles or misfortune) and the end (the 
confession), between the spoken and the written, a change was worked: 
the contrast could be seen in the transcripts, for example, the interviews 
between Aka Afué, a Baoulé woman, with the clerk eliciting her con-
fession in comparison with the eventual typed “diabolical” confession 
(Piault 1975: 257–75). In the transcripts of later interviews, she accepted 
and admitted to her devil killings and those of her associates. However, 
the transcript also revealed her personal tragedy: she was barren.
Clerk: You have killed all those people. Are you going to speak and 
tell us about it? Think carefully. Say everything you think, whatever 
comes into your head.
Aka: If we had sold all we killed, we could have had a million francs. 
Everything we killed, we destroyed. My father he killed too, and I 
have to struggle now to get money for my father so that we can eat. 
Me—I am in a state of sin toward God and I gave my womb to my 
devil associates so that I cannot have children and my periods have 
stopped. I don’t have my periods any longer and I still have headaches. 
And I cry out, O God! I am my father’s only child and after me there 
will be no more children. Why haven’t I had children? If my friend 
has a nice dress, that always makes me feel awful. It is some diaboli-
cal jealousy. Even when I eat, I never give any food away. I don’t even 
want my husband to have a second wife in the house. I must stay the 
only one, I have magnetized him so he won’t have a second wife. I go 
to so many places because of my illness, wandering without a penny 
on me. This illness strikes me down and l have nothing to make it 
better, and then I think I had better let myself die. Everywhere I go 
people say to me, “Afué, you have our sympathy. Afué, our sympathy.” 
The illness never leaves me. What shall I do? It’s sin. I could stay in 
a corner and weep. I have friends who have children and me, I don’t 
even have a child with me. It’s because of my sin that I haven’t been 
able to have children. That’s really because I got into the group of my 
(devil) friends and I gave things up to them, my associates. It’s because 
of that I have no children. I always say that. (Piault 1975: 261–62)
The clerk then questioned her about all of her actions en diable: how she 
drank women’s blood, brought about their miscarriages, displaced their 
wombs, made labor painful for them, and caused the newborn children to 
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die. In the spoken confession, the first part was marked above all by the 
theme of her unhappiness at her barrenness and her actions en diable. The 
latter part was about her efforts to give up the fetishes she used to try to 
bring back her lost fertility; she also spoke about trying to get rid of her 
headaches. In the end, belief in God appeared as the theme: God alone 
was capable of curing her, not of her barrenness but of her headaches.
In the written confession, the whole matter of her barrenness was re-
duced to two sentences. The far larger part was concerned with her meta-
morphoses into animals that destroy, her killings, what she had wrecked 
and brought to ruin.
What Atcho did, in the view of Andras Zempléni (1975: 153–218), 
was to provide patients with a bridge of understanding between old val-
ues and the new situation that imposed demands for an individualism 
foreign to their traditional values. In the new setting, people experienced 
the demands of competitive self-interest. But they had been brought up 
with different group values and obligations. The traditional explanation of 
misfortune was adapted to those group values. They were not necessarily 
easy to change. The strength of Atcho’s appeal may have been rooted in 
the ambiguous way his message responded to a problem and moved to-
ward a solution. His emphasis on the devil and action diabolique involved 
a relabeling of ideas about witchcraft and sorcery and a new emphasis 
on the individual’s own potential to control his or her own fate. In many 
confessions, the view of action en diable came close to the notion that 
the patient had a diabolical double that caused harm; what confession 
offered was a recognition of this. To the extent that patients saw this in 
traditional terms as a dark or nighttime double of themselves, they were 
not held responsible for it in the same way that they might have been 
held responsible for their daytime doings. By confessing, they detached 
themselves from the dark deeds; by exposing what the night hides, they 
enfeebled it. The people who gave confessions were not judged and pun-
ished in secular terms; instead, Atcho taught that God punished through 
illness. God also offered a chance of redemption through confession if 
people wholly recognized their faults and renounced evil.
Is Bregbo unique?
It would be easy enough to suppose Atcho and Bregbo were the prod-
ucts of some unique combination of circumstances and an exceptional 
individual. Augé argues that Bregbo was unique: “Bregbo, through its 
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intellectual relationship to the persecutive scheme of witchcraft and its 
links with Harrisme and Power, is unique” (Augé 1975b: 236). Certainly 
the confessions recorded at Bregbo are very striking, and Atcho seems 
exceptional. However, Margaret J. Field (1960) had conducted an earlier 
ethnopsychiatric study of people at shrines in rural Ashanti, Ghana. She 
recorded many case histories, including confessions of witchcraft much 
like many of those from Bregbo. The following example is an extract 
from Case 19, Akosua N., a woman of about twenty-six with three sur-
viving children, married to a catechist from her home town:
Akosua’s present illness. The onset was eight months ago immediate-
ly after a four-month miscarriage with heavy blood loss. When she 
walked about she felt darkness coming over her and something crawl-
ing up from her feet. She attended a hospital out-patient department 
and was given “injections and medicine.” She improved physically 
but continued to brood. Four months ago she started strange be-
haviour. She sat about weeping and refusing food, was sleepless and 
walked about at night. She said she had seen people on the wall at 
night. One night she said she had seen someone with mpesempese hair 
(obosomfo’s hair/hair of a priest of an obosom) standing in the yard and 
that it meant that the obosom [spirit or lesser deity] under whose pro-
tection her brother had put himself had come to “catch” her because 
she was a witch and had planned to kill her brother. She said she had 
done a great many other evil things. When she saw people talking in 
the street she thought they were talking about her.
The teacher-brother wrote down her “confessions.” Her mother 
and mother’s brother came to Mframaso [the shrine village] with 
her, bringing the written confession which the obosom’s clerk read 
before the shrine. This included most of the stereotyped misdeeds of 
witches—killing her own and her relatives’ children and various other 
people; causing accidents; illness, barrenness, poverty and the blight-
ing of crops; night-flying; harbouring big snakes in her belly, head 
and vagina; planning further deaths not yet achieved. . . . In spite of 
all these misdemeanours the obosom said she had more to confess and 
must come back another day. (Field 1960: 183–84)
Witchcraft and sickness
Just as with leprosy in biblical times, some conditions we now think of 
as sickness were differently viewed in the past—for example, in Europe 
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when demented women were identified as witches. The assumptions dic-
tated public responses. The second part of a textbook of the Inquisition, 
the Malleus maleficarum, “is devoted to what we would call today clinical 
reports. It tells of various types of witches and of the different methods 
one should use to identify a witch. To use modern terminology, it de-
scribes the clinical pictures and the various ways of arriving at a diagno-
sis” (Zilboorg1935: 8, 9). The book used the dogma of true faith to fuse 
insanity, witchcraft, and heresy into one concept and exclude even the 
suspicion that the problem might be a medical one. In Gregory Zilboorg’s 
account of the blows of the witches’ hammer and what he called the first 
psychiatric revolution, he portrays Johann Weyer as a tranquil but devas-
tating critic of the Malleus (Zilboorg and Henry 1941: 144–244). Like 
Michel de Montaigne, Weyer wrote against demonology and its cruelties 
in favor of a medical view of those who were judged to be witches. He 
accompanied his chief work, De praestigiis daemonum (1563), with a letter 
to Duke William of Julich, Berg, and Cleves in which he says:
To you, Prince, I dedicate the fruit of my thought. For thirteen years 
your physician, I have heard expressed in your Court the most varied 
opinion concerning witches; but none so agrees with my own as does 
yours, that witches can harm no one through the most malicious will 
or the ugliest exorcism, that rather their imagination—inflamed by 
the demons in a way not understandable to us—and the torture of 
melancholy makes them only fancy that they have caused all sorts of 
evil. For when the entire manner of action is laid on the scales, and 
the implements therefore examined with care and scrutiny, the non-
sense and falsity of the matter is soon clear to all eyes and more lucid 
than the day. You do not, like others, impose heavy penalties on per-
plexed, poor old women. You demand evidence, and only if they have 
actually given poison bringing about the death of men or animals do 
you allow the law to take its course. (Weyer 1563, quoted in Zilboorg 
and Henry 1941: 216)
Weyer went over “in minute detail all the practices from exorcism 
to the endless varieties and refinements of torture, from the days of the 
past to his own.” He left no doubt that but one conclusion is warranted: 
the witches were mentally sick people, and the monks who tormented 
and tortured the poor creatures were the ones who should be punished 
(Zilboorg and Henry 1941: 215–16).
In the Côte d’Ivoire, witchcraft was (and no doubt still is) used to 
explain certain events. It informed an outlook on experience. Certain key 
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ideas about the powers of the person provided the potential for a perse-
cutory theory of misfortune and illness. Social rules set out an arrange-
ment of duties and attachments. Values and expectations were framed 
within them. The threat of witchcraft sanctioned some of their ideas 
about responsibility and blame. Thus, guilt or persecution might be an 
explanation for someone’s illness.
Ashanti social rules in the domain of family and kinship also con-
strained relationships in ways that could lead to witchcraft accusations 
(Fortes 1950). If beliefs about witchcraft sanctioned some aspects of be-
havior, we might expect the beliefs to persist so long as the same pattern 
of social structure prevailed. In fact, Meyer Fortes reported that rapid 
social changes had increased the levels of concern for witchcraft, as did 
Margaret Field. It is difficult to know what witchcraft beliefs were like 
before colonial change. In the 1890s, Mary Kingsley noted the strength 
of West African witchcraft beliefs:
You will often hear it said that the general idea among savage races is 
that death always arises from witchcraft; but I think from what I have 
said regarding disease arising from bush-souls’ bad tempers, from 
contracting a sisa, from losing the shadow at high noon, and from, 
it may be other causes I have not spoken of, that this generalisation 
is for West Africa too sweeping. But undoubtedly sixty per cent of 
the deaths are believed to arise from witchcraft. . . . Public feeling is 
always at bursting-point on witches, their goings-on are a constant 
danger to every peaceful citizen’s life, family, property, and so on, and 
when the general public thinks it’s got hold of one of the vermin it 
goes off with a bang; but it does not think for one moment the witch 
is per se in himself a thing apart; he is just a bad man too much, who 
has gone and taken up with spirits for illegitimate purposes. (Kings-
ley 1899: 209, 161)
Fortes’s analysis (1950) pointed to certain strains and divisions in 
Ashanti social structure. They help to account for the direction of accu-
sation and confession, as well as the disproportionate number of women 
over men who came to the shrines in Ashanti. With similar social struc-
tures and values, similar tensions occurred among the coastal Alladian 
peoples of the Côte d’Ivoire who made up most of Bregbo’s clientele. The 
lagoon peoples of the coastal Côte d’Ivoire shared many basic ideas with 
the Akan peoples of Ghana. The experience of colonization, economic 
failure, and humiliation might have been partly behind the reorientation 
of witchcraft explanations and an emphasis on guilt.
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The West African prophets William Waddy Harris and Albert At-
cho perceived witchcraft and fetishes as a source of great harm and evil. 
Fortes said that among the Ashanti,
Accusations of witchcraft are everyday occurrences . . . and their vol-
ume is increasing as claims based on lineage ties come to be felt as 
more and more onerous. Side by side with this is found a rapidly 
growing addiction to cults purporting to give protection against and 
to detect witches. Illness, death, barrenness, economic loss, and other 
misfortunes are often ascribed to witchcraft, and those accused are 
most often close matrilineal kin of the sufferer especially a mother or 
sister. (Fortes 1950: 275)
Confessions at Atcho’s Bregbo community (Piault 1975) and at the 
Akan shrines (Field 1960) also suggest changes occurred in ideas about 
witchcraft.
Augé (1975a) took witchcraft to be at the heart of a peculiarly dark 
view of the world. Certain assumptions guided them, in particular ideas 
about the nature of the person and witchcraft (Augé 1975a: 120). These 
shaped people’s understanding of events. They looked on things that 
happened as signs. There might be powers at work below the surface of 
appearances. Ideas of witchcraft and sorcery allowed people to interpret 
ordinary experience more profoundly. Augé adopted his surrealist view 
from André Breton, finding the surréel more suited than the “supernatu-
ral” to describe the coastal people’s sense of their social world and of 
the witchcraft (1975a: 103, 144). The surrealist approach takes account 
of real happenings and their apparent contradictions but it attributes 
deeper meanings to them, more profound relationships in the contra-
dictions. Events of daily life, family, and work, may have deeper mean-
ings and “speak” to people who can understand: they may indicate things 
about themselves and their relations with the world and other people. 
At least this can happen for the person who saw clearly, the clairvoyant 
or diviner, who sees the meanings and signs as belonging to this world, 
not as emanations from another or higher world. Breton articulated his 
notion of the surreal in these terms:
La théorie du monde est une théorie du surréel. [The theory of the world 
is a theory of the surreal.] The system of causality in such a concep-
tion of the world is not less logical than another, but it is condemned 
to the perpetual making of hypotheses about who or what will be 
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stronger (les rapports de force). The warrior of an Ebrié village, who 
confronts the coloniser to prove his invulnerability, is not blinding 
himself to things: he is testing out the truth about himself, and his 
failure serves as a demonstration and will be understood as such. 
(Breton 1975a: 144)
The duality of the person appears in many guises in West African 
thought. Someone’s reflection in a pool, in another person’s eyes, or in 
a mirror are images of one kind of double. The shadow is another kind: 
the shadow needs light, it flits along beside the person who casts it: it 
vanishes in the dark. Where is that shadow double at night? At Bregbo, 
action en double (action as a double or shade at night) was understood to 
be action en diable (action as a devil in darkness).
Certain aspects recur within a general Akan scheme of ideas about 
the components of the person. All observers have stressed the Ashanti 
and Akan belief that witchcraft is transmitted by inheritance within 
the matrilineage—that is, with the blood (mogya)—and that witch-
craft works against members of the same matrilineage, most commonly 
against close matrikin. This is the critical point for understanding guilt 
and blame: witchcraft strikes within the matrilineage. To hurt people 
outside it, there is magic or sorcery. Witchcraft harms those who are 
closest. Sickness may be the outward sign of these complex subtle strug-
gles between doubles, destiny, and individuality.
*     *     *
A number of points and questions have, I hope, emerged from this syn-
opsis: first, the personal success and charisma of Atcho and the political 
extent of his influence; second the ambiguous shift from persecution to 
guilt in the explanation of misfortune that allowed for some continu-
ity of beliefs in witchcraft; third, the ambiguity about whether Atcho 
should be perceived as a prophet or as a healer; fourth, explanations for 
the extraordinary public confessions of witchcraft, their stereotyping, 
and the persuasive role of the repeated interviews and the community; 
fifth, Bregbo and Atcho are not unique cases, and there is a remark-
able similarity between some Ashanti shrines and Bregbo in their or-
ganization and methods of healing; sixth, there are relevant similari-
ties between Ashanti and the coastal Côte d’Ivoire peoples in social 
structure, witchcraft beliefs, and colonial and postcolonial experiences; 
seventh, women and jobless young men seemed to preponderate as 
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sufferers. The two following chapters explore explanations for some of 
these findings.
The next chapter (on witchcraft or depression) moves from the ques-
tion of shifting ideas, uncertainty, and ambiguity in Indigenous under-
standing of misfortune to its role in the psychiatric identification of 
depression. What part do assumptions or bias play in perceptions of ill-
ness? The chapter that follows is about the rise of shrines for healing, 




Margaret Field (1960) had a special interest in mental illness. She sug-
gested that in certain societies, some people who are morbidly depressed 
confess to witchcraft. Among those attending the shrine in Ashanti, 
Field saw women who were anxious, agitated, and miserable. Some ac-
cused themselves of fantastic acts of evil and of causing harm. “Some 
were deluded, some hallucinated, some in morbid fear, others in exag-
gerated anxiety, and so on. Some believed themselves bewitched, some 
felt themselves being changed into witches, others thought themselves 
already witches, mysteriously disseminating destruction. Their compatri-
ots, invited by them to share their beliefs, readily did so: mental illness 
was not recognised as such, for it wore the garments of traditional ideol-
ogy” (Field 1960: 13).
She studied shrines in rural Ashanti, Ghana (Gold Coast, as it was 
known at the time). The confessions of some people who came to them 
strikingly resemble those later described at the therapeutic community 
of Bregbo.
Field had been influenced by her own 1930s anthropological field-
work to propose that “the key to an understanding, not only of witchcraft 
but of many other preoccupations of unsophisticated people, was Clini-
cal Psychiatry” (1960: 13). She equipped herself to examine it further by 
getting a medical qualification and psychiatric training. She returned in 
1954 to make her ethnopsychiatric study of people at new shrines like 
those she had seen in the 1930s. Her aim was to study mental illness, so 
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she chose the cases in her book accordingly. She cautioned, “Mentally ill 
people comprise only a very small proportion of the pilgrims who flock 
to these shrines not only from within Ashanti but from distant parts 
of Akan Ghana. The great majority are healthy people supplicating for 
‘protection’” (1960: 87). She then explained,
Although the shrine therapists recognise their limitations and fre-
quently tell patients with pneumonia, cardiac failure or pulmonary 
distress with blood-coughing, to go to hospital, they stand firmly on 
the theory that the primary vulnerability of the patient to the disease 
is of supernatural origin and until redemptive ritual has been per-
formed the hospital efforts are futile. When a patient who is already 
under obosom’s (the spirit’s) protection comes asking permission to go 
to hospital this is always given. (Field 1960: 117)
Selection by the healer or the client or the observer?
As mentioned in the previous chapter, some of Albert Atcho’s first cli-
ents came from the psychiatric hospital at Bingerville. Sometimes he 
referred physically and seriously sick patients to the hospital. Otherwise, 
Atcho rarely refused to treat someone who came to him for advice. The 
case histories suggest that many had already tried other kinds of treat-
ment. If there was some selection, it seems to have been done mostly by 
the patients and based on Atcho’s reputation spread by the distribution 
of his network and his fame. The most reasonable assumption is that 
those who chose to go to shrines and spiritual healers believed that spir-
its or mystical powers might be affecting their lives and health. When 
people told Atcho or the shrine priest what their problem was and the 
help they wanted, they revealed reasons or motives for coming. How-
ever, it was open to an observer to reinterpret their motives or reasons. 
This was also evident in what Field wrote concerning the Ashanti shrine 
priest. The priest’s methods were strikingly like Atcho’s in terms of style 
of questioning and insinuation. In Field’s medical opinion, many people 
who complained of sickness suffered from distress of mind rather than 
organic disease. She related their distress to the cultural concern with 
bad conscience and ill-will toward others. She wrote:
The majority of those who come to the shrines complaining of sick-
ness do not appear to have anything organically wrong, but they are 
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troubled. They complain of palpitations, pains all over, headache, 
trembling, giddiness, and darkness in front of the eyes. The priest is 
quick to recognise the patients and comments, “There are troubles 
in your sickness,” or “You are sick because you are keeping things in 
your head.” Often he elicits confessions and fears by employing shock 
tactics. “What about a certain man? What about a certain woman? 
What about a certain quarrel?” If the patient looks genuinely blank 
he tries another tack, but if there is any hesitation or embarrassment, 
he presses the point till he has elicited either confession or specific 
anxiety. Adultery on the part of the woman is one of the commonest 
causes of palpitation and “pains all over.” If the patient is reticent, he 
says, “Go away and come back when you are ready to lay bare what is 
in your mind.” (Field 1960: 113)
Depression and the maintenance of belief in witchcraft
Field accepted that people largely take their own ideas from ideas that 
are normal in their society; she also agreed that some of the beliefs might 
resemble those of the mentally ill. But she went further to suggest that 
the source of certain culturally specific ideas might have come from delu-
sions of the mentally ill: “An active belief in witchcraft . . . is kept alive by 
that mental illness which Psychiatry calls Depression and the fantastic 
delusions of sin and guilt which beset patients. Witchcraft meets, above 
all else, the depressive’s need to steep herself in irrational self-reproach 
and to denounce herself as unspeakably wicked” (1960: 38; see also 317).
The roots of someone’s particular response are in the individual, al-
though culture molds it. “The basic predisposition—the ‘psychiatric 
risk’—is probably the crucial factor throughout” (1960: 248; see also 
201–3). As noted above, Field said that most pilgrims had good mental 
health and wanted to ask for protection. Furthermore, “Financially suc-
cessful men are full of fear lest envious kinsmen should, by means of 
bad magic or witchcraft, bring about their ruin. Unsuccessful men are 
convinced that envious malice is the cause of their failure” (1960: 37).
Mental illness at the shrines
Field chose to work at the new shrines in order to find rural cases of 
mental illness of recent onset. At the time, not much was known about 
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mental illness in African rural settings. Relying on hospital records 
would give a false picture of the amount and kinds of mental illness, 
since people did not go to them and there were few hospitals anyway. 
The ones that existed were in towns; their resources for the treatment 
of mental illness were scant. For Field, the shrines were primarily places 
to find psychiatric subjects, and she did find them there. On the basis of 
her sample, her findings challenged some accepted ideas about depres-
sion in African people. Kennedy noted the extreme variety of the pre-
vailing views on depression in Africans (from common to nonexistent) 
and the impact of Field’s work on psychiatric opinion (Kennedy 1973: 
1139–45; for a revealing discussion of this question, see also Littlewood 
and Lipsedge 1982: 68–86).
Depressed Ashanti people expressed guilt, fear, and misery in self-
accusation; they accused themselves of being witches and of harming 
or killing their close relatives. They had fantastic ideas of the evil they 
had done—fantastic not to the Akan, who could accept the ideas within 
their understanding of witchcraft, but to the outsider. How can we be 
sure what self-accusation indicates? Field thought it was the cultural 
guise for severe depression in Akan women. Colette Piault and others 
who worked at Bregbo found the confession to be so highly stereotyped 
as to offer little insight into the individual’s particular state of mind and 
personal history. Instead, the confessions showed the effect of a special 
form of social pressure and persuasion when they were drawn up. Here, 
then, are contrasting interpretations.
The relation between individual and culture is reciprocal. Mental ill-
ness can provoke feelings of guilt just as local beliefs may provoke mor-
bid anxiety. Do delusions feed on those stories and images? Where are 
the clear standards for identifying the mental illness? Such standards 
are needed if we wish to compare its prevalence, variations, and disguise 
in different societies. There is no discriminating laboratory test for the 
disease, so we are left to depend on the clinical criteria. To evaluate the 
treatment Atcho offered, we would need to know what effects he really 
did bring about. But an answer about the nature of those effects depends 
first on the accuracy of the diagnosis. The man who is found to have no 
diabetes after some treatment cannot be described as having been cured 
of diabetes if he never had it in the first place. It is like the problem of 
the Indian rope trick: you may expend much ingenuity explaining how it 
might be done, but if no one can do the trick nor ever could, you would 
be wasting your time. The moral: you need to find out first whether any-
one can do the trick before trying to explain how it is done. The difficulty 
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with places like Bregbo and with people like Atcho lies in deciding what 
it is you have to explain. Witchcraft could be linked with depression. 
Ideas of witchcraft might prompt guilt. The curious thing about Bregbo 
and the Ashanti shrines was that people confessed to abominable acts of 
witchcraft. It is hard to imagine that anyone would stand up in public to 
declare that they had done such things. Yet this is not unlike what occurs 
in England, for instance, when some severely depressed people may feel 
they are responsible for the misery and misfortunes of people they love; 
they too may declare themselves guilty of abominable acts. However, a 
confession of witchcraft and the self-accusation of a severely depressed 
person might sound similar, but the likeness does not go much below 
the surface.
Figures of speech and different standards for the display of pain 
and emotion may be misleading enough to cause mistakes. This can be 
a practical problem for diagnosis. A suspicion that someone is harming 
another by hidden means might be the paranoid delusion of someone 
with schizophrenia. A similar suspicion of occult harm might appear 
to be someone’s firm conviction in witchcraft allegations. The idea that 
other people can harm one invisibly is a potent source of anxiety. The 
fixed suspicions of one person may be diagnosed as schizophrenic de-
lusions, the witchcraft fears of someone else seen as superstitions. We 
are liable to consider both the suspicions and the fears as false, but 
we see a difference. Paranoid delusions and suspicions of witchcraft 
are not the same. The first, in theory, indicates something abnormal 
about the individual; the second notes something about accepted cul-
tural beliefs. The resemblance between them is superficial. In Meyer 
Fortes’s opinion, “Ashanti witchcraft beliefs are customary beliefs, 
not psychopathological symptoms, though they lend themselves to 
the self-accusations and paranoid delusions reported” (Fortes  1977: 
148–49).
The diagnosis of depression
The diagnosis of depression in psychiatry has long provoked debate 
about how to define the disease and characterize its clinical varieties. 
The contradictory opinions about its prevalence in African populations 
(see Kennedy 1973) suggest that diagnosis is even more difficult when 
cultural influences change the presentation of the illness. Is the disease 
or syndrome really less common in some African communities, or is it 
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only that the observers failed to recognize or find the sufferers (Marsel-
la 1978)? If we suppose that the observers fail to recognize it, we cannot 
tell what the prevalence is on the basis of their estimates.
Grief, guilt, and suspicion are normal reactions in some circum-
stances. But depression as a mental illness or disease involves more 
than this. The name implies that a sad or gloomy mood is one sign of it. 
The textbooks of psychiatry describe the psychological features associ-
ated with the disease (gloom, misery, anxiety; self-reproach, thoughts 
of guilt and hopelessness; suicidal feelings); there are also other symp-
toms including physical ones (changes of sleep pattern and appetite, 
constipation, loss of libido, dull, slowed responses, brooding, or agita-
tion) and signs of changed social behavior (loss of energy and interest, 
neglect of appearance, impaired work performance, social withdrawal, 
irritability).
The presence of the psychological and physical symptoms together 
helps to distinguish the disease syndrome from the grief that is a nor-
mal reaction to loss. But the expression of feelings varies with personal-
ity and culture. Instead of saying he or she feels miserable and worthless 
or suicidal, someone may complain primarily of physical symptoms—
trouble sleeping, change in appetite, energy, or bodily aches and pains. 
Roland Littlewood and Maurice Lipsedge (1982: 200) suggest that in 
many Third World countries, mental illness may be seen in essence as 
abnormal actions rather than mistaken beliefs. Without direct com-
plaints of feeling wretched and worthless, the diagnosis may be missed 
when depression is not the main complaint. From the name of the dis-
ease, the mood sounds as though it should be its mark, yet it is not 
always.
Within any one society, people vary in verbal skills and in their dispo-
sition to examine their own feelings. Misunderstanding is not confined 
to language. It applies to behavior, gestures, and demeanor. Conventions 
of stoicism can mislead just as customary patterns for display can. Lan-
guages are differently stocked with words for emotions, and their idi-
oms may seem strange to foreigners. The conclusion that Africans often 
present psychological distress as bodily disturbance might derive simply 
from misunderstanding their figures of speech. Clichés we use ourselves, 
taken literally, would put us in a wildly surrealist world: “She was all 
ears,” “I cried my heart out,” “It made my flesh creep,” “I exploded with 
rage.” The misunderstanding of African distress could have that sort of 




The difficulties of diagnosis
If we only look for the verbal expression of feelings and thoughts, signs 
of the illness may be missed. Arthur Kleinman (1980: 150; 1986) notes 
that Chinese dislike the display of distressing feelings and are taught not 
to show them. Disapproval and shame make people hide their feelings. 
He suggested that instead of voicing them, they displace their distress 
into an awareness of bodily aches and pains.
Andras Zempléni identifies something similar in explaining why di-
agnosis at Bregbo is difficult:
It is generally accepted that one comes to consult Atcho because one 
is ill. What should we understand here by “illness”? There is no doubt 
that, among the troubles presented in consultations at Bregbo, the 
competent specialist would recognise both some of the major syn-
dromes of general medicine and some psychopathological disorders 
dissimulated behind the thick hedge of somatisations that all psy-
chiatrists have noted in African contexts. . . . The complaints which 
are by far the most frequent are those which could indicate just as 
well a budding organic syndrome as a diffuse malaise expressed in the 
“language of the body”: “headaches,” “body aching all over,” “heart-
aches,” “burning feelings, heaviness,” etc. And what to say about 
those people who describe their “illness” sometimes as a diminution 
of their strength, that is, according to traditional idiom, in one of 
the constitutive aspects of the person (“I lack blood,” “the devil has 
sucked my blood, I am almost dead”), sometimes as a misfortune 
put down to the magic of others (“I lack work, someone hates me”). 
(Zempléni 1975: 156–57)
The phrasing of feelings in terms of body language and imagery 
clearly requires perceptive interpretation. It is difficult with such exam-
ples to distinguish between conventional idiom, idiosyncratic, or poetic 
imagery, hyperbole, symptom, and sign. The problems of identifying 
what someone else feels from what he or she says and does have always 
existed.
Somatization
Kleinman has given much attention to “somatization.” He defines it as 
“the substitution of somatic preoccupation for dysphoric affect in the form 
Pandora’s box
168
of complaints of physical symptoms and even illness” (Kleinman 1980: 
149; see also Kleinman 1986). He suggests that the process or mecha-
nism leading to these bodily complaints rests on psychological disposition 
but with the difference or addition that such a disposition has an ulterior 
cultural cause or origin. People in a society are disposed by their culture 
to show certain forms for the expression of illness. He suggests that “the 
somatic idiom for cognising and expressing depressive feelings among 
Chinese constitutes the affect as a vegetative experience profoundly dif-
ferent from its intensely personal, existential quality among middle-class 
Americans” (1980: 149). His suggestion is that “Depressive feelings, then, 
are not simply suppressed by Chinese and expressed by Americans, but 
rather are different feelings. . . . Similarly masked depression with somati-
zation in Chinese patients may not represent substitution or displacement 
of a universal dysphoric affect, rather a different type of depressive feeling 
(i.e., vegetative rather than psychological or even a special type of vegeta-
tive state). This is a fascinating question for cross-cultural psychology and 
psychiatry, but not one answerable at present” (1980: 171). By the way 
they speak, Chinese people shift concern from the affect itself to the spe-
cific situation that gives rise to the affect. They leave the feeling vague but 
define the external situation that maintains it (1980: 149). The Chinese 
define anxiety, depressive feelings, and the like (dysphoric affect) in ex-
traindividual rather than in intraindividual terms (1980: 160). The style of 
description differs but that does not necessarily show that the feelings do.
Anthony Marsella (1978: 350) roundly asserts that depression in 
non-Western societies implies a totally different experiential process. 
Depression is a disorder associated with cultures that tend to “psycholo-
gize” experience. His position is a version of strong cultural relativism. 
He argues, in effect, that they perceive as bodily discomfort what might 
have been feelings of depression under other cultural circumstances. 
However, in the Taiwanese Chinese cases reported by Kleinman (1980: 
151–57), careful clinical examinations showed that psychological symp-
toms of guilt, hopelessness, gloom, and social withdrawal could be found, 
just as they can usually be found in “masked depression” in European 
and American patients. An illness felt differently in the radical sense 
suggested by Marsella would not be merely a question of someone being 
inarticulate or following a convention or disguising shameful symptoms; 
it would be a different inner experience.1
1. The ideas of “depressive equivalents” and of depression so far somatized 
that depression is not part of the illness are speculative. Indeed, the 
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The issue is difficult: it is at once the philosopher’s question about an-
other’s subjective experience: “Can we really know someone else’s pain? 
Or how they see the color red?” It is also a practical problem for the 
working psychiatrist (as, indeed, for other people). The Sapir-Whorf idea 
that people who use different languages live in different worlds is a half-
truth at best. No one supposes that those whose language has only two 
basic color terms all see the world in black and white. Littlewood and 
Lipsedge (1982: 76) suggest that some psychiatrists would record the 
diagnosis of depression only if their patients actually complained of it by 
name or if they had delusions of guilt. However, conversely, they also ob-
serve that members of ethnic minorities in Britain may believe doctors 
properly deal with physical illness and that the best way to communicate 
with them is by trying to talk a suitable language of bodily complaints.
The evidence of the detailed case histories presented by Kleinman and 
Field seems to correspond to a more straightforward view of depression. 
They reveal combinations of physical, psychological, and social symp-
toms. When the psychological symptoms are not obvious from what the 
patients say about themselves, cultural “masking” seems to explain their 
absence better than some radical difference in the character of the ex-
periences. There might be various motives for the disguise of symptoms: 
shyness, embarrassment, reserve, or preconceived ideas of what the doc-
tor wants to hear about.
Description or interpretation
Many diagnostic labels convey little about what precisely the patient 
complained of or felt or what signs were found. This was an important 
element of Alvan Feinstein’s critique (1964, 1967) of clinical medicine 
in general and the undervaluing of clinical observation, the move away 
from the bedside to the laboratory. The physician’s attention shifts from 
the patient to the laboratory findings on fluids, tissues, and tracings taken 
from him or her. Some diagnoses in fact convey little information about 
what the particular patient feels or complains of. To know that someone 
has diabetes, for example, may identify the disease, but it hardly reveals 
prelogical character of depression without depression might appeal to Lu-




in what way the patient is sick and, in fact, there are many different pos-
sible effects of being ill with diabetes.
Feinstein (1964: 1175–76) distinguishes three components in the 
doctor’s examination of the patient. Nowadays, the clinician is tempted 
to jump too quickly from observation to interpretation to diagnosis. But 
the diagnosis is an inference stated in the nomenclature of anatomists, 
pathologists, and physiologists, not a description of what was observed at 
the bedside. Clinicians often fail to distinguish the three separate acts of 
clinical reasoning (description, interpretation, and diagnosis); they com-
bine description with interpretation and may fuse all three procedures 
into a single act of diagnosis. If the diagnosis does not describe what 
the clinical observer has seen or felt or heard, even less does it describe 
what the patient felt or did. The position in principle would not differ 
greatly from that of the Ashanti woman saying she was sick because 
of witchcraft. She is not describing her symptoms; she has interpreted 
them. They are masked partly because they have already been interpreted 
and diagnosed.
There may be a further aspect to difficulties of diagnosis. Some be-
haviors mimic depression. In some respects, Gnau behavior in serious 
illness does as well. The purpose of the behavior is not to identify pre-
cisely the symptoms experienced by the sufferer so another person can 
interpret them. The sufferer has already done that for himself: he now 
acts in a way designed to remedy his situation by calling attention to his 
need for help. He does not offer a description of his symptoms so much 
as make an appeal. Clinical encounters are not always run on the same 
principles. The doctor may assume that the patient’s part is to describe 
what he feels, while the interpretation and treatment is the job of the 
doctor. The patient’s view of the priorities is different: the doctor’s pri-
mary job is to provide a remedy. The clinical tasks (description, examina-
tion, interpretation, diagnosis, treatment, prevention) are not necessarily 
put in the same order or given the same significance.
Thus, even within the same culture, not only between them chal-
lenges beset our efforts to understand illness and what to do about it. 
Medical anthropology both raises these challenges as questions to be 
addressed and attempts to point to paths toward providing answers.
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chapter eleven
The impact of events
Many people associate change with stress. But the idea of stress is dif-
ficult to use. It can be given a precise definition in physics but not in 
physiology and psychology, where the term gains added meanings and 
less clearly measurable ones (Richter 1957: 31–33). The word has a dou-
ble aspect, an outside or an inside reference—that is, stress as cause or 
stress as effect. Is it the stressor agent or the condition of the person or 
thing stressed? To quote Michel de Montaigne’s example again, “The 
philosopher Pyrrho, in peril of a great storm at sea, could offer his com-
panions no better example to follow than the serenity of a pig, their fel-
low traveller, which was looking at the tempest with perfect equanimity” 
([1588] 1927: 485).
We should therefore distinguish the state of stress from the conse-
quences of stress. The consequences of stress may be adaptive and valu-
able to the individual. Without stress, there would be no learning and no 
individual achievement. On the other hand, the consequences of stress 
may be maladaptive, leading to neurotic states, psychosomatic illness, 
and deviant behavior. Claude Bernard ([1865] 1949) was among the first 
to see disease as the outcome of attempts at adaptation—attempts that, 
though appropriate in kind, are faulty in amount. The reasoning he ap-




Stress and social change
Émile Durkheim’s Suicide ([1897] 1951) was the seminal analysis of the 
effects of social circumstances on behavior and mental health. His own 
ideas were rooted in discussions at the time about the effects of a break-
down in social cohesion. “Since the basic theme of Suicide is the ways 
in which social bonds become weakened and ultimately break down in 
modern societies, this work has had an immediate and continuing rel-
evance to the study of deviance and the whole field of social pathology” 
(Lukes 1973: 205). Durkheim, reflecting on the practical consequences 
of his study ([1897] 1951: 370–92), argued that it was necessary to find a 
remedy to the dissolution of social bonds taking place in modern society. 
But why think that people are so innately conservative that change in 
general must distress them? On the grand evolutionary scale, the species 
Homo sapiens stands out by the ability to learn, to change with astonish-
ing speed, to adapt, to innovate; in this versatility, Homo sapiens also has 
the ability to find the source of biological success.
Must social change cause distress? Jack Goody (1957) doubted 
whether it was right to take new witch-finding cults as an index of in-
crease in individual anxieties in Ashanti. “We have as yet no euphorim-
eters. . . . Yet sociologists and anthropologists appear to be increasingly 
committed to a hypothesis that culture change increases ‘individual anx-
ieties,’ ‘emotional malaise’! Is this not as dubious as Marx’s doctrine of 
increasing misery under a capitalist economy? And is it not immediately 
suspect as a possible rationalization of the social scientist, sociologist or 
psychologist, resulting from his vested interest in stable phenomena?” 
(Goody 1957: 362). Not every precontact society existed in some Arca-
dian state of harmony and stability. Stephen Kunitz (1970) wryly traces 
the way social theory has indulged a conservative belief in stability and 
the supposed warmth and cohesion of the so-called primitive commu-
nity. If we use the analogy of the organism, then internal stability would 
appear to favor well-being. Any change upsetting internal balance would 
be harmful. Claude Bernard’s famous aphorism was that fixity of the in-
ternal milieu is the condition of a free life. Kunitz traces how this physi-
ological idea was applied to the individual in society through Cannon’s 
concept of homeostasis and Alexander Leighton’s work (Leighton 1959; 
Leighton et al. 1963) on social change and mental health in different so-
cieties. Leighton and his colleagues based their hypotheses on the value 
of social integration, harmony, and equilibrium for both individual and 
social health.
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Functionalism predisposes us to think in terms of equilibrium: each 
part should serve a function that contributes to maintaining the whole. 
The well-being of the whole depends on the harmonious integration of 
the parts. Kunitz elaborates:
The point is that functionalist theory, which has come to be equated 
with equilibrium theory, resting as it does on an organic analogy of 
society, sees change in terms of disequilibrium, dysfunction, and even, 
at times, pathology. It is in this sense that I would call it conservative. 
The gemeinschaft-like community tends to be static, unchanging and 
without history. When it undergoes change, according to this theory, 
it is likely to disintegrate, and this causes psychiatric problems for its 
members. (Kunitz 1970: 320)
In Durkheim’s usage, “anomie” referred to the absence or weakness 
of social rules. It was pathological, a state of disaggregation. He viewed 
small-scale societies as having well-established traditional rules, so they 
were not supposed to show anomie. Many anthropologists since Dur-
kheim have explored how upbringing and social sanctions aim at pro-
ducing conforming individuals. Deviancy is assessed in terms of the ex-
pected patterns of conformity. “In general, all modes except conformity 
are essentially deviant in nature, and deviancy tends to be measured in 
terms of the status quo” (Levy and Kunitz 1971: 98). But in fact, not all 
small-scale societies are alike in the ways they stress obedience to au-
thority and tradition. Europeans have not always supposed that the life 
of those they saw or imagined as their primitive contemporaries were 
examples of social harmony: witness Thomas Hobbes, for one. As we 
cannot study precontact society, we tend to fill the vacuum with wish-
fulfilling reconstructions. It is “all too easy to attribute the pathologies 
we can see today to the only cultural reality we are able to observe, that 
of contact and acculturation” (Levy and Kunitz 1971: 100). By examin-
ing long spans of records of homicide and suicide and alcoholism among 
the Navajo and Hopi peoples, Levy and Kunitz showed good reason to 
doubt that “deviance was absent from pre-reservation society as well as 
for doubting that social deviance is in all instances high at present, or 
even on the increase” (1971: 119). The levels of deviance among the Nav-
ajo and Hopi differed from each other, and these levels had remained 
stable over long periods. The deviance also showed patterns more con-
sistent with traditional cultural configurations than with contemporary 
levels of stress or acculturation.
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The question of increase in mental illness
The prevalence of diseases change. But sources of data, especially in re-
gard to mental illness, are all too few, and it is difficult to assign exact 
significance to them. For West Africa, nothing sure can be said about 
changes in the diagnosis of depression in West African patients. Either a 
real change in prevalence or changes in diagnostic habits could account 
for the purported increase in recorded prevalence. Raymond Prince 
(1961, quoted in Kennedy 1973: 1141–42) has given various reasons for 
shifts in diagnostic findings. For one thing, there was the problem of 
observer prejudice: before independence, outsiders considered African 
peoples to be too simple and irresponsible to get depression; after inde-
pendence, they believed Africans gained responsibility and its attendant 
cares and burdens. For another, Western doctors did not recognize cul-
turally masked depression—that is, depressed people were not thought 
of as “sick” in a way that would have made it appropriate for them to 
come to the custodial hospitals for the mentally ill (such as there were in 
the colonial era), but now they come to the more dispersed, open hospi-
tal and clinic settings. Yet again, the incidence of depression might have 
increased under Westernization, literacy, and other modern pressures, 
but there is no satisfactory evidence of a real increase in mental illness, 
although disruptive changes took place during the colonial period (and 
also in the postcolonial period).1 The early colonial phase created a mood 
1. Edward Forster (1972) reviewed the patterns of mental illness for the twen-
ty-year period (1951–71) during which he was director-consultant of the 
Accra Mental Hospital. He was specifically concerned to match the preva-
lence of mental illness (as judged by the records of the hospital) against the 
stresses of political events in the country. He divided the events that took 
place into four five-year periods: “Preparation”—the five years leading up 
to the independence of Ghana from colonial rule; “Independence”—the 
period of adjustments in the first five years of independence; “Crisis”—
when Nkrumah was frightened and suspicious of revolution, so surveillance 
and dismissals increased and the country was impoverished and disturbed; 
“Change”—when the coup d’ėtat took place (1966), followed by major po-
litical changes and economic austerities. At the hospital, the largest number 
of outpatients was seen during the period of crisis, the period associated 
with the most suspicion and increased violence. Forster considered the 
anxiety to be justified and the cause of the increase in outpatient numbers. 
The proportion of women attending the outpatient clinics increased; they 
seemed most strongly affected by the uncertainties. Many women had great 
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of resentment and frustrated resistance. The mood was propitious to the 
emergence of new local leaders and religious cults. William Wade Harris 
came at the right time to catalyze reaction. He gave his own particular 
stamp to Christianity in a conversion movement of exceptional sweep.
Disruption: The emergence of leaders and cults
The first part of the twentieth century, in the Côte d’Ivoire was “a time 
for prophets” (Marc Augé’s phrase). Prophets arise in times of trouble 
and confusion. In West Africa, colonial conquest, the development of 
plantation agriculture, cash crops, the introduction of schooling and 
missions touched the lives of nearly all the people in some way. Some of 
the themes in the sermons of Harris and Atcho could be derived from 
experience of these events. People asked themselves how to obtain jobs, 
money, new tools, and the weapons that were so powerful; they specu-
lated on what produced them. The effect was to create widespread desire 
for things they could not get and to awaken a sense of inferiority and as-
piration. If the previous social systems had been relatively self-sufficient, 
relatively closed to other ideas and ways of doing things, colonization 
forced them to take stock of other practices and ideas.
This history is relevant to the success of Harris and the mood of 
the people who responded to his preaching. People had lost faith in the 
protection of their traditional religion and their gods. They were leader-
less. Harris came in 1913–14, offering hope and leadership. When he 
denounced the traditional pagan religion, asking them to reject it and 
accept his new teaching, thousands converted. Harris had the distinc-
tion of inspiring the greatest Christian mass movement in West African 
history (Haliburton 1973: 30–37; Webster and Boahen 1967: 249–54).
Ghana and the Côte d’Ivoire both had a history of prolonged resist-
ance and eventually suffering crushing military defeat. In both countries, 
the people were humbled by invading powers with Maxim guns. Social 
disruption in the Côte d’Ivoire was possibly more acute than in Ashanti 
and Akan Ghana because of the destruction of villages, the deportation 
of chiefs, and the policies of regrouping and resettling villages. But the 
contrast of Blacks and Whites, socially inferior and superior, was evident 
in both countries. The forced labor system and the land appropriations 




had enormous impacts on Indigenous Ivoirians. White settler planters 
were very evident in the Côte d’Ivoire. The demand for export crops—
coffee and cocoa—was a strong inducement to West African farmers. 
The development of cash crop plantations changed local patterns of pro-
duction and land use.
Harris thus emerged at a critical time. The humiliation of defeat and 
the disruption after long struggle left people ready to embrace a leader 
who offered them hope and moral direction. The striking mixture of 
Christianity, an explanation for Black subordination and failure, and the 
hope of redemption was fitting for the times. People could come to-
gether to fight against witchcraft and fetishes. Recent humiliation, frus-
tration, and defeat provided the favorable conditions for Harris’s success.
In 1918, the catastrophic influenza pandemic swept through West 
Africa with terrible effects that were long remembered (Field 1969: 87, 
90; Peel 1968: 60). Both Margaret Field and J. D. Y. Peel believed that 
some shrines and cults were founded in the wake of this pandemic. Lo-
cal people themselves recalled the panic and prophecies that circulated 
at the time. People had apocalyptic visions of doom and the need for a 
religious revolution or revival. Writing of the Yoruba, Peel (1968: 60–62, 
70, 73, 102, 130, 292) notes that a number of prophets gained their fame 
by preaching about the meaning of sickness.
It was indeed “a time for prophets”: their message was more telling 
in adversity and change. William Robertson Smith’s analysis of the Old 
Testament prophets and the rise of the Priestly conception of sin also 
illustrated this point (1889). Harris believed in the power of the Bible. 
He carried it with him and preached from it. He broke traditional ta-
boos and destroyed fetishes, yet no harm came to him because, he said, 
of what he carried with him: the Bible, the secret of White power (Augé 
1975a: 290). Harris did not deny the existence of spirits and magic pow-
ers; he disputed their strength and defied them. He set out to convert 
people of the Côte d’Ivoire in 1913 and had great success in the en-
deavor. The individual who first gives direction in a time of crisis may 
gain much influence.
There is no doubt that Harris had exceptional and inspiring per-
sonal qualities: he captured the imagination and devotion of people he 
preached to. He was intelligent, proud, serious, severe, fervent. To the 
extent that a general change can be ascribed to the influence of one 
outstanding person, that person’s life and the influences that molded 
him may be crucial to understand his or her actions and achievements. 
The influences of particular events in Harris’s life—his narrow escape 
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of a trial-by-witchcraft ordeal, his opposition to settlers in Liberia, his 
imprisonment, his vision in prison, his termination as an assistant Epis-
copalian school teacher—might be traced in his thought and work. They 
stoked the fire of his preaching. However, the success of his message 
cannot all be put down to the qualities and charisma of this one man.
In the case of Atcho, what else might have contributed to his success? 
The village of Bregbo was built around him. Before his influence, it was 
a small, dim place. The people who came to live there because of Atcho 
were not, for the most part, descendants of anyone who lived there a hun-
dred years ago. Bregbo became the center of his network. The village, the 
daily crowd of people waiting, watching, and the weekly sessions of heal-
ing bore witness all the time to Atcho’s power. He sought a certain glory 
through Bregbo. The church and Atcho’s villa, Ehuyia Thérèse, were new, 
fine buildings in the modern style made of cement. He welcomed for-
eigners and embraced the idea that news, films, and books about Bregbo 
went abroad. The interest of research workers was flattering. The vocabu-
lary and style of Bregbo were modern: it was a “therapeutic community,” 
it had a “secretariat,” its clerks used headed notepaper and typed up con-
fessions. Similarly, clerks had been prominent in the early phases of the 
Harris movement. Perhaps other elements were copied. Ritual forms of 
the Catholic Church (confession, penance and absolution, baptism, and 
the use of holy water) were conceivably models for some of Atcho’s ritual 
methods, but the use of ritual ablutions, with special water or herbs for 
cleansing, and white clays, are widely distributed in West African rituals 
(Peel 1968: 96, 99; Wilson 1973). Yet in his methods of consultation and 
treatment, one of the surprises about Atcho is that he did not borrow 
the outward trappings or labels of colonial medical practice, such as the 
hospital, doctors’ and nurses’ uniforms, stethoscopes, injections, and the 
like—even though he emphasized that he was a healer and Bregbo was 
a therapeutic community. It would seem that long stays at shrines have 
been a long-established Indigenous pattern, not an innovation copied 
from the hospital.
It is not surprising that Atcho’s sermons were about inequality and 
how to get rich and powerful. Atcho’s own lifetime (1903–1990) ran 
almost from the declaration of Côte d’Ivoire as a colony in 1893 through 
the ethnographic reports in the mid ’70s until his death at the age of 
eighty-seven. It spanned periods of government by soldiers, then by ci-
vilians, French colonialists, and on to self-government; it saw the ad-
vent of cars, steam engines, and airplanes. Many Ivoirians of his genera-
tion had known schooling, a system of forced labor, Christian mission 
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teaching, wage labor. Some got rich in business or professional jobs. The 
new national capital was built with multistory glass, steel, and concrete 
buildings. Atcho’s generation watched this happen. Traditional knowl-
edge and cultural assumptions brought from their villages did not arm 
them for the encounter. His generation was made acutely conscious of 
inequality by the treatment they received from White people by seeing 
vehicles and machines they knew nothing of at first and could not un-
derstand. Some of the White Europeans told them they were inferior, 
wicked, sinful, or stupid. Sometimes Atcho said that the lower position 
of Black people was God-given, at other times that it was the result 
of their own sin and choice of wrongdoing. According to Atcho, Black 
people misused powers by which they might have become clever, skillful, 
and rich, but they directed them to do evil. The appeal of his message was 
that people could change their behavior and thereby could acquire power 
and wealth. Atcho pointed to Africans who became rich and powerful 
to prove his point. He himself was an example, with his house, his wives, 
his celebrity and honors, his businesses. People saw how some Africans 
managed to cross the social gulf between Whites and Blacks and how 
government had passed into their own hands. Atcho taught that the 
powers mishandled by too many Africans by night had to be brought 
out into daylight, confessed openly, and transformed to bring benefits 
rather than harm.
The change Atcho demanded was not based on developing the inner 
logic of traditional ideas but on a blatant repudiation of the past. Ac-
cording to his sermons, Ivoirians blighted their own destiny. Develop-
ment and progress depended on rejecting past practices and transform-
ing themselves by turning from night toward day.
Atcho presented himself as a healer, not a prophet or a priest. His 
healing was open to all, regardless of their beliefs. He relied on the no-
tion of the healer as someone who is purely beneficent in aim. Prophets 
rebuke as well as foretell. A healer, being nonsectarian, is open to all who 
need his or her help, concerned only with doing good. This is a com-
forting image. Almost everyone who stayed on at Bregbo had troubles. 
Some—the failed and wretched—came because they had nowhere else 
particular to go (Piault 1975: 40–43, 155). For some, it was a halfway 
house between hospital and home. Others, required to go to Atcho’s 
community to be exposed to the truth about themselves and their own 
evil, stayed because they were persuaded by what he told them, to do 
penance and hope for salvation. Atcho and his staff provided that sup-
port in adversity by exposing evil, imposing punishment designed to 
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expunge faults, and by offering redemption and healing through confes-
sion and cleansing. He also mediated and interceded with God on behalf 
of the repentant. His work was explicitly concerned with individuals and 
their particular problems. Atcho stated that his mission was to heal the 
illness and suffering of people round him.
However, this image of a healer and therapeutic community disguised 
the other aspects of Atcho’s appeal. He was a successful businessman 
with commercial interests in fishing and other activities. Bregbo provid-
ed him with the labor force that brought him wealth. Atcho did not ask 
for payment for his healing work, but he got something in return. Breg-
bo was a working community as well as a therapeutic one. Those who 
stayed for healing were expected to work if they could and to do so for no 
pay. The community fed itself and ran a market. Modern and successful: 
the image of desirable change presented by Atcho and Bregbo appealed 
to African officialdom as well as to the ordinary Ivoirian and the unfor-
tunate. Their interests were like those of the French businessmen who 
continued to flourish under the government of President Houphouët-
Boigny. Judith Lasker (1977: 273) quoted his words: “What the Ivoirian 
wants is to share in wealth, not to share misery. And to do this we must, 
before everything else, contribute to the creation of wealth.” Atcho was 
a good example. His relations with the authorities in power were good. 
The interests of government were well served by docile, unrecriminative 
people. Was there a kind of complicity between Atcho, his views, and the 
interests of government? Atcho’s teaching turned witchcraft back upon 
itself, portraying it as sinful so as to shift responsibility for failure to the 
actor, turning what might have become blame pointed at powerful oth-
ers into guilt felt by the unsuccessful.
Rural young people were looking for jobs and a golden future in 
towns but met frustration in their search. They lacked the education and 
skills needed for the jobs they wanted, the life they dreamed of. New 
cults and shrines seemed to respond to their need for support. Some 
among Bregbo’s resident population revealed aspects of the community 
in this light. Barthelémy, a truck driver out of work in Abidjan, fell ill 
after a series of misfortunes and came to Bregbo. Andras Zempléni had 
many conversations with him (Zempléni 1975: 173–208, 277–322). Bar-
thelémy had struck a European with his truck and killed him: he lost his 
job, went to prison, and his illness followed, marked by diarrhea, vomit-
ing, trembling, insomnia, headaches, “pinched nerves,” loss of memory, 
and, above all, terrifying dreams, all accompanied by domestic miseries. 
Zempléni reflected on Barthelémy and his situation:
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If he can, just as an assumption, escape (by being at Bregbo) from the 
domestic hell he has been through or from the (mental) asylum at 
Bingerville which he has only just avoided, then that’s already some-
thing gained. There is no doubt that Barthelémy prefers to live in the 
shadow of the prophet (Atcho) rather than to sink into madness on 
the streets of Abidjan. His instinct for survival would be able to find 
at Bregbo a place of respite. Time to gather his baggage together. For 
there is also no doubt that sweeping the paths at Bregbo is not the 
last word on his story, and that he will find himself, sooner or later, 
back on the real stage for his destiny, that is somewhere on the work-
sites of Abidjan. (Zempléni 1975: 207)
Shrines and healing cult centers can provide places of refuge and care. 
But this, though conspicuous in the context of city life, is not an innova-
tion. Rural shrines provide lodgings for pilgrims and supplicants who 
want to stay for a time. The organization of Bregbo as a village heal-
ing center and community is an example of a more widespread pattern, 
not a unique invention or a product solely of modern urban life (see 
Field 1960: 92–94, 105; Peel 1968: 133; Twumasi 1975: 36 for compara-
ble examples). People’s needs are obviously relevant to the existence and 
activities of the shrines and centers. Lack of alternative care and support 
for the sick or unfortunate person away from home may explain partly 
why they spring up, why there are so many, and why they are so varied. 
Medical and welfare needs were greater than the colonial health services 
could meet, and after independence, the government resources allocated 
to health continue to be small when matched against the needs of a 
large, widely dispersed population (Lasker 1977).
What people do when they are ill must obviously also depend on the 
availability of treatment—whether it exists and is accessible given their 
means and situation. Dennis Warren (1974: 122–23, 247–50) found 
Western medical services (government and mission) were increasingly 
used in Techiman (Ashanti) because they were close by and provided 
prompt treatment. Both the introduced medical services and the tradi-
tional healers continued to practice without conflict. In his opinion, the 
people accepted the hospital services and used them not because their 
own values and ideas had greatly changed from traditional to mod-
ern ones but because the new forms of treatment were convenient and 
available. Choice of treatment anywhere probably depends on a com-
plex mixture of need, belief, trust, opportunity, convenience, experience, 
and curiosity. Situations and methods vary with whether people put 
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trust, to a greater or lesser extent, in the methods, the healers, or the 
institutions.
Religion in medical change
As the authority of traditional religion was undermined, would-be prac-
titioners had to specialize. Care of the sick was one way. People did not 
convert to modern medicine with an exclusive commitment. To put 
stress on an exclusive belief in one system of medicine is to mistake the 
most obvious character of demands for care in sickness—the desire for 
a remedy, the hope that a treatment will work. At the same time, people 
still wanted some protection. The call to purge evil and evildoers had its 
appeal to people who were uneasy. The move against witches drew sup-
port. The promise of relief was tied to identifying who was to blame. An 
anti-witchcraft movement could rally people to a common cause and, by 
uniting them, could serve latent or dissimulated political purposes.
Atcho offered more than protection or treatment for profit. His treat-
ment had a strong religious and moral component; he taught a set of 
doctrines offering the prospect of personal salvation and change. He 
asked for moral conversion; his patients had to cease from evil. That is 
what the minister Denise praised him for. One might hesitate to say 
whether his role was medical or religious. Atcho wanted to call himself 
a healer, not a prophet. He chose to appear unlinked to the political and 
economic spheres even though he was actually engaged in them. He 
could influence elections in the lower Ivory Coast through his network, 
which put him in touch with small village communities. Atcho’s planta-
tion and fishing interests grew along with his prestige. But despite his 
title of healer, he was not officially recognized as a medical worker or as 
part of the health services. Atcho knew that hospital and clinic medicine 
was something quite different from the care he offered. He referred some 
people to the hospital, particularly the psychiatric hospital at Bingerville 
(Piault 1975: 63–64), but there is no information about his opinions on 
official medicine or what he thought of surgery, injections, drugs, and 
the like. He did not compare his views about the underlying nature of 
sickness with those of hospital medicine nor did he comment on the 
introduced methods or explain why some kinds of healing worked for 
some people but not others.
Why should a traditional religion, disturbed by social change, de-
velop in a medical direction? A first reason is that the new orientation 
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continues a concern it had before. Although ideas associated with reli-
gious practice and belief had been used in explaining and treating the 
sick, illness did not disappear. Quite the contrary: new diseases were 
introduced, and in some places, epidemics were unleashed. The health 
care provided by colonial governments fell short of what the popula-
tion needed. This left the field open for folk practitioners to become 
even more active; despite their loss of authority in some spheres, diviners, 
healers, and priests were sought out to deal with personal misfortune and 
illness. Innovations of method took place.
There is no reason why people should commit themselves to only 
one system of medicine. The willingness of people in many societies to 
use both Western biomedicine and their own methods of treatment has 
been widely noted. They choose from what is at hand. They seek relief, 
not consistency for its own sake. Their trust is not based on belief in the 
system as such. It is only in a loose sense that we can say that treatments 
as varied as pharmaceutical drugs, surgery, psychotherapy, radiotherapy, 
and advice on exercise and diet fit coherently or logically within a single 
system. It is more accurate to see them as a highly syncretic mixture of 
treatments with diverse styles and origins. And in reality, the practice of 
introduced medicine in the developing world does not often meet ideal 
conditions. There may be a fine, well-staffed hospital in the capital, but 
perhaps outdated penicillin, fake tablets, colored candy, and steroids are 
being sold as modern remedies in rural markets; local people may see 
both as treatments introduced by Western medicine. People do not have 
to accept a particular body of knowledge or beliefs to swallow a tablet 
or inject someone in the arm; they need only the equipment. In practice, 
pluralism is made up of this mixture of old and new that people use 
based on pragmatic choice without insisting on a unified system.
Pluralism may mean the mere presence of alternatives. The new treat-
ments and the new places for medical care are not necessarily seen as 
competing with customary healing methods; some are too strange to be 
seen as analogues or replacements. Instead, they are something novel to 
add or try out. It is perhaps more typical of the providers of biomedicine 
to perceive a conflict than it is of the people treated with it. We may 
think that it is pluralism that is curious. On the contrary, experience 
shows it is the common rule. Most people are primarily concerned with 
effectiveness, with practical considerations, rather than with explana-
tory consistency or logic. Both medicine and religion involve matters 
of belief and practice, but the emphasis of each is different. At Breg-
bo and the Ashanti shrines, the powers—whether of spirits, humans, 
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or medicines—were used to secure particular benefits and obtain relief 
from illness. The approach was often more magical than religious.
Peel’s study (1968) of the Aladura churches in Nigeria, despite the 
points of similarity to Bregbo and the Ashanti shrines, provides a con-
trast, showing a predominantly religious attitude toward illness. The 
Aladura Christian churches take an extreme line based on a view of 
illness as punishment for sin and on a central doctrine of the potency 
of prayer. They believe sickness is caused by sinful deeds and that God 
answers prayers. If petitioners confess their sins, God will heal them. 
Illness thus becomes a test of faith and abstention from medicine the 
sign of commitment. Medicine and divine healing are seen as rivals. 
The founders of the Faith Tabernacle and the Christ Apostolic Church 
opposed the use of medicine as an attempt to interfere with God’s ar-
rangements. This was not because they thought that human medicine 
could not be effective but because using drugs and other human rem-
edies would represent a weakening and compromise of faith in Christ. 
If God wishes to heal, he well. It is a tough faith to follow and live by 
(Peel 1968: 119–35).
In a religious attitude toward illness, belief about its significance is 
what matters. In contrast, in a medical attitude toward illness, the main 
focus is on remedial action. The Aladura churches take sickness as a vital 
test of faith. The religious meaning of illness is what concerns them, at 
least in principle. The orthodox Western medical view is not concerned 
with the moral or religious significance of sickness but with the practical 
problem of what can be done to prevent or remedy it. In Atcho’s ex-
planatory scheme at Bregbo, the ties between sickness and sin were still 
evident. The traditional views integrate the natural world with a moral 
interpretation of it.
The history of medicine shows that the relations between science, 
technology, and ideas do not conform to grand theories about methods 
in the advance of science. Ziman explains:
Sometimes a technique precedes a science; at other times, a new 
technology grows from a series of discoveries motivated by idle curi-
osity. Some techniques develop in close connection with parallel pure 
sciences; in other cases, practice and theory may separate for many, 
many years, and live almost independent lives, until they recombine 
fruitfully. . . . The lesson is, perhaps, that the history of science and 
technology is of sufficient diversity and richness that it cannot be 
summed up in an abstract formula. (Ziman 1976: 35)
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The writings of the Greek anatomist Galen lasted centuries as the au-
thority before anatomy turned again to practical dissection. It was a long 
time before the study of morbid anatomy brought any direct benefits or 
improvements in the practical treatment of the sick. Should we be sur-
prised to learn how recently it was that doctors began to examine their 
patients (Reiser 1978), to expose them to touch, palpation, percussion, 
and observe their outward appearance and manner rather than just talk 
to them? Innovations in chemistry, lens-grinding, and electricity altered 
possibilities of knowing what was going on inside the bodies of the sick. 
A particular discovery in another field—for instance, the thermometer 
or the electrometer—led eventually to particular developments in medi-
cine, sometimes significantly altering the old perspectives. A traditional 
system of explanation may give illness meaning in religious terms. West-
ern medical treatments can be fitted into it necessarily subverting its 
ultimate or core beliefs. But as treatments at the level of symptoms and 
signs become more effective, the importance of treatment on the reli-
gious or moral level seems to lessen. People recognize new possibilities 
for controlling infirmities.
The experience of introduced Western medicine in Africa has been 
short. Religious and magical beliefs have been relatively resistant to 
change. For all the authority attaching to science and medicine in in-
dustrialized societies, many alternative beliefs and practices live on in 
popular esteem. As Keith Thomas concludes in his great study of Re-
ligion and the decline of magic, “If magic is to be defined as the employ-
ment of ineffective techniques to allay anxiety when effective ones are 




Part IV is focused on belief in treatment and on questions of efficacy. 
Healing activities can have various functions even when causality (in 
our terms) is not at issue. In the hope of relief, a great variety of things 
have been tried as treatments. Some are ready to believe in miracles; for 
others, experience brings skepticism. Different aims and different expec-
tations guide judgment. Questions of therapeutic efficacy—of cause and 
effect—are almost always difficult to answer. Compliance from patients 
normally requires their willingness to believe a treatment might work. 
Also relevant is the question of trusting in someone else’s judgment, 
skill, or knowledge, or in what has been done in the past. The shared be-
liefs and opinions of other people in the same community and the advice 





Treatment takes many forms. According to the dictionary, the verb “to 
treat” means “to deal with, to act or behave toward a person with a view 
to a result”; the aim is not focused, as it is with “healing” and its etymo-
logical implication of restoring soundness and wholeness to the body. 
“Care” may be a part of treatment that is missed by the word “to cure.” In 
common usage, “curing” has connotations of success; someone is either 
cured or not. However, Arthur Kleinman (1980: 82) suggested using 
the verbs “to cure” and “to heal” to fit the distinction between “disease” 
and “illness,” so that we could speak of the “curing of disease” when we 
refer to establishing effective control over disordered biological and psy-
chological processes, while using the “healing of illness” to refer to the 
provision of social and personal meaning for the life problems created 
by sickness. This distinction might alert the reader to think about the 
criteria used to identify the benefits from treatment.
Even with a view of benefits confined to biomedical aims and the sick 
person—ignoring others upset by his or her sickness—there is room for 
differences of aim: whether the removal of symptoms is a good thing or 
the maintenance of normal social adaptation a far better thing; whether 
to search out a cause to satisfy the doctor’s curiosity or to search only 
to the extent that the patient’s well-being demands; to be rational or 
empirical in treatment; to be satisfied with recovery or to aim at ideal 
health; to be quickly but only partially effective or to seek complete-
ness and say one is “cured.” Without knowing the aim, the criteria for 
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determining success or failure remain unclear. We also need to know 
who made the judgment, for it is obvious that the sick person is judged 
beyond dispute of whether he or she feels better or not. But this view 
may not be the same as the healer’s or physician’s nor that of the sufferer’s 
family or community.
Various elements may be thought to contribute to effective healing: 
the personal qualities of the healer; the correct and skillful performance 
of therapeutic or ritual actions; the effectiveness of the herbs or drugs 
used. All three elements play some part in most treatments, but at one 
extreme is the charismatic healer whose ability to heal is perceived as 
a unique individual gift; at the other extreme are therapeutic drugs or 
herbs with properties that are intrinsic to them, so they can be used by 
anyone who knows how to use them. Somewhere in between come ther-
apeutic performances that involve mixtures of individual skills, learned 
techniques, and forms of complex action such as surgery, behavioral rou-
tines, rituals, spells, and magic.
Verbal techniques and moral persuasion in treatment: The healer
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Pierre Janet (1919) 
did outstanding work on psychological healing. Henri Ellenberger com-
pared his achievement to “a vast city buried beneath ashes, like Pompeii. 
The fate of any buried city is uncertain. It may remain buried forever. 
It may remain concealed while being plundered by marauders. But it 
may also perhaps be unearthed some day and brought back to life” (El-
lenberger 1970: 409). I have plundered it a bit, especially Les médica-
tions psychologiques ( Janet 1919), his huge historical, psychological, and 
clinical study of methods of psychotherapy. He wrote particularly on 
the healer–patient relationship and those forms of treatment depend-
ing mainly on talk, personal influence, and psychological effects. Janet 
was interested first by automatisms, unreflective actions such as those 
that could be produced through suggestion and hypnosis, both of which 
represented special forms of influence or persuasion. The conditions for 
suggestion to work in the waking state were those in which the subject’s 
thought was depressed, as if numbed. The field of consciousness was nar-
rowed by preoccupation with one idea, and thinking was slow, uncritical, 
and not easily roused or alerted ( Janet 1919: 249, 279). In the case of 
hypnosis, there were various special ways to induce the state using fa-
tigue, exhaustion, surprise, and shock. Some parallels can be seen when 
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patients are anxious, weakened by their illness, and ruminating on their 
sickness.
Certain powers of the mind observed in connection with hypnosis 
and hysteria have fascinated observers. Despite suspicions about diag-
noses or methods and the whiff of deception that so often came with 
them, they have inspired fertile speculation about mental processes and 
possibilities (Ellenberger 1970; Jaspers [1913] 1963: chap.  6; Kraupl 
Taylor 1966: 233–95). During Janet’s day, such phenomena pointed to 
powers of the mind over the body, a chimerical diversity of signs and 
symptoms that could result from mental causes. They gave support to 
the prevailing dualistic view of mind and body. They served as models for 
the process of psychogenic causation, ideas of psychosomatic illness, and 
somatization; they have also inspired theories about the unconscious in 
psychoanalytic explanation and treatment.
Self-verifying convictions can result from autosuggestion. Uncon-
scious self-deception is sometimes implicit in them, taking many forms. 
More varied and extreme are similar phenomena resulting from the in-
fluence of others, whether charismatic individuals or leaders or particular 
social groups. The role of hope and expectations in deception and self-
deception, the powers of the mind over self and others, the malleability 
of people in response to prestige and collective pressures—these make it 
plausible to attribute to the emotions and the unconscious mind (as well 
as the conscious mind) aspects of both harm in illness and therapeutic 
benefit. If symptoms and signs of illness can sometimes be caused by the 
mind, then it seemed plausible to Janet that they could sometimes also 
be cured by the mind. We know the placebo effect ascribes a beneficial 
therapeutic effect to the expectation of benefit and the persuasions of 
faith. But the problem is to identify the range and limits of such effects 
and define them more precisely.
One component of the placebo effect is the impact on the patient 
of the doctor’s or healer’s own belief in the efficacy or value of a certain 
treatment. This, combined with interest and attention to the patient’s 
condition, may influence both parties. They lean toward assuming that 
any improvement is due to the treatment, but any worsening must be 
due to the illness. Their belief seems justified to them. They attribute 
benefit to the independent properties of the treatment rather than to 
their own convictions or to the natural remission of the illness.
Nevertheless, better reasons than mere possibility are needed before 
we assume there are psychological causes for signs or symptoms to ap-
pear or disappear. The variety of allegedly hysterical signs has perhaps 
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encouraged us to be uncritically ready to put illness in preindustrial soci-
ety down to psychological mechanisms. It is perhaps paradoxical that we 
should think this about complaints of illness in individual cases when we 
also know about the high prevalence of malnutrition, parasitic and infec-
tious diseases, and the often demanding environments in which people 
in such societies live. Perhaps there is also something paradoxical in the 
contrast of Denis Diderot’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s portrayals of 
the classic harmony of the Noble Savage with these other pictures of the 
Ignoble Savage fallen victim to fears, psychological stress, and noxious 
emotions.
Janet studied the skills and insights of the old magnetizers, hypno-
tists, and folk healers. In his view, psychotherapy was not a scientific 
procedure and had much to learn from the art of other practitioners. He 
laid great stress on rapport in moral influence; it depended on a direct 
and personal relationship between a healer and a sick person in which 
the healer as an individual was perhaps more important than the method 
used. The healer’s qualities of personality, the particular relationship with 
its peculiar intensity, the patient’s attachment to the healer and need for 
direction could lead the patient to set exceptional value on the healer’s 
words and understanding. As Janet put it,
People act unceasingly on each other and social influences are among 
the most powerful causes of health and illness, depression and exci-
tation. . . . Ever since the development of behavior and ideas about 
individuality, personality, and freedom, people have attached great 
value to the individual, to penetrating individuality, to the conquest 
of the individual; they have invented intimacy, i.e., special relation-
ships determined by the particular character of two persons face to 
face, “parce que c’était lui; parce que c’était moi,” and these delicate and 
perfected relationships are among the most powerfully exciting that 
society can offer us. . . . Direction is precisely the therapeutic use of 
this particular form of social action by people on each other. ( Ja-
net 1919: 417–19)
Albert Atcho achieved something similar in his treatment (or moral 
direction) when a patient who came to him had to review his or her 
life, the roles and relationships that he or she had been involved in, and 
then reconstrue them. Some healers, like Atcho, seem to have excep-
tional personal qualities, which they use to create confidence. Bonds of 
attachment and dependency grow between the patient and the healer. A 
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sense of urgency or anxiety over the troubles of illness might be strong 
motivating factors behind a patient’s readiness to respond. Atcho’s 
work strikingly exemplified many aspects of verbal techniques of treat-
ment. He had high authority and prestige; material signs of his success 
surrounded the patient. He gave moral direction and advice that was 
phrased in terms of values and ideas he and the patient shared. Although 
his message shifted notions of blame and guilt, it was not so radical as to 
deny all the former constructions of good and evil and responsibility. In 
his initial interview with patients, Atcho did not confront and challenge 
them so much as listen to their stories with sympathy and offer them en-
couragement, reassurance, and help. He hinted at an interpretation but 
then left it open for the patient to develop and explore in later sessions. 
In the first meeting, he assessed the patient’s suitability for treatment. In 
the verbal interchange recorded by J. Lehmann (1972), Atcho insinuated 
a doubt, suggesting a reinterpretation of the moral situation to the pa-
tient. He then set up the plan of treatment through interviews and con-
fession, established the patient’s readiness to comply, and indicated the 
clerk who would carry it out. The clerk gradually elicited, reinterpreted, 
redirected, and wrote up the confession for the public rites of healing in 
which Atcho again acted. The elicitation of the confession might have 
taken a month or more of almost daily sessions with the clerk. The reli-
ance on clerks to work with patients had come about as Atcho’s success 
had grown and he elaborated his procedures. Atcho himself acted at the 
beginning and the end, but in the middle his clerks carried out the main 
work—that of remolding conscience and belief—which was so remark-
ably expressed in the written diabolical confessions. They testified to the 
power of moral direction and persuasion exercised at Bregbo. The even-
tual confession contained a great modification in the patient’s personal 
construct of the significance of roles and relationships he or she had been 
involved in. The guided self-reexamination was a sort of indoctrination 
that led patients to adopt—or at least confess to—changed assumptions 
about themselves and their relationships.
The stress on a detailed review of all one’s past actions, accompanied 
by the demand for total avowal and the repeated sessions with a clerk 
who directed the interpretation toward revealing acts and feelings (hid-
den and even barely remembered or acknowledged), inevitably recalls 
some kinds of psychotherapy, especially psychoanalysis, which are simi-
larly based on avowal and confession as a means to insight and health. 
The meaning of past events becomes changed in the process. As at Breg-
bo, it is striking how people undergoing psychotherapy are willing to 
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adopt wholly different elaborate explanatory frameworks and meanings 
through such a collaborative reinterpretation. The element of encourage-
ment and support reinforces the desire of a demoralized person to accept 
the interpretation. It takes time for the intimacy of the personal relation-
ship between sufferer and therapist to develop and for moral redirection 
to sway the patient. The frequency and duration of interviews are notable 
as a preparation for the culminating public act of confession, an “act of 
termination,” as Janet called it. One aspect of diagnosis and therapy has 
always been to give an explanation and meaning to the symptoms the 
patient experiences. When the symptoms are distressing and mysterious, 
an interpretation of their cause and significance—sometimes just being 
able to give them a name—may help tame the anxiety and suffering they 
cause. People may then be able to make decisions with a more coherent 
picture of the situation; they can act with a clearer aim. But it would be a 
mistake to suppose that the mere explanation or naming of unhappiness 
and personal problems is necessary and sufficient for relief.
Atcho’s treatment resembled a process of cognitive restructuring that 
culminated in the public act of confession. The rationale was that there 
was a sort of nighttime double of the self; this allowed the patient to 
dissociate (perhaps to distance or exculpate) himself or herself from this 
other self. But the analysis tête-à-tête with the clerk was not enough by 
itself. The private acts of self-assessment would lead up to the punish-
ment and reward of the public act of confession that shamed the subject 
(as well as being a self-dramatization) before others, especially Atcho, 
the respected and admired prophet leader. The confession of horrifying 
deeds released emotion after the penances or tasks decreed by Atcho as 
punishment or expiation had been fulfilled. As a catharsis or purging to 
break the spell of evil, it gave the self-dramatization of the confession 
a point of release and termination, ending with the prayer and blessing 
by Atcho when he powdered the left foot of the patient with kaolin and 
gave him or her some of the lustral water (Piault 1975: 125–29).
In the end, the treatment moved from words to action. Atcho’s work 
was an example of verbal therapy akin to other forms of psychotherapy, 
based on an idea of the remedial value of moral insight. Words, ideas, 
and meanings are the basis of verbal therapies like confession and psy-
chotherapy. Voice, gesture, eye contact, and positioning play a part in the 
effects of therapy. The relationship between a patient and a therapist is 
crucial for its success. In the case of Bregbo, Atcho’s role as well as that 
of the clerk who elicited the confession has to be borne in mind. The 
relationships involved elements resembling those in the relationships of 
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priest to penitent, parent to child, friend to friend, trainer to trainee. 
In its typical European form, Christian confession a private act of self-
accusation that is usually made to someone in authority and has public 
consequences. Without a moral authority figure, the guilt that provokes 
confession might not be generated. Christianity stresses the free moral 
and religious nature of confession by contrast with the confession ex-
tracted by coercion, torture, or threat. The confessions at Bregbo reflect-
ed these Christian influences.
Confession as a mode of treatment is not found only in societies in-
fluenced by the ethical doctrines of a major world religion. Some of the 
most striking descriptions of therapeutic confession come from studies 
of hunting and gathering societies (Hallowell [1955] 1967: chap.  14; 
Rasmussen 1931). The common principle behind a range of treatments 
is that guilty actions may harm the person who has carried them out, 
even when they are hidden. In some cases, exposure is said to destroy the 
power of evil or witchcraft. People may purge themselves of guilt by re-
vealing their actions, by punishment, or by the humiliation of public ex-
posure. When we focus on the elements of purging, control, and guilt, we 
can find a continuity of principle running from therapies based on non-
verbal actions to the essentially verbal techniques of confession. If illness 
is specifically linked with a breach of a taboo, sickness can expose the 
cause, just as a sin may be exposed by particular signs of sickness. Over 
time, these associations may change. As I discussed in chapter 5, the his-
tory of concerns over leprosy suggests that they shifted from notions of 
taboo to those of sin, from emphasis on the collectivity to emphasis on 
the individual, from cleansing by sacrifice to notions of contrition and 
confession. The shift is expressed in Psalm 51: “For Thou delightest not 
in sacrifice, else would I give it: Thou hast no pleasure in burnt offering. 
The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, 
O God, Thou wilt not despise.”
The influence of the group
So far, my focus has been on the relationship between therapist and 
the patient. But the group is also a powerful influence. Bregbo had the 
atmosphere of a therapeutic community. There was the village and the 
spectacle for the new arrival, who was a spectator and invited to take 
part. During the public séances when residents commented on the cures 
to visitors and new arrivals, a sick person could tell his or her own story 
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or listen to it retold (Lehmann 1972: 360). Rapport connected the in-
dividual to the group. For some, the community at Bregbo provided a 
long-stay refuge, a place of reassurance and support, increasing rapport. 
The confidence of the community in the healing methods could also 
sway the sick person. Such an influence is a factor of special force in 
settings where treatment is highly public and dramatic. The group lends 
support to the sufferer through its shared belief and enthusiasm, its hope 
that he or she will get well. An improvement reconfirms everybody’s 
faith.
People are susceptible to the influences of others. Shame, ridicule, 
praise, and sympathy are social responses. Readiness to imitate, to learn 
by example, to accept teaching, and to follow others are all necessary 
for participation in social life. The effects of crowd solidarity arousing 
emotions through sympathy, the mass of people, the noise and cries, 
sometimes drum beats and musical rhythms have long been exploited 
in practice. Heightened group feelings may also underlie the susceptibil-
ity of an individual to respond to treatment. The organization of treat-
ment often gives a patient’s family and others a satisfying way to express 
their concern; it may mitigate gloom or worry over serious illness. The 
coordination of action in distressing circumstances, the effort of acting, 
the arousal of hope, may contribute to reducing anxiety and may help 
the participants in a crisis by giving them a sense of coping with the 
situation.
The beauty and magnificence of some healing rites and the noise, 
drumming, and singing that accompanies them act on the participants 
and on the sick person who is their raison d’être. At Bregbo, confessions 
that were not public would not have had the same power to shame or to 
absolve patients from the guilt that led to their illness. They may have felt 
the force of the wish of the group that they get well, especially when the 
group members believe their own well-being depends on it, so sufferers 
may yield to the wish or try to meet their expectations. Similarly, Victor 
Turner’s account of Kamahasanyi’s illness (Turner 1964) exemplifies the 
shared motivation in a healing rite. It is vividly conveyed in an extract 
Turner quotes from his field notebook (1964: 260–61). His account of 
the Ndembu cults of affliction is an outstanding example among many 
that indicate how joining a cult or community may bring benefit through 
the moral support provided by other members, including those who also 
suffer or have suffered from the same problems as the new candidate for 
membership. They offer shared understanding and experience and give 
living proof that the illness can be overcome or lived with.
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But dramatic, complex forms of treatment require preparation and 
organization and have a cost in time and labor. They cannot meet most 
needs. There must be some selection of the kinds of illness for which 
they are appropriate, a selection favoring chronic ailments. Acute illness 
cannot wait for them; much illness declares itself and begins to clear 
up spontaneously too soon for an elaborate healing ceremony to be got 
ready. Rest and isolation, nursing care, support and dietary measures, 
and a range of simple household remedies are at least benign in their ef-
fects and so ordinary that I have scarcely referred to them. They provide 
the mainstay of care for illness. But we tend to give our attention to the 
occasional, the uncommon, in exotic treatments. I stayed for nearly two 
years in Rauit, a Gnau community that then had about 350 people. In 
that time, there occurred one major healing rite lasting for twelve weeks 
and about twenty public healing rites that took a day to do; all the other 
forms of care were limited to nursing care and brief private therapeutic 
acts, including treatment I provided. During that time, the men and 
women exposed to risk of illness numbered 195 (I am excluding children 
from this assessment) and those who fell ill spent all told 2,447 days 
incapacitated to some degree by illness (G. Lewis 1975: 117). To present 
the major ritual treatments as the full subject matter with which to assess 
the Gnau methods for treating illnesses would grossly misrepresent the 
actual situation. The simpler forms of care must also be examined.
Isolation in illness: Gnau behavior in 1968–69
Gnau behavior in illness is notable for its social isolation. It is marked by 
the contrast with normal life, a social eclipse, and by the display of apa-
thy; the patient looks dirty, neglected, he or she is silent, socially with-
drawn, passive. It is a way of showing illness, isolating the patient, and 
eliciting care. When asked, local people might say they mean to show 
the afflicting spirits that their threat or punishment has been effective. 
Some sick people feel as ill as they look, others in part mean to deceive. 
The extreme is the inert patient lying alone unwashed, naked, in the 
dark of a closed hut. He eats little for fear of various mystical dangers 
in normal food; the sick man or woman may use nettles as a counterir-
ritant to pains or as a stimulant. Apart from the nettles, they have few 
other physical remedies to use in ordinary care, with no comforts except 
the fire kept going beside them. If a sick man has moved from the com-
munal men’s house to a separate house, his mother, wife, or daughter 
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may sleep on the ground beside him. A sick woman will usually have 
the company of her daughter, the wife of one of her husband’s brothers, 
or some other female in-law. Alternatively, she may decide to go back to 
her natal hamlet.
The reduction in talking to others or being talked to is striking by 
contrast with normal life and sociability. If outside, the sick person sits 
or lies, not moving much, showing little or no interest in what is going 
on all around. He or she does not look for distractions or conversation. 
Soothing by touch or bodily contact is not part of caring for a sick adult. 
The Gnau do not use massage, manipulation, or rubbing, apart from the 
nettles with which patients stroke themselves. People now ask for lini-
ment that they like to daub on aches; occasionally, they will prepare a 
poultice for an aching joint. But most of their time is spent lying alone 
in darkness or asleep in the silence except for the sounds of movement 
and activity in the village outside. Unless there is a gathering in sympa-
thy, the village is almost empty during the day, with people gone away to 
work in the gardens and only one or two adults who stay, nominally to 
watch over the sick person but in fact to keep an eye on the small chil-
dren left behind. The night brings no comforts.
Moping in the dark is miserable. The isolation and the opportunity 
to brood on one’s illness perhaps prepare the patient for treatment as 
a sort of incubation. The sick person is left to ruminate on their pains, 
their hopes, and their fears. The isolation and darkness serve to heighten 
the contrast and shock of a treatment if it is done in public. The length 
of illness is noteworthy. Long isolation and immobility, food avoidances, 
neglect, and dirt are undoubtedly debilitating. An element of deliberate 
self-degradation is also involved, either to deceive an afflicting spirit or 
to match the outward self to an inner feeling. Coping with a long illness 
contrasts with short-term illness. The seeming apathy and passivity of 
the Gnau in serious illness resembles prescribed helplessness, as if they 
knew they could do little in illness except wait and see. The stereotyped 
pattern suggests giving up: a numbed reaction, limpness, dejection. The 
behavior is meant to be registered by other people; it is up to them to act.
Treatments observed in 1968–69
During an illness, people come to give treatment to the sick person, 
some on their own impulse, others called. The same kind of treatment 
may be done more than once for different reasons or by different people 
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during an illness. But usually each one who provides treatment does so 
in a single session, completing it in a few minutes, and that is that. The 
caregiver is not by occupation a specialist in healing. Although in most 
cases the healer is a man, the person to act, being determined by rela-
tionship, knowledge of some spell, or by particular circumstances, may 
occasionally be a woman.
The method is what matters rather than the individual who performs 
it, except in those cases when a certain person is required because of 
having a particular social relationship to the patient. Personal rapport is 
not in general a striking feature of these short treatments. In theory, the 
timing of the treatment might be important for making connections be-
tween cause, treatment, and effect, or for pacing, as it were, the effort to 
help. But in practice, interventions are often so unplanned or contingent 
upon opportunity and impulse that no consistent pacing effect seems 
likely. Some suffer long periods of inattention; Wolai’s illness (described 
in chapter 3) was a poignant example of that. The passivity of the patient 
is striking. Most short treatments are private in the sense that, although 
one or two members of the family may be there to watch and assist by 
supporting the patient or fetching betel nut or doing something needed 
for the treatment, others do not crowd around to watch. It would be ill-
mannered to come just out of curiosity. The private interaction between 
healer and sick person is both direct and oblique. When the therapist 
asks the patient, for example, where the pain is felt, an attendant member 
of the family is likely to give an answer instead. The therapist may gaze 
intently at the patient but eye contact in which the patient returns the 
gaze is rare; instead, he or she looks downward, listless. If the therapist 
asks a question, it is repeated to the sick person or answered by some-
one in the family; if required, the patient’s arm is lifted for him or her. 
The behavior of people receiving treatment sometimes gives the impres-
sion of a passive human doll being moved rather than moving, suffering 
treatment rather than seeking it.
Treatment takes place in the day, usually early in the morning or 
late in the afternoon rather than at night. These are the times for brief 
social calls—before people go off or when they get back. Someone in 
the patient’s family fetches or helps him or her to the porch of the hut 
where there will be enough light to see (their houses have no windows); 
occasionally, the healer goes inside. The reasons for doing the treatment 
may have been discussed beforehand with the family but not with the 
sick person, especially if the patient is a woman or a child. She or he 
does not ask for explanation but submits to it. Action is taken as though 
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on an object with little or no direct exchange of speech between the one 
who is sick and the man performing the treatment. The choice of healer 
is defined by the situation, kinship connections, or the particular event 
rather than by special skills. He is someone familiar and fallible as others 
are. Such confidence as the Gnau have in their treatments seems to be 
placed in the method rather than the healer. It is confidence in general; 
often the attitude to particular treatments is less a strong conviction than 
simply trying a shot in the dark because they have some reason to think 
it might work. The treatments do not put in question or challenge some-
one’s personal claims to possess good judgment or skill. Although the 
sick person shares the same general assumptions as those who perform 
the treatment, his or her understanding of the particular reasons for do-
ing it may differ from theirs. Wolai’s case exemplified discordant views 
on the cause: Whose magic? Sorcery? Was it his own fault? A breach of 
taboo? His anxieties about himself were all not shared by those around 
him, and nothing was done to calm them. It is not difficult to find dis-
cordant views just by asking several people what they think about the 
same situation.
After treatment, there was rarely any immediate change in the de-
meanor of the patient, except in some cases when objects were extracted 
from the patient’s body. More people were present in these cases, anx-
iously excited and watching. The extractions seemed to calm them. One 
woman stopped trembling after treatment, another began to speak again 
after having been almost mute for two hours, holding her hands over her 
ears, which she kept bent forward to cover her ear holes. Few people said 
of their own treatment that they felt suddenly different or relieved after 
it. They expected to have to wait for a few days to notice improvement, 
but for how long was uncertain. The healer’s concentration during the 
treatment was matched by the spontaneous declarations of some who 
said they had put effort into doing it and felt tired or weakened by it. 
Some said they felt that there was risk in carrying out a treatment, a risk 
posed by the spirit concerned. One man said he was threatened by the 
spirit in his dreams after he had treated someone and he took to his bed 
to make the spirit think it had punished him already and need do no 
more.
The manner of the healer is contained and his attention concentrated. 
He does not chat or comment on what he is doing. Many treatments 
have verbal elements, muttered or choked spells with special noises or 
trills, accompanied by spitting, blowing, or puffing onto things being 
used or spat directly onto the patient. The spells are very low, suppressed, 
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secret noises just audible to the patient. The therapist may also speak in a 
strong voice directly to the afflicting spirit or to spirits of the dead, stat-
ing the intention of his treatment, reproaching the spirit for harming the 
patient, and telling it to leave. The therapist may strike the patient on the 
chest, head, or arms with the nettles or materials he is using; the blows 
are intended to startle off the spirit. They are given with sufficient force 
to cause the patient to jolt or wince. Other forms of treatment involve 
firm stroking of the affected part with nettles, the movements repeated 
downward and distally as though to gather together the harm, to bring 
it into a little pile, and sweep it off at the end into the nettle. The harm is 
then thrown away by the therapist with a curious overarm gesture. There 
are other more complex extraction procedures, such as the removal of 
“arrowheads” described in Maka’s case (see chapter 2). The mime, the 
obvious symbolism of the gestures—removing, sweeping away, sucking 
out, jolting off, throwing away, cutting free, scolding, sending off, offer-
ing valuables, washing—convey what they hope for and an idea of their 
assumptions about the process of healing. The aims are also stated in the 
appeals and prayers that precede and counterpoint the action.
The private treatments are usually short; they rarely involve more than 
five minutes of interaction between patient and therapist. They end with 
the patient being told (and here the speech is direct) to shake and stamp, 
to shake off the harm. Water is spat in a fine spray on either side of the 
patient, which is a form of asking for a good outcome. The patient may 
be given the betel quid to chew that the therapist was chewing during 
his action. Alternatively, the patient’s arms are jerked to make the joints 
crack or the fingers pulled and bent to make the knuckles crack. These 
are taken as signs of a favorable outcome. The patient then sits down or 
goes back or is helped back into the hut and left alone; the others turn 
away and go without further comment or inquiry about how he feels.
Treatment gestures and symbols
Some elements in Gnau treatments have distinct names: there are the 
special materials called geplagep (dry or shredded plant substances), 
wa’agep (the cooked preparations like a thick soup or a stew in consist-
ency), and nonmaterial elements such as belyigap (spells). These terms 
identify three types of things that activate or concentrate mystical power 
(see G. Lewis 1980: 154–58, 171–73). Knowledge of them is esoteric 
rather than open. The plant preparations have distinctive smells or tastes, 
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using ingredients such as marsupial scent glands and ginger roots and 
herbs. Spells are transferred into them during their preparation. These 
ingredients are peculiar, as are the sounds and words of the spells and the 
song verses used in many treatments. Their special power and quality—
peculiar in the intransitive magical or sacred sense described above as 
“mystical”—are signaled by the rules governing their preparation and the 
oddness of the sounds and vocal techniques used, for example, choked 
noises, trills, chanting, and allegedly archaic language.
In many societies, the magical power of sacred words often harks back 
to the past, to an occasion or a time of revelation (Tambiah 1968). The 
Gnau see it like that, too, and quite explicitly, as I heard in comments 
they made during ritual performances about the fixed, just-so origin and 
quality of what they had to do (Lewis 1980: 50–67). Magical words are 
something revealed, already set, arbitrary, to be learned, not something 
to be discovered by reasoning and observation. They use verses from their 
great songs as spells, adding secret names; they link performance of the 
verses with the presence and attention of spirits. The songs and spells 
concentrate their presence, attract them or call to them, as do things 
from the places and the plants the spirits are specially attached to. People 
treat the spell sounds, the words, and the secret names almost like objects 
that can be transferred by speaking or blowing them into substances, 
leaves, or a person to be healed. The objects then serve as vehicles for 
transferring an influence, acting as surrogates for the words (Skorup-
ski 1976: 130–59). They are used as if they had an active creative power.
Breathing and blowing spells, as well as spitting betel juice or water, 
are characteristic techniques of many Gnau rituals and treatments. They 
involve both communication and transfer. They blow or spit onto objects, 
onto the patient’s skin, or into his or her mouth to transfer an effect. 
Words and spells may be addressed to thought or objects, to spirits or 
people; some utterances have fixed forms for repetition, other forms are 
free and discursive, more like speech or appeals directed at a listener.
The Gnau have various verbs or phrases to refer to these special forms 
of action and gesture, techniques of the body used in treatment and rit-
ual. The phrases have precise meanings in context; they are, in effect, a 
technical vocabulary for identifying the elements and distinctive actions 
of which rituals and treatments are composed (G. Lewis 1980: 43–50). 
The prayers or speeches in free form, delivered aloud to the spirit or the 
ancestral spirits, are said to be given in a “loud voice” (nunt bu), in con-
trast to spells and secret names, which are given in a “small voice” (nunt 
seki’in) . The spitting and invocation addressed to the spirit “set up” their 
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request and command its attention. The Gnau refer to the invocation by 
a verb that ordinarily means “to stand something upright.” They speak of 
“bringing” a spell and “throwing it down” into something, “blowing” it in, 
or “laying it out” over something.
There are different techniques of spitting: ones used with betel juice, 
saliva, herbs chewed in betel quids, or water to spray during cleansing 
or the end of a ritual; ones specific to blowing spells into objects, onto 
skin, or into ears; ones for spitting spells directly into the mouth or for 
Figure 14. A sequence of fieldwork photos shows Dukini healing a feverish 
child by using a simple treatment ascribed to the spirit Panu’et. From left to 
right, top to bottom: He waves bespelled nettle leaves over the child; he calls on 
the spirit to leave the child; he strikes the child over his shoulder blades with 
the bespelled betel nettles to drive the spirit out; he ends the treatment with a 
gesture throwing the spirit off.
Pandora’s box
202
transferring them with nettles and blows. The techniques involve dif-
ferent details: whether the patient confronting a spirit should identify 
him- or herself by having the betel quid with the spirit’s special herbs 
or flowers already in his or her mouth; whether the person extracting 
magical arrowheads should be thinking of what he is doing; how much 
the concentration of effort in performance exhausts the healer; whether 
the healer clamps his lower lip between his teeth to block his breath and 
force his blood down into his arm as he strikes the patient with the be-
spelled nettle and treatment materials; and so on. Despite this long list, I 
doubt I learned all the refinements and nuances of the many techniques.
The commonly used gestures are odd and distinctive; they identify 
the peculiarity of certain treatments as clearly as special trills and archaic 
language do the spells. There are verbs and phrases for the repertoire of 
special gestures: a type of patting that strikes hard and gathers up the 
Figure 15. During a Panu’et rite for a young man’s hunting success, a senior 
man stands before a wooden image of the clan spirit attached to the main post 
of the men’s house. He spits betel nut juice and herbs filled with spells onto 
the image and smears it with blood from a cassowary just killed in a hunt. The 
spitting attracts the spirit’s attention so it will hear the appeal to bring success 
to the young man.
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Figure 16. In the Panu’et treatment for hunting, the senior man, standing, pre-
pares shredded ritual herbs (geplagep) to give to the younger man, seated. A 
green lyimungai banana leaf with two red hibiscus flowers lies ready for use. 
As in most rites, the procedure involves an invocation for success uttered over 
the leaf, which is held above the subject of the ritual, marking the culmina-




illness (na’abepeda, “strike-striking him/her with it”); a light, tapping sort 
of patting (nagelilapeda, “blink-patting”); a kind of brushing; just touch; 
a patting that marks out an area or measures off and surrounds the pa-
tient (nasila, “peeling”); a way of waving something over the patient so 
its influence falls on him (ne’aiya, ne’aiyeda), almost the converse of the 
harmful influence that falls on someone from overshadowing or “step-
ping over him/her” (nauwererapen); a gesture for “throwing away” the 
illness and the spirit (nitawa wilep); another for sending it off (nasubla); 
one for making the finger joints crack (nagelapen bigep); and the like.
The types of special preparations are few. Plants considered necessary 
for the wa’agep soups include six to ten types. The lists of plants associat-
ed with making images and masks of spirits are longer (fifteen to twenty 
items). The same plants may be used for varied purposes, especially those 
with strong scents (which, as a set, are called silwi-silwok, used to scent 
many rituals). Other materials (such as water from special pools, blood, 
silt, mud from pools, bark, or termite nest powder) may be needed for 
different preparations.
Other elements used in treatments act on different senses—sight, 
touch, hearing, smell, and taste. They may be material objects, sounds 
and words, scents, the taste of betel quids containing geplagep, ginger, 
and hunting-ash “salt” in wa’agep, the sting of nettles, touches and blows, 
special gestures, the colors of leaves and red hibiscus, red betel juice, and 
so on. However, the media used for treatments do not involve a compli-
cated technology, and many gestures are simple and clear. Elements of 
the small private treatments can be combined and elaborated in large-
scale rituals for illness.
In long treatments, an imagery of release may suggest itself, as in the 
example of cutting the creeper wound around the patient’s body. There 
are reiterated assertions that the patient will get well. The performance 
is ended by an action or sequence in which the spirit’s body image is 
destroyed and the spirit is sent off. There is an element here of make-
believe, of wish fulfillment, of stating and acting out what is hoped for. It 
is almost like the performance of a play. The analogy suggests a number 
of questions about the form of treatment and how closely the analogy 
holds. Plays involve a plot, direction, cast, settings, and an audience; so 
do the complex treatment rituals, with their clear imagery of confronta-
tion, appeal, and release. The first actor—the (passive) protagonist—is 
the hidden patient waiting to appear at the climax of the drama. The 
second is the spirit at the center of the drama. Then comes the cast of kin 
and supporters, led by the senior men who organize and stage it and act 
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as chorus with the young men, who also collect the materials and make 
the “props,” and the audience of women, children, and visitors.
Who is the recipient of the benefit? There are various ways we might 
respond: the patient, whose physical state or moral improves; the pa-
tient’s family and friends, who desire to help him or her and have the 
satisfaction of doing so by organizing the treatment and watching; the 
healer or group of people, who gain prestige or other rewards by carrying 
out the treatment; or the community, which gains a sense of solidarity 
and self-reliance. Perhaps belief is affected by this heightened activity 
and the visible presence of the images of spirits and beings—the point 
Figure 17. In preparation for healing a patient, a senior man spits bespelled 
geplagep herbs and betel nut juice onto the hand of the masked figure of the spirit 




is that sickness is a conspicuous trigger for religious activity in this so-
ciety. Indeed, sickness is a catalyst for the performance of major rituals 
throughout this region, the Lumi Subdistrict of West Sepik New Guin-
ea (McGregor 1975; Mitchell 1978).
Performances
In Gnau healing performances, the intentions of the actions are ex-
plicitly expressed in the accompanying invocations and appeals. The 
performance involves driving out or extracting the harm, first with a 
Figure 18. The large masked figure of the spirit Malyi emerges from its enclo-




statement, then with an enactment of the wish to be fulfilled. In the ap-
pendix of this book is a transcribed recording that conveys the character 
of a performance: the talk and the levity, people’s worries about getting 
it done on time, the banter between the men, the alternation between 
off-handed remarks and serious comments, the cues and concern with 
order and detail. The transcription gives a better sense of Gnau attitudes 
and understanding, the diversity of opinions, and the complexity of a 
performance. In general, the plot of the longer treatments is revealed 
by the sequence of actions. The meaning is clear in outline but not in 
the details. Obviously, an insider’s ability to catch hold of unstated as-
sumptions and associations is more acute than an outsider’s. The signifi-
cance lies in what can be seen as well as in what is said. The interplay 
of the verbal and the visual allows for both reinforcement and discord, 
for example, in the contradictory mixture of appealing to an apparently 
powerful spirit, followed by “killing” it, or in the gesture of throwing a 
spirit away but also requesting it to stay nearby to benefit their gardens 
or bring hunting success.
The necessary preparations give the patient time to build up hopes in 
the treatment. In major rites, much more is invested in the time and la-
bor of staging them. The masks or objects used and the singing and slow 
pace of some rites create a greater sense of power and mystery. Many 
people participate in them. For the patient, direct involvement may be 
confined to one brief exposure to the spirit or, in long rituals, to a series 
of brief exposures. The brevity of this direct contact between patient and 
spirit conveys the quality of a shock or of repeated shocks of confronta-
tion. The patient is told to expect to get better and that the spirit afflic-
tion will be destroyed and depart from him or her. In the long ritual for 
Dauwaras, which lasted over three months, the pacing was drawn out as 
it became distressingly clear he was not getting better. The sequence of 
acts in the ritual should have corresponded with a pattern of improve-
ment, but they could not be made to fit the reality of his deterioration. 
People waited, hoping for a change that did not come and, in the end, 
bleakly accomplished the performance to the sad counterpoint of his 
worsening state.
In a long ritual, the narrative sequence brings the spirit to confront 
the patient and release him or her after various exchanges, and then 
the spirit is sent off. The sequence should depend on the patient’s signs 
of improvement, these serving as cues for the next act in the sequence. 
But if those cues do not appear, even after waiting for a period, the se-
quence still must be completed so the dangerous spirit, whose presence is 
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concentrated by the ritual, can be sent away. The ritual sequence does not 
allow for a variety of endings and outcomes. The response to a particular 
case can be adjusted in terms of hastening or delaying the next move, but 
the timing is more apt to be determined by contingencies such as other 
demands on the performers’ time or the presence or absence of people 
needed for the ritual. Responses are not finely adapted to the illness.
Changes in social attitudes toward work and the division between 
weekdays and weekends are gradually appearing in Rauit. By 1985, gath-
erings to show sympathy for the sick had become less immediate, less 
Figure  19. The patient Dauwaras, carried on a platform, confronts the spirit 
Malyi for healing. He shows the spirit which knee is the most painful. Malyi 
will next touch him with the nettles, betel, and spells fixed to its arm while the 
gathered crowd sings verses selected from the spirit’s long ritual song. (Color 
image posted in www.haubooks.org/pandoras-box.)
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pressing, and less obligatory than in what I witnessed during my first 
visit in 1968–69 or the second in 1975. Visiting because of illness be-
came less frequent; when it did occur, it was more often fitted in during 
weekends. If this reflected a changing attitude toward time and schedul-
ing, it seemed strange to me. There was scarcely any reason for it in the 
village, since no one had to follow a strict schedule except the school-
teacher, who came from elsewhere, and the schoolchildren. The changing 
attitude toward illness and gatherings of sympathy suggested that the 
Gnau were beginning to leave illness more to the individual, to his or her 
family, and to the aid post and people specially trained to provide care.
Figure  20. Photos, assembled from 16mm film, showing how Dauwaras, by 




A Sepik performance of treatment
Some performances for healing the ill are more elaborate and complex 
than others. Among the Gnau’s more elaborate treatments, the Panu’et 
ritual was the one I saw performed the most times. This chapter de-
scribes it as viewed by an outside observer. The appendix contains the 
transcript of a recorded performance, giving a more direct idea of the 
atmosphere of the event and the participants’ points of view.
The performance takes up a full day (G. Lewis 1975: 169–80; 1986). 
Men must go to find the plant materials to make an image of the spirit 
at the place where the patient was supposedly struck. Materials for the 
wa’agep soup and the Panu’et image must come from where the spirit 
was actively present. The men set off in the morning to a garden, sago 
grove, or pool. As they go, they collect the plants and materials associ-
ated with the spirit and needed for the ritual: ginger root, sweet-smelling 
and decorative herbs, mud from a pool by sago palms the spirit nurtures, 
and the special flower of Panu’et.
The first act, as it were, is set in garden land. The sick person’s male 
relatives and neighbors look for materials to make a basic image and 
persuade the spirit Panu’et to return with them to the village. The women 
of the hamlet may need to go to the gardens to fetch food for entertain-
ing the visitors and participants, but they must return ahead of the men. 
Women are excluded from collecting the ritual materials, which under-
lines the point that men act on behalf of all in relation to the spirits. The 
men reassemble at a prearranged garden site after they have found what 
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Figure 21. A sago stand with mature palms. It is a place associated with the 
spirit Panu’et.
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they need. By whistles or ululation, they warn any women still in nearby 
gardens to clear off. Women stragglers who pass by after that get rude 
remarks. The men are in control of the ritual, which they see as a duty.
At the garden site where they have assembled, they make a body im-
age for the spirit. Its outward shape is a bark-wrapped cylinder tapering 
at the ends, about a meter and a half long. It has an internal anatomy 
composed of leaf and vegetable equivalents, specifically chosen to stand 
for the spine, ribs, heart, lungs, liver, bowels—an internal vegetable anat-
omy hidden from sight when the completed image is wrapped in its long 
cylinder of pinkish bark, its “skin.” When the men have tied the skin in 
place, they prepare a meal that includes sago jelly. In striking contrast 
to everyday practice, the men themselves “turn” the sago (i.e., mix sago 
flour and boiling water to make hatwara sago). They then eat together at 
the garden site and, with invocations, place some of the food, betel, and 
coconut, on a makeshift offering platform at the place where they have 
made the image. The invocation prayers to Panu’et draw attention to 
their offering and ask the spirit to come back with them to the village to 
heal the sick person (a woman named Milek in the case I will describe). 
They carry the image back to the village where the sick person lies, and 
the second act begins.




Figure 23. Men make an image of the spirit Panu’et at the sago grove where it 
struck the patient Milek. They fashion the body of the image by using sago leaf 
fronds for its rib cage, a wild yam tuber for its heart, and two upright cordyline 
leaves for its lungs.
Figure 24. The patient’s husband crouches beside the undecorated Panu’et im-
age, now with bark for its skin and the two leaf lungs marking the front of the 
image.
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Now in the village, the plain bark image is decorated. The men speak 
of pleasing the spirit so it will enter the image. They do not hide for it 
at this point but expect women and children to keep clear of where they 
are working. They prepare some paint and cut a sago-palm leaf base 
into a triangular shape for a brush, then paint a face, eyes, and ears on 
the head. The face is bound in place on the image with shell ornaments 
and pig tusks. After the face is done, male ornaments and a headdress 
are added, allowing the long cylindrical object to take on the shape of 
a human form. Up to then, only the two large red cordyline leaves (the 
“lungs”) sticking out of the bark “skin” showed which side was its front 
side and which end was the head. The shell valuables and male finery 
decorating the figure render it worthy to receive the spirit. It must look 
splendid before the men call on Panu’et to enter its image. Through 
invocations and spells blown into its vital center, face, ears, headdress, 
and onto the stinging nettles tied around its base, the spirit is cajoled 
to enter its image. They say the image then feels heavy with it. They call 
for Milek, the sick woman, to come forward. She has not been evident 
until then.
Figure 25. Senior men wait back at the village while the junior men collect the 
materials and make the Panu’et image at the sago site.
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Figure 26. Once back in the village, the junior men paint a face for the Panu’et 
image, using a sago-palm leaf base as a brush.
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The entry of the patient to confront the spirit marks the beginning of 
the third act, the climax of the performance. People gather around and 
their attention is focused on the action. The patient is given a betel quid 
with geplagep herbs in it to chew. The men surround her and start to sing 
Panu’et verses. Over her, they hold a bespelled lyimungai banana leaf, 
with two red hibiscus flowers attached, so she is in its shadow, and some-
one brings a bowl containing cooked ginger wa’agep soup and holds it in 
shadow as well. The leaf is like a long, pale green parasol splashed with 
scarlet. Milek declares herself before the spirit and begs it to leave her. 
One man holds the image horizontally with the stinging nettle base to-
ward her. He brushes it against her, “peeling” around the areas that hurt 
and then brushing her limbs and trunk or just beside them so as to mark 
out her whole body, brushing and stinging her.
This sequence ends when he passes the image briefly between her 
legs, lifts the whole image over her head, and waves it in an arc over 
her. While this is done, the surrounding men sing relevant verses from 
Panu’et’s song; the singing is part of making the spirit present. One of 
the men flicks her with a sprig of stinging nettle leaves. The man hold-
ing the image then jabs the base of it down to strike the earth at her feet 
with a jolt. The presence of the spirit and the confrontation ends with 
the jolt, dislodging the spirit from the image. The singing stops and the 
image is laid on the ground, as though it were dead. They say they have 
“killed” it—the verb they use means to kill, hit, or shoot.
With the spirit dislodged, the men cut the image open where the red 
cordyline leaves—its lungs—stick up through the bark. These mark the 
surface position of the image’s vital center, but they refer to this action as 
“opening its pouch” (using their word for a marsupial pouch) or “letting 
the cold in” to cool the hot power. They extract some of the vegetable in-
sides, including its tuber heart and lay them on the lyimungai banana leaf 
with some feathers and fur from the finery. The leaf with the vegetable 
bits of the insides is again held over Milek. An invocation and spells are 
sung as tobacco smoke is blown across the leaf, across the hearth ashes 
and the bowl of soup, and across her as she stands. The leaf is torn down 
its midrib so that the bits taken from the image spill down over her and 
fall to the ground.
All the senior men now treat Milek to expel the spirit. They give her 
some of the ginger wa’agep soup and pick up fallen materials from the 
image to extract the harm. They use spells and spitting as they address 
the spirit Panu’et, explain to it about her illness, and call on it to rec-
ognize who she is and to leave her. They address the image as if it were 
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a person, giving it reasons why it should relent. After speaking their 
spells into it, the senior men give her more soup. Some put shreds of 
the cooked mixture directly in her mouth, others give it to her by hand 
Figure 27. A banana leaf filled with spells is held over Milek and she is brushed 
with the nettle-covered base of the Panu’et image. The men surrounding her 
sing verses from the song belonging to the spirit.
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over their right shoulders with their backs to her—a gesture recalling 
the way a mother pulls her child up onto her back to carry her. They pick 
up bits taken from the image in a nettle leaf and use them to brush her 
skin, as if to gather up and remove any illness left inside her, catching 
the harm with the leaf and brushing it off. Some men strike her sharply 
as if knocking out the illness. As they do so, they call out loudly for the 
spirit to leave her and go away to the bush belonging to others. They then 
throw the harm away with an overarm gesture, as if throwing it far away 
in the direction they want it to go. They tell her to stamp or to shake her 
head to get rid of the influence. After all the senior men involved have 
done this, she goes to sit down.
Next, some women bring hot water heated in green bamboos. They 
gather around her to bathe her, first with hot water and then with cold, 
cleansing her body to remove the dirt and illness. It serves as an ending, 
an act of termination. The treatment is over. Everyone can now sit down 
now to a meal that the women bring. The sick woman does not eat with 
the others, instead going back to her house. The meal with everyone eat-
ing gathered in groups is a part of all Gnau ceremonies.
On a few occasions, I was struck with how patients who had ap-
peared frail, tremulous, and weak-voiced when they first confronted the 
Panu’et image changed after the treatment and began using a more nor-
mal voice and posture.
The effort of support
A great deal of effort is involved in organizing a treatment for someone 
who is ill. The senior male relative closest to the sick person—husband, 
father, or brother—is usually responsible for mobilizing a network of 
kin and neighbors. He gets support from older men who live in his im-
mediate hamlet and who are likely to be lineage or clan kin. Whenever 
people gather, they hear about an illness and begin planning it and send-
ing messages. In the transcript in the appendix, the cast of people who 
speak most often includes members of the patient’s husband’s hamlet 
(Watalu), her brothers from the hamlet of Wimalu, and her married 
daughter and son-in-law from Pakuag. There are some other men pre-
sent who have come from a fourth hamlet, Bi’ip. They belong to the same 
clan as her husband and have come in solidarity with him.
Watalu has a mixture of clans. The patient’s husband, Purkiten, has 
strong ties to the other senior Watalu men—notably Maluna and Tawo, 
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who live in the hamlet but are not of the same clan. The senior men 
from Wimalu have come to take part in treating Milek, the patient, be-
cause they are her brothers (i.e., Marki is her brother and Silmai is her 
collateral brother). They are expected to show concern for her and her 
children. Silmai, once Wimalu’s tultul (government village official), wily 
and forceful in character, plays a conspicuous role with gusto, telling oth-
ers what to do. He directs banter at the junior men doing the hard work. 
By contrast, Milek’s husband says little; he is busy in the background 
making sure the necessary food and materials are ready. He holds the 
finished image for the confrontation between his wife and the spirit, 
touching and stinging and marking her out with it, while the others sing. 
Galwun, their son-in-law, helps energetically with the preparations. Two 
of the junior Watalu men, Walei and Waleka, paint and decorate the im-
age, with assistance and advice from others. Milek’s sons are boys still, 
so they have no responsibilities for this treatment. Very little is heard at 
all from the women, who keep apart while the decoration of the image 
is going on; some are cooking, others have come as guests. They include 
the wives and families of the men from other hamlets who are helping to 
perform the treatment. Some of the women sit near Milek. Her daugh-
ter Dauwanin has to do much fetching and finding, besides giving her 
mother support. She is the eldest, a busy daughter with her own family 
to look after, who has been cooking, fetching things, and helping her 
mother during her illness.
The presence, gathering, and noise of all these relatives and friends 
are evidence of their support, perhaps an encouragement to the patient. 
The pattern of seated groups and the movements of different people as 
they fetch food or materials needed for steps in the treatment reveal 
aspects of control and the division of responsibilities. The separation of 
men and women is expressed spatially and in their different tasks. The 
conventional picture of authority, with the senior men directing the jun-
ior men, dominates in the casual mixture of their voices reiterating what 
to do next.
The movements in the performance from the village to the garden 
and back to the village mark transitions and intervals in the acts. They 
link the different settings that involve a contrast between the public fo-
cus of treatment in the village and the privacy and exclusiveness of the 
junior men as they fashion the image in the garden. Spatial shifts of fo-
cus are matched by shifts of attention, intensity, and grouping. The early 
part of the day, when the men search for materials in the garden, seems 
quite casual, involving just an expedition. Their attention heightens as 
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they get ready to construct the image. They check that they have all the 
materials needed for it and the wa’agep and geplagep preparations, and 
then they begin making the figure. Once they have wrapped and tied it 
up, they can relax a bit. They eat at the garden, make the offering, and 
persuade the spirit to come back with them to the village. The return 
journey is often a cheerful trip, faintly resembling a return from a suc-
cessful hunting trip. They reenter the hamlet with the figure, which is the 
cue for the next phase—the decoration in the village.
These various entrances and exits lend a pattern and rhythm to the 
treatment. They focus attention and act as cues to the groups and cat-
egories of participants. Timing, space, movement, grouping, effort, at-
tention, and concentration contribute to the effects of the experience. 
As the Gnau see it, the men go out to find the spirit and return with the 
image, accompanied by the spirit. However, the spirit has yet to be per-
suaded to enter the image. Many entries and exits take place: the entry 
of the image into the village, the entry of the spirit into the image, the 
entry of the patient, matched later by the dislodging of the spirit, the 
“killing” of the image, the removal and casting off of the harm, and the 
sending off of the spirit. These are brought to an end with the cleansing 
of the patient, the act of termination. In the transcript, the participants 
bluster about the right order of actions, having things ready, and getting 
the treatment done in time, with daylight going and the evening frogs 
starting to pipe. Though much of it hardly sounds serious, it gives the 
scene a sense of urgency and exhilaration.
The patient has not seen all the fiddling and painting and fixing 
needed to make the image; it will be revealed to her as a finished figure. 
Until then, she has been apart, mostly silent and alone. By the time she 
comes forward to confront the spirit, the junior men have already done 
their bit. She looked tense and tremulous. The senior men surround her, 
calling out to the spirit, chanting the verses. The tempo of different ac-
tions and the calls speed up, and the intensity heightens as others come 
close to watch. Everyone focuses on what is happening. The press of peo-
ple, the calls, and the mixture of actions make it difficult to see exactly 
what is being done. Different people are doing different things at the 
same time. Items like the decorated image and the banana leaf stand out 
visually. It is dramatic when the image is thrown down with a jolt, when 
the leaf taken from its insides is torn up and the bits showered over the 
patient, and when the senior men call out and trill spells as the illness is 
gathered up and thrown off. These actions catch everybody’s attention in 
the flurry of activity. From the start of the confrontation to the point of 
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throwing away the harm, the scene is one of the people gathered around 
the patient and concentrated on her. The idea that the spirit is present 
is reinforced by appealing to it in loud voices, addressing speech and 
Figure 28. Milek stands while her brother Silmai strikes her with nettles. Her 
husband Purkiten holds a bowl of a special soup of herbs (wa’agep) for her. After 
this, the base of the Panu’et image will be banged on the ground to jolt the spirit 
out of it.
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song to it, moving the image around, and waving the leaf over it. When 
it is over, the pace suddenly slackens and the central focus is lost as the 
men disperse to go and sit down. The patient moves to the side, and 
some women come with water to wash her, but people do not gather to 
watch this. After the treatment, no one seems to pay much attention to 
the patient any more except her immediate family. But they also have to 
entertain the visitors and the people who have done the work. For those 
assembled, it is a time to relax and chat.
Form and effects
There are some final points to note on the form of Malik’s treatment. The 
reason for holding it was because the diagnosis attributed her illness to 
Panu’et. The aim was to persuade the spirit to desist from causing harm 
to her and to make it leave. These intentions were clearly expressed in 
words addressed formally to the spirit and in comments made by partici-
pants to each other during the preparations and performance. The meth-
od of achieving the purpose followed from the Gnau theory of illness 
and their diagnosis of this case; the performance expressed and inter-
preted these concepts. The spirit was made visible in an image, the harm 
extracted, the spirit “killed” and sent off, and the harm thrown far away. 
The treatments they perform are logical, given their belief in certain no-
tions about sickness and spirits. A few details depend on particularities 
in the case (for instance, which garden site the materials must come 
from, which people will act as organizers and participants), but there are 
not many other variations dependent on the precise circumstances of the 
case or on particular clinical aspects of the illness. The response is not 
specifically adjusted to the individual case other than identifying where 
and when the spirit struck. If the diagnosis is made, the form of treat-
ment follows according to a set pattern.
We might ask, then, whether the treatment strengthens belief in the 
theory behind it. “As imagination bodies forth the form of things un-
known, the poet’s pen turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing a 
local habitation and a name” (Shakespeare [1595] 1992: 3.4). Logic or a 
rationale does not necessarily have practical effects. The analogy with the 
performance of a play can be taken only so far. The treatment seems to 
confirm a theory of illness by making the cause visible. It is make-believe 
in the sense that the spirit is given form, made present to sight, hearing, 
smell, and touch. Ideas are objectified; gestures enact the extraction of 
Pandora’s box
224
illness and its casting away. Public representations also teach the young 
and help to convince spectators. The excitement and interest of a perfor-
mance bring the ideas alive.
The treatments of illnesses in other societies embody their theories 
about illness and express their hopes of healing. They might be analyzed 
or compared for symbolic transparency to see to what extent the actions 
of treatment convey in nonverbal terms a statement or revelation of the 
theory of illness that lies behind them. On the question of efficacy, there 
are different points of view to consider: that of the individual who is 
ill, those of the other participants, and that of onlookers. In many cults, 
the patient is the actor at the center of a drama. He or she may be ex-
pected to speak the name of the afflicting spirit or need to enter a trance. 
The patient enters into new relationships with a group, the leader of the 
cult, and the spirits. Crowds, noise, excitement, fatigue, or exhaustion 
enhance the effects on the patient. In the Burmese exorcism described by 
Melford Spiro (1967), the exorcist engaged a spirit through the patient 
in arduous, protracted negotiation and persuasion. At first, the patient’s 
trembling fingers were pressed together, then they separate in a sign that 
the possessing spirit who loved him was ready to release him. The patient 
in trance tried to give a handkerchief (a love symbol) to the spirit but 
was stopped from doing so. He tried to leap through the window to stay 
with the spirit. Among the Sinhalese, the ritual for healing illness caused 
by Sanni demons (Kapferer 1983; Obeyesekere 1968) is performed af-
ter midnight with flares by masked dancers reenacting the symptoms 
caused by the demons, who then suddenly startle the patient. The danc-
ers then portray a series of tableaux in which the patient is shown there 
is less to fear; the demons are diminished by ridicule and insults and 
finally subdued, their weakness exposed when confronted with the force 
of good—the Lord Buddha. In all these examples, the treatments in-
clude diagnoses in the sense of defining the illness, giving it a label and a 
shape. The actions make a diagnosis public, displaying the agreed-upon 
nature of the illness. The agent of the suffering—the cause or the illness 
itself—is embodied and objectified. The imagery confirms an idea or 
suspicion; it may show to the young what older people think. The ideas 
serve to justify the treatment; in turn, the treatment helps maintain the 
ideas. The performance of the treatment plays a part, too, in promoting 
learning and belief.
For the Gnau, illness is a spur to reflection and action, a reminder 
of forces present but unseen. As elsewhere, it triggers the performance 
of rituals that give visible and public shape to their ideas. The stand 
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individuals may take concerning the reality of a spirit and its image re-
flect their experience. With Panu’et, some will know what the image 
is and how it is made; they have done it and seen it done many times 
before. They can remember some of the sufferers who got better, others 
who did not. The gathering includes people who have been through the 
treatment themselves. Some of those present are close to the patient and 
deeply hope for a cure. Nevertheless, there is no reason for them to ana-
lyze exactly what is going on when they call on the spirit to enter its im-
age. The various actions of “killing” the image, extracting the harm, and 
sending the spirit off only suggest ideas of localized illness, the nature of 
spirits, and the presence of harm in the patient, but they do not present 
them in explicit terms. The question of their reality may not arise for par-
ticipants. The collective effort and conviction give encouragement and 
support to the patient and satisfaction to others. Those who have made 
the Panu’et figure may perhaps see things differently from the patient, 
who is alone and waiting to confront the spirit. Exposure to the sight, 
stings, noise, singing, the tastes of betel, ginger, and herbs heightens the 
patient’s shock while in the spirit’s presence, but it is acted out in a pro-
tected space. The patient is surrounded by the senior men and by friends 
who are calling out on her behalf, urging the spirit to leave her, striking 
it, “killing” it, taking the illness out of her, and throwing it away. They 
show how the illness may be overcome through the process of removing 
it. The invocations begin with appeals to the spirit and end with com-
mands for it to leave her and assertions that she will be well. The final act 
of washing her implies the illness is ended.
The words exposure, shock, modeling, and protected space may sug-
gest possible parallels with behavioral conditioning techniques used in 
the psychological treatment of fears and obsessions. The ideas of acting 
out a wish, expressing fantasies, or learning in some safe setting how to 
cope with fears, playing another role or status, trying out different rela-
tionships to others or to one’s own past—all of these have appeared more 
or less explicitly in some modes of psychological treatment. The methods 
used in such therapies have various names and theories behind them, 
such as drama therapy, modeling, psychodrama, or desensitization. They 
share some features with the “exotic” treatments described above: acting 
out in a safe place, making assertions of what is wished for, expressing 
desires and fears in order to come to terms with them, modeling behav-
iors to defuse anxiety, overcoming distress through simulation and prac-
tice, and perhaps the (almost magical) hope that by enacting something 
in anticipation, it can be made to come about. But without full, vivid 
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descriptions like those of Bruce Kapferer (1983), Gananath Obeyesekere 
(1968), Melford Spiro (1967), and Andras Zempléni (1966), it is vain to 
speculate on the way such treatments work. We cannot just assume they 
do. The Gnau treatments are not systematically repeated nor do they 
involve intense exposure or long-lasting effects, so it is not plausible to 
argue that they must work in the same way as treatments elsewhere or 
that they are effective for the same reasons. Treatments in other socie-
ties include examples in which the intensity, exposure, or repetition may 
suggest closer parallels to conditioning techniques. Suggestion, persua-
sion, catharsis, reward, and punishment are all possibly involved in some. 
Amulets and charms, drumming and dance, or cults of affliction can 
serve as means to evoke past associations that are presented again in the 
treatments. The social and collective support displayed during the per-
formance may also be a benefit for the patient.
Milek’s illness caused by Panu’et began with a fever and headache, a 
vague backache, and some discomfort with urination. Malaria may have 
been behind her symptoms, but I treated her for a urinary infection. 
Although her fever ended, she still did not feel well. Her illness began 
on May 30; it was not until June 26 that she felt sure she was well and fi-
nally washed. Early on, she had received various treatments: from some-
one whose spells she thought might have made her ill by mistake; the 
medicine I gave her; and a small private version of Panu’et performed by 
her husband and her collateral brother, Saputem. This small version on 
June 5 was followed by the full version for Panu’et on June 9, the one that 
I have described in this chapter and the appendix. In the days afterward, 
she said that she felt she was getting better, but she remained as someone 
ill, with dirt and ashes covering her body. She still felt “heavy”—a bit 
stiff, aching, and feeble. She thought this came because a woman from 
Mandubil had been killed on the spot where Milek’s house now stood 
and where she slept; the woman’s ghost weighed on her. For a week, she 
moved elsewhere to sleep. At last she washed. The problem is to know 
what difference the treatment made.
In judgments of the relation between cause and effect, timing matters, 
whether from the point of view of looking forward or of looking back. In 
a priori reasoning, we need an idea of what to expect without treatment 
in order to tell whether the treatment makes a difference. If several treat-
ments are all given at almost the same time, we cannot distinguish which 
worked. Benefits are easily mistaken. A gift for timing—close to the 
improvement—may tempt us to link an improvement to what was done 
just before it, especially when considering the case a posteriori. The lack 
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of a prognosis or a wrong one confuses the assessment of the benefits. 
Right or wrong, prognosis can create or contribute to both favorable and 
unfavorable judgments. The pacing of treatment is an art. It can be used 
to help to sustain hope; it may clarify or confuse the evaluation of effects.
To know how long some effect lasts or how often it is produced re-
quires us to follow up on patients who receive a certain treatment and 
those who do not, those who come back and those who do not. What 
this involves is, in short, implicitly an echo of the skeptical statistical 
approach used in biomedicine. The cases described in this book have 
included successes (such as the treatments at Bregbo) and failures (such 
as the attempt to heal Dauwaras). Often a simple answer about success 
is hard for anyone to give. A treatment seems worth a try at the time, 
but afterward people’s attention may shift to reveal other diagnoses. The 
Gnau approach some treatments almost experimentally, as a trial con-
ducted in the hope of benefit but done casually, without resolve to scru-
tinize the result. They sustain hopes by remembering how in the past, 
some people got better, not by identifying which treatments failed. They 
preserve, at least on the surface of daily life, an optimistic view in general 
of their own ability to do something about suffering. If an illness contin-
ues, this suggests to them that other agents are at work, and their focus 
of attention shifts forward rather than backward; they do not accuse an 
earlier treatment of failure or deny the first diagnosis. Belief in someone’s 
ability to control an illness influences the decision to seek treatment and 
the response to it. If the link between treatment and result is obvious—as 
it was in Rauit, for example, when the health post workers gave griseof-
ulvin pills to treat a long-standing, disfiguring fungal infection known as 
grile—people are keen for it and great demand soon follows. They seize 
on the evidence and act on it. The fungal infection in question was dis-
tinctive and much disliked. The contrast in their responses to other bio-
medical treatments—for example, the drug treatment for leprosy—was 
striking. The links between the signs of illness, the perception of need, 
and the evidence of therapeutic effects may be so attenuated that a spe-
cific treatment might be little appreciated, reducing demand for it. If it 
involves Western medicine, the Gnau prefer something they are already 
familiar with, something they know is “strong”: an injection, a linctus 
with a powerful taste, a lotion with a smell to make one’s nose tingle. 
The varied nature of diseases adds to the difficulty of deciding what to 
do. Many everyday illnesses are bearable or trivial and do not pose such 
serious problems of meaning or cultural interpretation as those that have 
occupied this discussion. But illness can sometimes prompt questions 
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of people’s convictions and the meaning of events. There are examples 
in which the introduction of a treatment—a vaccination, an injection of 
penicillin against yaws, or the like—has removed a form of disease that 
may have been central to some set of beliefs. The effect of treatment was 
to destroy the meanings they involve. More broadly, the impacts of bio-




Faith and the skeptical eye
Some wish for miracles to heal them. My subject is the art of healing, 
a subject in which miracles have played a part. Pierre Janet, one of the 
great students of the healing arts, wrote:
It is clear that the principal difficulty . . . lies not in the interpreta-
tion of miraculous facts, but in their observation. It is not a question 
for endless debate . . . to know if the rapidity of cure is a sign of a 
miracle, or if the Holy Virgin in healing must leave or not leave a 
scar. Quite simply it is a question of knowing what did happen and 
that is extraordinarily difficult, the knowledge that we have of these 
facts comes to us from reported evidence and we know how defective 
people’s reports are as a source of information. ( Janet 1919: 32–33)
The first question is deciding what it is that needs to be explained. 
Answers to that question depend on accurate observation. Janet further 
explained:
But there is no smoke without a fire: so many peoples would not have 
preserved ways of religious and magical healing for centuries if these 
treatments had had absolutely no influence. Medicine now, scientific 
or would-be scientific, has improved on some procedures of religious 
or magical medicine, made them a little surer, but in doing so it only 
continues them: it could never have been born if they had not already 
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imposed themselves on mankind because they were effective and use-
ful. ( Janet 1919: 34–35)
W. H. R. Rivers also saw certain continuities between Western and 
non-Western forms of healing: “From the psychological point of view 
the difference between the rude arts I have described in this book [Medi-
cine, magic and religion] and much of our own medicine is not one of 
kind, but only of degree” (Rivers 1924: 51). Janet realized that there are 
many similarities in healing rites even though they may be separated by 
centuries or found among quite different peoples. He had religious heal-
ing, miracles, and faith healing in France particularly in mind:
The practices to prepare for the miracle always stay the same: the sick 
person arrives from afar after a long and painful journey. The local in-
habitants do not easily benefit from the miracle cures which happen 
on their doorstep and for that reason there are still sick people round 
Lourdes, which seems curious. One does not let the sick person go 
straight, and without preamble, to touch the relic or drink from the 
sacred spring: one imposes a propitiatory novena on him first, long 
waiting at the door of the temple during which he listens to sermons, 
repeats prayers, and above all during which he hears tell of miracu-
lous cures and sees the innumerable ex-voto, in brief, he must enter 
slowly into the temple and he must prepare himself by a special incu-
bation. If the miracle happens the sick person must still thank God 
in public, decorate the temple with clearly visible signs of grateful 
recognition: everything happens today at Lourdes as formerly it did 
in the Asclepion. One could besides make the same remarks about 
animal magnetism, the mysterious practices around the seer who 
speaks while sleeping, the rites of initiation, the hermetic teachings 
present us with the same preparation of the patient under another 
form. . . . These observations show the miracle is not as arbitrary or as 
free as one might think. Miracle though it be, it submits to some laws 
which have always stayed the same. The God who does these miracles 
does not heal just anything, nor does he heal just anyhow. Don’t go 
and ask in one of these sanctuaries for God or the (magnetic) fluid 
to make a cut-off leg regrow, or the scars of wounds to disappear. 
( Janet 1919: 36–37)
His general point about similarity would seem to apply to much dra-
matic religious healing and to healing cults. The journey and the for-
eignness have to be replaced by the creation of strangeness or mystery 
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through masks, trance, esoteric knowledge, special sites, or time of per-
formance. The rites divest officiants from their familiar roles, as do the 
costumes and special forms of speech.
There have been many attempts to compare treatments (some of 
the earlier sources include Ackerknecht  1971; Bouteiller  1950; Cle-
ments 1932; Ellenberger 1970; Frank 1961; Janet 1919, Rivers 1924). 
Most often discussed have been questions of treatment—therapeu-
tic efficacy, rationale, the role of the healer—rather than methods for 
the promotion of health, the prevention of sickness, or rehabilitation. 
From Rivers and Janet onward, writers have noted similarities; they 
classified them in various ways, such as by method of training, prin-
ciples, and techniques (Bouteiller  1950) or by theories of cause and 
the logic implicit in responses (Clements 1932; Murdock 1980); they 
suggested reasons for similarities, such as in psychological effects (El-
lenberger 1970; Frank 1961) or for their distribution (Murdock 1980; 
I.  M.  Lewis  1971; Rubel  1964). Some looked for biological univer-
sals of physiology and pathology to suggest plausible explanations; 
others identified discoveries of herbs or drugs or methods, considered 
questions of diffusion and spread, or explored the influence of literate 
traditions or the great regional systems, such as Asian medicine (Les-
lie 1976); yet others analyzed the effects of political forces, of colonial 
and commercial interests, and of migration, transport, and poverty on 
the dissemination of cosmopolitan medicine (Melrose  1982; Morley, 
Rohde, and Williams 1983).
Hopes and disappointment
Pain, uncertainty, and anxiety make people seek relief in illness. The suf-
ferer looks for help. There is pressure to do something rather than noth-
ing, to try something in the hope that it will work. Many physicians 
know how difficult it is to practice “masterly inactivity.” Talcott Parsons 
(1951) remarked on this demand for positive action in his original analy-
sis of the medical system and medical practice in society.
When someone undergoes great distress and uncertainty, the bet on 
treatment, like Blaise Pascal’s wager on God (that faith offers the hope 
of Paradise and disbelief offers nothing), is loaded in favor of belief if 
the choice is between possible relief or continued suffering. The hope 
of release or victory over illness is a frequent theme in rites of healing. 
What interests me is the willingness to believe. The medical past offers 
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its spectacle of optimism and belief, its history of panaceas, theriac, and 
bloodletting. Testimony is most often testimony of cures, not failures, 
for “sorrows,” wrote Sir Thomas Browne, “destroy us or themselves. . . . 
To be ignorant of evils to come, and forgetfull of evils past, is a mercifull 
provision in nature, whereby we digest the mixture of our few and evil 
dayes” (1977: 311).
There is value in that optimism as a spur to action and a sustainer of 
morale. A Gnau hamlet organizing a major rite for someone’s serious 
illness—the distribution of tasks, the sequence of days devoted to its 
performance, the gatherings, the singing, the communal meals—was a 
scene of energy and activity and hope. It stood in great contrast to that 
same hamlet weeks later when the sick man was hidden in a house sur-
rounded by barriers, the villagers waiting, demoralized by the sense they 
had exhausted all they knew to save him and had to abandon hope. The 
few visitors who now came did so to weep over him. For anyone who had 
seen the change, it would leave, I think, a strong sense of the social value 
of the hope that sustains treatment.
Uncertainty over what to expect can make it hard to tell when treat-
ment helps. Equally, it can make it hard to detect harm from treatment. 
Medicine is full of lessons on how people believe their reasoning rather 
than the facts. To the Eddystone Islanders in the South Pacific, the flut-
tering of a butterfly seemed to resemble epilepsy, so by a certain logic of 
analogy and sympathy, they used a butterfly in treating convulsions (or 
to cause them; Rivers 1924: 33–34). Similarly, in France and England, 
physicians let blood relentlessly when a theory of the humors or purifica-
tion required it. Firm convictions about some reason for illness—as firm 
as the reasons a Zande has concerning witchcraft—may make a response 
seem quite rational to the actor. But the fact that an action seems ra-
tional does not necessarily make it effective. Empiricists long contended 
with rationalists in the schools of medicine.
The sick person may view the matter differently from those who 
watch or apply the treatment. At one point in a performance at Rauit to 
heal an affliction by the spirit called Malyi, a creeper was wound around 
and around the sick man’s body and tied to the tall, masked figure of the 
Malyi. They said the spirit had struck him down. He could not walk. 
He had to lie there; his pain was such that he could scarcely even crawl. 
They said he was like a tree cramped and stifled by creepers and vines. As 
men might come to cut the vines so the tree could grow and its branches 
spread, in the ritual they came and cut the creeper that bound him to 
Malyi. They cut it into many pieces so he might be able to get up and 
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walk and move without pain. Here, I quote directly from my fieldnotes 
at the time:
Treatment with creepers, October 22, 1968
There was a bigger gathering of singers and singing throughout the 
day. Sometimes they spoke about the newly returned plantation la-
bourers being able to learn the songs. None of the pinistaim labourers 
took on the mask and danced outside. At about 3:40 p.m. they got 
out a long vine creeper and the special leaves to make the dugi (navel 
cord—the name given to the creeper when used in this rite indicates 
another path of symbolic association: the patient is tied to the spirit 
Malyi as a baby just born is still tied by the cord to its mother). Sai-
buten, directing the occasion, unrolled the creeper (lambet tamodat) 
and hung it on the side of the enclosure fence. He called to the junior 
men to come and tie the decorations on it. They tied on scented and 
coloured leaves and some moss. Meanwhile Saibuten split bamboo 
to make foot-long knife-blade lengths. On each of the three, he tied 
some scented dyu’elbi leaves and coloured cordyline leaves. These were 
to serve as the knives for cutting the “navel cord.” The long creeper 
was then fastened onto the top of the headdress (waipet) of the tall 
mask and wound round and round its body. Parku got inside the 
mask to dance for this bit as Malyi. Then people began calling out for 
Dauwaras (the sick man) to come down from Pakuag. They waited. It 
wasn’t until 5:30 p.m. that he came down, carried in the palm spathe 
“chair” that Dabasu and Walei had made for him. Dauwaras was in 
a tense and wretched state, finding all the movement and jolts very 
painful, holding out his arms to have the dugi fastened round him 
and his outstretched arms trembled, his legs and thighs too trem-
bling. I thought these tremors, easily visible, were from extreme ten-
sion. He scarcely looked up at the people so close to him, mumbling 
in a high-pitched voice, deeply dejected, complaining of his pain, 
looking down at his feet. His misery affected everyone so that as they 
wound the dugi around him, they looked at him with pity, drawn 
faced, unsmiling and silent. The dugi was tied around his right big 
toe first and then brought up between his legs, around his neck, then 
down around both thighs and then wound round his chest a number 
of times. Saibuten brought out the bamboo knives and, taking the 
upper end of the dugi, cut him loose from Malyi. He passed the knife 
to Samo who unwound the creeper a bit more from Dauwaras and 
cut. They called on the men, including many of the younger ones, 
to come and cut it, unwinding it bit by bit, undoing it from him. 
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As they were cutting through, Dauwaras thinly complained of his 
pain, and when they had finished and the bits of cut dugi were lying 
at his feet, he was still speaking of his pain in a little broken voice, 
almost in tears, still with his head bent down. He stopped. They car-
ried him back to Pakuag. It was a dull grey, after-rain light, twilight. 
.  .  . Dauwaras was not getting better. It was a depressing evening. 
Disillusionment.
The logic implicit in the treatment was coherent—but it did not work.
The skeptical eye
If we are tempted to think no one was as shrewd or as skeptical as we 
are now, Michel de Montaigne, writing in the sixteenth century, shows 
us how wrong we would be. To understand what follows, we may sup-
pose that Montaigne was thinking of an imaginary case—namely, that of 
an elderly Frenchman with a melancholic temperament who is afflicted 
with epilepsy. The question was: How did the physician discover it could 
be cured by a preparation of elk’s horn applied to the finger during win-
ter and the conjunction of Venus and Saturn?
Galen tells us that a leper happened to be cured by drinking some 
wine out of a vessel into which a viper had crept by chance. In this 
example we may discover the means and a likely guide to that kind 
of experiment, as also in those to which the physicians say they have 
been led by the example of certain animals. But in most of the other 
experiments to which they say they were led by fortune and had no 
other guide but chance, I find it impossible to believe in the progres-
sive course of their investigation.
I imagine a man looking at the endless number of things around 
him, plants, animals, metals. I cannot think where to make him begin 
his experiments; and if his first fancy should light upon an elk’s horn, 
which would need to be a very pliant and easy faith, he will yet find 
himself equally perplexed in his second operation. He is confronted 
with so many diseases and so many circumstances, that before he has 
arrived at any certainty as to whither the perfection of his experi-
ments should lead him, human wit will be at the end of its tether. 
And before he has discovered, among that endless number of things 
that it is this horn; among so many diseases, that it is epilepsy; and 
so many constitutions, the melancholic; so many seasons, in winter; 
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so many nations, the French; so many ages, old age; so many celestial 
changes, the conjunction of Venus and Saturn; so many parts of the 
body, the finger; being guided in all this neither by reason, nor by 
conjecture, nor by example, nor by divine inspiration, but solely by 
the movement of chance, it must be a chance that is perfectly artifi-
cial, regular and methodical.
And then even should the cure be effected, how can he be as-
sured that it was not because the disease had reached its crisis, or that 
it was not the result of chance or that it was not due to something 
else he had eaten or drunk or touched on that day, or to the power 
of his grandmother’s prayers? .  .  . Besides supposing this proof to 
have been perfect how many times was it repeated? How often was 
this long bead roll of changes and coincidence strung anew, to infer 
a certain rule therefrom? Should it be inferred by whom? Among 
so many millions, there will be but three men who trouble about 
recording their experiments; will chance have lighted upon just one 
of these three? What if another or even a hundred others have had 
the contrary experiences? We might perhaps see some daylight if all 
the reasoning and all the decisions of men were known to us; but that 
three witnesses and those three doctors should lord it over mankind 
is against reason. (Montaigne [1588] 1927: 235–36)
With such acumen, he distinguishes nearly all the issues. The French 
physician Pierre Louis, writing nearly three centuries later in 1835 on 
the subject of bloodletting, observed:
Physicians . . . witnessed a few fatal cases where no bloodletting was 
employed, and thereupon jumped to the conclusion that this process 
would have saved them. Other practitioners noted a few cases where 
death followed a resort to bloodletting, and denounced the practice 
as the whole cause of death. In neither instance did they employ any 
check or test of their sweeping conclusions. “Quels faits!” exclaimed 
Louis, “Quelle logique!” We must, instead, know how often venesec-
tion aided and how often it impeded recovery. . . . Their numerical 
estimates were of the vaguest character. In the difference here be-
tween exactitude and vagueness lay all the difference between truth 
and error. (Shryock 1948: 136)
Pierre-Charles-Alexandre Louis, a nineteenth-century doctor who 
conducted research on the effects of bloodletting, impressed the medical 
historian Richard Harrison Shyrock in some ways as the most significant 
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study ever made in medical method, declaring that it placed the crown 
on medicine as a science.
The diversity of healing practices
The things done in the name of treatment are extremely varied. A list of 
kinds of treatment inevitably suggests both similarities and differences. 
The same processes of disease may occur anywhere. Perhaps that is a 
partial explanation for some of the similarities. But there are problems in 
deciding which procedures can fairly be identified with each other and 
when the differences are more significant than any resemblance.
There are many forms of treatment, including guidance on diet, “hot 
and cold” foods, the balance of humors, regimen, food as therapy; herbs 
and poisons, the use of drugs; physical treatments involving cutting, sur-
gery, the management of bone and joint injuries, sores, wounds; scarifica-
tion, counterirritation; exercises and manipulation, ointments, liniments, 
poultices, heat therapy, sweating and sweat baths, massage; washing, 
cleansing, purification; talk used as psychotherapy aimed at gaining in-
sight, moral reeducation, indoctrination, persuasion, confession; sugges-
tion and hypnosis; dream therapy and incubation, relaxation, meditation, 
sleep therapy; religious therapies and treatment rituals; behavior thera-
pies that make use of drama, shock, catharsis, acting out, the gratification 
of desires, release from frustration, exposure to feared objects, emotional 
flooding, desensitization, operant conditioning; social therapies involv-
ing group support, noise, music, dance and trance, voluntary associations, 
self-help groups, cults of affliction; and so on and so forth.
Just as difference is a matter of degree and quality, so is similarity. 
For instance, in an account of the Iroquois’s theory of dreams and their 
dream therapy, which Jesuit priests first recorded in the seventeenth cen-
tury, Anthony Wallace (1972: 59–75) suggests that the Iroquois came 
strikingly close to psychoanalytic intuitions and assumptions:
They recognized conscious and unconscious parts of the mind. They 
knew the great force of unconscious desires, were aware that the frus-
tration of these desires could cause mental and physical (psychoso-
matic) illness. . . . They had noted the distinction between the latent 
and the manifest content of dreams, and employed what sounds like 
the technique of free association to uncover the latent meaning. And 
they considered that the best method for the relief of psychic and 
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psychosomatic distresses was to give the repressed desire satisfaction, 
either directly or symbolically. (Wallace 1972: 63)
Wallace’s approach picks out the similarities. The psychological lan-
guage identifies them so that we can recognize them stripped, as it were, 
of exotic cultural qualifications. But when the cultural particularity is 
put back, the likeness of Iroquois notions to psychoanalytic treatment 
almost vanishes:
One man, to satisfy the dictates of his dream, had himself stripped 
naked by his friends, bound, dragged through the streets with the 
customary hooting, set upon the scaffold, and the fires lit. “But he was 
content with all these preliminaries and, after passing some hours in 
singing his death song, thanked the company, believing that after this 
imaginary captivity he would never be actually a prisoner.” Another 
man, having dreamed that his cabin was on fire, “could find no rest 
until he could see it actually burning.” The chief ’s council in a body, 
“after mature deliberation on the matter,” ceremoniously burned it 
down for him. A third man went to such extremes of realism, after 
a captivity nightmare, that he determined “that the fire should be 
actually applied to his legs, in the same way as to captives when their 
final torture is begun.” The roasting was so cruel and prolonged that 
it took six months for him to recover from his burns. (Wallace 1972: 
65–66)
As I shall try to identify some similarities in forms of treatment and 
responses to them, I mention this caution to the reader. There is a risk of 
deceiving oneself into seeing a similarity where there is none.
What place is there for an anthropologist?
When Max Gluckman posed the question of “closed systems and open 
minds” (1964), he applied it to the writings of anthropologists using 
ideas from economics, psychology, and psychoanalysis. What place is 
there for a medical anthropologist to judge the efficacy of treatment? 
Biomedicine is specialized and rather suspicious of outsiders. The blunt 
question raised is this: How can an anthropologist make observations 
that would be adequate and pertinent to scientific medical thinking if he 
or she attributes the efficacy of alternative treatments to their putative 
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physiological or psychological effects, or to the pharmacological effects 
of herbs? Medical people are almost bound to ask them for relevant 
evidence.
In a famous paper on the efficacy of symbols, Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(1963) plunges into these problems when he discusses a healing chant 
used by the Kuna people of Panama as a treatment to aid delivery in 
difficult childbirth. For all the appeal of his essay, his wonderful explana-
tion of the treatment seems to take its efficacy for granted. It is the idea 
that matters, not the evidence. First, he interprets symbolism in it that is 
appropriate for childbirth. The interpretation shows why the song might 
be a way of treatment. Then he goes into questions of psychological and 
physiological cause and effect to explain how a song might help in diffi-
cult labor. He takes for granted that it works (i.e., aids a delivery delayed 
or obstructed for unknown reasons—and of which he has no evidence) 
and suggests how it would do so.
Is the symbolic meaning of the chant recognized equally by the sha-
man, the patient, and the anthropologist? The analysis suggests that the 
effect of the chant depends on understanding its meaning. Could the 
specific meaning discerned by the anthropologist from the text have an 
effect if the patient were ignorant of that meaning? If the shaman knew 
it, it might justify his action even though the patient did not know the 
esoteric meaning. But then, if the patient were unaware, how could the 
song have its effect? Lévi-Strauss argues that the effect of the song is 
to make the distressed sick woman relive the initial situation with pain, 
reveal to her the causes of her distress, and bring to a conscious level 
conflicts and resistance that have remained unconscious; by implication, 
this does something to make her uterine contractions stronger or dilate 
the passage for birth. He says that the specific symbolic meaning has 
organ-specific effects on the birth passage. Such symbolic imagery can 
only work on the emotions, he implies, through eventual conscious un-
derstanding. But what should we think if the sick woman denied that 
she thought the chant had a particular meaning? Or if she denied that 
the chant brought her relief ? Or if we found the chant was not followed 
by her safe delivery?
A detailed ethnographic study by Norman MacPherson Chapin 
(1981: 394–441) found that Kuna shamans interpret the birth ritual and 
its mode of action differently, for they consider that its effects work in 
a spiritual domain separate from the woman’s flesh and body and the 
material world. To Kuna specialists, the curative action of the chant is 
not aimed at the physical body of the woman but works through two 
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conceptual parallels: a first between the spiritual essence or “soul” of the 
pregnant woman and her physical body; and a second between the wom-
an’s soul and the spiritual cosmos. Kuna specialists distinguish between 
these different conceptual levels, and the chanter is concerned with con-
trolling events in the world of the spirits. The chant is directed not at the 
pregnant woman but to the inhabitants of the spirit world. The chant is 
sung in the language of the spirit world, which is unintelligible to the pa-
tient. “The chanter is the sender of the message, the spirits are the receiv-
ers, and the woman is merely an uncomprehending part of the audience” 
(Chapin 1981: 435). Lévi-Strauss neglected the midwives who are vital 
participants in the birth event. They are familiar with the chant and pay 
close attention to its progress. They supply the chanter with information 
about the patient’s condition, and they may do certain ritual actions in 
synchrony with the chant.
Changes in the woman’s physical state provide indications as to the 
condition of her “soul” (purpa), and in turn serve as crucial evidence 
of the progress of the shamans as they bring the spirit of the fetus 
down Muu’s river . . . the chanter of Muu Ikar is concerned with con-
trolling and directing events as they unfold in the world of spirit. The 
midwives, on the other hand, are involved in a much more earthly 
task. They are working directly with the pregnant woman’s body, mas-
saging the baby into proper position, administering medicine, and 
bending all of their talents to coax the child from a woman who is 
convulsed in pain, bleeding, and in acute danger of losing her life. 
But while the chanter and the midwives are focused on different or-
ders of reality, they are also attending to each other’s activities and 
exchanging interpretations of how things are progressing. In this way 
they work together, in unison, filling crucial complementary roles. 
(Chapin 1981: 437–38)
These observations point out several issues: Whose standpoint should 
be taken—the actor’s or the observer’s? Is a literal meaning or a meta-
phoric meaning intended? Who consciously identifies it? Who gives 
the reasons for action or belief ? What is the effect on the woman and 
her body—delivery of the baby after obstructed or delayed labor? What 
is the cause of the obstruction or delay (e.g., cephalo-pelvic dispropor-
tion, transverse lie, breech position)? What is the effect of the treatment 
on the mother’s mind (e.g., relief from pain, confidence after anxiety)? 
What do the shaman and the midwife say?
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Relativism or double standards?
Criteria of successful treatment may indeed differ from biomedical ones. 
But I would question how we are to use different or double standards if 
asked to explain or comment on the efficacy of treatment. For a practic-
ing physician, there are obvious moral issues. We apply critical standards 
to our own treatments and we expect certain standards of safety and 
tested efficacy. In judging efficacy, should we apply different standards 
to the treatments used in other societies—in effect, certain standards for 
them (perhaps appropriate for them but not for us) and keep others for 
ourselves (those of biomedical tests and facts)? Should we use double 
standards in this sense? We may record and understand other people’s 
criteria for successful treatment, but if we want to explain why and how 
their treatments work in biomedical terms, we enter a different field. If 
we adopt the strong relativist position, we might argue that we are not 
justified in applying external criteria to what people in other societies 
do, perhaps even arguing that the practicing physician is not justified 
in interfering or intervening. This position would hold that it is inap-
propriate to subject alternative views to scientific criteria because these 
only make sense to someone who is already conversant with science and 
accepts its methods.
For the relativist, “Truth is different on the other side of the Pyr-
enees”; scientific views about the facts can change. So, it might be held, 
anyone who is sensitive to cultural relativity should see that one must use 
the standards given in that society. This sounds like an argument for us-
ing different standards according to each context. If rigorously followed, 
it would make comparison across cultures impossible.
However, we may say that biomedical standards are universally ap-
plicable, but this does not mean that only those standards are valid. De-
scribing as well as identifying the views and aims of other people and the 
criteria they use is one thing; evaluating these by biomedical standards 
is another.
When we do not understand why a treatment has efficacy, one an-
swer might be, “Well, they say it made them feel better.” But is there a 
link between what they did and their feeling better? “Perhaps the herbs 
they used were effective,” one may say; another might refer to the power 
of suggestion to explain it, the placebo effect, psychosomatic efficacy, 
or symbolic efficacy. Whose explanation is at issue—the actor’s or the 
observer’s? Did the disease just end in its usual way or get better by 
itself ? Half the time we do not know what was wrong with the patient 
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in medical terms or, indeed, if anything was wrong. The “placebo” or 
“suggestion” explanations risk creating an impression that much in their 
illness is imaginary or emotional. Are these other people really so sug-
gestible? Walter Cannon’s essay on “voodoo” death (1942) might seem to 
give some authority to that view.
Perhaps we are more willing to credit the mysterious powers of psy-
chological and psychosomatic forces when the cases come from distant 
places and concern Aborigines or Africans. It goes with a certain roman-
ticism about exotic people (their witchcraft, their spirits and magic, their 
“superstitions”) and persisting assumptions about their emotional labil-
ity. This example from a government settlement of Aborigines in central 
Australia illustrates the problem:
Attitudes and behaviours of the nurses at the Yuendumu hospital 
between 1969 and 1971 varied greatly. Some were very willing to 
co-operate with a medicine man and to enlist his aid, particularly if a 
patient requested that he be consulted. For example, there was some 
doubt about whether a very sick man in his thirties [ Jungala] was 
suffering from a blow on the head or from a psychosomatic disorder 
produced by the knowledge that he had been “boned” and “sung” fol-
lowing his wife’s recent death. A medicine man was asked to come 
to the hospital to treat Jungala. .  .  . On 1.6.70 Jungala, Nungarai’s 
husband, died in Alice Springs Hospital from a cerebral abscess after 
a sickness of a week’s duration, during most of which time he was 
on the settlement. .  .  . It was rumoured that he had been “boned” 
and “sung.” Everyone on the settlement, including the nursing staff, 
felt that his illness might have been the result of this rather than the 
after-effect of a blow on the head received during a drunken brawl in 
Alice Springs. (Middleton and Francis 1976: 135, 41)
Anecdotal evidence
One difficulty is the anecdotal nature of evidence in most of such cases; 
another is how to provide appropriate or adequate evidence in the par-
ticular circumstances. How do you test for ghosts? As in the case of the 
Indian rope trick, it is worth making sure the trick has really been done 
before spending time trying to explain how it was done. But often the re-
porters resent skeptical requests for more detailed descriptions of exactly 
what happened, how often, and who witnessed what. Such resentment is 
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quite common when shamanic healing, paranormal or psychic phenome-
na, or new cures for cancer are at issue. Rare cases and uncommon medical 
events are bound to be difficult to investigate. In the history of Western 
medicine, the concentration of patients in large hospitals and the dissem-
ination of published information (Shryock 1948; Ziman 1976) helped to 
reduce some of the problems of rarity. But for some of the most striking 
cases anthropologists reported (e.g., suspected “voodoo” death or success 
in dramatic rituals for healing), it was unreasonable to expect detailed 
investigations at such times and in such places. Such an attempt would 
alter the circumstances; the investigative techniques and equipment could 
disturb and disrupt the event. Moreover, some of the problems could not 
be answered unless appropriate methods for tackling them were available. 
This is different from saying, as the strong relativist might do, that such 
phenomena are intrinsically unsuitable or inimical to scientific investiga-
tion. That sounds more like the evasive defense of the spirit medium who 
says the spirit will not manifest itself in the presence of a skeptic.
It is rare to find examples from anthropologists who record the fre-
quency of therapeutic failures, do follow-ups, or find out how many peo-
ple do not bother to come back to the healer next time. It is difficult 
enough to assess the efficacy of treatment in a highly controlled hospital 
setting; the difficulties outside are far greater. A simple assertion, how-
ever confident, that a treatment might work psychologically, psychoso-
matically, by suggestion, or through symbolic efficacy rings hollow. The 
double virtue of Kaja Finkler’s (1980) and Arthur Kleinman’s (1980: 
311–75) studies of healing is to have studied the patients’ perceptions 
of their treatment carefully and to have also done follow-ups. Earlier 
I quoted Janet’s remark that the difficulties lie not with interpretation 
so much as with observation. But the chemistry of laboratory tests, the 
numbers needed for statistical significance, the equipment, the invasive 
and specialized procedures for investigating pathology—these are not 
our province as anthropologists. So what aspects can we tackle, given our 
means and limitations?
Outcome expectations
The aims of treatments in different societies are varied. We would mis-
take the aims if we set a medical frame around the biblical instructions 
for cleansing the leper. They were not a treatment to heal so much as a 
rite of passage for readmission to the community.
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By classifying a problem, the diagnosis may set expectations about 
the outcome. Conversely, the results of treatment may cast doubt on a 
diagnosis or a causal explanation. Treatment, in effect, puts hypothesis 
to test. Prognosis had a high place in Hippocratic medicine because it 
was held that the physician who could forecast the natural course of the 
disease would not merely gain in reputation, but he would be better able 
to treat the disease (Brock 1929: 83–84; Lloyd 1979: 16, 30, 170). Diag-
nosis was the art of reading signs—the practice of semiology in an old 
sense. From signs, the physician might be able to tell the past, the pre-
sent, and the future or if the natural processes in disease were regular and 
had a pattern that could be recognized. We may separate the notions of 
diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis, but other people do not everywhere 
make these sharp divisions. Knowledge of what to expect is a source of 
strength and confidence. The art of healing also lies in giving advice, in 
identifying the illness, the problems that gave rise to it, and those it may 
lead to. Judgments of the success or failure of treatment depend on what 
was expected to happen without treatment. And so prognosis—or the 
lack of it—can be critical to the formation of opinions about treatment. 
In practice, the outcome of an illness is often uncertain.
The Gnau people would say that illnesses caused by the spirits or by 
sorcery and destructive magic were ones that could lead to death unless 
they were stopped by treatment. They might say this casually and with-
out qualification. To think that most illnesses, if untreated, will lead to 
death is to provide a strong basis for belief in the benefits of treatment. 
The Gnau might attribute serious and mild illnesses to the same cause if 
the circumstances suggested it. For example, they supposed one particu-
lar spirit afflicted a young child who was acutely ill, as I thought, with 
meningitis; on another day, they made the same diagnosis for an old man 
with an aching hip after he had been gardening. The same treatment for 
that spirit might well have very different outcomes.
I have described one panic when a spirit attack or sorcery was sus-
pected, the case of Maka (see chapter 2). In theory, perhaps, the out-
come of a certain treatment might have identified or confirmed one of 
the diagnoses made about her condition. In practice, the villagers’ ef-
forts at treatment and their confusion took up all their attention until 
they saw she was not dying. The pressure for a diagnostic verdict then 
evaporated. What was left was the satisfaction that they had responded 
energetically to an emergency and that it was over. On the other hand, 
the prolonged illness of Wolai made quite different demands on them 
(see chapter 3). The nature of his illness, its slow rate of change, and the 
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different treatments given concurrently altered the possibility of iden-
tifying whether one treatment in particular worked or whether one di-
agnosis in particular was right. In practice, people at Rauit were little 
concerned to say what they thought would happen in particular cases or 
to predict how soon a treatment should be effective.
One strength of saying so many illnesses might be fatal if left un-
treated is that most people, in fact, get better. The value of treatment 
seems to be confirmed. The gestures of prediction—for example, crack-
ing knuckles, making a langit leaf curl up—were perfunctory. No one 
seemed to bother about the result once such actions were taken. The 
serious techniques of divination I saw used were done after death or in 
desperate situations. Such divination was not for prediction. Although 
in theory the outcomes of treatment might serve as tests of their specu-
lations about the cause, people at Rauit gave them only fitful attention.
The pastor’s dilemma
Illness may be accepted as a derailment of nature, but it has more often 
been understood in religious or moral terms (e.g., as sin, atonement for 
guilt, affliction, a test or challenge to the self, a sign of weakness, loss of 
control, retribution, just deserts, attack, revenge). Treatment, reflecting 
one or another of these assumptions, might then be rather like a strug-
gle for survival or a battle, a contest against an attack on the patient as 
a victim, on the one hand, and on the other, the disease, an agent, or a 
person as the enemy, the inflictor. The illness may be seen as an ordeal or 
a trial of the self to be endured and overcome, or it might be considered 
as retribution, a punishment to be suffered, a sin to be expiated, exor-
cized. The patient may have to be purified, cleansed, refined by suffering, 
or made whole, put back in balance, restored to harmony, strengthened. 
Alternatively, an illness can be viewed as a sign, message, or warning, and 
the treatment a process of adaptation, learning, accommodation, a path 
to insight and understanding, reeducation; or a quest, a journey, a pil-
grimage, a rite of passage. Such connotations are not necessarily explicit, 
although sometimes the course of events in an illness brings them out.
Explanations and responses to illness, suffering, and death have had 
a central place in many religions. But in industrialized modern societies, 
the questions prompted by these events have been increasingly seen as 
the responsibility of biomedicine to answer. Faith in science has come to 
supply or replace answers that were previously given by faith in religion. 
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Biomedical practice then may challenge a religious belief, pose doubts, 
or lead to a dilemma of duty to self or faith. In the particular area of the 
Sepik where I did fieldwork, the nearest local evangelical mission was 
associated with outstanding medical work. But for one of the Indigenous 
pastors, his own illness represented special problems in the case that fol-
lows. For him, they had less to do with the introduction of biomedicine 
than with the status of his former beliefs and ritual allegiances. His case 
illustrates the complexity of moral issues sometimes provoked by deci-
sions over the choice of treatment. In this part of the Sepik, performanc-
es of the major traditional religious festivals or rituals of the sort called 
singsings in Tokpisin were usually triggered by someone’s illness. Some of 
the major rituals were supposed to have been acquired originally to heal 
someone. Perhaps that association between religion and healing gave a 
sharper point to the problems I shall now describe.
In 1985, a singsing was going on in a neighboring village. The man for 
whom it was being performed was the local village pastor, thus a com-
mitted Christian prayer leader. The crux of the matter in this case was 
whether the ritual to be performed was a medical or a religious activity. 
If it was religious, that meant it was “heathen” and wrong for a Christian 
to take part in. But if its purpose was to heal him, did that excuse his 
participation? His village was the same as that of the aid post orderly 
(APO) who had come to work in Rauit. The APO told me the story 
(in Tokpisin). It presented problems for him. He, too, was a Christian 
and someone who owed his medical training to the evangelical mission, 
especially to the first missionary doctor there. The pastor became ill, the 
APO said, and no one could not find out what was wrong with him. He 
went to the Wewak and Lae hospitals for tests. The doctors there could 
not determine the cause, yet he continued to feel ill. He kept dream-
ing of fish and spirits of the dead, who said he must do a singsing. So, 
against his will, he said yes. His dreams predicted he would have diar-
rhea for three days after the ritual started, and the watery stools would 
remove the sickness from him. His main trouble had been pains in his 
belly and a feeling that his feet were going to take off and he would fly. 
This, said the APO, was what made the doctors at Lae concentrate on 
his previous motorbike accident and bangs to his head, even though he 
had not felt pain in his head at the time. When he returned to the vil-
lage, people held the singsing for him despite his reluctance. Some of 
the people in his village who were strong converts said it was wrong to 
hold the singsing, a sin God would see. Some of them left the village for 
the duration of the ritual (either in protest or to escape God’s wrath or 
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the mission’s disapproval). Soon after it started, the ill pastor had diar-
rhea and then felt better. Ever since then, he has danced in singsings 
and stays well. The APO pointed out to me that the singsing made him 
better (given the evidence of the prediction and the timing), so it was 
possible that bad spirits of the village made him ill. Furthermore, the 
doctors at Lae could find nothing. Perhaps the accident had harmed his 
brain, he said. Then, speaking for himself, the APO wondered what was 
right: he himself was a Christian, he believed God could see everything 
and everywhere, holding singsings was a pekato (sin), yet the pastor was 
a strong Christian and had prayed fervently. Why hadn’t God healed 
him? Why did he then get better with the singsing? I thought the APO 
was genuinely perplexed. But I was also aware of his ambiguous position 
toward me, a doctor, someone who knew the missionary doctor who had 
trained him. Was it calculated a little by what he thought I might tell 
the mission people?
Ten days later, I was going through the village where the singsing was 
still being held. A missionary Bible translator who had been working 
for years on Au, the language spoken in that village, had just come up 
the hillside to see the pastor who was healed. I found them sitting on 
the ground in the porch of the pastor’s house. They were talking in Au. I 
understood nothing, but afterward the linguist told me what was said: he 
had gone to see the pastor who, he heard, was deeply upset, conscience-
stricken about allowing the singsing to be performed for his illness. The 
pastor said he had allowed it only at the heavy insistence of his relatives, 
after all the investigations and much prayer. He told the linguist that he 
was annoyed the singsing was going on so long and that he had repeat-
edly urged them to end it. He had prayed until he was exhausted. Then 
his relatives from another village turned up to dance and he could not 
refuse them. While the singsing was going on, he said he could not lead 
or take part in any Christian services. He prayed but felt in the wrong.
From the linguist, I learned that his illness consisted in dizziness, 
ringing in the ears, feeling light-headed. It had been diagnosed as 
Menière’s syndrome. He also had migraine with visual aura. He was tak-
ing some pills prescribed by the doctor at Lae for his symptoms. But the 
pastor said they didn’t help; only the singsing did. On that day, he looked 
well, neatly dressed in a white shirt, clean shorts, boots and socks, and a 
wristwatch.
Later, however, he seemed different when he came to Rauit for a 
ceremony celebrating the birth of someone’s first child. I quote from my 
fieldnotes:
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He sits down to chat. They offer him the mash of yams, coconut and 
taro. No, he can’t eat that, tubers come from the ground. Then a lot 
of chat about all the things he cannot eat because of the singsing. All 
food that has an association with the ground, ground-living birds and 
animals, fish, even tinned fish: he speaks about these food avoidances 
as a committed believer. He told me he used to have belly cramps and 
pains after food, feel pins and needles running about his skin, his guts 
twisting and turning. You could hear them making noises like sago 
grubs inside the trunk of a palm. He felt unsteady on his legs, but 
things didn’t seem to turn round outside him. He had a small, high, 
ringing sound in his ears. Both the ringing and the dizziness have left 
him since the singsing. He intends to keep the food avoidances for a 
time and then try tiny amounts of the foods, waiting in case any of 
his symptoms come back. What strikes me now is his cheerful and 
sincere conviction that the singsing helped. In this setting, I would 
never guess at his perplexity or his pangs of conscience.
An unswerving commitment to one set of beliefs is the demand of 
monotheism, asserting the truth is single and exclusive. But local pat-
terns of belief in Rauit were not at all like that. In many cases, the stated 
belief was “Because that’s what everyone says” or “Because someone who 
knows says so.” If enough people said so, something might become the 
truth. For example, it was often hard to tell in advance the day on which 
a ceremony would happen, a hunt would take place, or a party would set 
out on a visit. One or two people might say, “Oh, yes, the day after to-
morrow,” yet the event would not happen then. But if many people said, 
“Yes, the day after tomorrow,” then it would happen. With scandalous 
gossip, the victim had to deny it quickly and vigorously, loudly and pub-
licly, before too many people gave it currency and credence. People might 
repeat something as if it were a fact when they had only heard a rumor. 
Would it be accepted or contradicted? Some of these assertions were 
actually surreptitious experiments or tests to see if, by trying them out, 
they would pass muster and take on a stronger status as the truth. How 
often does truth or fact turned out to be or to depend on what everyone 
accepts or says it is? As an explanation for belief, it is not so far from the 
analyses offered by Peter Winch (1970) or Thomas Kuhn (1970). One 
can believe many things without ever having to put them to any test. But 
that is not always the case with medical treatments. Treatment involves 
doing some action to remedy suffering, and the result might challenge 
expectations or the beliefs behind the action.
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Quesalid’s story: Of belief and doubts
Belief or disbelief in a treatment, a healer, or a remedy does not have to be 
fixed or certain; it is not a matter of an all-or-none commitment. Franz 
Boas recorded the story of a Northwest Coast shaman named Quesalid 
who began to have doubts about his treatments. The texts by Boas (Boas 
and Codere 1966: 120–48) on shamanism include personal accounts of 
the initiation and practice of Kwakiutl shamans, with a perceptive com-
mentary by Boas on reasons for shifts of belief in them. Quesalid’s story 
became well known when Lévi-Strauss used it in his essay (1963) on the 
nature of the sorcerer’s belief in his own magic. Boas knew Quesalid for 
over thirty years, and between 1897 and 1930, he recorded four accounts 
Quesalid gave him of the same events. Quesalid (Qaselid) was, in fact, 
George Hunt, Boas’s Kwakiutl friend, coauthor, and close collaborator. 
After Boas taught him to write, he wrote Kwakiutl texts for Boas as well 
as being, in the most literal sense, a participant observer and ethnog-
rapher of Kwakiutl life (Boas and Codere 1966: xxviii–xxxi). The texts 
provide direct insights into his personal beliefs and experiences. Boas 
discusses the shifts in Quesalid’s attitude to what had taken place at his 
initiation to become a shaman in 1870 or 1874. His beliefs in the theory 
and practice of shamanism reflected conflicting pressures on him: his 
identification with other shamans, his membership of a secret society, 
his own experience of “fainting fits,” the constraining authority of older 
shamans, then of missionaries, his fear of getting into trouble with the 
government if it found out about corpses being used, and a desire to 
show White people that he was critical about things in which he knew 
the Whites did not believe.
Boas notes the possibility of imagination and contradictory attitudes 
altering the recall of long past events—and Quesalid’s pride in Indig-
enous culture, his wish to impress Boas, and his perception of Boas’s 
interests. As to the flickering quality of Quesalid’s skepticism, which 
Lévi-Strauss brings out so well, Boas also discusses the brilliant develop-
ment of illusion and trickery in Kwakiutl ceremony and art. The winter 
ceremonial contained a profusion of spectacle and great ingenuity de-
voted to stage tricks, illusions of decapitation, trap doors through which 
monster spirits appeared and disappeared, and masks with second hid-
den faces. A society that values and competes in such arts of deception 
must encourage the skeptical spirit that is such a fascinating element in 
Quesalid’s story and that indeed runs through Boas’s whole account of 
shamanism, for instance, in the account of the “dreamers,” the “creatures 
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of the shamans” who are their “eyes” or their spies; the pretense of sick-
ness and dying through self-starvation; the theater of ecstasy; the arts 
of belly wobbling and jaw trembling; the trick of transforming a piece 
of quartz into a starfish; the illusion of sucking disease out of the body 
and showing the illness in the form of a bloody worm in the shaman’s 
hand; or the ability to vomit blood in public. But the shamans match 
these deceptive acts with the sincerity evident in many vivid personal 
accounts of dreams, visions, and experience of sickness and healing: Tle-
beet’s account of sickness and of being outside his body, when, he said, 
“I arose and saw my body lying on the ground groaning”; or the shaman 
affecting sickness with smallpox, coming back to consciousness, think-
ing that many wolves were near him and that two were lying by his side 
licking his body. “The principal inference to be drawn from these ac-
counts,” writes Boas, “is that notwithstanding the knowledge of fraud, a 
deep-seated belief in the supernatural power of shamanism persists, even 
among the sophisticated” (1966: 125).
Beliefs may shift over time. There are also blurred areas where it 
is hard to know whether someone means something literally or not. 
The treatment of illness is rich in the ambiguity of instrumental versus 
expressive action. Discussions of ritual and belief in magic have made 
these questions prominent (Beattie  l966; Horton  1967; Leach  1968; 
Skorupski 1976; Tambiah 1968). Consider another one of the Kwakiutl 
examples in Boas and Codere (1966: 360): If a woman is pregnant for 
the first time, she gathers four pebbles on the beach, which she puts 
under her garments. She lets them drop down and prays, “May I be 
like these!” She does this to secure an easy delivery. Boas argues there 
is no evidence (unless presumably she were to say so) that would show 
whether she is performing an act from which she thinks an easy birth 
follows as a necessary, causally determined result or whether she be-
lieves that the symbolic act is a prayer to a supernatural power resid-
ing in the stones or the act. The line between magic and religion, as 
these are distinguished by convention, is fluid. “It is not even the same 
for all individuals in the same society. For some, the relation between 
two happenings may be purely mechanical; for others, it may have a 
religious significance” (1966: 162). He then points out that the Kwak-
iutl use medicinal plants with healing properties that have been dis-
covered through careful observation. Nevertheless, they make prayers 
to these plants, which gives them a religious connotation. They imply 
that the plant becomes efficacious on account of the prayer addressed 
to the plant. When used without the prayer or any other indication that 
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supernatural powers are involved, the act would be analogous to one 
based on experience. He gives a parallel:
The difficulty of drawing a clear line between causally determined and 
magically determined may perhaps be illustrated by an example. If, in 
doing some woodwork, someone spoils his work repeatedly when us-
ing particular knife, he may say, “That is an unlucky knife” and refuse 
to use it. The word “unlucky” implies, no matter how weakly, an un-
controllable “supernatural” power. If he should take it up some other 
day and say to it, “I hope this time you will behave better,” it may be 
merely a linguistic form, but it may also imply the idea that on ac-
count of his expressed wish (or prayer) it will be more willing to obey 
his hand. I feel certain that a clear distinction between happenings 
whose interrelation is understood purely as those of cause and effect 
and others that imply or express explicitly the presence of something 
supernatural cannot be sharply drawn. (Boas and Codere 1966: 162)
An effect? What did they really think?
In certain treatments, the Gnau extract arrows shot into people, but the 
arrows are not all of the same kind. Surely they must see some difference 
between symbolic surgery and literal surgery; it is implausible to suppose 
that they consider all kinds of treatment to be similar in principle. There 
are three kinds: (A) I described Pauwarak’s and Maisu’s attempts to re-
move “arrows” (sigap) from Maka (see chapter 2). They did it in a careful 
but prosaic way (even though at the same time the procedure looked like 
a bit of “magic”). They both seemed to have had trouble finding any of 
the arrow points after the extractions and were not sure whether they 
had got any in the end. The “arrows” they looked for were tiny spicules 
that could easily be confused with fibrous shreds or splinters in the dust 
where they searched. A skeptic might say that they could easily find what 
they were looking for in the dirt, that the mixture of selective attention, 
expectation, and error would meet no difficulties here in sustaining belief 
( Jahoda  1970: 33–52). (B) I also witnessed the successful removal of 
larger minmin sorcery “arrow points” from Maka a few months later—
the largest was about four centimeters long, made of white wood, and 
looked like bone. The man spat it out with what looked like a gout of 
blood into a half-coconut shell filled with water (he had been chewing 
betel before he did the extraction). (C), there were still a number of men 
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in the village who had been wounded in fighting in the past and had had 
arrows cut out from their wounds; they could describe doing such sur-
gery or having it done to them. Some of the arrows they made had tips 
designed to break off in a wound. Similar methods were sometimes used 
to remove splinters embedded in someone’s foot or hand.
The three kinds of arrow removal suggest that those removing the 
arrows would take different positions on the question of the match be-
tween what they are actually doing, what it looks as if they are doing, and 
what they say they are doing. Gnau do talk among themselves about 
fraud and sleight of hand, and they say that some people produce ar-
rows by tricks but some are genuine. It is easier to imagine the actors in 
(A) doing the extraction with complete sincerity and conviction than 
in (B), where the size of the arrows extracted makes it much harder to 
believe. It is also difficult to challenge people directly about the sincerity 
of their actions without appearing to suspect them of fraud or tricks. As 
Boas’s commentary on Quesalid’s accounts made plain, even when you 
know someone well and imagine you have put the question tactfully, the 
answers may leave you wondering how far they said what they really 
thought. From her fieldwork in China, Emily Ahern (1979) noted how 
magic and medical treatments are often not practiced with the certainty 
they will work; the attitude of mind in doing them may be like that of 
a supplicant or a petitioner and may range from wishing and hoping 
to expecting, requesting, or imploring, even to commanding—there is a 
whole spectrum there. She likens some of the Chinese attitudes to those 
they take in their dealings with officials, bureaucracy, and legal institu-
tions. She suggests that these gave them experience of the uncertainty 
of desired outcomes and models for ways to express hope and to seek 
attention and help from superiors. Belief in the efficacy of petitions is 
not something one would normally think of characterizing in terms of 
“literal” or “symbolic,” binary terms that seem inappropriate.
Questions about sincerity of belief become more insistent with ac-
counts like that given to W. Lloyd Warner by a Murngin Aboriginal 
sorcerer:
Her large intestine protruded as though it were red calico. I covered 
my arm with orchid juice. . . . Little by little I got my hand inside her. 
Finally I touched her heart. I pushed the killing stick with my thumb 
up over the palm, which pressed the stick against my fingers into her 
heart. . . . I turned her over, her large intestine stuck out several feet. I 
shook some green ants on it. It went in some little way. I shook some 
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more on and a little receded. I shook some more, and all of it went 
in. Everything was all right now. There was no trace of the wound. 
(Warner 1937: 199–200)
What kind of surgery is this? Could I have been the man who said 
that? What conceivable experiences could lead me to tell such things 
and believe them? Were they fabrications or fantasies? It is striking that 
surgery in the imagination could be so vividly described and so ambi-
tious when surgery was in fact so rare and limited.
Introspection tells us that belief in a treatment is quite often in an 
inconstant state. Interests and emotions may affect it, so it is inappropri-
ate to pose the issues solely in cognitive terms. Belief implies an attitude 
toward what someone asserts. Our very use of the word “belief ” rather 
than “knowledge” to describe what people think suggests the stance we 
take toward what they say: a stance of doubt or disbelief.
Compliance? Or the rejection of advice?
In the changing medical situation of the Sepik over the course of my 
research in 1968–69, 1975, and 1985, the introduction of new treatments 
brought forward various problems of trust and compliance. Compliance 
can, of course, at times be an issue with respect to medical advice any-
where, and the issues range from ignoring relatively trivial matters to 
rejecting necessary treatment, even to being forced to comply.
The problem for the public health authorities in New Guinea con-
cerned the long-term treatment for people with leprosy. In chapter 5, I 
mentioned how the earlier segregation policy for lepers blighted the life 
of the first man in Rauit to show signs of lepromatous leprosy. He was 
sent to prison for absconding from the hospital, then sent far away for 
treatment when he absconded again. He was newly married in 1968; his 
wife had no children and, in his absence, had an affair with his brother. 
This led to much family misery, fights, and punishment for other people 
as well. The local hospital was originally set up with a separate ward 
for lepers (according to government public health requirements, which 
were later revoked). By 1985, the health center was no longer manned 
by a resident doctor, and a missionary nun, a nurse specialized in lep-
rosy, came to take charge of the services for leprosy and tuberculosis. The 
segregation policy had long been ended. Concerning compliance with 
leprosy treatments, opinions differed, as my notes attested:
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The Nurse: The specialist nurse at the Leprosy Mission said that P. 
[the patient in question] was not taking his treatment. He should be 
on three drugs because of the high risk of bacterial resistance, given his 
long history of intermittent treatment. He didn’t come for his check-
ups. When he did come, she said, he was perfectly friendly, they got on 
well, joked together. But he was quite unreliable and she didn’t believe 
he took his drugs. He hadn’t come for months. She doubts whether 
anyone in the village is taking their leprosy treatment as they should. 
They are certainly not coming to follow-up appointments nor have 
they come to get further supplies of dapsone [the drug used] at the 
right times. P. [with his lepromatous leprosy] is a real hazard to others 
in the village. What can she do? He won’t listen. They won’t listen.
The Aid Post Orderly (APO): The APO in this village is someone 
of considerable reputation in the subdistrict; he was once the health 
education orderly for the area. When he had that job, he did a lot of 
patrolling, explaining about leprosy and finding cases. The aid post 
work he has now is not arduous the way he does it. He has known P. 
for years—since P.’s childhood—and he first spotted and diagnosed 
his leprosy. Years ago, he also had to report him to the kiap [govern-
ment patrol officer] when he absconded and would not follow the 
treatment. He says he has talked and talked to P. in the past. He can’t 
get him to take the treatment now. Telling him about how it spreads 
to others has no effect. P. has been taking the drugs for so many years 
and can’t see the point of still going on with them. He no longer cares 
about getting sores and injuries. It’s true that people with leprosy 
should come to the APO to get their fresh supplies of dapsone, but 
not many do. He’s fed up with telling people to do so. He lists the 
people who have come regularly and those who have completed their 
course of treatment. Most others have taken only part of the course 
of treatment; they have pills moldering in their houses. He leaves it 
up to them now. The sister [the Leprosy Mission nurse] gives them 
three- or four-month appointments, but they don’t go. They are bikhet 
[uncooperative, obstinate, they do as they like]. I asked what hap-
pened if they didn’t go. Nothing, it’s not like before, they can’t call 
the kiap and get him to send a policeman. When he was doing the 
health education and leprosy work, he [the APO] used to go around 
to find people who were defaulting on treatment or absconding. But 
the leprosy control people can’t do it all the time. Now really the only 
thing the sister can do is to ask the village kaunsil [councilor] or his 




A Young Man in the Village: A number of the people I questioned 
about completing treatment said they had been told to stop because 
they had finished; that did not fit with the impression I got from the 
sister. Other people commented on P. and his treatment (but only be-
cause I asked). One young man said most people took the medicine 
for leprosy for a while and then threw it away but told the nursing 
sister they were taking it, or else they didn’t go back. The older people 
felt they needn’t bother because they would die anyway and clear off 
that way. I asked who really felt like that and he cited P.’s aged moth-
er, who in fact had suffered from leprosy, too, but had died for other 
reasons. But, I said, that cannot be true of Delen [the other man 
who has lepromatous leprosy]. The young man spoke more seriously 
now. People like Delen think they have eaten the medicine, they can’t 
feel anything wrong, so they think it must be enough and they stop. 
Or they look at their skin, think the lesions are not significant, and 
wonder why they should bother about them. Infected sores are worse.
The Patients: Delen is a calm, dependable man in his mid-forties. 
I know him quite well. I broached the topic of his treatment with 
him. He said he takes them as he was told to. He put his hand into 
his bilum [string bag] and brought out the tin of dapsone to show it 
to me. I had been there for five weeks; I just happened to ask him 
that morning. He says he takes them and has more in his house. His 
manner is unbothered. I can’t see why I should disbelieve him; I have 
no grounds to doubt his word.
As for the patient P., I didn’t see him for nearly two months after 
my return in 1985. He lives in the hamlet most distant from the 
main village, and he had shifted his house to an outlier of the hamlet. 
For most of the time, he had been quite far away from the village at 
a bush site, Saikel. So I didn’t see him until a day on which most of 
the village gathered for a boy’s puberty ceremony. P. and his brothers 
arrived late, when there was a crowd already gathered in the warkao 
[the day house where people gather] (Fig. 30). P. came in discreetly 
and sat at the back of the warkao on a garamut [slit gong] (Fig. 31). 
I did not speak to him at first, partly because I was involved in con-
versation, partly because I wanted to see whether he would make a 
move. He saw me stare at him from time to time. He couldn’t have 
supposed I didn’t recognize him. Then, after half an hour, I got up 
and pushed through to speak to him—a very public move, given the 
crowd. I sat down beside him on the garamut. He smiled. I asked how 
he was. He said he was well and that he had been staying at Saikel. 
Can you do everything you want to? I asked. Yes, I can hold a bow 
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and arrow, I can shoot. Can you do gardening? Yes. How about your 
hands and feet? (He was wearing plastic sandals to protect his dam-
aged feet.) He showed me his hands and feet, he said they were all 
right. How could he go up and down steep slopes with those sandals? 
He said he takes them off on steep slopes. Abruptly, unfairly, I asked 
about his medicine. He said he is taking it, he has four bottles for four 
months’ supply and takes the pills every evening before sleep.
Since my visit in 1975, he had stayed in the village and did not 
want to have to leave it again. We talked a bit about when I had been 
there before. He cheered up, especially when recalling the dispute 
over the Saikel bush, how old W. nearly got speared. I told him he 
ought to make sure he saw the nurse sister regularly about his treat-
ment so that she was clear he was taking it. He had depigmented 
scars on one elbow, which I think are from burns. His hands were 
obviously affected, with right little and ring fingers deformed and 
clawed from contractures. His appearance showed his disease more 
obviously than before: thickening of his eyebrow ridges, no eyebrows, 
fleshy ear lobes. His eyes look all right. His toes are damaged, with 
the loss of part of one. I didn’t try to examine him. This was what I 
could see as we talked.
One important factor behind what people do is the information they 
have, the nature and sources of that information, and how they evaluate 
it. The following episode gave me a little insight into these matters:
A Shrewd Observer: I am sitting by a garden in the bush called 
Namelim with Tilpetau, a man in his early thirties. His wife died 
some weeks before in the hospital at Vanimo on the coast; she had 
been sent there from the local health center. Her death is a calam-
ity for him and their two children. Tilpetau, looking through his 
bilum, takes something out, wordlessly holds it up for me to see, 
as if challenging me to guess, just as he did before with his wife’s 
family-planning card. This one is also a crumpled card. It states that 
he is on dapsone, 100 mg a day, and it has a note saying, “for sandals 
and gris.” What is the card for? I ask. It is because of the holes in his 
feet, he says, and shows them to me—hard to see them on the soles 
of his feet, about four tiny punched-out holes, approximately 3 mil-
limeters in diameter. They hurt on strong pressure. Yes, he knows it 
is a sik lepro card. They gave him medicine to take every day because 
other people in the village have sik lepro, but he doesn’t have it. The 
medicine he has is “for something else” (beiya menamdem), it is for 
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Figure 29. Visitors who have come for a ceremony rest in the warkao day house. 
The man seen standing has brought a set of bow and arrows destined as an ini-
tiation gift for his sister’s son.
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Figure 30. A log slit gong used to accompany ritual dances and funerals and to 
signal to people in other villages or distant gardens. This slit gong is housed in a 
lineage’s day house, but most lineages keep them in their men’s house.
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his feet. He took it for a while. He still has a lot left, but he hasn’t 
been taking it since he went to the hospital at Vanimo with his wife. 
He only started it at the time his wife was ill in the health center. 
What he was taking, he said, is not the same as the “big medicine” 
they take for sik lepro, because that kind they eat on Mondays and 
Thursdays. Yes, he knows they say he has leprosy, but he does not 
believe them; what he has is not serious. The only serious cases in 
the village now are P. and Delen. He points out to me that he doesn’t 
have any skin marks, not the kind that involves a loss of feeling, and 
he hasn’t swollen up anywhere. He just has these holes on his feet. 
But he wants to get the plastic sandals. So do a number of men in 
the village.
I was struck by the way he didn’t reveal at first how much he knew 
about leprosy: about the other (two-day) treatment schedule he had 
observed at the health center (a multiple drug treatment to stave off 
resistance to dapsone), his conclusions about the types and severity of 
the disease. He and other villagers make a clear distinction between 
the kind of illness P. and Delen have and the other sik lepro, which is 
what most people diagnosed have. This is the tuberculoid type, which 
shows up as painless marks on the skin. In the views of one young 
man, “People don’t think leprosy is serious. It is not a bad disease in 
the sense that you could die from it. Leprosy is wuyinda [good, mild 
in quality], the signs are just marks, they don’t harm or incapacitate 
you. People don’t believe what the health education people tell them. 
What those people tell them or show them in the pictures isn’t what 
they have.” The skin lesions that villagers see look much like other 
skin troubles they know well: gapati watelila or gadu’et wanu’en, which 
are benign fungal infections. They are used to putting up with grili 
(an unpleasant fungal disease). Leprosy doesn’t even itch or hurt or 
smell or scale off. Scabies, infected sores, abscesses, and wounds are 
worse. The swelling kind of leprosy, the kind P. and Delen have, is 
different. People might die from it. The villagers have expanded the 
category to include some quite different serious illnesses, ones ac-
companied by painless swelling of limbs, face, or body, which they 
suppose are true cases of sik lepro.
On the one hand, there are the villagers’ doubts that people diag-
nosed with leprosy really have a serious disease. On the other, there is 
the nurse sister’s conviction that the villagers are not taking treatment, 
that the main fault lies with them. When I followed up answers from 
some of the villagers who said they had been told to stop their treat-
ment, I found they were right. The cards kept by the sister showed 
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that in 1978 and 1983, a number of them had at some point been 
told to discontinue treatment. The diagnostic questions are medical 
matters. The health authorities may have misconceptions about the 
patients’ extent of defection and apathy about treatment. But when 
villagers express some doubts about the seriousness of what disease 
they have, even about whether they have real leprosy, I think they are 
sometimes right.
Response to innovation
Leprosy stands out as an example of a disease for which the people of 
Rauit did not ask for treatment; it was imposed or brought to them. 
With leprosy, compliance was a matter of persuasion; in the past, it was 
something closer to enforcement for someone with lepromatous leprosy. 
The call for treatment came from the providers (the public health service 
officials), not the recipients, who were passive or simply tolerant. Ini-
tially, they were unaware of the diagnosis, and many are still unconvinced 
of its seriousness. If they really believed in the benefits of treatment, they 
would act differently. They complied willingly with griseofulvin treat-
ments for grille, a disfiguring fungal skin disease.
Just about everyone in the village knew that the aid post had a white 
powder (procaine penicillin), which was meant to be dissolved for injec-
tions, could be sprinkled directly onto an infected cut or sore to clear 
it up quickly. When the APO was not looking, adults and children 
would surreptitiously pick up half-used vials. They kept them bilong was 
tasol—that is, “just in case” they might need it. The APO said he knew 
they should not put the penicillin powder directly on sores; he knew 
about resistance and skin reactions. And he said all this with his broth-
er-in-law’s twelve-year-old son sitting on a bench beside him in the aid 
post, wearing nothing and clutching two half-used penicillin vials in his 
hand. He had just snatched them for his father. This use of penicillin 
was an innovative misuse of the penicillin powder; they observed that it 
worked well. Someone must have experimented first. It seemed suitable 
to them because it was so like their former use of silt or termite dust to 
dry up cuts quickly. It was also like the sprinkling of lime or kaona lime 
on cuts.
But any long-term treatment, as with leprosy, is liable to put its own 
merits in doubt because of the delay in improvement and lack of obvi-
ous results. In Rauit, the time between any treatment (cause) and an 
Pandora’s box
260
improvement (effect) was expected to be short. The longer the time gap, 
the less likely they were to consider a treatment effective. They did not 
see that some forms of treatment take a long time to work. The need to 
continue with a repeated treatment undermined belief in its value. There 
was scant chance that someone diagnosed with leprosy would complete 
a full course of treatment.
When health patrols justified the need for treatment of leprosy, they 
did it by referring to the dangers of future harm to the infected person 
and of spreading it to others. But it is notoriously difficult to convince 
people that something worse in the future has been stopped from hap-
pening. Leprosy was new to the villagers. They were told they might 
spread the disease to their children and family through “germs.” But 
germs were not visible. The idea of germs (jiem in Tokpisin) had already 
taken strong root in relation to some illnesses, though not to sik lepro, ex-
cept for the bad swelling sort. The ideas they now learned about infection 
and contagion—that invisible agents can make an illness pass or jump 
from one person to another—were familiar. The new agents of illness, 
jiem, behaved rather like their own spirits.
With something common like infected cuts and sores, villagers knew 
what to expect and could assess the benefits of a new treatment. Patrol 
officers, missionaries, and health patrols had advised or ordered them 
to dig latrines, to improve their water supplies, to dispose of corpses 
through burial because, as they kept saying, flies and germs spread dis-
eases. But the villagers had always had rules of their own about wash-
ing, hygiene, and food, as well as ones for the disposal of excrement 
and rubbish. Yet they often seemed to neglect scabies and sores. They 
acknowledged that bandages and penicillin injections made infected 
sores better. Flies settled on open sores; dressings kept them off. Their 
traditional leaf bandages and bark dressings were rarely to be seen by 
1985. The new dressings from the aid post had displaced them, but 
the villagers had to depend on the staff for them. They had become 
less self-sufficient. Whether someone sought treatment depended on 
its availability and distance. But the common reason they gave for ne-
glect was that most sores got better anyway. They were used to putting 
up with them; the aid post had only been there for a few years and 
was not always staffed. The neglect was a kind of learned tolerance. At 
the distant hunting camps where people would stay for two weeks or 
more, traditional methods for treating sores were occasionally used. I 
watched the grandfather of two young girls make a mixture of yellow 
sap, crushed vine creeper, and lime to put on their sores. Most children 
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were used to putting up with flies, scabs, and pain—but they did not 
have much choice.
*     *     *
If the definition of health goes beyond the mere absence of recognizable 
diseases, as it does in most conceptions, it is associated with social values 
and personal ideals. Ideals for health cannot be comprehensively defined 
except by taking values into account. Many of the choices and answers 
must lie with the community and individual conscience. In some way, 
every society has made care of the sick a collective responsibility and 
not left it solely to the individual. In Gnau, there is no word meaning 
“disease” in general, but there is a verb for saying “he is sick” (neyigeg), 
which can be used for any state of illness. It is a form related to the word 
neyig, meaning “he will die” (G. Lewis 1975: 136–39). The added syl-
lable seems to modify the meaning rather than intensify it. I learned its 
meaning of being sick without noticing or realizing the morphological 
connection with “to die.” Yet years before, Rivers (1924: 4–5) had de-
fined medicine as: “Practices by which man seeks to direct and control 
a specific group of natural phenomena . . . affecting man himself which 
lower his vitality and tend toward death.” This referred to the phenom-
ena we call morbid. The very word for being sick in Gnau pointed to its 
connection with death. One chief object of Rivers’s book was to discover 
the nature of the concept of disease among those who fail to distinguish 
medicine from magic and religion and the steps by which medicine has 
become differentiated from other institutions and acquired independent 
existence. There were many peoples, like the Melanesians he studied, for 
whom medicine, magic, and religion were so closely intertwined that 
disentangling each from the rest was difficult or impossible. He gave 
preeminent importance to
the great mystery of death as the most important motive in the de-
velopment of the religion of mankind, the connexion of religion with 
the art designed to meet disease, the harbinger of death, would have 
seemed especially natural. .  .  . That running through the history of 
mankind there has been in action a process of specialization of social 
function stands beyond all doubt, and I should have been keeping 
strictly within the truth in regarding the increasing distinction of 




In biology, an organ is said to be specialized when, although it is ef-
ficient in one respect, it lacks the capacity to perform other functions 
that are satisfactorily performed by similar organs in other animals. The 
differentiation of medicine from its initial confusion with magic and 
religion did not easily take place. Criteria of medical progress are now 
largely set by medical specialists. But the experience of illness and the 
practice of medicine are hard to separate completely from religious and 
moral values. We are too quick to take our present medical system and 
practices as the standard by which to judge progress in treatments. If 
we extrapolate from the notion that specialization involves the loss of 
capacity to perform other functions that were satisfactorily performed by 
comparable entities elsewhere, we have grounds for taking an interest in 
other people’s ways to care for the sick. Medicine is concerned not just 
with life expectancy and population statistics but also more directly with 
the illnesses of individuals and with providing care for their suffering. As 
Rivers wrote, “I believe that there are now becoming apparent in many 
departments of social life (I recognise it especially in that of science), in-
dications that specialization can be carried too far, and that with further 
advance we may come again to those close interrelations between the 
different aspects of human culture which are characteristic of its earlier 
stages” (1924: 115). In the final analysis, this may offer a justification for 
the comparative study of medicine in different societies, not just focus-
ing on our own.
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appendix
Transcription of Milek’s healing
This treatment was recorded on June 9, 1969, in the middle of my first 
fieldwork visit among the Gnau. The patient, a middle-aged woman 
named Milek, had been ill for about ten days with a fever, malaise, vague 
backache, and some discomfort on passing urine. For these symptoms, 
she had already received several treatments: one to counter a spell, a 
treatment from me, and a small version of Panu’et. Since these afforded 
her no relief, a large version of the Panu’et healing rite was held four days 
later, from which this translated transcript comes. The transcript starts 
in the second act, back in the hamlet of Watalu, when the junior men 
are preparing the face, painting it, and decorating the image under the 
supervision of the senior men. Their concern to do it well—in the sense 
both of doing it correctly and of doing it beautifully—appears in many 
comments, teasing, and criticism. For the treatment to be effective, they 
must please the spirit, they say; otherwise, there is a risk of it doing more 
harm. Another feature of this section is the high number of instructions 
contained in the comments and criticism. There is a continual barrage 
of banter, prompting, reiteration, and rhetoric in which all the senior 
men seem to want to have their say. Many of their statements involve 
instructions about technical details of what to get or what to do, many 
of which are contradicted by competing instructions. Reasons for doing 
something and snippets of information are scattered throughout their 
discussions. Things are done in the wrong order and corrected, opinions 
are loudly asserted and contested. It is a way of learning. It is lively, a bit 
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chaotic. There is no reason to expect that the details they argue about 
here (for example, the position of the pig tusks) will come up for dispute 
next time. The translation below preserves the continuity of the record-
ing. It is a full translation (I have cut out only a few asides.) I think the 
way they talk and comment gives insight into the style and mood of the 
ritual performance as well as revealing directly how they express their 
ideas. It is the text of an event.
Cast of characters
From Watalu Hamlet
Milek—the patient, a woman about fifty years old
Purkiten—Milek’s husband
Maluna









Wives and children (not much is heard from them in the recording)
Other men (only those with something to say in the transcript are 
listed)
From Wimalu Hamlet
Silmai—Milek’s “brother,” collateral line, former tultul [assistant to 
the headman]
Marki—Milek’s full brother, older than she is
Maitata—a younger man, married to Milek’s step-daughter (i.e., 
Purkiten’s daughter by a previous wife who had died)
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From Pakuag Hamlet
Dauwanin—Milek’s eldest daughter, wife of Galwun
Galwun—Dauwanin’s husband, Milek’s son-in-law
Others
Maisu—a senior man from Dagetasa Hamlet, of the same lineage 
as Galwun
Dauwaras—younger married man, from Bi’ip Hamlet, of the same 
clan as Purkiten
Wani—father of Dauwaras
Preparations for the performance: Painting the image’s face
Silmai: You think it’s like the nimbalgut nut pattern. The line should 
go down like this, then make it go up, like this. Then around and 
along like this—there! Draw it like that and up—here . . .
Marki: Get a betel nut for her. I’ll prepare it for when she has to spit 
in front of it. (This is done to identify herself to the spirit Panu’et.)
Silmai: Bring me the stuff. We’ve got to do the face, decorate it, and 
put the spells into it.
Matupin: Do the jaw line—down and then going up.
Waleka: Do the jaw line, then draw the face for me.
Walei: See if there’s some water. Isn’t there some poured out for do-
ing the painting?
Silmai: Draw the line straight down the middle for the nose. Right. 
Now go on down until it joins the jaw line. .  .  . There! That’s 
enough for the jaw. Give us some more [paint] for the eyes, both 
sides. Enough. That one goes down there. That one turns and goes 
up there. He’s brought a [sago-palm] leaf base for painting on.
Dauwaras: No, no, I came alone. The leaf base was too slippery-
surfaced, so we put breadfruit sap on it so we could paint on it (the 
sap serves as a primer).
Marki: Dauwanin, bring some betel so I can get it ready.
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Purkiten: And some ash salt. And bring some ginger. For spitting 
over the things.
Marki: Like that. Carefully now. Will you need two betel nuts 
prepared?
Maluna: Just split one. What would you want two for? There’s some 
of the Eagle wood (to be added to the geplagep herb scrapings). You 
should take some and put plenty in so that the betel has some 
kick. To give spice to the ash salt.
Purkiten: Dauwanin, get them some water.
Galwun: Hurry up.
Purkiten: Pour it over the ginger.
Dauwaras: Break off some of it. Cut some cordyline.
(They need the cordyline to make a stiff sort of paintbrush out of its stalk. 
Purkiten and Marki pound geplagep herbs to mix with the ginger and 
ash salt. Later, they mix these into the wa’agep soup mixture, which 
they have partially cooked in the garden, where they added beetle grubs 
to the mixture.)
Maluna: Cut some cordyline and bring them at the same time. 
Fetch a leaf so we can cut it. . . . Make the line, one side like that 
and the other like this, so they come together. (He makes a wedge 
shape like the fork of a tree to indicate the line of the jaw.)
Wultu: He’s tearing it off at the stalk, he’s tearing the stalk off.
Maluna: That’s right—the stalk.
Waleka: Hold it up and I’ll tear it off.
Walei: No, you hold it and pull. Yaopei, get a knife!
Wultu: Keep the stalk with it.
Waleka: He’s messing it up.
Walei: Look, it’s so small!
Maluna: Get some ash salt for mixing with the stuff. Quick, get the 
betel ready. Quickly now!
Wultu: Split the betel. Oh! Look, the sprout is coming out from the 
side.
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Kantyi (a brother of Maluna): I think you should get a big bowl to 
do a lot of ginger.
Maluna: Go on, get a bowl.
Wultu: Here’s a big one. Tultul (addressing Silmai by the title of his 
former office), break one off, but don’t tear the stalk.
Dauwaras: Here, try this cordyline. Don’t pull the top off.
Wultu: Carefully, pull it carefully. The stalk—ei! It broke!
Waleka: This man is doing it wrong and messing it up.
Wisuk: Yaopei, the knife!
Wultu: We don’t need it, we’ll tear it off.
Maluna: You bring some salt to mix in with this, and hurry up with 
getting the betel nut ready.
Kantyi: I said I think you should get a big bowl and pour out plenty 
of water so it can take a lot of ginger.
Maluna: Aren’t they asking for a bowl?
Wultu: Here’s a big one. Tultul, tear one off. Tear it but don’t break 
the stalk.
Dauwaras: Go and get a cordyline, but don’t break off its shoot.
Wultu: Careful, careful now. Don’t break the stalk.
Maluna: Come on, get the [white paint] marks painted on.
Waleka: Aiik, no! I just splotched them on it, they’re much too big!
Wultu: They’re just marks, it doesn’t matter if they’re big.
Dauwaras: Why didn’t they finish painting the face much earlier?
Maluna: Ah! Now take the bowl and put the stuff in it, they’ll add 
the wood herb scrapings to it.
Silmai: Hey! Give me some of the ash salt here to mix in with the 
paint here so it comes up bright—it won’t without it.
Maluna: Haven’t you got any yet? Haven’t they brought you any?
Marki: Go get some, bring it here!
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Wultu: Here’s some coming now. Try it and see if it’s enough.
Waleka: We painted it too wet. Now it won’t come up bright white. 
(He means it will not dry in time, which is necessary for it to turn 
bright white.)
Marki: Fetch some water. Can’t they hurry up with the water?
Waleka: I did those marks . . .
Walei: They are awful. And it [the spirit]? No! It will go barging 
into everyone! (He implies that the spirit will be displeased by the bad 
painting and therefore hurt someone.)
Galwun: Bring us some water.
Walei: Do the painting your way and bring me my nettles. (The net-
tles will be fixed on the base and later rubbed on the patient as part of 
the treatment.)
Silmai: What’s going on? They said they could do it and now look. 
. . . And that cordyline—what’s that for? You lot, you keep laugh-
ing and mucking about. Go on like that and you’ll mess it up.
Dauwaras: You’ve brought an awful lot [of ash? Ginger?]. You 
should have brought just a little. Maybe it’ll be all right. Why on 
earth did you think of bringing so much?
Unidentified man: Because Father said to.
Maluna (sees a bold toddler, Takun, wandering up too close): Who’s 
this? Off you go!
Silmai: Let’s get on with it. Quick now, quickly. Daylight is leav-
ing. And it [Panu’et] will go off, stand on the path, turn around, 
and come back. It will come strike some woman or child. It will 
overshadow [and do harm through] something belonging to you.
Walei: Paint the marks on the face for us.
Silmai: I thought you’d already done them a lot earlier to put them 
in the sun so they would come out well.
Dauwanin (calling to them): Give me a bit of ash salt. You’ve got 
more than enough betel pepper catkins there.
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Purkiten (replying to his daughter): The betel pepper catkins are over 
there.
Walei: Do you mean the head, we should do it like that? Look, 
should we do it like that for the head and then, for the face, like 
this? You must finish it.
Marki: And the eyes, each side.
Silmai: You people didn’t learn how to do the mynah-bird–type 
painting on the face until just yesterday. Well, you didn’t know my 
mynah-bird version. (Silmai’s version is named after the triangular 
markings on the head of the golden mynah bird, called gapati gugalen 
in Gnau, a noisy occupant of trees around their gardens.)
Walei: You put the little shells in (to resemble to image’s ears) and then 
you do the mynah-bird–shaped face.
Silmai: You lot don’t know how to do it, so you’ve drawn it badly.
Maitata: Those bits should be like this . . .
Wisuk (a small boy): Like shit. (He throws in his comment, speaking 
close to the microphone.)
Marki: Bring a little salt, some salt (added for making the paint).
Purkiten: Dauwanin, bring some salt!
Yaopei and Marki (both shouting): Dauwanin! Bring a little salt!
Walei: Bring a lot so it will “bite” and the color will come up bright. 
The ears, the curly spirals—come on, paint them on well.
Waleka: The older brother—he’s just taken the stuff I was using. 
Where’s he gone to?
Wultu: There, they’ve painted the ears. That’s done. Now put the dots 
along the lines of the jaws, along the cheeks on each side—just 
follow the line there. That’s it. Hey! That’s really good! Beautiful!
Another small boy (speaking to Dauwaras to tattle on another boy): 
He just stepped over you! Couldn’t he bother to walk round you? 
He rushed past. He wanted to play. (The boy violated a rule forbid-
ding people from stepping over each other; they parallel some of the 
other rules of precedence.)
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Dauwanin: Where has the ash salt gone?
Galwun: Look out, there’s mud there. .  .  . Get me the jaw so the 
marks can fit along the jaw.
Silmai: Get a move on, hurry up, you lot there! Look, night is falling, 
it’s coming soon.
Wultu: Night? Already? He’s painting it as fast as he can so the 
spirit can go off back into the bush.
Maitata (commenting on the painting): That squashed-up face—
that’s just right.
Walei: Panu’et will spy out the lay of the bush, ready to go along 
a bad path. (The reference is to the spirit leaving when it is sent off 
through wild bush, maybe going where they want to send it but by 
its own path. They call it “a bad path,” meaning going cross-country 
through rough terrain.)
Waleka: Go on now. Paint the marks on already so it can leave by 
the bad path.
Silmai: Are you lot ever going to do it? I could do it all by myself. 
Ha! The frogs have started piping (this is the signal of evening fall-
ing). Get on with it, quick!
Waleka: Go carefully with the painting.
Marki: When they’ve got it all ready, the others must come and stand 
and watch while we get Panu’et to treat her—someone to stand 
with the nettle ready to sting her, ready holding the leaf.
(Marki, like many other men, keeps repeating bits of procedural instruc-
tions that everyone already knows, something that will become obvious 
from the rest of the transcript. It is a notable feature of any public gath-
ering, a litany of prompting and reiterating what should come next. 
Silmai’s comments about night falling are false alarms; they are meant 
to hurry them up; no one takes them seriously. They still had about two 
hours or more to go before nightfall.)
Decorating the figure
(The next part has mainly to do with putting on the decorations, shells of 
different sorts, and a pig tusk nose ornament.)
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Waleka: Bring the pig tusks.
Maisu: Now, stick them through ready. .  .  . Hey! What are they 
pointing down for? Put them in pointing up.
Walei: There? But that’s the neck. He’s crazy!
Silmai: Ahh, just like that, that’s it.
Marki (teasing Waleka, who is fixing them on the Panu’et image): Don’t 
you know anything? Is this the first time you’ve come? I even 
know your version and how to do it. Doesn’t he even know the 
way his own ancestors did it?
Maluna (catches sight of little Takun again): Hey, Takun, off you go!
Waleka: I don’t know the way he does it.
Marki (to Walei about Waleka): Why don’t you—you’re his cross-
cousin—tell him how to do it?
Maluna: Takun, off you go!
Marki: If things go on like this, when these men die, who will be 
around to tell you how to do them? You won’t know how. Well, 
maybe it doesn’t matter. Maybe just leave it.
Waleka: His way? No!
(Someone whistles, meaning “Shut up, keep quiet!” Someone else brings 
bamboo tubes containing shell and feather ornaments. They were stored 
in the thatch of a roof, so the ornaments got dirty.)
Marki: These are dirty. Go and wash them so they are ready.
Purkiten: Even if you wash them, is that going to make them good? 
When you put them away, the rats will get back to work and make 
their nests there.
Maisu: You, young men there, eating things you shouldn’t be! You’ll 
be lying asleep in the house there, with dirt and rat shit falling on 
you. You’ll get sick!
Maluna: Go and fetch a tekanik shell string (referring to a woven 
string loop with small shells sewn on it). Bring it quickly!
Walei: Wut! He’s gone and pulled too hard! It’s cut through.
Maluna: Go fetch a tekanik, there’s one left.
Pandora’s box
272
Dauwaras: If some are left, bring them here. . . . Not like that! Fasten 
them on the chest in front.
Silmai (spitting to clear his mouth): There. And put them on the neck. 
Bring me our tekanik to hang them on the ears, both sides.
Maisu: No! Aaaa, these should be on the neck!
Silmai: They should go close up to the chin.
Maisu: That’s it! That’s it. Some for the chin.
Silmai: There, now! You lot didn’t know my way of doing it. This 
should be tied here and hang down.
Dauwaras: Where were they put?
Maisu: Go fetch a bone awl for us. Where did they put them?
Walei: We didn’t use it for fastening the things on.
Dauwaras: Get some saorangel shell strings to go right up to the face 
there. At the neck is down too low.
Walei: This one is only fit for throwing away—it’s broken.
Dauwaras: You two hold on to it or else the nettle will come off. (He 
means the nettle leaves that have to be tied to cover the rounded base of 
the image; they are the part that touches and stings the patient during 
the treatment.)
Galwun: Fasten it with something.
Maisu: Maybe you should go and eat in case you need to go and 
fetch more material to cover the other.
Silmai: Bring something, bring me a dalabi mat to go on top of 
them. (He is referring to an oval coconut-fiber mat covered on one 
side with small, flat Nassa shells—formerly the main valuables used as 
bridewealth.) Haven’t you got enough finery to show? (This is said 
to tease or taunt the other man.)
Maluna: Just a little. That’ll be enough.
Walei (addressing Silmai): Tultul, where should we put it?
Silmai: No. You bring it here and put it against this coconut trunk, 
over here.
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Waleka: Could you bring us a gilt shell to tie on here and then take 
the dalabi to fasten here? Or maybe it doesn’t matter.
Walei: Oh, bring it! Tie them on, go on! Hey, hey, pull on it, you lot! 
Tie it on strongly!
Waleka: Then loosen the dalabi so it slides farther down.
Galwun: He’s painted it so it’s very ugly!
Waleka (laughing): No, no, I haven’t! It’s just their way, the White 
man’s way of doing it!
Galwun: You, pull them really tight.
Dauwaras: Take it and hold on to that up there.
Maluna (calling to his youngest son): Yaopei!
Walei: You over there, tie the little rings on quickly!
Maluna: Yaopei!
Walei: There are the things, the little one there.
Maluna: Go and tell Yaopei to get the little knife.
Galwun: What are you holding it [the Panu’et image] for? Go and 
put it down on the ground!
Wultu: If you hold it, you’ll get it dirty, the nettle will get torn off.
Maisu: Right. Tie the things and then we’re ready to go.
Silmai: You there, tie the things on quickly!
Galwun: We’ll tie them on now. Tell me, should that one go low 
down? I was going to put it on that side.
Walei: I’ll fasten it on the other side
Silmai: Tie it first on that side.
Galwun: These people put theirs high up. (Presumably he was refer-
ring to the way of wearing some piece of shell decoration.)
Walei (to Waleka): Look first!
Waleka: Pull them and cut.
Wultu: You said to tie the little one on, but it’s broken.
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(Now they are almost ready for the senior men to spit betel juice and spells 
onto the image at its ears, headdress, vital center, and the nettle base. 
Maluna and Silmai courteously invite each other to do this. The lyi-
mungai banana leaf with two hibiscus flowers stuck in it will also 
have two big blotches of betel juice spat on it with spells. Maluna will 
do this.)
Maluna: You spit on it.
Silmai (demurring): You spit on it.
Maluna: You spit. For your daughter. (This must be a way of referring 
to the patient, Milek, a “sister” of Silmai, but a collateral one in a junior 
line.)
Wultu: But wait, it’s not ready.
Galwun: But what’s got into you to make you rush everyone into the 
spitting?! You can still work on it a bit and lower it.
Silmai: He’s teasing; it’s just a joke.
Galwun: These here—elder brother . . .
Maluna: And all you—“little sisters”!—telling off your elder broth-
ers!? (The way Galwun and the young men tell them to stop rush-
ing makes Maluna laugh, so he is teasing them back. A lot of laughter 
ensues.)
Wultu: You spit on it. It didn’t turn out right (that is, the betel juice is 
not red enough). What’s missing?
Maluna (jeering): The sister, the sister!
Silmai: The son-in-law [Galwun] should hold the bowl and his fa-
ther-in-law [Purkiten, husband of Milek] should get the ginger 
wa’agep mixture and pour it into it.
Galwun: Yes, I know.
Silmai: Aaa, no! Turn them up, turn them, the tusks!
Maisu: Ours are all right now.
Galwun: Go on, turn them up so it looks right.
Maluna: You lot! Turn them around to point upward, toward the 
nose holes, up like that.
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Dauwaras: Gaita, we’ll go to this side. Or shall we go to that? (They 
are carrying the image at this point.)
Silmai: Turn it around the other way up. Like that. Like that. As he’s 
holding it, he can turn it around so the decorations are on top.
Maluna: Listen, hold it like that. That’s right. They can throw it, 
turning it, so the tusks go down like that on this side. When I 
was little, you would put them in so they pointed upward, then I 
saw how my father’s generation would stick the tusks in, pointing 
down for women but twisting them up for men.
Galwun: Put them in. It doesn’t matter if it’s the wrong way.
Maluna (reminiscing): When I was in Wimalu, I got some terrific 
tusks. They shot a pig and I got the head and the tusks. They really 
stretched my nose and it hurt dancing for Wunitap with them in. 
Ehhh, they hurt so much!
Silmai: Well then, you should go shoot your own pig for yourself 
(i.e., if you don’t like the size of the tusks they gave you).
Putting spells into the image to make the spirit enter it and spitting 
betel on the leaf
Waleka: Now bring it, quickly, over here.
Matupin: Go and blow [the spells] on it, in here (indicating where 
the headdress goes), put them into it.
Dauwaras: Watch out, you’re putting dirt on the nettles.
Maluna: All right, I’ll go and blow my spells on it.
Silmai: Wuutt! Blow in the ears first, each side. Then you can jiggle 
the croton headdress into place.
Walei: Go and bring the ginger mixture. And get the banana leaf.
Silmai: Get the ginger and hold it under it, under the leaf, so it’s 
covered. Then you must get the tobacco for blowing smoke over 
them and fetch the hearth ashes.
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Dauwaras: Get some of Milek’s own hearth ashes that she slept 
beside. Then someone rolls the cigarette.
(The idea of getting her own ashes is that Panu’et will see that the ashes 
come from her fire and accept her request to leave her. If she were to take 
ashes from someone else’s fire, it would be like trying to trick the spirit.)
Silmai: Walei, the ashes can wait for now, leave the ashes.
Maluna: It’s time for this [the image] to go.
Silmai: Put the leaf over the ginger mixture to cover it. It’s not time 
yet for the ashes, not yet. First, the “peeling,” touching it on her.
Maluna: Right, not yet! First, do the peeling treatment, then you 
can get the ashes, and then blow over the leaf and tear it up.
Silmai: That’s right. First, go and blow spells in at the ears (so the 
spirit will hear and understand the appeals).
Labawan (a boy overheard speaking to another small boy): My father 
shot us that thingumme . . . the cockatoo there.
Matupin: Take it out of her [Milek’s] way. She’s going to stand over 
there when she comes. Take the leaf so it’s out of her way and lay 
it over the ginger mixture.
Maisu: You mustn’t put it down on that side. Lay it down on this 
side. If you lay it down over there, the nettle will be on the wrong 
side.
Silmai: Who’s going to get me a fire stick?
Galwun: Here’s mine so I’ll know where you are with it. Come and 
stand over here. I’ll pick a nettle and keep it for you. We’re coming.
Matupin: Don’t pull the nettle leaves off the stalk.
Purkiten: Hold on, hold on to the croton [in the headdress].
Maluna: The younger brother can hold it at this end while they spit 
the betel on it. Hey, the spit is getting on me! What a mess! You 
people! Oh well, it doesn’t matter. You can mess me up.
Dauwaras: They are our things. It’s all right to spit on them. When 
it’s over, we’ll take it and throw it away in the bush.
(Noise of spells being blown by blowing and spitting into the image: pfff 
. . . pfff . . . pfff . . . gilei . . . gilei . . . gilei. . . . Maluna spits on the 
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leaf and on the nettles covering the base of the Panu’et image. Purkiten 
blows the spells into its headdress and ears.)
Dauwanin: I’m bringing plenty of ashes now.
Silmai: Wait, we’re not ready, put them down. Come and put them 
down. First, hold this nettle. Come and help your poor mother 
come down here. Put the ashes down for now.
Marki (loudly): She should go and stand over there.
(Milek, the patient, gets ready to come to confront Panu’et.)
Dauwanin: Milek, Milek, come on out now. Come and stand over by 
the coconut, by the trunk there.
Walei (loudly): Her brother [Marki] should give her the betel so 
she can start chewing it. (This is so she has the betel quid with the 
geplagep in her mouth ready when she faces Panu’et.)
Purkiten: I’ve got the smoke ready. Should I blow the smoke over 
the things?
Marki: Not yet, not yet. Wait ’til she comes.
Purkiten: I think you should give it her to chew. Give it her to chew 
while she’s waiting over there before coming here.
Maluna: She should chew it as she comes forward to spit in a spray. 
What she should say is: “Can’t it see who I am, my paths, my 
bush? I only have one lot of bush that’s mine, and others go there 
too. It doesn’t recognize me. It must go off somewhere far away, to 
the empty bush, and leave me alone. It’s not as though I had a lot 
of paths and bush plots to go to. They can use other bush plots. I’ve 
got only this one and others are using it too.”
Dauwaras: Bring them to us—over here. (To Milek) Eat it. Keep 
your mouth closed. Go and stand over there.
Meini (to Milek): Eat it, keep your mouth shut as you come.
Silmai: Bring them over. Blow the spells on them, the ginger and 
stuff there. When she comes, give her the betel with your spell to 
your ancestors in it. She should chew it . . . and then you can give 
her the ginger mixture after that. The ginger is for her; you must 
put Panu’et’s own spells in it. It is not as though yours are differ-
ent; yours are just the same as everyone else’s.
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Maluna: That’s it. You give her this ginger and put some aside. 
When you give her the first part, give only a little bit. Then take it 
[the Panu’et image] and throw it down on the ground while she 
looks at it.
Matupin: One of you standing at the head end, hold it [the image] 
with your senior [literally, “grandfather”].
Maisu: There! The spirit has gone down into it. You think this is 
nothing! The spirit has gone inside it. Come hold it and feel it 
[i.e., feel how heavy it is]! Now turn it so the face is upward. Come 
and stand here now. That’s right.
The confrontation
Matupin (to Milek, who looks so frail and has a long stick for support): 
Hold your stick tight. Lean on it.
Maisu: The ashes don’t matter. Leave them.
Walei: Can the ashes be left out? Are you going to get some to blow 
over her or not?
Maluna (yelling): So are you going to listen to me or not?! The 
hearth ashes, where are they?
Dauwaras: Bring them and throw them down.
Maluna: There’s only one way to do it, one path, and that’s the one 
I follow.
Maisu: You lot, listen to me!
Silmai: Now get ready to tear the leaf. Aren’t you going to tear it?
(They are about to begin singing. If Milek announced herself to the spirit, 
it was inaudible. She stands in the presence of the spirit as the im-
age touches her. Purkiten holds it while Marki holds the leaf over her. 
Matupin is flicking her with a sprig of nettles. The Panue’et image 
swings back and forth. Purkiten rubs its nettle base on her back and 
the back of her neck. Milek indicates with her hand that she wants him 
to rub higher up on her neck. He rubs her chest, her legs, abdomen, and 
face. The singing continues; it is part of the spirit presence. The subject of 
the verses is known; the individual words are said to be in a language 
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of the ancestors, but they can only guess at some of the meanings. I have 
transcribed the sounds but the way I set them out as words and lines of 
verse is rather arbitrary [see G. Lewis 1980: 59–65].)
Tawo: Start with the “Woman” verse first.
Marki (shouting excitedly): No, you’ve got to sing the “Sago” verse 
first, don’t you? It was the sago that struck her!
Maluna: Sing the Woman verse first. (He starts it off, and the others 
follow his lead.)
Various men (singing):
 Anya mauru mawa au rimetau ei wisililu meitao
 an selei ao seli wisililu meitao yelelei
 iwa yelu rimawa wisililu
 mei lao wa-o selei wisililu meitao
Tawo: Sililu meitao mete selelelei
 mei anga lu sililu mawa malililu meitao
 meitao sililu, wisililu meitao, selei sililu
Maisu: Go into the Sago verse now—you’re singing the Woman 
verse; sing the Sago one.
Many men (singing a verse about the stone adze pounding sago; some of 
the words clearly sound like the names of varieties of sago palm):
 Wilakala wila walala wa kirp iwalala wil walala
 warki wakemei yiulem walema
 erki walemi ilei alemei yila lamei
 erki walemi ilei alemei wawel keristu walemao,
 keristu walema walem laota walema kekepag walema
 ekapag walema kerisu walema kerisu.
Milek (in a voice that can only just be heard): Eii, I’m dying here!
(The image is swinging back and forth, touching and stinging her.)
Matupin: Sing each verse singly, once.
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Maisu and other men:
 Wiyem alalau siyao melelau siyao milalau siyao
 melelau siyao elkakao siyao ayu
 keitapao serakim kaitapao siyao ei siyao ei
 mauren gigru’ei maurin gigru’ei [this is the “Pandanus” verse].
Maluna: Don’t hide the face. Turn it upward.
(The singing continues with a verse about galip nuts [Tahitian chest-
nuts] and the striped possum [Dactylopsila sp.]):
 Maurin gigruei wawunkakra yilawa kakra yilawa
 melyi’it ao yilawa wawum barya yilawa peryiai
 wipunk karara yiwak kawa simena kawa simena
 wawa laota wawa gegapa simenei—babi! [Enough!]
Wultu: Go on, turn the face!
Maisu: Sing her one verse.
Marki: Sing the “Striped Possum” verse. You must sing the Striped 
Possum verse!
(Singing) Yuli peikao yauli peikao, yauli peikao yuli peikao yauli peikao
 watukil kenau kerawit wita yuli peikao yauli peikao
 watukil sirpet kerawita yuli peikao yauli.
Tawo and Maluna (loudly): That’s enough. . . . Enough! Now you 
should blow spells on it, you throw it down into the ground, and 
you stand up over here. Throw it down so it goes over there!
Tawo: Hold it up and over her, wave it over her, wave it first, then 
throw it down! (To Milek) Open your legs. (To others) Wave it over 
her!
(The nettle end of the image is passed between her legs, swung back, waved 
over her head, then dashed into the ground at Milek’s feet.)
Saimo and Tawo (calling out to the spirit): Don’t you know her? You’ve 
struck our Sagrat [one of Milek’s old nicknames] here. Use your 
eyes [to see who it is] and leave her alone!
(The image of Panu’et is laid down on the ground.)
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Cutting the image open: Tearing the leaf
Maisu: Bring some ashes. He’s got the cigarette there. Bring the 
ashes.
Maluna: Bring the ashes here now.
Tawo: Her “son” must bring some here to the spells on the mixture 
for her. (He is referring to Maluna, who, although senior, is classified 
as Milek’s “son”.)
Tawo and Maluna: Saimo, Saimo! Wait, they’ve got to cut the 
thingumme first! Wait! Leave the cigarette. Get a knife and cut it. 
I just saw her son-in-law carrying one over there.
Maisu: Quick, bring us the small knife!
Tawo: Cut the pouch open there so that cold can get into it.
Maluna: Where’s Dauwanin’s husband gone? He’s got the knife for 
cutting the pouch.
Tawo: Put it down for her over here. . . . Take the knife and cut, cut, 
cut, like this! Come on, cut its pouch now!
Silmai: And pull out some of the cuscus fur, some of the white pos-
sum fur there. (Shouting) Pull some of it out there!
Tawo: The possum fur there, the white possum! What? Now who did 
I see wearing it?
Maluna (loudly): What? The white possum there? Leave that out. 
Aren’t you going to take some bird feathers? (He is reminding 
them of the first example in the Delubaten myth with its origin for the 
leaf-tearing rite in an episode when some men sprang up, created from 
bird feathers, when such a leaf set with hibiscus flowers was torn over 
them.) Leave that fur—the striped possum fur and the other rub-
bish. Where do you come from anyway?!
Wultu: Who was using it before?
Maluna: That’s enough!
Silmai: Now stand at the head end, cut the pouch quickly, hold that 
end [of the leaf ]. Blow over the ashes. Bring the cigarette, bring 
them so we can get on and finish up.
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Tawo (spits and then addresses the spirit in a loud voice): Ssssa! So, do 
you know her?
Silmai (spitting and trilling the spell as he tears the leaf): Sssssa! Rrrrrr! 
Rrrrr!
Matupin (spitting): Do the spells. Put the spells into her!
Maisu: Wait! You must put spells into the ginger mixture and give 
it to her!
Tawo (spitting, addressing the spirit): Go off now to Bi’ip! (To others) 
Put the spells in for her. Throw it off to go in this direction.
Treatment to expel the illness
Marki: Bring some of Panu’et [its inside material] for doing her 
treatment, the patting and hitting. Put spells into it for getting it 
out of her and throwing it away.
Silmai: The Panu’et stuff there for treating her.
Matupin: Do some light patting.
Silmai: Chew some of the ginger for doing the patting, then eat 
some more of it when you blow the spells on it and give her some 
over your shoulder, standing with your back to her.
Maitata: If you’ve shot something—a snake, lizard, mouse, what-
ever—for her Panu’et treatment, then put spells in it and strike her 
with it, then throw it away.
Purkiten: Dauwaras, you see that we’ati flower? Well, you should’ve 
seen the one that was growing over there.
Walei: But the two of us showed it to them, we asked them to look 
at the flower first and say if it was the right one for Panu’et. We 
went and showed it to Saimo. He said it was the right one for 
Panu’et.
(Flowers are not named and classified. Knowledge of special ones, like the 
flower for the mixture used in the Panu’et ritual, is passed on by a 
senior man who shows another man which one it is; it has no common 
name by which to label it for common knowledge and make it openly 
identifiable.)
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Silmai: They all went off over there.
Walei: I became old enough only recently. I collected it and went to 
show them. It was growing low down near the shallow pool where 
the water collected. Well, look at it.
Meini: Go and lean it against the coconut tree belonging to Gaita, 
over there.
(Meini is a young woman married into Watalu Hamlet. She sees that after 
the Panu’et image had been cut open, it is leaned against one of the coco-
nut palms belonging to her husband. She is frightened that this contact 
might somehow cause harm to enter her or her family or the coconuts. 
So she asks them to lean it against someone else’s palm.)
Saimo: That one’s a tall coconut, so what’s the worry?
Wultu: She’s thinking of Panu’et, the spirit, and the danger. But it’s 
the Eagle Spirit, the wind, that’s blowing through the fruits at the 
tops of the trees.
Sabuta: They say they’re frightened that the spirit will strike them if 
they eat the coconut.
Maisu: Oh, yes! But what if Panu’et goes into it and the spirit eats 
out the insides [of the coconut]?
Maluna: (Laughs heartily.)
Purkiten: Bring some of the mixture to pat her [Milek] with.
Maisu: Maybe if it leans on the palm there, the spirit will gnaw out 
the insides of the coconuts.
Purkiten: Maluna, when you treat her, throw it away in the direc-
tion of her uncles. To that side. Psssah [spitting]!! Go off to see 
Wani with his fine sons there. Go off and see the Luluai [village 
headman]. Take your eyes away from me. What have I got? I don’t 
have plots of bush here and there to go to, just one bush plot that’s 
mine. One bush plot there for me to go to.
Maluna (addressing the spirit): Don’t your ancestors know her? So 
you strike her? Where else can they go? I say that when they go off 
to their bush plot, you should be watching out over them.
Maisu: Use the “Birds” spell to hit her with so she’ll feel light. Use 
the words of the “Birds” spell so her mind is clear and she’ll feel 
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light. (The imagery of feeling better is lightness, which contrasts with 
feeling heavy, weak, befuddled, confined, tied up.) I know all about 
this. I sent the young men off to fashion Panu’et for her. Because 
it struck her, so she got it. (This is the assertive rhetoric that accom-
panies his gestures of hitting and extracting something as he treats her. 
It seems addressed to the audience, not the spirit.)
Maluna (still calling to the spirit): Go off and visit Malden, he’s fine. 
Stop over to see him and stay in Bi’ip!
Walei: And go off and see Wani, he’s fine too!
Maisu: There now, her arm cracked! (This is a prognostic sign of a good 
outcome. He has pulled on her arm or hand at the end of doing his 
treatment to see if he could get her joints to crack. Others do so, too.)
Maluna: Off you go! Go and see Dauwaras. Visit the Luluai! And 
Weimbari there!
Matupin: I’ve done its spell for her! There, that’s it! She’ll soon feel 
light now. (To Milek) Stamp your feet! Stamp your feet. Shake 
your head! Clear your head!
Tawo: Prrrrr [noise of trills in the spell]!
Maluna: Get us a fire-lighting stick. A fire stick, quick! Saimo, light 
mine [a cigarette?].
Tawo: Prrrr! Mmmmm! Mmmmm! Mmmm [choked noise of the 
“Birds” spell being done]!
Wani: Now go and bring some water!
Maluna: Dauwanin, go and heat some water for your mother to 
wash with.
Dauwaras: Help her back to her house.
Matupin: They should bring the water to wash her now.
Tawo: Prrrr!
Maisu: One at a time now!
Matupin: Let her sit down by the fire there and rest a bit. Then you 
can bring the water to wash her. Tell them.
Purkiten: Belei, Belei! Bring some water, bring water for washing!
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Galwun: Haven’t they finished heating it up yet?
Tawo: Prrrr . . . mmm . . . mmm! Prrr . . . mmm . . . mmm . . . mmm . . . 
prrr . . . mmm . . . Get the fire going. Make a fire up for her.
Silmai (addressing the spirit): They’ve had lots of people coming to 
sit. (He is referring to Milek’s illness and, before her, Dauwaras and his 
long drawn-out, tragic illness.) For weeks and weeks, they’ve been 
kept here, waiting, waiting, sitting around. Now they’re exhausted. 
Leave them alone now so they can get on with their gardens.
Silmai and Tawo and Matupin (talking at the same time): For so 
long now. . . . The child of the lineage wrecked by illness. . . . Al-
ways having gatherings for sickness. . . . Sitting down all the time. 
. . . Things in the garden going to waste. . . . Abandoned. . . . Take 
a proper look! .  .  . Take your eyes off them! (The idea is that ill-
ness can result from the spirit paying too much attention to someone.) 
. . . Leave them alone now to get on with their gardens and their 
garden work!
Maluna: Let them get back to work now. The harm has ruined eve-
ryone. Go off and leave them alone. Let them stay healthy and 
fine.
Matupin: We have taro and bananas to plant. We need things to 
cook and feed people with. If we don’t, then what about tomor-
row? Tomorrow is going to come. What then?
Maluna: Are you going to have to sit there, your head hanging 
down? (He is implying that the spirit is hanging its head in shame 
because it has nothing to offer.) That would be terrible!
Matupin: It [Panu’et] is pleased by the treatment we’ve done.
Silmai: Yes, it approves [wawilp; the verb they both use means to 
approve or be pleased by something so that the agent appealed to 
gives the desired response].
The act of termination: The bathing
Marki: Go and bring some water for warming up.
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Weiri: Husband of Milek! Bring some of the ginger mixture for 
these children. They’ve been eating lots of sago mushrooms.
(The remains of the ginger mixture are soon distributed among the small 
children and women to protect them, more or less as a preventative 
measure just in case of risk, since the spirit has been concentrated among 
them. Weiri, the mother of four small children, adds the point that they 
have been eating sago mushrooms that sprout on discarded piles of sago 
pith and are therefore closely associated with Panu’et, adding to the 
risk.)
Dauwanin: Pour some water out and bring it over.
Maluna: Wash her now.
Milek (in a quavering voice): I don’t want it.
Dauwanin (to her mother): This is warm water.
Silmai: Wash her! Wash her skin.
Wopi (Waleka’s little brother draws attention to two of Weiri’s small 
daughters): Look! Banu and Teraweia are running off! (They are 
scared something will be done to them.)
Matupin: Put your hand over the end of the water tube to sprinkle 
it on her.
Galwun: So she has just a little water for rubbing on now. Then, 
tomorrow or the day after, she can wash properly.
(This seems to make a distinction between the present washing and a real 
washing to mark the end of her illness, which he expects soon but with-
out setting an exact time for it. The present washing done right after 
the treatment thus seems to be a prescriptive or make-believe gesture 
rather than the real act of termination.)
Dauwanin: Father, give Saoga [Dauwanin’s little daughter] some of 
the mixture. She has been eating all sorts of things.
Bilki (to Galwun, his own son): Have they made a fire? If not, you’re 
the son-in-law, get some wood and make one.
Matuwil (speaking to a small child): Take some, eat it.
Galwun: Dauwanin, take some and go and give it to your group of 
women [referring to the Watalu women from the hamlet where 
Dauwanin was born.]
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Weiri: Over there, you! Come and get some to eat!
Maluna: I think that’s enough. Go and get the taro mash to eat.
(As at any gathering with visitors, they have made a mash of taro and 
yams mixed with scraped coconut in its milk. Those who remain in the 
village ate theirs in the middle of the day and put some aside in coconut 
shells and the wooden mashing bowls for the others who had gone to 
fetch the image.)
Tawo: Now get the mash to eat, it’s for her sake. (He uses a special idi-
om that means to eat something all together at a ceremony to support or 
honor someone. But the person for whom the ceremony is held explicitly 
does not eat with them. He or she abstains, eating alone and apart; it 
is a special way of singling out the patient. The actual idiomatic phrase 
he uses literally means, “They break her/his backbone.”)
Bagi: Put some aside for Milek, a little bit. Put a little aside.
Maluna: They’ve finished up all the coconut milk. There’s no liquid 
left [to go with the mash]. With liquid, the mash is good, but 
without it, it’s not. Take some to them, take some to the men.
Sabuta: Hey, Papa, Father!
Dauwanin (to Milek): I’ve made a fire for you over there.
Tawo: Carefully now, go and sit beside it.
Wani (seeing a child fooling around): Put that fire-lighting liana down. 
He’s got hold of that arrow. Watch out, the way it’s pointing, he’s 
going to stick it in my eye.
Tawo (to the other men sitting on the bench): Move over, move up to-
ward the top end.
Marki: Fetch the food, let’s eat. Come on, it’ll get cold!
Purkiten: Take this, it’s cockatoo. It’s for you to eat.
Dauwanin (calling over to the men): If you’re eating, here’s some water 
for washing [your hands].
Galwun: If you go and sit down close to the fire like that, it’ll dry out 
your blood and turn you into woodworm.
(Dauwanin can be heard reassuring Saoga, who is three years old, not to 
be frightened by the ginger mixture, made with sago and breadfruit 
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beetle grubs. The Gnau consider this dish to be a prime example of deli-
cious food.)
Dauwanin: They’re teasing, it’s a grub, a grub, breadfruit tree grubs. 
Go on, eat it!
Matupin: Tultul, take this. They’ve turned it down.
(He explains that the mash he offered was not eaten by some of the others 
because they could not eat it. The reason is strict rules of precedence and 
seniority apply to eating food that contains coconut grown or scraped 
into coconut milk, rules that depend on the status of the person who 
scraped or planted the coconut tree. The rules affect a number of the men 
attending on this day.)
Matupin: Sit down first; you can leave later.
Purkiten: Take this, they couldn’t eat it.
Dauwanin: Purkiten, they all had to refuse it.
Wani: Huh? Can’t you eat it if Tawo scraped it?
(People often have to think to work out how the complex rules apply, as 
illustrated in the chat that follows.)
Dauwaras: Yes. Well, Father is . . .
Wani (Dauwaras is Wani’s son): Of course, he doesn’t make it taboo. 
He’s going to eat it.
Tawo: There! The two of us are going to sit down now and eat it to-
gether. “Father,” indeed!
Saputem (an old, frail man): Yes, he’s in the junior line and his father 
was senior. The two of us were initiated together.
Dauwanin (to Milek, her mother): Just rub your skin a little with it to 
wash, then go and sit beside the fire.
Silmai: His mother came first, so I can eat it.
Tawo: As father’s younger brother, I was initiated first.
Dauwanin (to Milek): First, stand up so you can wash properly.
Walei: The mash they made and left standing is now hardened . . .
Saputem: If you put in some coconut to mix with the mash, the co-
conut water will help with the stuff that’s too dry.
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Papia (a girl): Baiwan, come and eat. (Women’s voices start to be heard 
more often.)
Baiwan (one of Tawo’s daughters): I’m full!
Dauwanin: Galwun, come and get the food for them.
Bagi (another young woman): He’s still eating the mash.
Wultu: Oh, look! That selfish bunch ate up everything! Her poor 
son-in-law is sitting with nothing to eat (referring to Maitata, 
who is married to Milek’s step-daughter, Belei, the daughter of a 
co-wife who died years ago.)
Walei: Oh, well, maybe he’ll just have to go without. He’s like one 
of us anyway!
(Their rules of hospitality are that guests should be fed before hosts, so if 
Maitata has nothing, he is being treated as if he were a member of the 
family or the hamlet.)
Dauwanin (still trying to get Milek to finish washing): Pour it over 
yourself so you’ll get well. Go on . . . first wash there and there. . . . 
Father, can they take some fire over to her house for her?
Walei: Those dogs! What’s got into them? All they do is eat!
Dauwanin: They threw it away [some of the ginger mixture?]. Saoga, 
Saoga, just look at her belly (i.e., What on earth has she been eat-
ing?)! She was heating it up and the bamboo cooling tube caught 
fire!
Walei: Get some cold water to pour over her to cool it.
Dauwanin (to Milek): Don’t you want the cold?
Milek: Pour some on me, pour some on me.
Walei: See if there’s some of theirs over there.
Dauwanin: She’s teasing, she doesn’t mean it. She’s frightened it will 
hurt.
Walei: Hey, see if there’s some cold water left to cool it!
Kenken: There’s some of ours up in the porch.
(The rest of the recording is filled by the men’s general chatting as they wait 
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